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ABSTRACT: 
Models of the writing process are used to design software tools for 
writers who work with computers. This thesis is concerned with 
the construction of a model of fiction writing. The first stage in 
this construction is to review existing models of writing. Models of 
writing used in software design and writing research include 
behavioural, cognitive and linguistic varieties. The arguments of 
this thesis are, firstly, that current models do not provide an 
adequate basis for designing software tools for fiction writers. 
Secondly, research into writing is often based on questionable 
assumptions concerning language and linguistics, the interpret- 
ation of empirical research, and the development of cognitive 
models. It is argued that Saussure's linguistics provides an 
alternative basis for developing a model of fiction writing, and 
that Barthes' method of textual analysis provides insight into the 
ways in which readers and writers create meanings. The result of 
reviewing current models of writing is a basic model of writing, 
consisting of a cycle of three activities - thinking, writing, and 
reading. The next stage is to develop this basic model into a model 
of fiction writing by using narratology, textual analysis, and 
cognitive psychology to identify the kinds of thinking processes 
that create fictional texts. Remembering and imagining events and 
scenes are identified as basic processes in fiction writing; in 
cognitive terms, events are verbal representations, while scenes 
are visual representations. Syntax is identified as another distinct 
object of thought, to which the processes of remembering and 
imagining also apply. Genette's notion of focus in his analysis of 
text types is used to describe the role of characters in the writer's 
imagination: focusing the imagination is a process in which a 
writer imagines she is someone else, and it is shown how this 
process applies to events, scenes, and syntax. It is argued that a 
writer's story memory, influences his remembering and imagining; 
Todorov's work on symbolism is used to argue that interpretation 
plays the role in fiction writing of binding together these two 
processes. The role of naming in reading and its relation to 
problem solving is compared with its role in writing, and names or 
signifiers are added to the objects of thought in fiction writing. It 
is argued that problem solving in fiction writing is sometimes 
concerned with creating problems or mysteries for the reader, and 
it is shown how this process applies to events, scenes, signifiers 
and syntax. All these findings are presented in the form of a 
cognitive model of fiction writing. The question of testing is 
discussed, and the use of the model in designing software tools is 
illustrated by the description of a hypertextual aid for fiction 
writers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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Last Christmas, my sister gave me an orrery - orreries are models 
built to demonstrate the movements of bodies in the solar system. 
Mine was a plastic kit that had to be assembled with the aid of a 
knife and glue, and consisted of a miniature earth, sun and moon. 
The instructions point out that the model is not to scale: "the earth 
and the moon have been made too large compared with the sun, 
and their distances have been made smaller, but this is the only 
way to keep the model to a convenient size". Once assembled, this 
model can be set in motion with the aid of a clockwork motor, and 
demonstrates the orbit of the earth around the sun, and of the 
moon around the earth. It can be used to show why we have 
seasons, why we have day and night, and various other features. 
With the aid of computers, the art of model building takes 
on a new dimension. Computer-based modelling aids have been 
used in schools to teach a variety of topics in mathematics and 
mechanics, as Sharples points out: "A good way to understand the 
laws, constraints, and possibilities of a complex rule-governed 
system is to build models of the system, subject to the same rules, 
and then perform experiments on them" (Sharples 1985, p. 52). In 
this case, the purpose of a modelling aid is to enhance a child's 
understanding of mathematics by enabling her to build her own 
model of a complex system, or to alter the variables in a pre- 
determined system and see what effect this has. Computer-based 
modelling aids have been used to teach topics in linguistics; in this 
case, a modelling aid enhances a child's understanding of grammar 
and the English language by enabling him to manipulate models of 
syntactic structure (Sharples 1985, pp. 54-55). 
Compared with orreries, models of syntax, and models in 
mathematics, the development of models of writing is a more 
recent phenomenon. Models of writing are used in teaching, but 
the main motivation for their development is the growth of 
interactive computing and the design of computer software for 
writers. As Noel Williams points out, software tools for writers are 
always based on a model of writing, whether explicit or implicit 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31). A model of writing is a rather different 
entity to the above examples of models. If we consider writing as 
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a dynamic process, then a model of writing should have more in 
common with an orrery than with a model of syntactic structure - 
a representation of process rather than structure, motion rather 
than stasis, diachrony rather than synchrony. However, we do not 
have any ready made plastic kits out of which we can assemble a 
writer with pen or keyboard, wind him up, and observe the 
process of writing; neither do we have the equivalent of mathe- 
matical modelling tools. So, a model of the process of writing is a 
conceptual model rather than a physical model - an implicit or 
explicit hypothesis about how writers write, or what writing 
involves, perhaps conceived as a number of stages such as "Plan, 
Draft and Revise", a set of operations that a writer performs in 
sequence to produce a finished text. According to Williams, this is 
the most common model found in teaching and computer software 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31). Flower and Hayes describe a model as a 
metaphor. 
"A model is a metaphor for a process: it's a way of 
describing something, such as the composing process, which 
refuses to sit still for a portrait. People build models in order 
to understand how a dynamic system works, and to describe 
the functional relationships among its parts. In addition, if a 
model is really to help us to understand more, it should 
speak to some of the critical questions in the field of writing 
and rhetoric. It should help us to see things in a way we 
didn't see them before. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980b, p. 390) 
This thesis is concerned with the construction of a model of 
fiction writing. The purpose of the model is to design a hyper- 
textual planning or thinking aid for fiction writers. The motivation 
for designing this software is discussed in chapter one, where we 
summarise the assumptions in our approach to modelling, and 
compare them with those that characterise much of the current 
research' into writing. To construct a model of fiction writing, our 
first stage is to review existing models of writing. In chapter two, 
we introduce the variety of models in current use, and discuss the 
assumptions of cognitive science concerning the testing of models. 
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After discussing writing behaviour, cognitive models of 
writing, and models of planning in chapters three to five, we 
emerge with a basic model of writing -a general model of writing 
behaviour. This model is basically an interpretation of what has 
been called a "consensus model of writing" - the Hayes and Flower 
(1980a) model of writing. In this interpretation, we represent 
writing as a cycle of activities - thinking, writing, and reading - 
and distinguish between motivational, metacognitive, and 
cognitive processes in a writer's thinking. One problem with 
models of cognitive processes is a general failure to consider 
conscious thought, as Griffin (1984) points out. In representing 
writing in this fashion, and making these distinctions in a writer's 
thinking, our aim is to remedy this general failure by trying to 
identify the kinds of conscious processes that create fictional texts. 
The basic model is only a general model, and makes no 
reference to the kind of text a writer is creating; the text is an 
absent feature in the models discussed so far. To develop this 
basic model into a model of fiction writing, our next stage is to 
consider linguistic approaches to modelling writing. However, we 
find that these approaches are dominated by the influence of 
Chomsky's (1965) transformational grammar. Their main concern 
is structure: linguists and cognitive scientists have developed 
grammars to represent not only syntactic but also semantic 
structures. Thus a linguistic model of writing tends to describe 
writing in terms of synchrony rather than diachrony, in terms of a 
hierarchy of semantic and syntactic structures rather than 
structuring activities. In this case, a hierarchical model of 
structures, in which semantic structures are transformed into 
syntactic structures, is assumed to be a model of writing. 
This kind of model confirms the critique of Winograd and 
Flores concerning the influence of the rationalistic tradition in 
computer science: "In a complete rationalistic analysis of meaning, 
we would be able to explicate the meaning of each utterance by 
showing how it is built up systematically from smaller elements, 
each with its own determinate meaning" (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p. 64). Linguistic approaches to modelling writing generally 
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assume a rationalistic view of language, in which words are the 
names of things, and ideas are entities that have a separate 
existence from language; they also assume a rationalistic view of 
narration and description which is not always relevant to the 
context of fiction writing. 
Our alternative approach in developing the basic model into 
a model of fiction writing is to follow a semiological view of 
language. In this approach, we adopt Saussure's notion of the 
linguistic sign, the assumption that we cannot separate ideas from 
language, and the view of language as a system of sequential and 
associative relations, in which syntax is an aspect of the former. In 
addition, we look at research in the area of narratology - the work 
of Jakobson, Genette, Todorov and Barthes in particular - to gain a 
perspective on how different types of texts might influence the 
process of writing. We use narratology and textual analysis to 
make inferences about thinking processes, and look to research in 
cognitive psychology for any confirmation or refutation of these 
inferences. 
We pursue this approach in chapter seven to look at 
narration and description in the context of fiction writing, and we 
identify the remembering and imagining of events and scenes as 
basic processes in fiction writing. In cognitive terms, events are 
verbal representations, while scenes are visual representations. 
Syntax is another distinct object of thought, to which the processes 
of remembering and imagining also apply. In his discussion of 
perspective or "point-of-view", Genette (1980) uses the term 
"focus" to classify narrative texts. Using his analysis and the 
accounts of fiction writers on their characters, we identify the 
process of focusing the imagination in fiction writing. Focusing the 
imagination is a process in which a writer imagines she is 
someone else, and we show how this process applies to events, 
scenes, and syntax. In chapter eight, we look at the influence of a 
writer's story memory on their remembering and imagining, and 
we argue that interpretation plays a role in generating new 
stories. In fiction writing, interpretation fills a gap between 
remembering events (from a writer's story memory or from her 
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personal experience) and imagining the events of her fictional 
work, and we show how story schemata are used in this process. 
In chapter nine, we look at Barthes' (1990) account of 
textual signifiers, pursuing the suggestion that avenues of 
meaning for readers can also be avenues of meaning for writers. 
Barthes describes reading as a process of hypothesis testing, in 
which naming is equivalent to problem solving. We explore the 
role of naming in reading and writing. Following Saussure, we 
argue that names are signifiers, rather than elements in an 
inventory of things, and we argue that naming in writing is not 
the continuous process given by rationalistic accounts of language, 
but refers to the specific process of imagining names or signifiers. 
We add signifiers to the objects of thought in fiction writing, and 
show how the processes we have already identified (remembering 
or reflecting, imagining, and focusing the imagination) apply to 
this object. We explore the role of problem solving in reading and 
writing, comparing rationalistic accounts of problem solving with 
Barthes' account of the hermeneutic code -a code of enigmas or 
mysteries - and we show how mysteries in fictional texts can be 
classified according to event, scene, signifier, and syntax. We 
argue that in the context of fiction writing, problem solving 
includes the creation of enigmas for the reader. 
As the purpose of the model is to design a hypertextual aid 
for fiction writers, we look at hypertext in more detail before 
presenting the results of our investigations in the form of a 
cognitive model of fiction writing. The model is based on the basic 
model of writing discussed in chapter five. We identify the 
principal elements of cognitive planning in fiction writing as 
remembering and reflecting, imagining, focusing the imagination, 
and problem solving. Each of these processes can be applied to 
events, scenes, syntax, and names or signifiers. We show how the 
model can be used in design by using it to construct a 
hypertextual aid for student writers of fiction, and we describe 
the conceptual design of a prototype. In the conclusion, we outline 
some of the implications of our findings for future research, 
design, and teaching. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
AIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we describe the objectives of our research, discuss 
the motivation for it, and explain our methods of pursuing these 
objectives. We introduce the assumptions behind much of the 
current research into writing, and compare them with the 
alternative set of assumptions that informs our approach. We 
begin by considering research as a type of narrative. 
1.2 BEGINNINGS 
A story, according to Propp's Morphology of the Folk-tale, begins 
with a lack (Propp 1968), which is a feature that this type of 
narrative shares with research. In an attempt to characterise the 
latter activity, Roland Barthes asks: 
"What is a piece of 'research'? To find out, we would need to 
have some idea of what a 'result' is. What is it that one 
finds? What is it that one wants to find? What is missing? 
(Barthes 1979b, p. 197) 
So, just as the lack motivates a quest in the folktale, we can say 
that research is a type of narrative, in which a quest is motivated 
by the question, "What's missing? " In Genette's view, "research is 
nothing but a series of questions, and the point is not to ask the 
wrong question" (Genette 1988, pp. 75-76). In that case, we need 
to add to Barthes' questions, "Are we asking the right questions? ". 
Traditionally, empirical research begins with a statement 
that defines some kind of problem. A method of resolving the 
problem is then proposed, perhaps in the form of a hypothesis, 
and the method is tested by practical experiment. A description of 
the experiment, or series of experiments, leads to a discussion of 
the results, and possibly the confirmation, refutation, 'or qualifi- 
cation of the hypothesis. Some kind of conclusion is reached, and a 
programme of future work outlined. But what kind of assumptions 
do we start with, and how do those assumptions influence the 
definition of a problem, the construction of a hypothesis, the 
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design of practical experiments, and the interpretation of results? 
Or as Barthes asks, "In what axiomatic field will the fact be 
isolated, the meaning brought out, the statistical discovery be 
placed? " (Barthes 1979b, p. 198). 
The objective of the research activity that has resulted in 
this thesis is the design of writing software. To be more specific,, 
the objective is to design a hypertextual aid for student writers of 
fiction. Why? What is the motivation for this particular objective? 
What are the initial assumptions? 
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research is motivated by four sets of consider- 
ations. The first set of assumptions come from accounts of student 
writing. For the majority of students on writing courses, the 
environment in which most writing takes place is the writing 
laboratory or resource centre. Investigations into the effects of 
computers on composing suggest that the use of word processors 
does not encourage planning (Haas 1989). Research has also found 
that expert and novice writers when composing with a computer 
have difficulties achieving a global view of the text (Eklundh 
1991). From a developmental perspective, psychologists have 
argued that students often have difficulties with "high-level 
structures" in writing, and tend to get immersed in the "low-level" 
concerns of grammar and sentence construction (Collins & Gentner 
1980, Bereiter 1980). Flower and Hayes argue that planning is the 
most effective method of reducing constraints in writing, and that 
experts adopt this method more often than novices (Flower & 
Hayes 1980a). 
The collation of these findings results in the argument that 
while there is a need for planning or structuring in writing, the 
use of computers to compose does not encourage such activity. We 
can conclude, therefore, that there is a need for on-line planning 
tools for students on writing courses who perform most of their 
writing in a writing laboratory or resource centre. We do not 
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assume that the process of writing essays or argumentative texts 
is the same as writing fiction. However, we do assume that the 
conditions that Flower and Hayes call the task environment 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a) - the conditions in which writing occurs 
and cognition is situated - are similar for students on writing 
courses, whatever the task, in that most writing takes place in the 
writing laboratory. The differences between planning in fiction 
writing and planning in writing argumentative texts will therefore 
be one of the topics of our investigation. 
The second reason for this objective comes from a review of 
the various types of writing software available in the market, 
which indicates a lack of tools aimed specifically at fiction writers 
(Dorner 1992, Williams 1991a, 1992b, Kellogg 1989). Many word 
processors now include a spelling checker, a grammar checker, 
and a thesaurus, while a range of reference material exists on CD 
and CD-ROM, including multimedia encyclopaedias and the 
complete works of Shakespeare, for example. There is also a range 
of software tools intended to support planning in writing, such as 
idea generators and idea processors (Kellogg 1989). However, this 
range of tools is generally intended to assist the planning of 
argumentative texts. Moreover, as we shall see, most writing 
software assumes a model of writing that describes how writers 
compose in a medium of pen and paper, so that the software tools 
based on such models may not be adaptable to the ways in which 
writers compose with computers (Williams 1991a). There is some 
software support for plot development (Sawyer & Weingarten 
1991), but does plot development constitute planning in fiction 
writing? The conclusion of these observations, therefore, is that 
there is a lack of writing software aimed specifically at fiction 
writers, while we still need to investigate the question of what 
constitutes planning in fiction writing. 
The third reason for this objective concerns hypertext. A 
hypertext or hyperdocument is an electronic document that 
consists of nodes, or chunks of information (text or pictures); 
nodes are connected to other nodes by links that enable a reader 
or user to pursue various paths through the document. hypertext 
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has been used for various purposes (Conklin 1987), including the 
design of an "open learning system" for writers (Williams 1991b). 
Conklin claims that it "opens some very exciting possibilities, 
particularly for new uses of the computer as a communication and 
thinking tool" (Conklin 1987, p. 17). One of its uses is the design of 
"problem exploration tools" - "tools to support early unstructured 
thinking on a problem when many disconnected ideas come to 
mind" (Conklin 1987, p. 20). Hypertext has been used to design 
some of the planning tools mentioned above, such as idea 
processors - tools for planning and developing arguments in which 
"ideas" are represented by nodes, and the relationships between 
ideas are represented by various kinds of links (Kellogg 1989, 
p. 75). Hypertext has also been used to create "interactive fiction", 
a hypertextual fiction that presents the reader with a different 
text on each reading (Bolter & Joyce 1989). It seems, therefore, 
that hypertext would be a suitable device to design a thinking, 
planning or structuring tool for writing fiction. 
The fourth set of assumptions are concerned with the 
decision to design a tool, rather than a piece of instructional 
software or "courseware". The first consideration here is the 
question of learning in the context of writing. Different domains 
need different strategies of teaching and learning - "learning is 
not unitary", as Hammond points out (Hammond 1993, p. 53). 
Psychologists studying learning have made a distinction between 
declarative and procedural knowledge (Anderson 1981,1983; 
Kahney 1986, pp. 123-124). Hammond refers to this distinction in 
his discussion of the use of hypertext in education. Declarative 
knowledge is "essentially knowledge of facts", while procedural 
knowledge is the knowledge of how to do things (Hammond 1993, 
p. 62). In the former case, Hammond argues that "on the whole, 
learning of conceptual material occurs as a by-product of 
understanding it" (Hammond 1993, p. 57). In the latter case, he 
argues that "since learning occurs as a by-product of performing 
the actions, rote practice (perhaps appropriately varied and 
contextualised) is often effective" (Hammond 1993, p. 57). 
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The process of writing is an activity rather than a body of 
declarative knowledge, and teaching it would seem to require a 
different set of strategies compared with the teaching of history, 
for example. However, declarative knowledge is often tested by 
writing, and writing is one strategy for acquiring it. A writer calls 
on declarative knowledge to write an essay on a historical topic, or 
a fiction using historical data. At the same time, the process of 
writing requires various kinds of procedural knowledge, such as 
using computer software to underline text, copy files, print, and so 
forth. In short, writing argumentative texts is an activity that 
requires both types of knowledge, while declarative knowledge is 
less of a prerequisite in writing fiction, traditionally an activity in 
which the imagination rather than reason is the dominant faculty. 
However, whatever the type of text, the process of writing is like 
other activities, in the sense that skills in writing are acquired by 
practice. 
What Hammond calls "rote practice" may be effective in 
enabling what psychologists call the automation of skills, such as 
learning how to spell in the context of writing development 
(Bereiter 1980, pp. 80-82). For certain types of mechanical or 
motor task, such as riding a bicycle, driving a car, or handling a 
mouse, an automation of skills is an advantage because it allows 
for "parallel processing"; that is, it allows humans to engage in 
more than one task at the same time (Sutcliffe 1988, p. 41). For 
example, a proficiency in keyboard skills allows a writer to think 
about what she is writing, rather than where certain letters are 
placed on the keyboard. However, in the case of more complex 
activities, automation can be counter productive; an automatic 
response may be triggered in situations where it is inappropriate, 
a phenomenon known as "set" (IIayes & Flower 1980a, p. 9), and 
may result in human error (Sutcliffe 1988, p. 41). 
From a developmental perspective, Bereiter argues that 
"mature writing involves a large number of skills at different 
processing levels" (Bereiter 1980, p. 81). An "adequate mature 
functioning", he continues, "can be possible only when many of the 
skills are highly automated, and when they are well enough 
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coordinated to permit efficient time-sharing" (Bereiter 1980, 
p. 81). In the case of the novice writer, who has yet to master 
grammatical and stylistic conventions, "low-order" skills have to 
become automated before "high-order" skills can develop 
(Bereiter 1980, p. 82). However, Bereiter assumes a model of 
writing in which many processes occur simultaneously - this is an 
assumption about writing which needs further investigation. A 
second assumption here is that a mastery of grammar is a "low- 
order" skill that has to become automated for writing expertise to 
develop - an assumption that reflects Chomsky's notion that 
implicit knowledge of a grammar, or "competence", is a require- 
ment for language comprehension, or "performance" (Chomsky 
1965). Beyond spelling, and a procedural knowledge of techno- 
logical tools, an automation of skills is not necessarily an 
advantage in writing, because of the possibility of "set". The place 
of syntax in the process of writing is therefore another topic that 
needs investigation. 
Traditional grammar is concerned with a lexical taxonomy, 
or "parts of speech", and the structure of the sentence (Phythian 
1980). In the context of teaching writing, traditional grammar is 
inadequate for two reasons. The first is that traditional grammar 
does not investigate the role of sentences as elements in a larger 
discourse (Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983). A knowledge of sentence 
structure represents a declarative rather than procedural 
knowledge, and from the latter perspective,, it is grammarians and 
linguists, rather than writers, who produce the isolated sentence. 
In the writing of prose, writers produce sentences that are 
adapted "to the framing of the text". (Nash 1980, p. 89), and 
connected by a range of cohesive devices (Halliday & Masan 1976). 
The second reason for its inadequacy follows from the first, 
which is that traditional grammar does not address the problem 
that Collins and Gentner describe as "downsliding" - "the phenom- 
enon of getting pulled into lower and more local levels of. task 
processing", in which writers, particularly children, "lose sight of 
the high-level relationships they originally wanted to express" 
(Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 67). They argue that "if :a teacher 
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emphasizes accuracy in spelling and grammar, it will reinforce the 
natural tendency toward downsliding" (Collins & Gentner 1980, 
p. 67). So although traditional grammar has a place in teaching, it 
needs to be placed in a framework of procedural rather than 
declarative knowledge for it to be relevant to the process of 
writing. 
For students on writing courses, practice consists mostly in 
performing the assignments given out on the course. But practice 
can also be a feature of instructional software. For example, the 
hypertext described by Williams is an "open learning system" for 
writers which offers the learner three views - writing concepts, 
writing exercises or practice, and illustrations or examples 
(Williams 1991 b, p. 7 1). The learner selects a topic from the menu, 
such as audience analysis or types of audience, and can read about 
the topic in the concepts view, study the examples, or do the 
exercises. However, like the problem with traditional grammar, 
one problem with the exercises offered by instructional software 
is their relationship to a student's regular writing tasks. 
For example, in a paper delivered to the Sixth UK Conference 
on Computers and Writing, Thea van der Geest described a six- 
year project to design a writing environment for students (van 
der Geest 1993). The environment combines word processing 
software with writing instruction in an attempt to encourage 
students to plan. However, evaluation of the project identified a 
basic problem' in trying to integrate instruction on the one hand, 
and on the other, the word processing software that students use 
to perform their regular writing assignments; van der Geest 
argues for the separation of tools and courseware. 
Winterbauer reports a similar problem in his evaluation of a 
"pre-writing" aid; the aid uses a question and answer dialogue, 
and is intended to encourage students to develop ideas before 
they start writing (Winterbauer 1992). According to Winterbauer, 
"the core of the problem seemed to be that students were 
unwilling to devote'extra time' to using an innovation that did not 
seem to have a direct relationship with the rest of the course 
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requirement" (Winterbauer 1992, p. 176). In both cases then, 
instruction or exercises had an interference effect on a student's 
regular writing tasks, giving rise to the question: why bother with 
tools or exercises that appear to be irrelevant to the task at hand? 
These observations lead to the second consideration in 
designing a tool - the view that actions and effective learning are 
both "situated". On the first, Hammond explains: 
"Recent years have seen something of a change of emphasis 
in the modelling of plans and their execution: there has been 
a swing from the somewhat formal view that people largely 
plan their goals and actions in advance (and that these can 
in principle be modelled) to the view that much action is 
'situated', and is determined by a mix of high-level goals 
and of the specifics of the immediate situation. " 
(Hammond 1993, p. 58) 
Situating learning makes use of the observation that learners 
make sense of concepts by engaging in the activity that 
circumscribes those concepts (Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989a, 
1989b). So, for example, students will understand concepts in 
writing by writing. According to Hammond: 
"Information is learned for a number of purposes... The 
situation in which the information will be used is an 
important determinant of how it should best be learned: 
other things being equal, the greater the similarity between 
the conditions of learning and the conditions of use, the 
better the demonstrable learning. " 
(Hammond 1993, pp. 60-61) 
Hammond argues that "if computer based learning material is to 
support some specific -task, then as far as feasible the materials 
should reflect the intended task and its situation" (Hammond 
1993, p. 61). In the case of hypertext, he argues that the inability 
to match the goals of a task to the structure of information and 
activities offered by the system is the cause' of navigational 
difficulties (Hammond 1993, p. 54). 
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The third consideration is an ergonomic one. Traditional 
computer based learning, or "programmed instruction", "presents 
information to the learner in a fixed sequence interspersed with 
tests, with branching back to earlier, or remedial, information if 
the tests indicate inadequate learning" (Hammond 1993, p. 56). 
Hypertext, on the other hand, is particularly suited to learning 
situations where flexibility is required, and, as we saw in the case 
of Williams' "open learning system", allows the learner to explore, 
rather than follow a pre-determined sequence of instruction: 
"The use of hypertext tools in education and training is 
growing. In some cases, hypertext serves as the sole 
mechanism for delivering information to the student: I shall 
term this basic hypertext. Basic hypertext systems present 
information to the learner in the form of a linked network of 
displays (whether frame-based or window-based), allowing 
exploration through browsing. " 
(Hammond 1993, p. 53) 
McAleese argues that hypertext not only allows exploration by 
browsing, but also allows learning by exploration: 
"One of the aims of hypertext is to enhance existing learning 
strategies. Learning by exploration is one of the most 
powerful strategies for certain types of information and 
certain learning goals. Exploring in this way is occasioned by 
known concepts triggering off new ideas or by the learner 
attempting to make a link between two previously known 
ideas. In hypertext this has its parallel with a node 
triggering another node and a learner or designer making a 
link or association between existing nodes. A discovery 
approach is a situation where what is to be learned is 
determined independently by the learner. Guided discovery 
places the locus of control in the hands of the teacher or 
teaching materials. " 
(McAleese 1993, p. 19) 
Research does indeed show that browsing is the favoured reading 
strategy when hypertext is used for study purposes (Mcnleese 
1993, Whalley 1993, Wright 1993). However, Whalley argues that 
browsing is not necessarily conducive to learning (Whalley 1993). 
Moreover, he argues that "because of its fragmented nature", 
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hypertext "is not a suitable medium to form the core of teaching 
materials" (Whalley 1993, p. 17). In Hammond's view, "hypertext 
presentation systems, on their own, are a poor vehicle for many 
learning situations" (Hammond 1993, p. 51). As a means of linking 
together a multitude of documents to form an electronic reference 
library (Yankelovich 1991), hypertext may facilitate information 
retrieval - but, as Hammond points out, "learning is not the same 
as retrieving information" (Hammond 1993, p. 66). The ergonomic 
constraints in reading on-line text have been identified as one 
reason why writers find it difficult to achieve a global view of 
their text (Haas & Hayes 1986). Ergonomic constraints could also 
be a factor, therefore, in the choice of browsing as a strategy for 
reading hypertext. 
Hypertext, however, does not have to be seen in terms of a 
"New Alexandria" (Landow & Delany 1991, pp. 42-44; Crane & 
Mylonas 1991, p. 206); it could equally be viewed as a means of 
designing "minimal manuals" (Ramsay & Oatley 1991). Minimal 
manuals are based on the notion of activity based and goal 
centred learning, and research has found them effective for 
learning various computer skills (Draper & Oatley 1992; Hammond 
1993, p. 52). The reason for their success is a debatable subject - 
some argue this is due to a minimalist approach to instruction, 
while others argue that activity based, learning is the explanation 
(Draper & Oatley 1992). Hammond emphasises the second. 
Referring to psychological research into memory, he notes two 
phenomena with consequences for the design of educational 
materials. The first, known as the enactment effect, is that the 
remembering of descriptions of actions is more effective when 
those actions are performed, and the second, known as the 
generation effect, is "that people tend to be better at remembering 
material that they have generated for themselves than equivalent 
material provided by someone else" (Hammond 1993, p. 60). The 
implication for design is that "learning is enhanced by doing": 
"Learning-by-doing, whether through the performance of 
task-relevant actions or through the generation of materials, 
tends to lead to good retention of information. Learning-by- 
doing, together with minimising the baggage of verbal 
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instructions and descriptions, has been a central theme of 
the highly effective minimalist approach to the training of 
computer skills pioneered by Carroll and his associates... " 
(Hammond 1993, p. 60) 
Thus the ergonomic consideration of reading on-line text takes us 
back to the first consideration - that of learning in the context of 
writing. 
We assume a situation where students are already involved 
in writing fiction - students, for example, on writing courses which 
feature creative writing as a minor or major component. In this 
context, we assume that the bulk of the teaching is carried out 
through lectures, seminars, and tutorials, and that this teaching 
includes instruction in the use of computers and word processing 
software. Given the above comments on the psychology of 
learning, and given that writing is an activity rather than a body 
of declarative knowledge; given the empirical research already 
undertaken into the use of hypertext in education, the use of 
instructional software for student writers, and the ergonomics of 
on-line reading - given all these considerations, we conclude that 
learning in the context of writing will be more enhanced by a 
range of tools rather than by instructional software; tools, that is, 
that provide on-line assistance to students when they are writing. 
Our aim, then, is to design a hypertext that will assist a student's 
thinking about their writing, and is designed for the environ- 
mental conditions in which most of their writing takes place. 
In summary, our aim is to design a hypertextual aid for 
student writers of fiction. This objective is motivated by four sets 
of considerations. Firstly, reports of student writing have 
identified a need for on-line assistance in planning. Secondly, 
there is a lack of software that supports the planning of fiction 
writing. Thirdly, hypertext has been used to' design different 
kinds of planning or thinking aids, including tools to support the 
planning of argumentative texts. Fourthly, an analysis of reports 
on computer based learning materials suggests that learning in 
the context of writing will be more enhanced by a range' of tools 
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rather than by instructional software. The next question is how 
should we proceed? 
1.4 METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
What is the procedure for designing a tool for student writers? 
The initial obstacle to achieving our objective seems to be that we 
lack sufficient information to define what a planning, structuring, 
or thinking tool for fiction writers might contain. A further 
question is whether we should distinguish between tools for 
professional writers and tools for students. In the context of 
writing development, Sharples argues that "if we want children to 
become adult writers, we should equip them with adult writing 
tools" (Sharples 1985, p. 10). Following Sharples, we could argue 
that if we want students to become professional writers, we 
should equip them with professional writing tools; that is, tools 
designed for professional writers. However, psychologists argue 
that there are many differences between the ways in which 
students write and the ways in which professionals write 
(Bereiter 1980, Flower & Hayes 1980a, Steinberg 1980). Surely 
then, a tool designed for professionals is not going to be 
appropriate for students? Moreover, professionals have already 
achieved their status without using such tools, and many have 
done so without using computers . at all - 
indeed, some 
professionals not only persist with methods of writing to which 
they have become accustomed, but also 
, 
reject the idea that a 
computer can be useful to writers (Williams 1992a, pp. 4-7). Is 
there not a paradox, therefore, in advocating that we should equip 
students with professional writing tools, when many professionals 
do not see the need for such tools? 
However, the alternative would seem to be that we design a 
tool that reflects the ways in which students write. In that case, is 
there not also a paradox in that, while the notion of teaching 
generally assumes some change or transformation on the part of 
the student (through the acquisition of knowledge and under- 
standing), the notion of a software tool for student writers should 
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assume that tools should merely reflect the ways in which 
students write? Why should writing be an exception to the 
general assumption? The answer lies in the notion of writing 
behaviour - that is, that writers have acquired or adopted certain 
patterns of-behaviour in their procedures for composing, and that 
software tools for writers should reflect that behaviour. 
In the design of writing software, writing behaviour serves, 
therefore, as a model of writing - that is, as a model that can be 
used as the basis for design. Noel Williams points out that while 
writing software is always based on a model of writing, such 
models are often implicit, and may be incoherent, unorganised or 
arbitrary (Williams 1991a, p. 31). He argues that we need to model 
writing in order to design more effective software: 
"Different writers act in different ways. Writers think in 
different ways, organise their time in different ways, 
behave in different ways. Few people can sit down with pen 
and paper, or a computer keyboard, and write a document 
from beginning to end without pause, review or reworking. 
Yet we all have different approaches to these complex 
processes. 
If we are to teach people how to write, or how to 
improve their writing; if we are to use computers to support 
real writers in real situations, in the practices they normally 
use, we need to understand those processes, behaviours, 
ways of thinking and ways of organising. In other words, 
we need to be able to model the writing process, and to 
model it in a way which makes sense of what people 
actually do, want to do and ought to do. " 
(Williams 1991a, p. 29) 
Returning to the question of "What's missing? ", the initial obstacle 
to our objective is now twofold. As well as a lack of sufficient 
information to define what a planning, structuring, or thinking 
tool for fiction writers might contain, we also lack a model of 
writing. As we shall sec however, the two lacks are closely 
related, and in making provision for the one, we shall also provide 
for the other. 
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Matsuhashi claims that "the search for a model of the 
writing process is part and parcel of a search for a methodology to 
verify that model" (Matsuhashi 1982, p. 271). However, to claim 
that a model can be verified is to assume that a model is some 
kind of proposition to which we can attribute a truth value; thus 
some models may be true, while others may be false. Sharples and 
Pemberton, on the other hand, argue that a model of writing can 
be refined, rather than verified, and that this process is perform- 
ed by using the model to design a computational writing tool, and 
by testing the tool: 
"A writing tool designed on the basis of an explicit model of 
writing is an embodiment of the assumptions, possibilities 
and limitations of that model. By testing the tool with a 
variety of writers the model can be evaluated and refined... 
As well as offering new facilities for writers, a cognitive- 
based writing environment can also act as a powerful 
research tool with which to explore and develop further 
models of the writing process. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 335) 
So, according to Sharples and Pemberton the relation between 
model and tool is a complementary one, in which an explicit model 
of writing serves as the basis for designing a tool, the 
implementation and testing of a prototype serve to refine the 
model, and the refined model in turn serves as the basis for 
making enhancements to the tool. Elsewhere, Sharples and 
colleagues refer to a design cycle of implementation and 
evaluation (Sharples, Goodlet & Pemberton 1989, pp. 34-35), while 
Winograd and Flores argue that "the development of any 
computer-based system will have to. proceed in a cycle from 
design to experience and back again" (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p. 171). This cycle is often referred to as iterative design, and is 
discussed in more detail in chapter eleven. 
The first stage of our quest for a model of writing is to 
consider the models that are used in current writing research. 
These models give us an insight Into various aspects of the writing 
process, such as writing strategies and writing behaviour 
(Torrance & Thomas 1993), writing operations such as "planning" 
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and "reviewing" (Hayes & Flower 1980a), and the external 
representations that writers create and manipulate (Sharples & 
Pemberton 1992). After discussing writing behaviour, cognitive 
models of writing, and the operation of planning in chapters three 
to five, we emerge with a basic model of writing. However, the 
basic model does not supply sufficient information to design a 
planning, structuring, or thinking tool for fiction writers. 
Moreover, these discussions show that much of the current 
research into writing is based on a set of questionable 
assumptions, which can be summarised as follows. 
The first concerns the claim that "we can find out more 
about how people write by observing writers in action than by 
analysing finished texts" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 320). 
Empirical research into writing, however, not only observes what 
writers do, but often uses the technique of protocol analysis in 
these observations. This requires writers to articulate their 
thoughts in an attempt to obtain reports about the writer's 
activity directly from the writer, while they are in the process of 
writing. These "think aloud" protocols are then assumed to have 
some kind of objective validity. Yet to perform an activity that 
often requires a process of verbal rehearsal (Cohen, Eysenck & 
LeVoi 1986, p. 67), while simultaneously providing a commentary 
on that activity (a process that also requires verbal rehearsal) 
makes a demand on working memory that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to satisfy. 
Such demands must turn a writer's usual activity into one 
that is only performed under these peculiar experimental cond- 
itions, so that the picture of writing which emerges is a distorted 
one. Yet the assumption about empirical research is that such 
intrusive methods can tell us more about writing than the non- 
intrusive method of textual analysis. It appears that, while 
empirical research is viewed as somehow objective or scientific, 
textual analysis is seen as subjective and the results a question of 
interpretation. However, this is to deny the ubiquity of interpret- 
ation, as Winograd and Flores (1986), following lleidegger, point 
out. The results of empirical research are also interpreted, and the 
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second assumption in writing research is that the Hayes and 
Flower (1980a) model of writing represents some kind of norm, 
according to which empirical research into writing should be 
conducted. The model is used in writing research to define 
problems, construct hypotheses, design experiments, and interpret 
results; according to Smith and Lansman, the Hayes and Flower 
model has become "the standard model accepted by composition 
theorists as well as cognitive psychologists who study writing" 
(Smith & Lansman 1989, p. 17). 
Thirdly, much of the current research into writing is based 
on linguistic assumptions inherited from Chomsky, such as the 
separation of semantics and syntax, the distinction between 
cognitive and linguistic planning, and the notion of "translating", 
an operation defined by Hayes and Flower (1980a), and funda- 
mental to their model of writing. Fourthly, the assumption of 
cognitive science is that cognition is basically a process of 
manipulating mental representations, and that a theory about 
cognitive processes should be tested in the form of an intelligent 
knowledge-based system, in which representations form the input 
and output to various processes; thus Chomsky's (1957) linguistic 
theories, which have formed the basis for designing machine 
systems of language understanding (Bornat 1979), are held to be 
cognitive theories (Mandler 1985). Because of this concern with 
representations, models of cognitive processes generally fail to 
consider conscious thought, as Griffin (1984) points out, and much 
cognitive research into writing assumes that a writer's thinking 
processes are generally inaccessible. 
The second stage of our quest is concerned with developing 
the basic model into a model of fiction writing. To do this, we start 
with an alternative set of assumptions. The basic model lacks 
detail concerning, types of writing; to fill in this detail and to find 
out how textual structures are created, we turn to linguistics for 
assistance. However, instead of following Chomsky's rationalistic 
view of language as a system of rules and grammars, we follow 
Saussure's view of language as a system of, sequential and 
associative relations. Saussure viewed linguistics as a branch of 
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what he called semiology or the science of signs, a science that 
was yet to be developed; semiology was in turn seen as a branch 
of social psychology. Barthes claims that all research in the area of 
structural analysis of narrative has a common scientific origin in 
semiology, "the science of signification" (Barthes 1981, p. 135). In 
chapter six however, we criticise Culler's (1975) discussion of 
structuralist approaches to literature for the failure to distinguish 
between a rationalistic linguistics and a semiological one. When 
applied to literary theory, the former seeks to establish the rules 
and grammars for constructing semantic structures, while the 
latter seeks to explain the ways in which meanings are created by 
readers. 
The difference between these two approaches is reflected in 
Barthes' distinction between structural analysis and textual 
analysis. According to Barthes, structural analysis seeks to 
establish a structure, grammar, or model of narrative. Once this 
model has been discovered, "faced with all the narratives in the 
world... each particular narrative will be analysed in terms of 
divergencies" (Barthes 1981, p. 135). Textual analysis, on the other 
hand, "does not try to describe the structure of a work; it is not a 
matter of recording a structure, but rather of producing a mobile 
structuration of the text" (Barthes 1981, p. 135). Thus the purpose 
of textual analysis is to show how texts signify, and "to locate and 
classify... the forms and codes according to which meanings are 
possible" (Barthes 1981, p. 135). 
The alternative assumptions which inform the second stage 
of our quest are as follows. The first concerns linguistics and 
notions of language. Culler advocates the use of linguistics as a tool 
for "semiological investigation" (Culler 1975, p. 257). While we 
follow Culler's suggestion, we argue that to carry out such an 
investigation we need to follow Saussure's semiological view of 
language, rather than Chomsky's rationalistic one. Secondly, in 
contrast with Hayes and Flower's decision to . model individual 
writers (I Iayes & Flower 1980b, pp. 390-391), the discussions of 
writing behaviour in chapter three suggest that our aim should be 
to model writing rather than writers. Thirdly, given the absence of 
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the text in current models of writing, we conclude that in order to 
model fiction writing, we need to look at fictional texts. The fourth 
assumption is that Saussure's linguistics and Barthes' method of 
textual analysis can provide us with insight into textual signifiers. 
Moving beyond this insight however, the fifth assumption 
concerns Genette's suggestion that "what would theory be worth if 
it were not also good for inventing practice ?" (Genette 1988, 
p. 157). We assume that if we can locate what Barthes (1981, 
p. 135) calls "the avenues of meaning" in fictional texts, then we 
can model the ways in which writers create meanings; that is, we 
assume that avenues of meaning are avenues not only for readers 
but also for writers. In chapter five, we use the term textual 
structuring to describe a writer's mental activities in creating 
meanings. The sixth assumption is that such activities are not 
inaccessible, and that the possible ways in which writers perform 
textual structuring can be identified. 
Finally, we return to the paradox concerning tools for 
students and tools for professional writers. We assume that the 
purpose of providing software tools for students is to improve 
their writing, and that one way of improving their writing is to 
learn from professionals. We assume that this can be achieved by 
looking not only at how they write but also at the texts that they 
produce. If we can establish a model of fiction writing by 
analysing the texts created by professional fiction writers, then 
we can use the model to identify where students need assistance 
and design the software accordingly - the two lacks, of model and 
tool, are therefore complementary. 
Returning to the notion that research is a type of narrative 
in which a quest is motivated by a lack, we can now identify this 
dual purpose of designing model and tool as one way in which the 
quests of fiction and the quests of research part company. Genette 
describes Proust's A ]a recherche du temps perdu as a novel, not 
about the novelist, but about the future novelist, and adds that 
"what is novelistic is the quest, the search [rccherche], which ends 
at the discovery (the revelation), not at the use to which that 
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discovery will be put" (Genette 1980, p. 227). While the novelistic 
quest might end with a discovery, this quest is concerned with a 
model that is constructed rather than discovered, and ends with 
an explanation of the consequences for design. 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we described the objectives of our research, 
discussed the motivation for it, and explained our methods of 
pursuing these objectives. We introduced the assumptions behind 
much of the current research into writing, and compared them 
with the alternative set of assumptions that informs our approach. 
In the next chapter we classify models of writing according to 
their derivation and purpose. We also discuss the assumptions of 
cognitive science concerning the testing of models; this involves a 
discussion of the relations between cognitive psychology, 
computer science, and artificial intelligence. 
p 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MODELLING WRITING 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we introduce models of writing, and classify a 
range of models by considering their derivation and purpose. The 
different types of models may undergo different types of tests. 
However, cognitive scientists argue that models of cognitive 
processes should be tested by designing and testing a compu- 
tational system that simulates the appropriate process. We discuss 
the assumptions of cognitive science and consider the implications 
of this kind of test for modelling writing. We conclude that it may 
not be feasible to test a model of writing by designing computer 
programs that simulate human writers. 
2.2 MODELS OF WRITING 
What is a model of writing, and how do we begin to construct one? 
There are two methods of answering these questions. The first is 
to describe the ingredients that a model ought to contain, and to 
suggest procedures for obtaining them; we might then go on to 
review existing models and see how they measure up to our 
requirements. We can describe this method as moving from 
prescription to description. Alternatively, we might review 
existing models, examine their inadequacies, and suggest 
improvements. We can describe this method as moving in a 
counter direction, from description to prescription. 
Each method is not without its problems. The problem with 
the first is that prescribing a list of ingredients will not be 
uncontroversial - we return to this point at the end of chapter 
four. The problem with the second is that, in describing and 
reviewing existing models, we already entertain some notion of 
what constitutes writing, and this notion constitutes an implicit 
model of writing that needs to be made explicit. In teaching and 
writing technology a model of writing is frequently implicit, but as 
Noel Williams points out, a model is always present: 
"You may ask: why bother with a model of writing? Why not 
just design the software or do the teaching? The answer is 
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that writing software and writing teaching always use a 
model of writing, but that model may be an unclear or 
variable one. It will probably be a model implicit in the 
method of teaching or the software design, rather than an 
explicit one that has been stated and researched as the best 
foundation for those students or those users. Such a model 
may well be incoherent or unorganised, simply an arbitrary 
or accidental model that makes some kind of sense to the 
people concerned, derived from a multiplicity of experi- 
ences. Nevertheless, a model of writing will be there. " 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31) 
How do we identify an implicit model of writing? Williams 
claims that the most common implicit model found in software 
and teaching is "Plan, Draft and Revise", a set of operations that a 
writer performs in a linear sequence to produce a finished text 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31). On the other hand, Flower and Hayes 
describe a common assumption that writers simply write when 
possessed by the muse; they claim that students often subscribe 
to this implicit model of writing (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 32). 
However, both "Plan, Draft and Revise" and "Draft and Revise" are 
two "strategies of writing" acknowledged by research into the 
process of writing (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 324). To 
identify an implicit model of writing then, we must have some 
notion of a minimal model as a writing strategy, such as "Plan, 
Draft and Revise", or simply, "Write". 
Bearing this in mind, we can now return to the question of 
what might constitute a model of writing. Our approach to this 
question is the second method outlined above. We defer 
discussion of a list of ingredients until we have reviewed existing 
models of writing. The question we ask of these models is whether 
they provide a suitable basis for designing software to assist 
fiction writing. Besides the minimal models frequently implied in 
teaching and writing software, explicit models of writing generally 
fall into two categories: psychological or linguistic. Psychological 
models of writing can be behavioural, cognitive or developmental. 
Behavioural models are discussed in: the next chapter, and 
cognitive models in chapter four. We refer to` developmental 
models in chapter five, and linguistic models in chapter six. 
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Behavioural models of writing aim to model the usual ways 
in which writers approach the task of writing. In this context, the 
aim of behavioural psychology is to identify different kinds of 
writing behaviour and to develop a taxonomy for classifying 
writers. The methods employed for this purpose are statistical and 
experimental; questionnaires may be used to collect information 
(Hartley & Branthwaite 1989, Torrance, Thomas & Robinson 
1993), or writers may be observed directly at work (Matsuhashi 
1982, Torrance & Thomas 1993). In either case, the subjects tend 
to be writers within higher education (students and lecturers). 
Whereas the aim of behavioural psychologists is to model 
behaviour, the aim of cognitive psychologists is "to understand 
human mental processes" (Sutcliffe 1988, p. 57). Sutcliffe describes 
cognition as "the mental activity we describe in everyday terms as 
reasoning, problem solving, thinking and learning" (Sutcliffe 1988, 
p. 11). Thus a cognitive model of writing aims to model writing 
primarily as a mental process (Hayes & Flower 1980a). A 
cognitive model may be used as the basis for software design 
(Smith & Lansman 1989). Cognitive psychologists studying writing 
often use the technique of protocol analysis (Hayes & Flower 
1980a). This involves the direct observation of a writer at work, 
but working in a situation where she has been asked to comment 
simultaneously on her activity. The comments are recorded, and 
the recordings are later analysed and interpreted by referring to 
the text that the writer was producing at the time. 
While a behavioural model is purely descriptive, a cognitive 
model may be constructed by using a writer's descriptions as the 
basis for informed speculation or generalisations about the writing 
process. The resulting model might have a prescriptive purpose 
(for example, in software design). However, implicit models of 
writing such as "Plan, Draft and Revise", which also has a 
prescriptive purpose in teaching and writing software, are often 
based on assumptions concerning writing behaviour, as Williams 
points out (Williams 1991a, p. 31). For example, the model of "Plan, 
Draft and 'Revise" is based on observations of writing behaviour in 
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a medium of pen and paper, but software designers have used the 
model as an indicator of behaviour in an electronic medium - the 
assumption is that the medium of writing will not have a 
significant effect on writing behaviour (Williams 1991 a, p. 43). As 
we shall see in the next chapter however, writing technology can 
alter the ways in which writers approach the task of writing. 
Developmental models of writing are derived from studying 
the development of writing in children (Bereiter 1980, Martlew 
1983, Kroll & Wells 1983, Bereiter & Scardamalia 1987). The 
purpose of these models is to identify what might be called a 
normal sequence of events in the development of writing; thus a 
developmental model aims to model writing primarily as a 
chronological process. Consequently, it can be applied in the 
classroom to develop a curriculum for the teaching of writing, and 
to identify children with learning difficulties or special needs who 
may need extra tuition. A developmental model of writing might 
also serve as the basis for designing educational software targeted 
at a specific age-group (Sharples 1985). 
A linguistic model of writing aims to model writing as a 
process that is primarily concerned with the manipulation of 
written language (Nystrand 1982, Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, 
Cooper & Greenbaum 1986). Linguistic models of writing are 
derived in the first instance by applying linguistics to analyse 
written texts and to identify textual structures (Frederiksen 1986, 
Witte & Cherry 1986). As, traditionally, linguists have identified 
the sentence as the largest structure open to linguistic analysis 
(Crystal 1971, Halliday & Hasan 1976), the identification of textual 
structures larger than the sentence is a polemical affair, as are the 
ways in which the individual sentences of a text can be mapped 
onto more global structures (van Dijk 1980). Having identified 
layers of textual structures, the next stage is to formulate the 
ways in which these structures are manipulated in the process of 
writing; experiments are then designed in which this hypothetical 
formulation is tested (Frederiksen 1986, Witte, & Cherry 1986). 
There are a number of ways in which linguistics can be applied to 
L the modelling of writing; these are discussed in chapter six. 
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The purpose of a linguistic model is to develop our 
understanding of writing as a linguistic process. Consequently, a 
linguistic model might have implications for the teaching of 
writing. Another reason for designing this kind of model is the 
possibility of implementing it on a machine. A linguistic model of 
writing or comprehending could serve as the basis for designing a 
computational system of story understanding or story writing, for 
example. 
Having constructed a model of writing by following one of 
the above methods, how do we test it? Different kinds of models 
need different kinds of tests, and the kind of test that a model 
may undergo tends to reflect its derivation and purpose. In the 
case of behavioural or developmental models, a model of writing 
is based on observation, experience and empirical evidence. The 
model might serve to summarise or collate the findings of many 
researchers in the field or, as Williams (1991a, p. 31) comments, it 
may be an accidental model that is "derived from a multiplicity of 
experiences". Therefore, these models may need to be modified in 
the light of new discoveries in the fields of writing behaviour or 
writing development; new observations may result, for example, 
from experiments on the effects of writing technology. As we 
argue in the next chapter however, studies of the effects of 
writing technology frequently adopt a model of writing in order to 
design experiments and to interpret results. In that case, the 
model serves as a kind of norm and is used to measure the effects. 
In the case of linguistic models, a model of writing is more 
of a hypothetical model based on the results of textual analysis, a 
hypothesis which suggests that the structures derived from an 
analysis of written texts are structures that writers manipulate in 
the process of writing. As we argue in chapter six, the claim that 
such hypotheses can be confirmed by practical experiment (for 
example, Frederiksen 1986) is a questionable one, and a linguistic 
model may also be open to refutation by alternative applications 
of linguistics to the analysis of written texts. 
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In the case of cognitive models, we face a problem in that 
models which claim to be cognitive, or which tend to be called 
cognitive in the literature, can be quite different in their 
derivation, so that in this case we also face different kinds of tests. 
For example, Hayes and Flower (1980a) use the technique of 
protocol analysis to study a number of writers in order to 
construct their model of writing. A test of the model also uses 
protocol analysis. The designers point out that "although the 
model was derived through informal analysis of many protocols, it 
has been tested formally with only one protocol", and they plan to 
conduct more extensive testing using the same method (Hayes & 
Flower 1980a, pp. 27-28). 
On the other hand, Sharples and Pemberton (1992) note that 
writing involves the manipulation of external representations; a 
taxonomy of these representations and their organisation forms 
the basis of their model of writing. Testing the model is not a 
subject of discussion, so that a refutation of the model would 
presumably rest on a disagreement with their method of 
classification, on the observation that there are other types of 
representations not accounted for in the model, or on the claim 
that external representations are not fundamental to writing. 
Elsewhere however, Sharples and colleagues test their external 
representation model by carrying out a protocol analysis and task 
analysis of two writers at work (Sharples, Goodlet & Pemberton 
1989, p. 28). 
As we discuss below, some cognitive psychologists argue 
that linguistics is a cognitive science (Mandler 1985), so that a 
linguistic model of writing can also claim to be a cognitive model 
of writing (Frederiksen 1986). In this case, testing consists of 
mapping the texts produced by an experimental group of writers 
on the one hand onto the models of textual structures designed by 
researchers on the other. This method of testing may form the 
preamble to a more rigorous test of a linguistic model, in which 
the model is used to design a computational system that can 
simulate these transformations of textual structures. From the 
perspective of a cognitive science, some would argue that the only 
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scientific test of a cognitive model is this kind of computational 
test. Before we discuss models of writing in more detail, we need 
to discuss this argument about the testing of cognitive models. 
2.3 COMPUTERS, COGNITION, AND COMPUTER MODELLING 
In the last chapter we outlined a set of questionable assumptions 
in writing research. One of those assumptions is found in the field 
of cognitive science, which is that cognition is basically a process 
of manipulating mental representations, and that a theory about 
cognitive processes should be computationally tested in the form 
of an intelligent knowledge-based system, in which represent- 
ations form the input and output to various processes. This 
relation between computers, cognitive psychology, and models of 
cognition is an issue that we need to discuss in more detail. 
The assumption about cognition is an example of what 
Winograd and Flores (1986) call the rationalistic tradition in 
computer science. According to Winograd and Flores (1986, p. 14), 
the rationalistic tradition has greatly influenced not only "current 
thinking about computers and their impact on society" but also 
"the development of linguistics and cognitive psychology": 
"In examining how people have thought about and 
talked about computers, we become aware of the pervasive 
effect of a powerful tradition that emphasizes 'information', 
'representation', and 'decision making'... 
We have labelled this tradition the 'rationalistic 
tradition' because of its emphasis on particular styles of 
consciously rationalized thought and action. In calling it 
'rationalistic' we are not equating it with 'rational'. We are 
not interested in a defense of irrationality or a mystic 
appeal to non-rational intuition. The rationalistic tradition is 
distinguished by its narrow focus on certain aspects of 
rationality, which ... often leads to attitudes and activities 
that are not rational when viewed in a broader perspective. 
Our commitment is to developing a new ground for 
rationality - one that is as rigorous as the rationalistic 
tradition in its aspirations but that does ' not share the 
presuppositions behind it. " (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 8). 
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Winograd and Flores begin their disclosure of this tradition by 
considering the question, "What do people do when faced with a 
problem whose solution they care about? ". In their view, a 
rationalistic orientation to this question can be represented as "a 
series of steps" (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 14-15). The first step 
is to "characterize the situation in terms of identifiable objects 
with well-defined properties". The second is to "find general rules 
that apply to situations in terms of those objects and properties". 
The third is to "apply the rules logically to the situation of 
concern, drawing conclusions about what should be done". 
Winograd and Flores point out that "there are obvious questions 
about how we set situations into correspondence with systematic 
'representations' of objects and properties"; however, in much of 
the rationalistic tradition, these questions are "deferred in favor of 
emphasizing the formulation of systematic rules that can be used 
to draw logical conclusions" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 15). They 
argue that much of Western philosophy "can be seen as a drive to 
come up with more systematic and precise formulations of just 
what constitutes valid reasoning" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 15). 
The use of symbolic logic to formalise thought is a feature of 
artificial intelligence or Al (Kowalski 1979). However, Winograd 
and Flores argue that the designation of certain computer systems 
as "intelligent" is based on a rationalistic notion of intelligence: 
"The rationalistic orientation not only underlies both pure 
and applied science but is also regarded, perhaps because of 
the prestige and success that modern science enjoys, as the 
very paradigm of what it means to think and be intelligent. 
In studies of thought, emphasis is placed on the form of the 
rules and on the nature of the processes by which they are 
logically applied. Areas of mathematics, such as symbolic 
logic and automata theory, are taken as the basis for 
formalizing what goes on when a person perceives, thinks, 
and acts. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 16) 
Winograd and Flores claim that "the rationalistic orientation 
pervades not only artificial intelligence and the rest of computer 
science, but also much of linguistics, management theory, and 
29 
cognitive science - three areas with which artificial intelligence 
has been closely associated" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 16). A 
rationalistic orientation is particularly apparent in the relatively 
new discipline of cognitive science, which in their view represents 
an attempt "to unify theories of human thought and language 
from within the rationalistic tradition" (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p. 23): 
"The research programme of cognitive science encompasses 
work that has been done under different disciplinary labels, 
but is all closely related through its roots in the rationalistic 
tradition. Cognitive science needs to be distinguished from 
'cognitive psychology', which is the branch of traditional 
(experimental) psychology dealing with cognition. Although 
cognitive psychology constitutes a substantial part of what is 
seen as cognitive science, it follows specific methodological 
principles that limit its scope. In particular, it is based on an 
experimental approach in which progress is made by 
performing experiments that can directly judge between 
competing scientific hypotheses about the nature of 
cognitive mechanisms. " 
(Winograd & Flores 198G, pp. 24-25) 
Cognitive psychology deals with psychological processes such as 
perception, attention, learning and memory (Greene & Hicks 
1984). According to Greene and flicks: 
"Cognition is often defined as higher level mental processes 
going on inside our heads, such as conscious thoughts and 
feelings, making plans, having opinions and deciding what to 
say. But basic cognitive processes usually refer to the 
mechanisms underlying such activities as perceiving and 
recognizing objects, attending to sounds, learning simple 
responses and memorizing lists of items. These basic 
mechanisms are considered to be universal to all members 
of the human species, if not to the whole animal kingdom. " 
(Greene & Hicks 1984, p. xi) 
What, then, is the relation between cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science? Winograd and Flores describe the boundaries of 
cognitive science as "vague", but in their view, "much of 
linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of 
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mind fall within its scope" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 24). For 
others, however, the boundaries are not as vague as Winograd and 
Flores make out. Beaugrande and Dressler describe cognitive 
science as "a comparatively new field integrating the concerns of 
cognitive psychology and computer science" (Beaugrande & 
Dressler 1981, p. 210), and the area of computer science most 
often associated with cognitive science is Al. Elsewhere, 
Beaugrande and Dressler add linguistics to the concerns that 
cognitive science attempts to integrate (Beaugrande & Dressler 
1981, p. 12). For George Mandler however, the "cognitive sciences", 
as opposed to cognitive science, is simply the collective noun that 
likewise includes cognitive psychology, linguistics, and Al, so that 
cognitive psychology is a cognitive science (Mandler 1985). 
Al, however, is hailed by Mandler as "keeper of the 
computational grail", and the means of testing cognitive theories 
by their implementation on a machine (Mandler 1985, pp. 13-14), 
and it is this point which is crucial in distinguishing between 
cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The relation is not 
simply one of inclusion, but of integration - cognitive science, as 
opposed to "the cognitive sciences", is a term that applies to the 
integration or merging of cognitive psychology with Al. Van Dijk 
points out that "although the methods of inquiry in these two 
branches of cognitive science are rather different" (carrying out 
psychological experiments on the one hand, building and running 
computer programs on the other), "they share an important 
common attention for the processes of understanding " (van Dijk 
1980, p. 3). In a similar fashion, Beaugrande and Dressler argue 
that through research in the area of cognitive science, "computers 
can lead us from understanding data toward the broader domain 
of understanding understanding" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, 
p. 220). However, the merging of cognitive psychology with Al Into 
a cognitive science leads to a sharing of interests -that is not 
confined to a common concern for understanding. For example, 
van Dijk uses the case of language understanding to illustrate the 
different interests of the psychologist and the Al researcher: 
"The psychologist in that case will often be more interested 
in the precise cognitive processes, memory constraints, 
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decoding strategies, storage capacity, retrieval conditions 
and contextual factors of understanding. The researcher in 
artificial intelligence, on the contrary, will try to satisfy the 
demands of a running, and hence algorithmically explicit, 
program which at the same time should preferably have 
some psychological plausibility. Thus, the precise forms of 
representation of semantic information, and hence of 
discourse, will be crucial in such programs, as well as the 
knowledge which is necessary to make understanding by 
the computer possible. " 
(van Dijk 1980, p. 3) 
Decoding, storage capacity, retrieval - all these are terms that are 
associated with computer science and the description of machines; 
but here, the same terms are used to describe the psychology of 
humans. On the other hand, as Griffin points out, "words that used 
to be reserved for conscious human beings are now commonly 
used to describe the impressive accomplishments of computers" 
(Griffin 1984, p. 456). 
As Mandler points out, the original term for cognitive 
psychology was "human information processing" (Mandler 1985, 
pp. 90-91). It is this characterisation of cognitive psychology which 
he seeks to defend by pointing to "the rather naive models used 
within the information processing community during its early 
days": 
"There were boxes and arrows and the arrows dutifully 
went from box to box; the model was simple and serial - the 
serial box model. However, serial processes have given way 
to parallel processes and boxes to distributed represent- 
ations and complex processing activities. To be interested in 
human information processing is to be concerned with the 
flow of information/knowledge within the organism and 
between it and its environment. It seems peculiar, therefore 
to hear claims that some research project has shown the 
information processing approach to be incorrect. Such an 
approach cannot be "correct" or "incorrect". Information 
processing is a way of looking at the world, a framework for 
thinking, NOT a theory. For most of its practitioners it is a 
synonym for cognitive psychology. " 
(handler 1985, p. 19) 
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Mandler also claims that the information processing approach in 
the 1950s and 60s "was the first step from the stimulus-response 
psychology of the preceding era to contemporary cognitive 
psychology" (Mandler 1985, p. 90). Thus for Mandler, the replace- 
ment of the stimuli and responses of behavioural psychology by 
the inputs and outputs of information processing is "a change in 
terminology that probably did no more than define a break with 
the past" (Mandler 1985, p. 90). Subsequently, he claims, "with the 
development of cognitive psychology, the concern with simple 
input-output relations dimmed and the major interest began to 
center on the nature of the internal inferred mechanisms - the 
representations and processes" (Mandler 1985, p. 90). Responding 
to criticisms that cognitive theory is "tightly wedded to computer 
language and computer processes", he remarks that "the computer 
metaphor was unavoidable; it was forced by the culture of the 
1950s and 1960s" (Mandler 1985, pp. 20-21). 
However, according to Winograd and Flores, the advocates of 
'information-processing psychology' claim that "cognitive systems 
can be best understood by analogy to programmed computers" 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 25). Moreover, although Mandler 
claims that "we have moved away from the computer metaphor" 
(Mandler 1985, p. 21), his own account of the development of 
cognitive psychology shows that, far from being left behind, the 
metaphor has evolved with the changing concerns of computer 
science, particularly developments in computer architecture 
(Stallings 1990). The large mainframes of the 50s and 60s were 
characterised by a type of architecture that restricts the 
processing of data to sequential or serial processing. Subsequent 
research has investigated possible architectures that will enable 
parallel processing, while the development of the much smaller 
personal computer in the 70s and 80s brought about a new era of 
interactive computing, distributed or networked systems, and the 
application of computers to a diverse range of functions and users. 
Certain developments in cognitive psychology - that is, the 
evolution of models of basic cognitive processes - parallel these 
developments in computer science. For example, Mandler claims 
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that a serial view of mental processing was replaced by the notion 
that mental processes "may occur in parallel and provide 
interactive products during such parallel processing" (handler 
1985, p. 91). Mandler's discussion of the future directions of 
cognitive psychology is a debate that is intimately associated with 
future developments in computer science: 
"The development of parallel processing notions occurred 
hand in hand with the promotion of distributed processes... 
Once one considers representation to be distributed rather 
than locally organized, the idea of parallel processes 
operating over these representations follows naturally. 
The general adoption of a model of parallel inform- 
ation processing did, however, create a new problem. Action 
and thought are obviously serially organized; how does a 
parallel system produce a serial output? " 
(Mandler 1985, p. 91) 
Yet while cognitive scientists look to the computer for appropriate 
models of human behaviour, recent research on animal behaviour 
suggests that intentions, thoughts, feelings and consciousness are 
characteristics not only of humans but also of animals -a view 
that challenges the traditional belief that animals are motivated 
solely by instinct (Griffin 1984). 
Griffin argues that information processing psychology is no 
different from behavioural psychology in that "historically, the 
science of psychology has been reacting for fifty years or more 
against earlier attempts to understand the workings of the human 
mind by introspective self-examination - trying to learn how we 
think by thinking about our thoughts" (Griffin 1984, p. 456). The 
result, he argues, is that "psychologists largely abandoned the 
effort to understand human consciousness, replacing introspection 
with objective experiments" (Griffin 1984, p. 456). According to 
Griffin however, "the rejection of any concern with consciousness 
and subjective feelings has gone so far that many psychologists 
virtually deny their existence or at least their accessibility to 
scientific analysis" (Griffin 1984, p. 456). Ile argues that "analyzing 
people as though they were computers may be useful as an initial, 
limited approach", but the result of this emphasis on information 
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processing is the absence of conscious thinking from models of 
cognitive processes: 
"Conspicuously absent from most of contemporary cognitive 
psychology is any serious attention to conscious thoughts or 
subjective feelings... Information-processing is doubtless a 
necessary condition for mental experience, but is it 
sufficient? Human minds do more than process information; 
they think and feel. " 
(Griffin 1984, p. 457) 
While models of cognitive processes have developed in 
tandem with computer science, the merging of cognitive 
psychology with Al into a cognitive science has two consequences. 
The first is that both share a common concern for representation 
and process, as Mandler points out (Mandler 1985, pp. 10-13). The 
second is that theories about cognition are only acceptable as 
theories if they can be implemented on a machine - that is, if a 
computational system can be constructed such that a machine will 
produce the required representation or behaviour. For example, a 
theory of human vision is an acceptable cognitive theory (within 
cognitive science) if it provides a basis for designing a comp- 
utational system that can simulate the perception of objects; given 
a photograph of a tree as an input, the system should be able to 
produce the name of the object - "tree" - as the final output. 
Winograd and Flores summarise these assumptions as follows: 
"1. All cognitive systems are symbol systems. They achieve 
their intelligence by symbolizing external and internal 
situations and events, and by manipulating those symbols. 
2. All cognitive systems share a basic underlying set of 
symbol manipulating processes. 
3. A theory of cognition can be couched as a program in an 
appropriate symbolic formalism such- that the program 
when run in the appropriate environment will produce the 
observed behavior. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 25) 
According to Winograd and Flores, the programs designed and 
tested by Al researchers or cognitive scientists are "then taken as 
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theories of the corresponding human behavior" (Winograd & 
Flores 1986, pp. 25-26). 
In their critique of the rationalistic tradition and its 
influence on computer science, Winograd and Flores refer to 
Heidegger, who rejects the notion that representations are basic to 
human cognition (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 27-37). They also 
refer to work in the area of hermeneutics, to argue not only that 
cognition involves interpretation as well as understanding, but 
also that Interpretation is a regular feature of human interaction. 
On that basis, claims that Al systems somehow embody human 
intelligence can not be supported. In the case of natural language 
understanding for instance, Al systems assume a rationalistic 
notion of semantics, in which lexical items and sentences have 
some kind of absolute meaning -a meaning that is independent of 
the context in which they occur. Winograd and Flores characterise 
such an approach as follows: 
"In a complete rationalistic analysis of meaning, we would 
be able to explicate the meaning of each utterance by 
showing how It is built up systematically from smaller 
elements, each with its own determinate meaning. At the 
bottom, the smallest elements would denote objects, 
properties, and relations of interest In the external world. 
Although there Is a deep fallacy in this orientation, there is 
also a power in Its emphasis on regular formal structures. To 
the extent that they are adequate for a particular purpose 
(such as the implementation of language-like facilities on 
computers) they provide a systematic approach for 
generating rules and operations dealing with symbolic 
representations. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 64) 
A rationalistic analysis of meaning is exemplified by Chomsky's 
notion of a transformational grammar (Chomsky 1965), which, as 
we shall see, has had a major influence on cognitive psychologists. 
Indeed, Mandler acknowledges claims that "cognitive psychology 
was fathered by the emergence of transformational grammar In 
linguistics" (Mandler 1985, p. 10). In his view, "the development of 
transformational grammars in linguistics and the notion of deep 
structure... can be seen as the discovery of underlying represent- 
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ations and the processes that operate on them" (handler 1985, 
pp. 12-13). This discovery of representation and process in 
transformational grammar enables him to claim that Chomsky's 
linguistics is a cognitive science: "If one accepts the commonality 
between deep structure and underlying representations, linguists 
have been cognitive since the 1950s" (handler 1985, p. 16). As we 
shall see, this is a claim that does not bear close scrutiny. 
Winograd and Flores characterise the future directions for 
Al research by describing a "forking of paths": 
"Until the mid-1970s artificial Intelligence researchers 
generally believed they could work simultaneously towards 
two goals: extending the capabilities of computers, and 
moving towards an understanding of human intelligence... 
In the last few years, this view has been questioned. 
There Is a tacit acceptance of the point we have made in this 
book - that the techniques of current Al are not adequate 
for an understanding of human thought and language. As a 
result, there is a clear split between the 'knowledge 
engineers', who apply the well-developed technologies of Al 
to practical problems, and the 'mind-modelers', who 
speculate about the more complex structures that might 
underlie human thought. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 126) 
Those that follow the first path include the designers of "expert 
systems", which Winograd and Flores characterise as "programs 
for problem solving in some scientific or technical domain" 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 127). A knowledge-base for a specific 
domain such as medical science can be used by "non-experts" for 
consultation or advice In decision making or analysis. The 
application of Al techniques to robotics has also been successful 
for limited tasks In specific domains, such as car manufacturing. 
However, according to Winograd and Flores, those that follow the 
second path have not been so successful. In the area which they 
characterise as "cognitive modelling", such as designing a system 
that simulates human vision, traditional Al techniques have taken 
a back seat to the connectionist techniques of neural science 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 130-131). In the case of natural 
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language processing or speech recognition, attempts to develop a 
system for general use have also not met with much success. 
A similar pair of paths are identified by Beaugrande and 
Dressler in their discussion of future directions for a science of 
texts. They claim that on the one hand, Al is "intended to improve 
the interactions of humans with machines, particularly where the 
abilities of the two groups complement each other" (Beaugrande & 
Dressler 1981, p. 219). On the other hand, Al can also be used as a 
source of models for human processes: "In the new field of 
cognitive science, theories about the mental activities of humans 
are frequently tested by building computer models" (Beaugrande 
& Dressler 1981, p. 220). 
However, Beaugrande and Dressler describe a divergence of 
paths by looking at Al from a functional perspective (enhanced 
interaction versus a source of models). On the other hand, 
Winograd and Flores describe a divergence from an applicational 
perspective (limited domains versus general systems). Yet if we 
view Al from a modelling perspective, these diverging paths 
converge, in that whatever the function or the application, Al is 
primarily concerned with the modelling of knowledge. One 
problem with using AI to enhance interaction is that this purpose 
can come into conflict with the way that knowledge is tradition- 
ally represented in Al - that Is, by the predicate calculus and a 
programming language such as PROLOG - so that further research 
is required to create a suitable "front-end" for non-programmers 
(Nicolson 1990). On the other hand, the "theories about the mental 
activities of humans" that are tested by building models are, 
traditionally, general theories about object perception or language 
understanding, in which cognition is assumed to be the man- 
ipulation of different kinds of representations (the Input and 
output to various computational processes). As Griffin points out, 
such models are marked by the absence of conscious thought, with 
the result that current psychological research may tell us more 
about the consciousness of animals than of humans (Griffin 1984). 
aý 
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Two reasons for this have been mentioned - the influence of 
the rationalistic tradition, and the reaction to Introspection - and a 
third is Al's prime concern for the modelling of knowledge, rather 
than mental activities or conscious thought. A fourth reason is that 
a cognitive theory not only has to be implemented as a comp- 
utational system In order to be a viable theory, but given that 
cognitive science merges cognitive psychology with Al, it has to be 
implemented as an Intelligent knowledge-based system. Such a 
theory is bound to be based on some kind of computer archi- 
tecture - otherwise, it would not be an implementable theory - 
and theories that are based on computer architectures are, 
traditionally, theories of basic cognitive processes. In the case of a 
general system of natural language processing or computer vision, 
the designer's aim is to simulate understanding or recognition, and 
the modelling of knowledge is basic to this purpose. 
A fifth reason is the traditional role of computers in the 
research programmes of the humanities and sciences. On the one 
hand, information technology is viewed by some universities as a 
human science, so that psychology, ergonomics, and anthro- 
pometry are integrated components of courses. On the other hand, 
the computer is traditionally viewed by the humanities as a tool 
for studying texts, numbers, or pictures, and is particularly 
associated with stylometry (Kenny 1992, p. 1). From this persp- 
ective, the study of the kinds of activities that humans perform 
with texts, numbers, or pictures - and particularly, the use of 
computers to develop theories about those activities - are seen as 
the province of psychologists and cognitive scientists. 
However, Winograd and Flores argue that "computers, like 
every technology, are a vehicle for the transformation of tradi- 
tion": 
"We cannot choose whether to effect a transformation: as 
designers and users of technology we are always already 
engaged In that transformation, independent of our will. We 
cannot choose what the transformation will be: individuals 
cannot determine the course of a tradition. Our actions are 
the perturbations that trigger the changes, but the nature of 
those changes is not open to our prediction or control... 
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However, we can work towards unconcealment, and 
we can let our awareness of the potentials for transform- 
ation guide our actions in creating and applying technology. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 179) 
In a short time, computers have transformed the nature of work, 
working practices, and organisational behaviour. Two decades ago, 
the main purpose of computers was data processing. In a batch 
processing environment, systems analysts would discuss the data 
needs of their clients, design a suite of programs by using flow 
charts, and pass the program specifications onto the programmer. 
The programmer would design a program by using another set of 
flow charts, write the program code on sheets of paper, and pass 
the sheets of paper onto the punch card operator. The punched 
cards were delivered to the programmer, who passed them onto 
the data processing clerk, who passed them onto the computer. 
The programmer would collect the output, and initiate further 
passes of cards while testing and debugging the program. 
The history of Al goes back to those days of non-interactive 
computing. The function of the computer as a data processing 
machine has therefore had a major influence on notions about the 
purpose of Al and the ways in which It might be implemented, as 
well as the notion of machine understanding as the manipulation 
of representations. Far from being envisaged as an enhancement 
to interaction, Al systems were seen as stand-alone systems, to be 
implemented in the form of robots that would perform routine 
tasks, or, ideally, intelligent machines that would perform more 
complex tasks. As mentioned, the subsequent development of Al 
continues to be Influenced by those aspirations, some advocates 
claiming that "Al researchers are trying to create a computer 
which thinks" (Charniak & McDermott 1985, p. 1). So just as 
systems analysts modelled data, Al researchers modelled the 
knowledge that was thought to be fundamental to understanding. 
However, as Winograd and Flores point out, "design includes 
the generation of new possibilities" (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p. 170). In the last twenty years, transformations In technology 
have occurred at a rapid pace, and since playing a limited role as a 
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data processor, the computer now plays an integrated role in 
communications of all kinds. In particular, the innovation of the 
microcomputer generated the possibility of interactive computing. 
Subsequently, designers have considered the potential use of 
technology for a variety of purposes, and have developed 
different kinds of software to assist a variety of activities. To do 
this, they have had to consider the needs of different kinds of 
users. Interactive computing therefore gives rise to another kind 
of modelling: the modelling not only of data but also of the 
activities that humans perform on it. 
This kind of modelling involves the modelling of activities 
that require the manipulation of external representations. Such 
representations must be translatable into machine code, a binary 
symbolism of ones and zeros. Numbers, letters and still or moving 
pictures can all be represented in this way, so that any activity 
involving numerical, textual or graphic manipulation might be 
amenable to some form of computational assistance. 
On the one hand then, iieidegger's observation that rep- 
resentations are not basic to human cognition - an observation 
that may be relevant in the context of basic cognitive processes - 
is not appropriate in this context, because human activities such 
as drawing or writing fundamentally involve the manipulation of 
representations. On the other hand, the process of writing Involves 
not only the basic cognitive processes such as attention and 
perception but also conscious thought and the manipulation of 
written language. It would appear, therefore, that creating a text 
is a more complicated process than merely attending to stimuli. 
However, as we noted above, cognitive psychologists have 
traditionally modelled cognition as Information processing, In 
which an input or stimulus produces an appropriate output or 
response. These models have tended to follow developments in 
computer architecture, evolving from bottom-up serial processing 
models, to serial models that acknowledge the role of top-down 
processing, to parallel processing models. Within the framework of 
cognitive science, where the aims of cognitive psychology arc 
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integrated with the aims of Al, a cognitive model Is only 
acceptable if it can be implemented in the form of an intelligent 
knowledge-based system that can produce the required output 
from a specified input. In this context, the purpose of cognitive 
modelling Is to construct a computational system that simulates a 
basic cognitive process such as perception or understanding. In 
the case of Marr's (1982) computational theory of human vision 
for example, the "computational problem" is to describe, for each 
level of the system, a method that will obtain a specified output 
representation from a specified input representation (Roth & 
Frisby 1986, p. 138). 
So, although cognitive psychologists have developed more 
sophisticated models of cognitive processes, a cognitive model that 
would be acceptable to cognitive scientists is one that specifies an 
input or stimulus, an output or response, and a method of 
transforming input into output - that is, a model that follows the 
traditional data processing models developed by Al researchers. 
From this perspective, it follows that a cognitive model of writing 
would be a model that represents writing as data processing. 
To model writing In this fashion, we would have to specify 
the initial input to the system, the final output, and a method of 
producing the output from the given input. Would the Input be a 
written Instruction to write an essay on a given topic, for example, 
or to write a novel on a specified theme? In that case, how would 
such an Input 'be transformed Into the desirable output of the 
system, such as a cohesive text In the form of an essay, a novel or 
a short story? If we need to give the system Instructions to write 
in the first Instance, does this not suggest that the system lacks 
motivation or can only simulate writers who work to a given 
brief? How do we model motivation? Should the system be given 
financial incentives to produce several best-sellers a year, or 
should It be programmed to produce a Pinnegans Wake once 
every twenty years? 
Despite the difficulties of answering this range'of questions, 
a cognitive model of writing would only be acceptable to cognitive 
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scientists if it could be used to design computer software that 
simulates the process of writing. It is from this perspective that 
Sharpies comments: 
"Although Flower and Hayes used a computational metaphor 
to describe the act of writing, there have been few attempts 
to verify the model by building computer programs that 
mimic a human writer. .. And by attempting to design 
programs that mimic human writers we can see, in failure, 
inadequacies of our existing models of the writing process 
and, in success, some confirmation of their worth. " 
(Sharpies 1992, pp. 2-3) 
So according to Sharpies, the test of a model of writing is its use in 
designing computer programs that mimic human writers. There 
are two problems with this formulation, however. The first is that 
the only models that can be tested in this way are data processing 
models. Therefore, If we demand that models be tested in this 
fashion, are we not imposing constraints on the modelling of 
writing that may not be appropriate to our purpose? The second 
problem Is that even If we accept these constraints and emerge 
with a data processing model of writing, it may not be feasible to 
use the model to design the software that Sharpies requires. There 
must be a reason why there have been few attempts to design 
software that imitates human writers, so let's seek an explanation. 
Traditionally, Al researchers have been primarily concerned 
with modelling the knowledge held to be necessary for 
understanding and perceiving - "Input processes" that Involve 
attending or responding to Incoming information, rather than 
"output processes" that involve creating or generating new kinds 
of Information. Such knowledge is assumed to be universal to all 
humans, In the same way that a basic cognitive process is 
"considered to be universal to all members of the human species, 
if not to the whole animal kingdom" (Greene & Micas 1984, p. xi). 
The kind of knowledge which Is held to be universal Is a 
knowledge about causality and temporal ordering, for example, 
and is often referred to as semantic knowledge (Quillian 1968). 
However, In studying the operations of human memory cognitive 
psychologists have made a distinction between semantic -memory 
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on the one hand and episodic or autobiographical memory on the 
other (Tulving 1972). Cohen and colleagues explain: 
"Episodic knowledge is an autobiographical record of your 
own experiences - the events, people, and objects you have 
personally encountered. Semantic knowledge consists of 
facts about the world in general. So you might have stored 
in your episodic memory personal knowledge about, for 
example, a particular clock in your living room at home, its 
appearance, habits, history, etc. You also have semantic 
knowledge about clocks in general, their function, 
mechanism, defining characteristics, and so on. " 
(Cohen, Eysenck & LeVoi 1986, p. 46) 
It is semantic rather than episodic knowledge that Is thought to be 
necessary to understanding and perceiving, and it is this kind of 
knowledge that is traditionally modelled by Al researchers. 
Given that Al researchers have primarily been concerned 
with "input processes", we face two major problems In attempting 
to design computer programs that Imitate human writers. The 
first is whether a model of semantic knowledge is adequate to 
design a system that will create rather than comprehend. The 
second takes us back to the question of testing - how do we 
measure the success or failure of such a system? On the one hand, 
the demand of a model of writing that it should be tested in this 
way appears to be a call for rigorous testing; but on the other 
hand, this apparent rigor collapses if we have no way of knowing 
whether such a system succeeds or falls. 
Let's consider the example of another creative process; that 
of painting. As we mentioned above, the test of a cognitive theory 
of human vision, for a cognitive scientist, is whether it provides a 
basis for designing a computational system that can simulate the 
perception of objects. Given a photograph of a tree as an Input, the 
system should be able to produce the name of the object - "tree" - 
as the final output. The same stimuli should provoke the same 
response, and the response should be the same if we implemented 
the system on another machine. How could we apply the "tree 
test" to evaluate a system that simulates human artists? Given the 
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instructions to paint a tree, the system should be able to produce 
a representation that is recognisable as a tree. To be consistent 
with the perceptual test, repeated instructions should produce the 
same results, and different machines should also produce identical 
results if they are given the same instructions. But if our system is 
intended to simulate human artists, should it not produce a 
unique work of art each time it receives a request to paint? 
In some situations however, identical results from a team of 
artists may be desirable. In the Hollywood film production studios 
of the 1930's, for example, the artists who painted the cels of a 
Walt Disney animated cartoon would have been expected to draw 
Mickey Mouse in the same fashion, for obvious reasons, and their 
working conditions would have resembled the mass production 
and assembly line techniques of a car factory, rather than the 
traditional view of an artist's garret (Balio 1976). So, the criteria 
used to assess a computational system of perceiving (sameness 
and repeatability) may also be used to assess a system of creating, 
depending on the sort of work in production. 
This observation also applies to a computational system 
designed to simulate human writers. In some areas of writing, it 
may be desirable that, given the same instructions, different 
writers should produce the same text, or, at least, texts that 
deliberately disguise the individual author. For example, Hoard 
and colleagues discuss an automated grammar and style checker 
for writers of "Simplified English" (Hoard, Wojcik & Holzhauser 
1992): They explain: 
"Boeing Commercial Airplanes has made a commitment to 
write its aircraft maintenance manuals In Simplified English, 
the new international standard for aerospace technical 
documents. The standard places a heavy burden on the 
technical writers who produce the documentation, since 
Simplified English prescribes severe restrictions on grammar 
and style, forcing the writers to memorise an enormous 
body of detailed information about word usage. " 
(Hoard, Wojcik &I lolzhauser 1992, p. 278) 
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According to Hoard and colleagues, "Simplified English" places 
severe restrictions on vocabulary; only 1500 words of general 
English are permitted, "fewer than 200 of which are verbs" (Hoard 
et al 1992, p. 279). A supplementary vocabulary consists of a 
number of technical terms chosen by the manufacturer (Hoard et 
al 1992, p. 281). The grammar and style restrictions imposed by 
"Simplified English" include limits on sentence length, paragraph 
length, paragraph content, verb forms and punctuation (Hoard et 
al 1992, pp. 282-283). 
The "Simplified English" used by the aerospace companies is 
an example of what Schreurs and Adriaens (1992) call "Controlled 
English", limited forms of English that Impose these kinds of 
restrictions on vocabulary and grammar. According to Schreurs 
and Adriaens (1992, p. 207), "Controlled English" was first 
developed by the Caterpillar Tractor Company in the mid-1960's, 
when "Caterpillar Fundamental English" led other companies 
producing technical manuals to develop similar grammars. 
Schreurs and Adriaens compare the grammars of three companies, 
and discuss the problems of introducing a standard form of 
"Controlled English": 
"The continuous expansion of international industries has 
inevitably led to the need of standardisation and conformity 
in the field of written communication... 
To ensure that the language of technical documents Is 
unambiguous, well-structured, economical and easily 
translatable, 'controlled' language has been thought to be the 
solution. However approachable this phenomenon seems to 
be at first sight, it has been marked with some kind of 
mysterious Isolation: controlled grammars appear not to 
exceed the confines of industry. International companies 
protect their own controlled grammar to enhance the 
internal functionality of personal business matters without 
attempting to co-operate with other multinationals, or even 
universities. " 
(Schreurs & Adriaens 1992, p. 206) 
From Schreurs and Adriaens' account, It seems that multinational 
companies -protect their own form of "Controlled English" as an 
essential part of their corporate Identity. Under these conditions, 
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the author of a technical document is the company rather than the 
individual, and a technical manual produced by one team of 
writers would be indistinguishable, other than by its content, from 
one produced by another team employed by the same company. 
In the production of business reports, technical manuals and other 
kinds of writing that involve a standardisation of vocabulary, 
grammar and presentation, Al techniques have been used to 
design software tools that help writers to follow the recommended 
procedures (Beeken, Geerts & van Belle 1992). 
However, if we consider the types of texts that Cooper and 
Matsuhashi (1983, p. 14) call "poetic" (a category that includes 
fiction) or "expressive" (diaries and personal letters) rather than 
"transactional" (in which a writer is Informing, persuading or 
instructing), then the restrictions imposed by the various forms of 
"Controlled English" no longer apply. In courses on creative 
writing, students are encouraged to seek out new forms of 
expression and explore a range of linguistic possibilities: 
"... the student is awakened to the real life of language, with 
all that implies of the physiology of words, their ancestry 
and history and dynamic behaviour in varying 
circumstances... At the same time he is introduced to 
literature as a living organism, part of the human organism, 
something which embodies the psychological record of this 
drama of being alive, something which articulates and 
illuminates the depth and range and subtlety of being 
human. " 
(Hughes 1981, p. xvi) 
In the case of "Controlled English", software tools assist writers in 
producing texts with a uniformity of style and grammatical 
construction. In the area of literary studies on the other hand, 
stylometry has been used in textual analysis to find out whether a 
text of unknown authorship Is the product of a particular author 
(Kenny 1992). In the latter case, an author's texts are analysed to 
identify favoured words or grammatical constructions' that are 
generally uncommon In other texts 'of the period. The text of 
unknown authorship Is then analysed for occurrences of these 
favöured constructions. At some time In the future, perhaps 
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stylometry will be applied in the area of corporate 
communications to detect whether a technical manual is the 
product of IBM, BT or Caterpillar Tractors. 
If we return to the problem of designing computer programs 
that simulate human writers, It would seem, therefore, that we 
are more likely to succeed if we restrict our system to simulate 
certain kinds of writing. We are more likely to succeed if we try to 
simulate the writers who are employed to write in the various 
forms of "Controlled English", where the traces of Individual 
authorship are deliberately suppressed In favour of a corporate 
identity, where a uniformity of product is desirable, where we can 
measure our results against some kind of standard, and where Al 
techniques have been successfully applied. The body of linguistic 
knowledge required to produce "Simplified English" is the sort of 
knowledge that is stored in a writer's semantic memory, and as 
we mentioned above, It is this kind of knowledge that is 
traditionally modelled by Al researchers. 
We can represent this kind of writing in the form of a data 
processing model by designating the input to the system as the 
brief to write a certain kind of manual, and the output as the final 
product. The body of linguistic knowledge concerning "Controlled 
English", and the body of semantic knowledge concerning 
aerospace manufacture or whatever, all of which would be stored 
in the technical writer's semantic memory, could be represented 
by AI techniques, and could be invoked as required. We would 
still need to model the processes that will turn the Initial brief 
into the final product, and the difficulties of doing this are 
discussed in chapter six. 
However, if we try to represent fiction writing In the form of 
a data processing model, we encounter a further set of problems. 
Professional writers of fiction often work to no given brief and are 
motivated simply by the urge to write (Boylan 1993). In that case, 
the input to the system would have to be designated as the 
writer's personal experiences which arc translated Into the 
fictional work. A writer's personal experiences are an example of 
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the episodic knowledge or autobiographical record stored in 
episodic memory, in contrast to the semantic knowledge 
traditionally modelled by AI researchers. Therefore, in addition to 
modelling the general kind of linguistic knowledge stored in 
semantic memory, we would need to model what is unique to a 
particular writer: the autobiographical record of a writer's 
episodic memory. 
We can designate the output of the system as a cohesive text 
in the form of a novel, but in this case we lack the measure of a 
uniform product, unless we limit the range of fiction to a 
particular genre such as romance, and we cannot apply the 
criteria of sameness and repeatability to the results. And, as a 
final problem, we still face the difficulties of modelling the 
processes that will transform the input of episodic knowledge into 
the final product. 
In short, we may be able to represent fiction writing in the 
form of a data processing model, but it may not be feasible to use 
the model to design computer software that simulates human 
writers. As Al has traditionally been concerned with input 
processes, the question is whether a model of semantic memory 
is sufficient to explain the output processes involved in writing. 
For some types of writing, a model of semantic knowledge may be 
adequate, but the processes of transforming input into output are 
not easy to identify. Compared with other types of writing 
however, the writing of fiction is a process that seems to make 
more demands on a writer's episodic memory, and this provides 
one explanation why there have been so few attempts to design 
programs that mimic human writers. 
As we mentioned above, the other problem with Sharpies 
formulation is the Implications for modelling. If we demand of a 
cognitive model that it be tested in this fashion, and the only test 
of a cognitive model is the simulation test, then the only models of 
writing that can be called "cognitive models" are models that 
represent writing as data processing. This constraint on testing 
therefore enforces a constraint on modelling, a constraint that 
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may not be appropriate to our purpose. As we mentioned above, 
AI researchers describe their aim as "trying to create a computer 
which thinks" (Charniak & McDermott 1985, p. 1), and modelling 
knowledge is seen as essential to that purpose. In the context of 
interactive computing however, we are more concerned with 
modelling human activities, and our aim is to design software 
tools that assist humans in those activities. This does not preclude 
the use of Al techniques in situations where they may be 
appropriate, as we mentioned above (eg Beeken, Geerts & van 
Belle 1992). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we Introduced models of writing, and classified a 
range of models by considering their derivation and purpose. We 
also considered the different types of tests that models may 
undergo. Cognitive scientists argue that models of cognitive 
processes should be tested by designing and testing a compu- 
tational system that simulates the appropriate process. We 
discussed the assumptions of cognitive science and the influence 
of the rationalistic tradition In linguistics and computer science. 
We also considered the implications of the simulation test for 
modelling writing, and concluded that it may not be feasible to 
test a model of writing by designing computer programs that 
mimic human writers. We now turn to discuss models of writing 
in more detail. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
WRITING BEHAVIOUR 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we begin our review of current models of writing 
by discussing the notion of writing behaviour. Firstly we ask, why 
is creative writing traditionally viewed as a mysterious process 
that does not lend itself readily to detailed investigation? 
Secondly, we consider the reports of writing behaviour given by 
professional fiction writers. We compare these accounts with the 
findings of behavioural psychologists, who are trying to classify 
writers according to their behaviour, and conclude that a 
taxonomy of writers Is not an appropriate basis for software 
design. We then discuss an alternative notion of writing 
behaviour, in which writing Is viewed as a cyclical process of 
engagement and reflection. Thirdly, we discuss research into the 
effects of writing technology on the behaviour of student writers, 
and find further evidence of writing as a cyclical process. We also 
find that research into technological effects often adopts a model 
of writing in order to measure effects, and conclude by 
summarising the features of the computer as a medium of writing. 
3.2 TIIE MYSTERY OF WRITING 
In the Phaedrus, Plato distinguishes between the inspired and the 
uninspired poet: 
"The third type of possession and madness is possession by 
the Muses. When this seizes upon a gentle and virgin soul it 
rouses It to Inspired expression In lyric and other sorts of 
poetry, and glorifies countless deeds of the heroes of old for 
the Instruction of posterity. But If a man comes to the door 
of poetry untouched by the madness of the Muses, believing 
that technique alone will make him a good poet, he and his 
sane compositions never reach perfection, but are utterly 
eclipsed by the performances of the Inspired madman. " t 
In ancient Greece, the oracles at Delphi and elsewhere were 
thought to be mediums who were possessed by a god or a goddess 
I p. 48 in Walter Hamilton's translation for Penguin (1973). 
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and whose words needed interpretation by the appropriate 
authority. Similarly, the poet sought inspiration by appealing to 
one of the nine muses to take control of his speech. In Plato's 
account, poets, prophets, lovers and madmen are all possessed and 
not in control of their reason. 
In more recent times, Flower and Hayes argue that the 
teaching of writing has traditionally emphasised the product while 
neglecting the process of writing (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 32). 
The consequence of this neglect is that many students have ideas 
about processes that reflect the Platonic tradition of possession: 
"There is, of course, a well-established mythology about the 
nature of writing as a creative process. Some of this 
mythology is insightful; some of it is pure bunk. Students 
often seem to subscribe to the inspiration paradigm in which 
a writer sits patiently waiting for delivery and the descent 
of the muse. " 
(Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 32) 
The notion of creative genius (a Roman equivalent to Plato's 
divine possession) and the distinction between creative and 
prosaic writing both help to perpetuate the idea that some writing 
is the product of thought processes which are irrational and defy 
analysis. 
Professional writers themselves tend to reinforce the view 
that their activity is a mystery. This Is Clare Boylan, introducing a 
collection of essays by fiction writers on their art: 
"Over and over the writers in this volume refer to 'the 
mystery' - that element In their work which is outside 
themselves but to which they aspire or submit...... Most 
writers of fiction claim that the mystery cannot be explained 
(and should not be too closely investigated)... " 
(Boylan 1993, p. xi) 
Many writers In this collection allude to the role of the 
unconscious In the writing of fiction. For example, IIilary Mantel 
writes: 
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"It seems to me that a good part of the business of fiction is 
performed half-consciously, even subconsciously. " 
(Mantel 1993, p. 38) 
Some writers point to childhood as a source of inspiration (Gardam 
1993, Paretsky 1993, McGahern 1993, Hill 1993, Jolley 1993, 
Moore 1993), while some refer to character as their main concern 
(Swift 1993, Mantel 1993, Moggach 1993, Fitzgerald 1993, 
Highsmith 1993, Hart 1993, Mortimer 1993). Swift's advice to 
young writers is to "write about what you don't know - for how 
else will you bring your imagination into play? " (Swift 1993, 
p. 24). He makes the point that "one of the fundamental aims of 
fiction is to enable us to enter, imaginatively, experiences other 
than our own" (Swift 1993, p. 24). This is Deborah Moggach, 
describing her imagination at work: 
"More recently I was planning a novel about a man who had 
a lot of ex-wives. He sprang into life once I had pinpointed 
where he lived: one of those sooty blocks of mansion flats on 
the Edgware Road. For days I sat in my car, opposite the 
building, and pictured him shuffling out - big, bearded, 
wearing espadrilles with the backs squashed down and 
pulling along one of those matted little dogs that looks as if 
it has been run over. By this time his name had come to me 
- Russell Buffery. " 
(Moggach 1993, p. 134) 
In his essay on creative writers and daydreaming, Freud 
(1985c) argues that there is a relationship between the 
unconscious, childhood memories and imaginative activity. 
Arguing that "the creative writer does the same as the child at 
play", Freud continues: 
"He creates a world of phantasy .. which 
he takes very 
seriously - that is, which he invests with large' amounts of 
emotion - while separating it sharply from reality. " 
(Freud 1985c, p. 132) ýs 
According to'Freud, child play, creative writing and daydreams 
are activities which all involve the imagination, although each 
serves a different function. Through' play, 'the'child comes to terms 
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with the world of the adult. When the child grows up and the 
imagination can no longer express itself publicly through play, it 
finds a private outlet in fantasy and daydreams. These are usually 
associated with ambition, eroticism, or both. The creative writer 
gives concrete expression to imaginative activity. Freud singles 
out the romance as the prime example of an "egocentric story", in 
which a sharply differentiated hero and heroine are invested with 
the writer's ego' (Freud 1985c, p. 138). He makes the connection 
between memories of childhood and the writer's imagination in 
this way: 
"A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative 
writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually belonging 
to his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish 
which finds its fulfilment in the creative work. " 
(Freud 1985c, p. 139) 
This stringing together of past, present and future occurs in a 
similar fashion in fantasy; in this case, the creative work is the 
daydream. In Freud's "wish fulfilment" hypothesis, the activity of 
the imagination is tied to the writer's ego, even when the writer's 
ego is not directly bound to a central character's point of view: 
"The psychological novel in general no doubt owes its special 
nature to the inclination of the modern writer to split up his 
ego, by self-observation, into many part-egos, and, in 
consequence, to personify the conflicting currents of his own 
mental life in several heroes. " 
(Freud 1985c, p. 138) 
Given that, some years prior to writing this essay, Freud had 
frequently used the technique of self-observation in his work on 
dream analysis (Freud 1976a), one could argue that here he 
assumes that the creative writer works in a similar way. 
However, a view of the imagination that restricts its field of 
operation to "wish fulfilment" or "self-observation" is not likely to 
find many adherents among the writers whose essays are 
referred to above. Even so, Freud's departure for his enquiry is 
essentially the same question raised by Clare Boylan in her 
introduction: from what sources does the creative writer draw 
55 
inspiration, and why is creative writing such a mysterious 
process? Whatever one thinks about Freud's "wish fulfilment" 
hypothesis, these essays provide fresh evidence for the idea that 
past memories and present incidents are tied up in the creative 
work. In particular, the anecdotes of fiction writers reinforce 
Freud's suggestion - that it is the involvement of the writer's 
unconscious which makes the process of writing fiction difficult to 
articulate and shrouds attempts to do so in the rhetorical cloak of 
mystery. 
It therefore appears that our aim of establishing a model of 
fiction writing faces two immediate problems. Firstly, how can one 
model a process which is traditionally seen as mysterious and tied 
to the unconscious? Secondly, how can one generalise from the 
particular, when the latter - the imagination - is traditionally held 
to be the unique property of individuals? We shall return to these 
questions when we explore linguistic approaches to writing. 
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3.3 FICTION WRITERS AND WRITING BEHAVIOUR 
Fiction writers are no exception to the observation that "different 
writers act in different ways" (Williams 1991a, p. 29). For example, 
several writers in Boylan's collection describe writing as a 
compulsive activity: 
"... as the essays included here reveal, the compulsion to 
write, coupled with cunning, intelligence, endurance and a 
willingness to lay open oneself and pretty well lay down 
one's life, is all that is needed to engage with the mystery (if 
you are a story-teller, if you have a story to tell). " 
(Boylan 1993, p. xi) 
Lorrie Moore believes that "the compulsion to read and write - 
and it seems to me it should be, even must be, a compulsion - is a 
bit of mental wiring the species has selected, over time, in order, 
as the life span increases, to keep us interested in ourselves" 
(Moore 1993, p. 199). However, Jane Gardam denies any 
compulsion to write. After her initial spark of inspiration, she 
claims that: 
"There is no immediate compulsion as a rule to do anything 
about it. Like love, if it is the real thing there is often no 
sense of urgency. " 
(Gardam 1993, p. 12) 
Hilary, Mantel's strategies reveal a similar cautious approach to 
the early stages of writing. This involves the use of index cards or 
small notebooks in which she gathers material before attempting 
to piece it together -a method she describes as "growing a book, 
rather than writing one" (Mantel 1993, p. 41). 
Following Plato, we might say that one way in which writers 
differ is their relation to the muse. To invoke compulsion as a 
means of engaging with the mystery of writing is like summoning 
the muse, with the possessed poet disguised as the compulsive 
writer. However, sometimes the muse can be resisted. Josephine 
Hart confesses that "for most of my adult life I resisted writing", 
but her first novel had been completed in her head, "long before I 
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sat down to write it" (Hart 1993, p. 209). When the urge to write 
could no longer be restrained, Hart sat down and finished her 
novel in six weeks, while still refusing to be taken over: 
"I always stopped at 12.30 irrespective of how I felt the 
writing was progressing. Whenever a wave of intense 
creativity threatened to break over me, I got up and walked 
away. I refused to 'go with it'. " 
(Hart 1993, p. 210) 
As a further complexity, there are some writers who never 
receive a visit from the muse - Hilary Mantel attributes her 
method of working to her lack of imagination, rather than a 
resistance to compulsion (Mantel 1993, p. 37). 
Is it possible to make generalisations about differences 
between fiction writers? One method is to construct various poles 
along which differences can be scaled. For example, another way 
of expressing the above relation to the muse is that writers vary 
along a Platonic pole of possession and detachment. At one 
extreme, the compulsive writer is absorbed in her work, thinks or 
writes until exhausted, and never allows any disruptions to her 
train of thought. At the other extreme, the completely detached 
writer imposes a timetable on her work, always works at a set 
time, and never allows an outburst of inspiration to disrupt her 
regularity. Writers also vary in the amount of time thinking 
through ideas before writing anything, in the scope of this 
thinking (a sentence, a chapter, an entire book), and productively 
in terms of how much writing results. Whereas Josephine Hart 
thinks about an entire novel over a long period before writing a 
word, Hilary Mantel writes a few sentences at a time, as they 
occur to her, while having no idea how these sentences will be 
incorporated into her story. Developing Hilary Mantel's metaphor 
of "growing a book", we might describe a pole of horticulture here, 
with tree planters at one end and seed sowers at the other. 
However, bearing in mind incubation periods, the size of the plant, 
the number of fruits, and differential rates of growth, developing 
a metaphor of complex processes can itself become a complicated 
affair. 
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Differences in the ways that academics approach writing 
have been found by psychologists researching writing behaviour. 
This research has led to a polar taxonomy of writers. The two 
breeds are the "planner" (Torrance, Thomas & Robinson 1993), 
who is also known as the "serialist" (Wason 1980) or the 
"Mozartian" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992) - and the "discoverer" 
(Galbraith 1991), who is also known as the "reviser" (Torrance et 
al 1993), the "wholist" (Wason 1980), or the "Beethovian" 
(Sharpies & Pemberton 1992). Describing research into the writing 
of PhD students, Wason gives two examples of "opposite 'cognitive 
styles' in writing" (Wason 1980, p. 134). The "serialist writer" (the 
planner) starts with a plan of the whole before writing a draft, 
whereas the "wholist writer" (the discoverer) writes without a 
plan and with much subsequent revision. 
However, establishing a taxonomy of writing behaviour is 
currently a polemical affair. In a paper presented to the Sixth UK 
Conference on Computers and Writing, Mark Torrance discussed 
the writing strategies of research students in the social sciences 
and identified three distinct groups (Torrance et al 1993). In 
comparison with the "planners" and "revisers" described above, 
the "mixed strategy" writer not only plans before starting to write 
but also revises extensively. In the ensuing debate however, it 
was pointed out that given the statistical methods used to place 
writers into the categories, the categories were self-defining. 
Establishing a polar taxonomy of writing behaviour is even 
more problematic. Following Wason and Odell, who both advocate 
writing without a plan as a means of discovering ideas about a 
subject (Wason 1980, Odell 1980), Galbraith goes further and 
claims to have confirmed experimentally that discovery through 
writing "is a consequence of the spontaneous spelling-out of ideas 
in continuous prose" (Galbraith 1991, p. 151). Ile contrasts this 
"romantic" view with the "classical" view, which asserts that 
"discovery is a consequence of planned rhetorical organisation" 
(Galbraith 1991, p. 151). In relation to. the. two breeds of writer, 
the classical view maintains that . 
the planner will discover new 
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ideas, whereas the romantic view claims that the writer without a 
plan will discover new ideas. To select the two groups of subjects 
for his experiment, Galbraith has to find a way of placing writers 
into one of the two categories. An initial attempt to do this based 
on their writing strategies is abandoned because of "large 
individual differences in the strategies they actually employed" 
(Galbraith 1991, p. 153). The two groups are then selected using a 
questionnaire developed by social psychologists to measure 
differences in self-monitoring (the ability to present ourselves to 
others in order to create a desired effect). Galbraith makes the 
assumption that subjects rated as high and low self-monitors 
based on the results of this questionnaire can also be classed as 
planners and non-planners in terms of their writing behaviour - 
the grounds for making such an assumption are omitted from his 
argument. 
The above research into writing behaviour explores 
academic writing, and the subjects of the experiments are often 
research students writing essays or theses. Are there any 
similarities between academic writing and fiction? Is the process 
of writing a thesis, for example, fundamentally different from the 
process of writing a novel, or do the above observations on 
writing behaviour apply equally to "creative" writing? 
Evidence for poles of behaviour in the writing of fiction can 
be found in the anecdotes of professional writers. Josephine Hart's 
description of writing seemingly places her in the category of 
"planners", while Hilary Mantel's methods might place her at the 
other extreme in the category of "discoverers". Hart claims she 
has four novels completed in her head (Hart 1993, p. 209), while 
Mantel writes: 
"When I am putting a book together my aim is never to 
think about plot, to think even less about structure. I like to 
let these things sort themselves out... " 
(Mantel 1993, x. 39) 
In the literature however, the notion of "planning" either 
refers to a mental process of reflective thinking (Burtis, Bereiter, 
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Scardamalia & Tetroe 1983, Haas 1989, Schilperoord 1994), or 
suggests the externalisation of ideas into some form of physical 
representation such as notes, diagrams, sketches or outlines 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, Galbraith 1991, Galbraith & Reed 
1994). In Josephine Hart's case, the conceptual process that we 
have translated as "planning" is more akin to daydreaming or 
using the imagination than to reflective thinking; moreover, her 
account of completing a novel mentally does not suggest any 
physical representations. Only one writer in Boylan's collection of 
essays explicitly mentions starting a story with an outline, and in 
that case, "once a character gets going they push it off in their own 
direction" (Moggach 1993, p. 135). Although some writers have a 
notion that plot is necessary (Highsmith 1993, Davies 1993, 
Mortimer 1993), a greater number would agree with Moggach's 
notion of a character as the "driver" of the imagination. If we 
assume that a "plan" for writing fiction might be the outline of a 
plot, then a translation of the division into "planners" and 
"discoverers" would consist of writers who start with a plot 
outline, and writers who work without a plot and allow the 
imagined lives of their characters to lead the story. Most fiction 
writers in Boylan's collection would then be located in the latter 
category. 
But, as Josephine Hart's anecdotes indicate, a "plan" for a 
piece of fiction does not have to be realised through external 
representations but can be formulated in the mind. Scenes can be 
visualised, stored in memory and described at a later date. Hence, 
writing fiction with a "plan" could be understood as starting with a 
plot outline, or with some sort of visualisation that is not 
necessarily externalised. The category of "planners" therefore 
contains writers who might find themselves at opposite ends of 
the Platonic spectrum of inspiration. 
Is the notion of "discovery" relevant to the writing of 
fiction? In the experiment mentioned above (Galbraith 1991), 
Galbraith measures "discovery" by asking his subjects to rate the 
depth of their knowledge about aspecific topic before and after 
writing an essay. An advocate of "teaching writing by teaching 
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the process of discovery", Odell (1980) suggests techniques that 
are derived from Aristotelian exercises in logic; although these 
techniques may be appropriate for developing arguments, they do 
not seem to be relevant to the writing of fiction. The notion of 
"discovery through writing" that is advocated by Wason (1980), 
Odell (1980) and Galbraith (1991) assumes a particular genre of 
writing and argues that thinking can be clarified through the 
"spontaneous spelling-out of ideas in continuous prose" (Galbraith 
1991, p. 151). 2 
Yet some fiction writers claim that their work is more a 
result of thinking through ideas rather than a product of the 
imagination. Hilary Mantel confesses: 
"I don't think I have much imagination. What talent I have 
is for seeing the connections between things, and in finding 
a dramatic form for abstract ideas. It seems to me that my 
books are ideas-driven... " 
(Mantel 1993, p. 37) 
We labelled Hilary Mantel as a "discoverer" above in contrasting 
her method of writing with Josephine Hart's. Pinned at random on 
a notice-board, Mantel's index cards of words, phrases and ideas 
accumulate "until one day I see a sequence, a logic, begin to 
emerge" (Mantel 1993, p. 40). Mantel's discovery of a structure for 
her novel would appear to be an example of the clarification of 
thought which, according to the romantic view, only arises 
through writing without an initial plan. She also discovers her 
themes: "I tease them out through the act of writing itself" 
(Mantel 1993, p. 41). For this writer then, the category of 
"discoverer" seems to be relevant. 
2 The Research Degrees Guide produced by the Faculty of Humanities at 
Middlesex University offers the following advice to prospective research 
students: 
"As Descartes once put it, 'the things which have seemed true to me 
when I think about them, have often appeared false when I tried to 
put them down on paper'. It may well be that trying to write is the 
best way of getting yourself to think effectively. " 
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The argument for a taxonomy of writing behaviour is based 
on research into the writing strategies of academics. However, we 
have looked at the anecdotes of professional writers and found 
two writers of fiction who not only exhibit entirely opposite 
characteristics in terms of their writing strategies, but who also 
seem candidates for the categories of "planner" and "discoverer". 
For some writers, the writing of fiction might entail thought 
processes that are usually associated with writing argumentative 
texts; that is, "logical" rather than "creative" thinking (Thomson 
1959). On the other hand, although Mantel writes without a 
"plan", she discovers a structure for an emerging novel by 
accumulating notes rather than writing continuous prose, so that 
we could equally label her as a "planner" who takes a long time to 
formulate a plan. In addition, we noted that when the imagination 
is involved in the process of writing fiction, planning can be 
visually orientated rather than text-bound. 
It would therefore be unduly optimistic to assume that 
every fiction writer can be slotted into a taxonomy based on 
academic writing and whose principles remain questionable. Some 
fiction writers describe a process of writing in which a character 
"takes over", a strategy of writing that does not easily fit the 
categories of "planner" or "discoverer". Differences in writing 
behaviour among fiction writers might be related to the 
imagination in some way, and these differences may not be 
apparent in other sorts of writing. A writer may also adopt a 
different behaviour when turning from fiction to write an essay, 
or even during the same writing assignment. Finally, as Noel 
Williams points out, technology itself can also alter a writer's 
behaviour (Williams 1991a, Williams 1992a). 
These observations make the notion of a behavioural 
taxonomy an inappropriate foundation for software design. 
Bearing in mind that writers. can occupy opposite, poles of 
behaviour, designers of flexible writing software would need to 
cater for these extremes and all the intermediate categories of 
writer. But the notion of writing behaviour is based on a writer's 
preferred writing strategies. If one writer can change her 
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behaviour, then to model merely this writer one would need to 
model the variety of strategies she might adopt. While still 
bearing in mind that approaches to writing can be radically 
divergent, one cannot avoid returning to consider the strategies 
that define the behaviour. 
An alternative view of writing behaviour is that the 
categories of "planner" and "discoverer" represent pathological 
cases, while the majority of writers are both "planners" and 
"discoverers". In a paper presented to the Sixth UK Conference on 
Computers and Writing Mike Sharples suggests that "there is no 
simple continuum between discovery-type writing and planning- 
type writing" (Sharples 1993): 
"To describe Planners and Discoverers as sitting at opposite 
ends of a spectrum of writing types, would suggest that 
there are writers towards the middle of the spectrum who 
are able to merge the two approaches. " 
(Sharples 1993) 
He argues that this is not the case. Because the act of writing 
demands full attention, it is not possible to write without a 
complete engagement with the text; therefore, every writer is in 
some sense a "discoverer". Neither is it possible to simultaneously 
write and reflect; all writers must organise their ideas when they 
are not completely occupied with the text. Therefore, every writer 
is also a "planner". He describes "Planners" and "Discoverers" as 
extreme cases or "pathological writing types", whereas "for most 
writers, creativity arises from a rhythmic cycle of engagement 
and reflection" (Figure 1): 
"A writer's regular movement between production and 
reflection on the product sets up a rhythm of writing. It is 
the frequency of the writing rhythm, along with the 
proportion of time a writer spends on reflecting or engaging 
with the text, and how the writer chooses to begin the task 
(with a period of reflective planning or'with'a session of 
engaged writing) which situates the writer between the two 
poles of Discoverer and Planner. " 
(Sharpies 1993) 
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REFLECTION 
(exploring 
conceptual spaces) 
reviewing 
ENGAGEMENT 
(creating the 
written material) 
planning 
FIGURE 1: THE RHYTHM OF WRITING (Sharples 1993) 
Walter Nash has also described a rhythm of writing, a 
rhythm that is a similar sort of alternation between reflection and 
engagement, between planning or deliberating on the one hand, 
and formulating on the other: 
"For most people there are periods of deliberation or 
creative daydreaming which alternate with active efforts at 
formulation; inner phases of imaginative exercise are 
followed by outer phases of technical exploration. The 
phases are interdependent, however, and in fluent 
composition it may be that we move more or less 
rhythmically from one to the other, sometimes letting 
technique follow the thrust of, the imagination, sometimes 
training the imagination to the set of a technique. One 
process may in fact criticize the other. Formulation is a way 
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of rapidly testing the feasibility of long-deliberated notions; 
deliberation in its turn assesses the value of what has been 
formulated. 
Modes of alternation between phases must certainly 
vary from writer to writer, from text to text, and even from 
one part of a text to another. Sometimes the transitions 
between inner and outer are quite swift; the composition 
takes shape sentence by sentence, brief muttering fits of 
abstraction being succeeded by rapid forays on to paper. In 
other cases the writer will dash off whole stretches of text 
without much forethought, but devote long periods of 
deliberation to refining and correcting what he has written. 
Then again, premeditation on the work can occupy long 
hours... " 
(Nash 1980, p. 160) 
Following the classical Greek motto of "nothing in excess", Nash 
considers an imbalance of phases to be detrimental to writing and, 
like Sharples, to mark the pathological writer: 
"Experience suggests that whatever the mode of composition 
may be it is important to keep inner and outer phases in 
some sort of supportive relationship. Too much introspection 
undoubtedly paralyses the will to compose; too much 
unpondered formulation produces an aimlessly wordy 
semblance of composition, a zombie prose from which the 
governing spirit has fled. Imbalance of the inner and outer 
phases seems, in fact, to be a primary element in the 
pathology of writing, and a cause of compositional blocks. " 
(Nash 1980, p. 161) 
We concluded above that the notion of a behavioural 
taxonomy is not an appropriate basis for software design. This 
alternative view of writing behaviour leads us to a similar 
conclusion. If we consider the process of writing as a cycle of 
reflection and engagement, then differences in writing behaviour 
reflect individual variations in this rhythm of writing. Sharples 
argues that it is "the proportion of time a writer spends on 
reflecting or engaging with the text, and how the writer chooses to 
begin the task (with a period of reflective planning or with a 
session of engaged writing) which situates the writer between the 
two poles of Discoverer and Planner" (Sharples 1993). 
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Consequently, whatever a writer's point of departure and 
however a writer's rhythm may fluctuate, at some stage a writer 
can be a "planner" by "exploring conceptual spaces", while at 
another stage the same writer can also be a "discoverer" by 
"creating written material" - unless the writer is a pathological 
case. 
However, in associating the categories of "Planner" and 
"Discoverer" with reflection and engagement respectively, 
Sharples is assuming the romantic view of discovery, according to 
which "discovery is a consequence of the spontaneous spelling-out 
of ideas in continuous prose" (Galbraith 1991, p. 151). In the 
classical view, "discovery is a consequence of planned rhetorical 
organisation" or invention (Galbraith 1991, p. 151). Whether 
discovery arises from engagement or reflection is not a question 
we can answer at this stage, but in either case, the answer will not 
be inconsistent with the notion of a "rhythm of writing". The 
problem seems to be at what point of the cycle does discovery 
occur, and we shall return to this problem in chapter five, where 
we discuss planning in more detail. 
3.4 STUDENT WRITERS AND WRITING TECHNOLOGY 
Empirical evidence of a rhythm of writing can be found in a report 
on the effects of word processing on student writers (Williamson 
& Pence 1989). Williamson and Pence set out to investigate the 
question whether students revise more when using word 
processors. In their view, "the revision episodes that we observed 
in the composing of student writers using word processors seemed 
to have a rhythm unique to each writer" (Williamson & Pence 
1989, p. 114). Following Matsuhashi's use of the term tempo in her 
research into pauses in writing (Matsuhashi 1982), they use the 
same term "to describe the pace at which text is generated and 
reviewed, based on the cursor speed across the screen" (William- 
son & Pence 1989, p. 114). 
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Using Matsuhashi's method of direct observation, Williamson 
and Pence find that students generally adopt one of three 
strategies in revising, and make a distinction between "linear", 
"intermittent", and "recursive" revisers (Williamson & Pence 1989, 
p. 114). The linear reviser completes a first draft before reviewing 
and correcting, whereas the intermittent reviser interrupts the 
process of writing a first draft to make substantial corrections 
before continuing the process of writing and reviewing. Recursive 
revision is the most frequent strategy when students compose 
with a computer. This is how they describe the recursive reviser: 
"The recursive revisers evidenced shorter periods of text 
generation uninterrupted by revising than the other two 
types of revisers. As recursive revisers composed, text 
inched across the video display screen, advancing as the 
writer generated text, then retreating as the writer deleted 
before the advance of text generation again. Recursive 
revisers often tried out numerous words, phrases, clauses, or 
sentences at close intervals in the text, sometimes 
experimenting with as many as three or four different 
versions of text at a given cursor location. Based on the 
slowness of their pace, they seemed to reread constantly but 
rarely scrolled backwards more than three lines. Unlike the 
other two types of revisers, the locus of their revision 
episodes seemed to be tightly bound to the point at which 
text was being generated. One revision episode usually 
followed right after another, with all revision episodes 
embedded within the generation of text. " 
(Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 116) 
Williamson and Pence find that student writers do tend to 
revise more when using a word processor, compared with those 
writing by hand. Moreover, they distinguish between the strategy 
of the recursive reviser and that of the basic writer, who tends to 
get stuck in a syntactic quagmire: 
"At first, the description of the recursive writer seemed 
similar to the descriptions of the composing processes of 
basic writers. However, only one student In this study 
consistently demonstrated the composing behavior of a basic 
writer as it has been described in the literature.:. Unlike 
basic writers, the recursive revisers' close attention to the 
text seemed enabling rather than disabling, a productive 
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experimentation with alternate forms of larger text 
structure... " 
(Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 116) 
According to Williamson and Pence, recursive revisers plan 
regularly, adjusting their plans as they progress, and, unlike basic 
writers, "were focusing upon meaning, not linguistic forms" 
(Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 117). They conclude that "word 
processing appears to change certain students' approach to text 
production, pointing the way to greater experimentation with 
their texts" (Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 120). 
Other reports on the effects of word processing on student 
writers do not present such a positive picture. Noel Williams, for 
example, describes a situation in which students appear to think 
and write simultaneously: 
"... one fault of student word processing is, in composing at 
the keyboard, that their writing veers to the natural fluidity 
of their speech, by incorporating their speech characteristics. 
Sentences tend to be heavily rightward branching, for 
example (by which I mean that, as students type, new 
modifications and new thoughts occur and are simply tagged 
on as modifications to the current sentence). Rather than 
capturing a thought entire in a single sentence, then placing 
that sentence on the page, the thought emerges during the 
process of typing and modifications are made as the 
sentence or paragraph goes along. " 
(Williams 1992a, p. 15) 
As we mentioned in the introduction, Haas (1989) notes that word 
processing has an adverse effect on planning, while Eklundh 
(1991) finds writers unable to achieve a global view of their text 
when composing with a computer. Haas suggests that writers may 
be inhibited from considering global discourse because of a 
tendency to become immersed in local planning, - that is, planning 
words and syntax (Haas 1989, p. 184). On the other hand, Haas and 
Hayes find that "some of the most frequent complaints about the 
computer were that it caused difficulties in reading", and argue 
that reading difficulties may explain why writers are unable to 
"get a sense of their text" (Haas & Hayes 1986, p. 24). 
69 
However, in a recent paper we argued that there are three 
problems in trying to identify the effects of writing technology 
(Bloor 1995). The first is due to what Williamson and Pence call 
"the laboratory effect" (Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 105). In their 
investigation of revision strategies, they compare two groups of 
students on a writing course, one group learning to write with a 
word processor and the other without. However, they point out 
that "crucial differences emerged between the kinds of instruction 
that students received in some sections of the handwriting mode 
of instruction as compared to the word-processing mode" (Will- 
iamson and Pence 1989, p. 105). Students using word processors 
were taught in a computerised classroom, and had to write during 
class because of limited access to the machines. On the other hand, 
students using pen and paper did most of their work outside of 
class. As a result, students using computers received more tutorial 
assistance with their writing than the others. When a writing 
course involves the use of computers, the "laboratory effect" is the 
tendency for a student to perform all aspects of her writing in the 
writing laboratory. Haas notes that in this environment, students 
are under pressure to produce a text, and that planning may 
suffer as a result (Haas 1989, p. 202). A lack of planning may 
therefore be due to the laboratory effect of word processing, 
rather than the technology itself. 
The second problem is the basis for making generalisations 
about the effects of writing technology. This problem partly arises 
out of an inadequate definition of "the medium of writing", and 
partly because of the changes in technology since the earlier 
studies of the effects of word processing (Bloor 1995). Writing 
software now includes many features that were absent in, earlier 
word processors (Dorner 1992, Williams 1991a, . 1992b), and if we 
define the "medium of writing" as the writing environment rather 
than the electronic computer - an environment that consists of the 
hardware, the peripherals, and the range of software, tools 
available to the writer - then the only constant feature of the 
medium is its mutability. 
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The third problem is how do we measure the effects of 
technology? Haas' concern is to investigate what happens to 
planning (Haas 1989), while Williamson and Pence (1989) invest- 
igate what happens to revision. However, what Haas describes as 
"local planning" bears a striking similarity to what Williamson and 
Pence describe as "recursive revision". How do we explain this 
discrepancy? One explanation is that in order to measure the 
effects of a new technology, we resort to using a familiar model or 
terminology based on an older technology, but the familiar terms 
and models are no longer adequate to describe the observed 
effects. 
Following the comment that "writing software and writing 
teaching always use a model of writing" (Williams 1991a, p. 31), 
we might add that models are also found in research into the 
effects of writing technology. Williamson and Pence construct a 
model of revising to account for the behaviour they observe in 
student writers. Haas, on the other hand, seems to adopt a model 
based on observations of writing behaviour in a medium of pen 
and paper - the model of "Plan, Draft and Revise" - to assess what 
happens in the electronic medium. Studies into the effects of word 
processing seem to indicate that computers discourage the 
approach of the "Planner", but encourage the approach of the 
"Discoverer" (Bloor 1995). Haas, however, assumes that writing 
normally begins with planning, and so its initial absence is a cause 
for concern (Haas 1989, p. 204). 
In conclusion, although writing technology has an effect on 
writing behaviour, this effect will vary according to the kind of 
software tools available, the nature of the task, and the working 
environment in which the technology is used. In addition, how we 
assess those effects depends on our initial assumptions about 
writing behaviour, and on the models that we use to interpret 
empirical research. In a recent paper, we sought to identify the 
distinctive features of the computer as a medium of writing (Bloor 
1995), and the results of that inquiry can be summarised as 
follows (the Hayes and Flower model of writing, -and the opera- 
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tions that they define as planning, translating, and reviewing, are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter): 
1. Electronic text is characterised by its visual instability as a 
flickering image and its erasability. The first feature makes 
reading on-line text potentially more demanding than reading 
print, and therefore has a negative ergonomic effect on tasks that 
require sustained reading (Hulme 1984; Galer 1987, pp. 124-139; 
Grandjean 1987, pp. 55-65; Iketani 1984). When using the 
computer as a medium of writing, a writer may find reviewing 
long documents a daunting task to perform on-line, and easier 
with hard copy (Haas & Hayes 1986). 
2. While the erasability of electronic text makes the correcting 
aspect of reviewing easy, its effect on writing strategies is 
dependent on writing software. Word processing software was 
initially designed to support the strategy of "Plan, Draft and 
Revise", with the computer seen as an advanced form of 
typewriter (Williams 1991a). A writer may successfully pursue 
this model of writing using different media, for example using pen 
and paper to plan and draft and using the computer to transcribe 
and revise. Pursuing this strategy with a computer however, a 
writer may face writing software that gives little support to 
planning, and will encounter difficulties in reviewing (Haas 1989, 
Eklundh 1991, Haas & Hayes 198G). 
3. These effects of the medium can be encouraged or counteracted 
by other factors that influence writing strategies, such as the 
social environment in which technology is used. For student 
writers, the writing laboratory and teaching strategies are equally 
influential. In addition, both planning and reviewing are task 
related. For some tasks, a writer may not see any necessity to plan 
to the end or review from the beginning (Williamson & Pence 
1989). 
4. When a writer is composing with a computer, then what Hayes 
and Flower (1980a) describe as a process of translating semantics 
into syntax may be interrupted by syntactic exploration and a 
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subsequent modification of semantics (Williamson & Pence 1989). 
Together with the above factors, this aspect of composing can 
encourage a strategy of writing where the Hayes and Flower 
operations of reviewing and planning are closely related to 
translating. The presentational features of integrated writing 
software may be a further encouragement to this strategy; a sense 
of the reader can change the way a writer reads her own text, so 
that a short episode of translating is followed by episodes of 
syntactic manipulation, reviewing and planning (Williamson & 
Pence 1989). For some writers, these operations are so closely 
related that they appear to merge (Williams 1992a, p. 15). 
5. Research into the effects of word processing on writing 
behaviour may be inconclusive because of discrepancies in 
terminology; different notions of what constitutes revision, for 
example, is one explanation for the disagreements about whether 
student writers revise more when word processing. What some 
researchers describe as "local planning" (Haas 1989) is similar to 
what other researchers describe as "recursive revision" 
(Williamson & Pence 1989). Hayes and Flower's definitions of 
planning, translating, and reviewing are derived from 
observations of writers who work with pen and paper (Hayes & 
Flower 1980a); these definitions may need to be reviewed in the 
light of electronic writing behaviour. 
6. Improvements in writing technology create opportunities for 
writers to develop strategies of writing that Sharpies and 
Pemberton would describe as "techniques" in a medium of pen 
and paper (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992). For, example, the 
windows environment of many word processors enables multiple 
views of a document: different parts of the same document can be 
viewed simultaneously, and more than one document can be open 
at anytime. These features enable a writer to manipulate text in 
ways that are less feasible using pen and paper, and were more 
difficult using older writing software. For example, a writer may 
use a technique of "Cut and Paste" to copy quotes from a number 
of sources into her current document. Developing this technique as 
a strategy of writing, the same writer may choose to recycle text 
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from her previous writings as a basis for writing something new. 
Conversely, she may anticipate the use of this strategy at a later 
date and organise her current writing accordingly. 
7. While professional writers have developed their skills so that 
many have become "automatic" (Bereiter 1980), student writers 
have the advantage over professionals in that their writing 
strategies have not become habitualised. For student writers, 
there is evidence that writing technology encourages exploration 
and play. Williamson and Pence (1989, p. 100) claim that "the 
paramount finding of our study is that writing on a computer 
appears to change the way in which student writers approach 
composing"; they conclude that "student writers can benefit from 
tools which encourage them to experiment with their texts" 
(Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 122). Whether one claims that 
computers are an aid to writing as "discovery" (Galbraith 1991) 
depends on whether one takes the "romantic" view of discovery 
through spontaneity or the "classical" view of discovery through 
planning. Some would argue, at least, that word processing 
encourages spontaneity at the expense of planning (Haas 1989, 
Eklundh 1991, Williams 1992a). 
8. We concluded above that a behavioural taxonomy is 
inappropriate for modelling purposes. In addition, considerations 
of a writer's "rhythm" (Sharples 1993) led to the observation that 
all "planners" are "discoverers" at some stage of writing; likewise, 
all "discoverers" are also "planners". Although the model of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise" is based on observations of writers who work 
with pen and paper, writers still need to plan at some stage when 
working with a computer. There is therefore a need for planning 
tools, particularly where the "laboratory effect" has created a 
situation where all student writing takes place in a computerised 
writing class (Williamson & Pence 1989). However, while on-line 
support is needed for planning, we also need to take into account 
the different relationship between planning and other writing 
operations that occurs when some writers compose with a 
computer. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we began our review of current models of writing 
by discussing the notion of writing behaviour. We argued that it is 
the role of the unconscious in the process of creative writing 
which makes this process seem mysterious and not amenable to 
detailed investigation. We considered the reports of writing 
behaviour given by professional fiction writers, and found 
evidence of different approaches to writing. We compared these 
accounts with the findings of behavioural psychologists, who have 
studied the writing behaviour of academics and are trying to 
classify writers according to their behaviour. We found that two 
fiction writers seemed to fit the categories of "planners" and 
"discoverers", but this finding was not without qualification, and 
we concluded that a taxonomy of writers is not an appropriate 
basis for software design. An alternative view of writing 
behaviour is that of writing as a cyclical process of engagement 
and reflection. We discussed research into the effects of writing 
technology on the behaviour of student writers, and found further 
justification for this view of writing behaviour. We also found that 
research into technological effects often adopts a model of writing 
in order to measure effects, and concluded by summarising the 
features of the computer as a medium of writing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
COGNITIVE MODELS OF WRITING 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we discuss cognitive models of writing in more 
detail. We concentrate on two models in particular: Hayes and 
Flower's (1980a) information processing model, and Sharpies and 
Pemberton's (1992) external representation model. There are two 
reasons for concentrating on these particular models. The first is 
that they are frequently cited in the literature; the Hayes and 
Flower model has been called "the standard model accepted by 
composition theorists as well as cognitive psychologists who study 
writing" (Smith & Lansman 1989, p. 17). The second reason is that 
they provide two different answers to a question asked in the last 
chapter. There we argued that a flexible software tool should be 
able to cater for different approaches to writing, and asked how 
can a single model of writing accommodate a range of writing 
strategies? The models discussed in this chapter provide two ways 
of accommodating diverse strategies, and we begin by discussing 
the relation between writing strategies and models of writing. At 
the end of the chapter, we return to the question of modelling 
writing. 
4.2 WRITING STRATEGIES AND MODELS OF WRITING 
In the last chapter, we mentioned that many students have ideas 
about writing processes that reflect the Platonic tradition of 
possession by the muse (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 32). Flower and 
Hayes refer to these ideas as a "simple model of composing" -a 
Think and Write model. An alternative to the "Think and Write" 
model is the "Pre-write, Write and Re-write" model (Flower & 
Hayes 1980a, p. 32). This is equivalent to the model of "Plan, Draft 
and Revise", which Noel Williams names as "the most common 
implicit model of writing, found in software and teaching" 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31). Underlying this model are the assump- 
tions that writing proceeds in a linear sequence of discrete stages 
and that each stage is marked by the emergence of a certain 
product. At the end of the first stage, the writer will have 
produced an outline or a plan. In the second stage, the writer uses 
77 
the plan to produce a draft. The writer revises and corrects the 
draft In the third stage to produce the final copy. 
According to Flower and Ilayes, linear models of composing 
are based "not on a study of the process of writing, but on the 
product" (Flower & Ilayes 1980a, p. 32). A further assumption 
underlies this linear product-based model: that thinking and 
writing are separate activities. Thus the stage of "pre-writing" is 
the stage where ideas are discovered; these Ideas are then 
translated Into writing In the next stage. Against this notion. 
Flower and Ilayes cite the experience of discovering ideas through 
the act of writing itself; this is the romantic idea of "discovery" 
that we discussed in the last chapter, where the writing behaviour 
of the "discoverer" %% s compared with that of the "planner". 
However, the preferred writing strategies of the "planner" 
seem to provide an argument for the linear model of "Plan, Draft 
and Revise". Torrance and Thomas point to recent research which 
suggests that the most productive academic writers do Indeed 
adopt this method of writing (Torrance & Thomas 1993). On the 
other hand, they fall to mention that over half the academics In 
the survey to which they refer (Hartley & I3ranthwalte 1989) 
think as they write and do not follow a sequential mode of 
writing; these writers are therefore excluded from the three-stage 
model of "Plan, Draft and Revise". 
In the last chapter, we concluded that a flexible design 
should accommodate diverse writing behaviours. We concluded 
further that this aim would best be served by considering the 
strategies that define behaviour. The three-stage model of writing 
Is based on one strategy only: "flan. Draft and Revise". What other 
strategies might a flexible model of writing encompass? Sharpies 
and Pemberton list the following strategies that "research into the 
writing process has identified" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, 
p. 324): 
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" Plan, Draft and Revise - 
The writer begins by generating a plan, uses this to form a draft, 
and then checks over the draft making corrections and alterations. 
" Outline and Draft - 
The writer creates a list of section headings, in the order they 
appear on the page, and then fills them out with text. 
" Draft and Revise - 
The writer sets down a hurried stream of ideas as words on the 
page. These form both a first draft and a source of inspiration for 
further cycles of drafting and redrafting. 
" Cut and Paste - 
The writer collects together already written material, such as 
notes, quotes and extracts, and then organises and alters them to 
fit the current task. 
Sharples and Pemberton distinguish between "general 
approaches" to writing, and a specific strategy "to meet the task at 
hand" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 324). The distinction 
between "planners" and "discoverers" in writing behaviour is 
based on a writer's general approach to writing. However, a 
writer's general approach is defined by a writer's preferred 
strategy of writing. The planner might adopt the strategy of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise" or "Outline and Draft"; these variants form the 
basis of the implicit model of writing that is prevalent in teaching 
and software. The discoverer will prefer the strategy of "Draft 
and Revise". The strategy of "Cut and Paste" may presumably be 
adopted by either where it is appropriate to the task. 
How might a flexible model of writing incorporate these 
different strategies? In particular, how can a model of writing 
accommodate writing behaviours that seem to be polar opposites? 
On the one hand, a writing strategy can be described by referring 
to written text as an external object which is subject to the 
writer's manipulation and which passes through a series of 
transformations. These transformations can turn disorganised 
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notes into organised notes, notes into a plan or an outline, and an 
outline into continuous prose. The different terms used to describe 
this textual object indicate its status in relation to the final shape 
of continuous prose. This method of describing a "strategy" is 
demonstrated by the second model discussed below (Sharples & 
Pemberton 1992). On the other hand, a strategy can also be 
described by referring to the thought processes involved in the 
various transformations, such as "planning", "organising" or 
"retrieving items from long-term memory". This method of 
describing a "strategy" is demonstrated by the first model 
discussed below (Hayes & Flower 1980a). 
The process of writing involves both an internal mental 
process that we call "thinking", and the manipulation of an 
external object. While these aspects of writing may concur in 
practice, in descriptions of writing one may be emphasised more 
than the other. In the first example below, the emphasis is on 
"thinking"; in the second, the emphasis is on the manipulation of 
text as an "external representation". Consequently, the two models 
provide different accounts of writing strategies. 
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4.3 A PROCESS THEORY OF WRITING 
We mentioned above that the most common implicit model of 
writing is the three-stage model of "Plan, Draft and Revise", and 
that this model is open to three sorts of criticism (Flower & Hayes 
1980a, p. 32). Firstly, the model is based on an analysis of the 
products of writing and not the process. Secondly, the model 
assumes that writing is a linear process, and thirdly that thinking 
and writing are separate processes. 
Linda Flower and John Hayes have developed an alternative 
theory of writing (Flower & Hayes 1980a, Flower & Hayes 1981, 
Hayes & Flower 1980a, Hayes & Flower 1980b) that is the basis 
for what Mike Sharples and Lyn Pemberton call a "consensus 
model of writing" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Hayes and 
Flower present a model of writing that is derived from protocol 
analysis (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 11). In this model (Figure 2), 
the process of writing is divided into five basic operations or sub- 
processes: planning (which consists of goal-setting, generating, and 
organising), translating and reviewing. Hayes and Flower explain 
these processes as follows: 
"The function of the GENERATING process is to retrieve 
information relevant to the writing task from long-term 
memory". 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 12 ) 
Writing takes place in the task environment. This includes 
the writing assignment, which consists of the topic, the intended 
audience, and possible motivational cues, such as rewards and 
punishments. Knowledge is stored in the writer's long-term 
memory: knowledge of many topics, audiences, and different sorts 
of writings - perhaps in the form of a generalised plan such as a 
"genre scheme" (Bereiter 1980, p. 78). Initially using cues from the 
task environment about the topic" and the audience, the 
GENERATING process retrieves useful items from long-term 
memory. The output of the process may either be notes on areas 
to be written about or criteria by which to judge'the text. 
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"The function of the ORGANIZING process is to select the 
most useful of the materials retrieved by the GENERATING 
process and to organize them into a writing plan. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 14) 
While the ORGANISING process sorts the notes into a plan, the 
GOAL-SETTING process identifies and stores the criteria by which 
the text may be assessed at the reviewing stage. "Goal-setting" is 
the process that allows for individual differences in writing 
strategies, and we return to this process below. 
The function of TRANSLATING is to find the appropriate 
semantics, which is stored in memory, and to translate this into 
syntax: 
"The function of the TRANSLATING process is to take 
material from memory under the guidance of the writing 
plan and to transform it into acceptable written English 
sentences. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 15) 
Finally, the REVIEWING process consists of READING and 
EDITING. Hayes and Flower make the following distinction 
between editing and reviewing: 
"On the one hand, EDITING is triggered automatically and 
may occur in brief episodes interrupting other processes. 
REVIEWING, on the other hand, is not a spur-of-the-moment 
activity but rather one in which the writer decides to devote 
a period of time to systematic examination and improve- 
ment of the text. It occurs typically when the writer has 
finished a translation process rather than as an interruption 
to that process. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 18) 
Hayes and Flower make two assumptions concerning editing. 
The first is that the editing process has the form of a 'production 
system, which is defined as "an ordered sequence of condition- 
action rules" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 17). This is a formal way of 
representing knowledge which has frequently been used in expert 
systems technology. According to Bratko, "the language of if-then 
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rules, also called production rules, is by far the most popular 
formalism for representing knowledge" (Bratko 1986, p. 316). He 
points out that "in general, such rules are conditional statements". 
Examples of such rules are: 
" if precondition P, then postcondition Q 
" if situation X, then action Y 
" if condition A is true and condition B is true, 
then condition C is true 
In the editing example, the conditions specify both the kind of 
language to which the rule applies and a particular type of error; 
the consequent action is the means of rectifying the error. If we 
let "condition A" represent a formal sentence and "condition B" 
represent the statement "first letter of a sentence is in lower 
case", then "condition C" is equivalent to "change first letter to 
upper case". Hayes and Flower explain: 
"If the writer is producing formal sentences, this production 
will detect and correct errors in initial capitalization. 
However, if the writer is only producing notes, the 
conditions of the production will not be met and 
capitalization will be ignored. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 17) 
The second assumption concerning editing is that "the 
process is triggered automatically whenever the conditions of an 
editing production are satisfied" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 18). 
Thus, the EDITING process will interrupt any other process. The 
GENERATING process can also interrupt any other process. This 
feature of "process interrupts" distinguishes this model from a 
linear one: 
"We are not saying that writing proceeds in order through 
successive stages of PLANNING, TRANSLATING, and 
REVIEWING... The model is recursive and allows for a 
complex intermixing of stages... the whole writing process of 
PLANNING, TRANSLATING, and REVIEWING, may appear as 
a part of an EDITING sub-process. Because EDITING can 
interrupt any other process, these processes can appear 
within any other process. " (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 29) 
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As an example of recursion, Hayes and Flower mention a 
writer who, on editing a first draft, "recognised that the reader 
would not have sufficient context to understand the relation 
between two sentences" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 18). As a result, 
"the writer constructed a small explanatory essay to insert 
between the sentences" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 18). In this case 
then, editing invoked the processes of planning, translating and 
reviewing. 
In their summary of what is new about this model of 
writing, Hayes and Flower claim: 
"In particular, it specifies an organisation that is goal 
directed and recursive, that allows for process interrupts, 
and that can account for individual differences. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 29) 
How does this model of writing account for individual differences 
in writing behaviour? According to Hayes and Flower, the entire 
writing process is controlled by a "monitor"; in a similar model, 
this is referred to as a "high-level executive" (Bereiter 1980, p. 78). 
Like the editing process, this monitor has the form of a production 
system. In this case, the production system has ten rules, four of 
which are concerned with setting goals. A writer's goal is one of 
the four processes of generating, organising, translating or 
reviewing. Any writing strategy will involve, at some stage, these 
four processes. A set of production rules for goal setting 
determines when these processes occur. Thus, this model of 
writing accounts for individual variation by the diverse conditions 
that can trigger each process. 
The production rules are of three kinds. Firstly, a pair of 
rules state that the editing and generating processes may 
interrupt any other process; these two rules take priority over 
goal-setting rules. Secondly, there are four rules which state that 
once a goal has been set, the writer will persist with this goal 
unless it is interrupted by conditions which trigger the editing or 
generating processes. Following the interrupt, the writer will 
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return to the original goal. The third group of four rules relate to 
goal setting and here, Hayes and Flower offer four variations or 
"configurations". 
As an example, the authors describe four methods of writing 
an essay. At one extreme, we have the writer who tries to produce 
a perfect first sentence, followed by a perfect second sentence, 
and so on: "the work of planning, translating and reviewing each 
sentence is completed before the writer proceeds to the next 
sentence" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 19). At the other extreme, "a 
draft is planned and then written out in full before any review 
takes place" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 19). 
There are two problems with this explanation of how 
writing processes are monitored. The first concerns the specific 
claim that it can account for individual variation. Is a set of rules 
the property of an individual writer, or a group of writers? The 
example implies that each of the four sets of rules is common to a 
group of writers. Indeed, Hayes and Flower cite evidence of 
writing behaviour that corresponds to two of the four config- 
urations. But does this mean there are only four sorts of writer? 
Are these examples intended to be exclusive? One can imagine not 
only other combinations of the given rules, but also alternative 
rules; that is, other conditions which fire the processes. Can the 
rules ever change, or is the production system like some sort of 
genetic imprint and permanently encoded? If the latter is the 
case, then writing behaviour must be a fixed characteristic, like 
brown hair or green eyes. 
The second problem with this explanation is more general 
and concerns the account of writing as a goal-driven process. The 
notion that writing is a goal-orientated activity has become 
absorbed into what Sharples and Pemberton call the "consensus 
model of writing" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Elsewhere, 
Flower and Hayes write about goals in relation to "solving a 
rhetorical problem" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, Flower & Hayes 
1980b). In this model of writing however, we are given two 
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explanations of the process of goal setting, and the two accounts 
are inconsistent. 
In the first place, goal setting is explained as a sub-process 
of planning. The output of the generating process can include 
criteria by which to judge the text at the reviewing stage; the goal 
setting process identifies and stores these criteria. Here, the 
"goals" are related to the "rhetorical goals" that Flower and Hayes 
describe elsewhere (Flower & Hayes 1980b). As the writing 
process is recursive, planning can occur more than once during the 
same assignment, and so these goals can be reviewed and revised. 
In the second place, the rules for goal setting belong to the 
production system that constitutes the monitor. This monitor 
determines the entire process of writing including planning and 
goal setting. In this context, the goals are the processes 
themselves. The configuration of the monitor as a set of 
production rules determines what conditions will activate a goal 
or process. These rules and conditions are general and make no 
specific reference to the writing assignment. Hayes and Flower 
offer no explanation whether the rules themselves can change; in 
their account, it is only the goal as process that changes. As we 
mentioned above, the rules seem to be encoded like some sort of 
DNA that perpetually determines a writer's behaviour. 
Hence we have two sorts of goals. On the one hand, the goals 
that are set by the planning process do not have any influence on 
the monitor and are not integrated into the production system. On 
the other hand, the goals that are set by the monitor are the 
processes themselves, and these include planning. In other words, 
while the process of planning sets goals, it is also a goal in itself, 
and is subject to the production rules of the monitor. What might 
happen when a goal set by the planning process comes into 
conflict with a goal set by the monitor? One way of resolving this 
conflict is by the distinction between meta-cognitive and cognitive 
activities, as we shall see in the next chapter, but the Hayes and 
Flower model does not make this distinction. 
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In summary then, there are two problems with this 
explanation of how writing processes are monitored. The first is 
the claim that this explanation can account for differences in 
writing behaviour; as we have seen, this account is inadequate. 
The second problem is one of consistency in their accounts of 
writing as a goal-driven activity. Both these problems are 
associated with the representation of writing as a knowledge- 
based system, consisting of a set of production rules that 
determine a writer's strategy. Indeed, this process theory of 
writing exemplifies the computational models of cognition that we 
discussed in chapter two. Turning from the specific criticism of 
how writing processes are monitored, let's now consider their 
theory in general. 
Firstly, what sort of model does this process theory of 
writing provide? According to Hayes and Flower, the model is a 
"cognitive model of writing" or a "model of writing as a cognitive 
process". But this description blurs an important distinction 
between the two aspects of modelling that are involved here. 
Modelling writing as. a cognitive process is one, and modelling a 
cognitive process is another. Cognitive processes themselves need 
models, and these models can be quite different. As we explained 
in chapter two, models of cognitive processes have evolved with 
developments in computer architecture. Initially, psychologists 
modelled the human as an "information processor"; these models 
reflect the function of first generation computers; which were 
generally restricted to data processing. In these models, a process 
receives input data, transforms it in some way, and passes on 
output data to the next process in the system. Hayes and Flower's 
model of writing follows this pattern; writing is presented as a 
kind of information processing. The structure of their model 
resembles a computer architecture, and a series of flow charts 
indicate the flow of information around the system. Calling their 
model a "cognitive model of writing" hides this assumption: that 
information processing models of cognition are the only cognitive 
models. 
88 
If one models writing as a kind of information processing, 
then each process in the system will require an input and produce 
an output. In their critique of models of writing, Flower and 
Hayes refer to the "product" and the "process" as though the two 
were at loggerheads. Yet, much like William Blake's God and Satan, 
the two are usually found hand in hand. The notion of one implies 
a notion of the other, and, although Flower and Hayes prioritise 
the process, the product has a nasty habit of sneaking in through 
the back door. For example, the generating process receives an 
input in the form of an essay topic and "may produce notes", 
typically "single words or sentence fragments". The organising 
process turns these notes into other notes; the latter "often have 
an organizational form" of a plan or an outline. Each process 
receives an input and produces an output; both input and output 
are some sort of textual representation, or "product". 
Indeed, the products in this model are more clearly 
differentiated than the processes themselves. For example, the 
generating process involves searching the memory and 
"evaluating the usefulness of a retrieved element". The organising 
process involves the ordering of notes, and "evaluating the 
usefulness of a topic". While both processes involve the same 
operation of "evaluating the usefulness", the respective inputs and 
outputs are clearly different. It Is therefore easier to identify the 
processes in this model by the type of product that they 
manipulate, than to identify them by any distinctive properties 
that they themselves possess. Like the contents of the "black box" 
which often features in this sort of model (Boulay, O'Shea & Monk 
1981), the process remains a mystery, although its input and 
output may be well-defined. 
In addition to processes that are insufficiently differ- 
entiated, there are other mysteries in this model of writing. For 
example, although Flower and Hayes have a notion of "discovery 
through writing", there is no obvious way that this can be 
achieved within their model. The process of translation is one of 
finding the appropriate semantics, which is stored in memory, and 
translating this into syntax: 
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"The function of the translating process is to take material 
from memory under the guidance of the writing plan and to 
transform it into acceptable written English sentences. We 
assume that material in memory is stored as propositions 
but not necessarily as language. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a) 
As the semantics of a proposition already exist in memory, the 
writer's task is merely to locate it and then to transcribe it into 
syntax. Yet the romantic school of discovery would claim that 
semantics can be created, or modified at least, through "the 
spontaneous spelling-out of ideas in continuous prose" (Galbraith 
1991, p. 151). Moreover, according to Williamson and Pence's 
(1989) account of students composing with a computer, the 
recursive reviser works equally in the other direction, from 
syntactic manipulation to semantic exploration. How this can be 
achieved in the model is unclear. 
In a similar fashion, although Flower and Hayes criticise the 
separation of "thinking" and "writing", there is no indication in 
their model of how the two might be related; they remain 
separate processes. While "writing" is a translation of semantics 
into syntax, "thinking" is merely the search for information. This 
occurs in translation, and in generation, whose function "is to 
retrieve information relevant to the writing task from long-term 
memory". This reduction of "thinking" to information retrieval 
goes hand in hand with a particular notion of memory. In this 
model of writing, memory plays a passive role; its function is to 
store information, which is retrieved at the appropriate stage. 
In short, the model excludes the possibility of "discovery 
through writing", and any connection between "thinking" and 
"writing". Moreover, Hayes and Flower's representation of writing 
as information processing has the following consequences: a notion 
of "writing" as the translation of semantics into syntax, the 
reduction of "thinking" to information retrieval, and a passive 
role for the memory. 
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There is a further consequence of this information 
processing model: a text becomes pure information, of the same 
status and as undifferentiated as the information which is 
retrieved from long-term memory. Emphasising "process" while 
neglecting the "product", Hayes and Flower have no notion of a 
text as an entity that might exercise a continuous influence on the 
writing process. In their account, "the task environment includes 
everything outside the writer's skin that influences the 
performance of the task" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 12). Once 
writing has begun, this environment includes "the text which the 
writer has produced so far". Yet, in the model, the reviewing 
process is the only process where this text becomes an object of 
manipulation; notes do not appear to be "external" in the same 
way. Although Hayes and Flower differentiate between notes on 
the text and the text itself, the model does not entertain any 
notion of a meta-language that a writer may consciously use to 
manipulate a text. 
Apart from the absence of "textual interaction" (Holt 1989) 
in this model, there is a further significant omission, and that is 
the medium of writing. Patrik Holt refers to this model as "dated" 
(Holt 1989, p. 53), and these two absences can be explained by the 
context of computer technology at the time when Hayes and 
Flower were developing their model. Given that cognitive models 
have tended to follow computer architecture, then it is not 
surprising that an information processing model of writing does 
not mention the medium of writing. While technology had yet to 
produce microcomputers and interactive computing was still in its 
infancy, cognitive models would be data processing ones at the 
same time as word processing was not generally -available. It is 
the development of the latter that has significantly enhanced a 
writer's ability to interact with her text, as noted by Williamson 
and Pence (1989). The model does not mention the medium 
because, in the late seventies, it would have been safe to assume a 
medium of pen and paper. 
Finally, there is another significant absence in the model. 
Apart from the presence of the "genre scheme" in long-term 
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memory, there is no indication that different sorts of writing 
might influence writing processes. The function of a "genre 
scheme" is a further mystery; we have seen that the role 
attributed to the memory is purely passive. In the model, the task 
environment includes the writing assignment, but this latter is 
constantly referred to as an essay topic. Hayes and Flower assume 
that "writing" means "writing essays". 
Let's now summarise the above comments: 
" To allow for individual difference in writing behaviour, 
Hayes and Flower suggest that the writing process is monitored by 
a knowledge-based system which has four configurations. 
However, there is no provision in this system for changing the 
rules, and the explanation of writing strategies is inadequate. 
Moreover, they offer two accounts of goals which are inconsistent. 
" In presenting a model of writing as a "cognitive model", 
Hayes and Flower obscure the distinction between two sorts of 
modelling; their model is essentially an information processing 
model of writing. 
" In a model of this sort, process and product are bound 
together. 
" In this model, products are more clearly differentiated 
than processes. Although Flower and Hayes criticise models of 
writing that emphasise the product, their description of writing 
as information processing is an inadequate explanation of process. 
Ironically, the processes in this model can be distinguished by the 
products that they manipulate. 
" In this description of writing as information processing, 
"writing" is the translation of semantics into syntax, "thinking" is 
the retrieval of information, and the memory plays a passive role 
as a data bank. Consequently, this model cannot explain how 
discovery through writing can be achieved, nor can it suggest 
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corresponding ways in which thinking and writing might be 
related. 
" The status of the text in this model is reduced to a sort of 
undifferentiated information; the model does not entertain any 
notion of interacting with a text (Holt 1989). 
" There is no mention of the medium of writing in the 
model; nor is there any indication how different sorts of writing 
might influence the writing process. 
Must we then conclude that the account of writing given by 
this model is utterly inadequate? Despite the above comments, the 
Hayes and Flower model is the basis for what Sharples and 
Pemberton describe as a "consensus model of writing" (Sharples & 
Pemberton 1992, p. 326) and is a regular point of reference in 
current writing research (Levy & Ransdell 1994, Winter 1994, 
Milian 1994, Torrance 1994). Two American researchers claim 
that "for more than a decade, a considerable body of research in 
writing has been guided by a model developed by Hayes and 
Flower" (Levy & Ransdell 1994, p. 122), while a German researcher 
comments: "Since Hayes and Flower have presented their famous 
process model of writing, it is obvious that text producing is a 
cognitive activity" (Winter 1994, p. 183). Smith and Lansman 
write: "In 1980, John Hayes and Linda Flower first outlined what 
has since become the standard model accepted by composition 
theorists as well as cognitive psychologists who study writing" 
(Smith & Lansman 1989, p. 17). Describing this consensus, Sharples 
and Pemberton write: 
"The picture of cognition and writing that has emerged from 
the past ten years of research is of a goal-directed task 
governed by multiple constraints. There is no simple 
progression from one stage to another, but instead a cycle of 
planning, text generation' and revision, with the written 
words acting as triggers for further planning. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 325) 
However, the connection between the model that we have just 
discussed and this consensus is somewhat mysterious. We have 
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shown that Flower and Hayes give inconsistent accounts of goals, 
and although they write about constraints elsewhere (Flower & 
Hayes 1980a), these constraints do not figure in the model itself 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a). In addition, the notion of writing as a 
"cycle" has more in common with the "rhythm of writing" 
(Sharples 1993) than the Hayes and Flower model. 
Sharples and Pemberton go on to describe the implications 
of the model for teaching and software design, and, here again, 
these implications have a mysterious connection with the model 
that we have just discussed. The first implication is that "students 
need to learn not only what to write, but also how to write" 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 325) - but does the model show us 
how to write? The second implication is that teachers need "a 
meta-language to communicate with the student about writing 
operations... and to describe the structure of plans and texts" - but 
does the model feature such a meta-language? Thirdly, the 
teacher should promote ways of writing as discovery - but we 
have shown that the model excludes the possibility of discovery. 
Fourthly, the teacher should note that each writer will adopt her 
own approach to writing - but Hayes and Flower do not give an 
explanation of writing strategies that can account for individual 
difference. In short, it is impossible to arrive at these conclusions 
on the basis of the Hayes and Flower model. Indeed, Sharples and 
Pemberton respond to the model's deficiencies by inventing 
another one, which is the subject of the next section. 
In the light of these observations, we might conclude that 
the Hayes and Flower model has a fanciful relation to the 
consensus that Sharples and Pemberton describe. I Yet, given the 
frequent references to this model in current writing research, we 
cannot avoid searching for some way in which the model might 
meet with common approval. Our last criticism above was that the 
model does not take into account different types of writing or 
I Attempts to clarify this relation are not aided by 'an ambiguity in the 
authors' use of the term "consensus= model". On the one hand, the 
"consensus model" is the result of ten years of research, but on the other 
hand, the "consensus 'model" that Sharples and Pemberton seek to extend is 
clearly identifiable as this Flower and Hayes model. 
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writing technology. However, in the model's defence, we might 
respond by describing it as a model of writing operations of a 
general sort that can be performed in any medium and are 
independent of the genre of writing. Is this the case? Let's look 
again at the three major operations that Hayes and Flower 
identify: planning, translating and reviewing. 
Planning consists of goal setting, organising and generating. 
Two of these processes are thinking processes that do not 
necessarily produce writing: goal setting is associated with a 
writer's motivation, while generating involves the retrieval of 
propositions from memory. If we extend the definition of 
generating to include the retrieval of other items from memory, 
then "planning" could include the sort of visualisation or mental 
planning that can motivate or influence the writing of fiction. In 
addition, goal setting may produce notes on the text to be written, 
and in that respect is similar to organising, which entails the 
externalisation of thought in the form of written plans or outlines. 
While the organising process may be more active in the 
development of arguments, this notion of planning as a whole, 
which we can summarise as "thinking and note taking", is wide 
enough to accommodate different types of writing and diverse 
technologies. Translating and reviewing are not only mental 
processes but require the management of external text. 
Translating is the operation that produces syntax, while reviewing 
consists of reading and editing. We can summarise these two 
operations as "writing, reading, and revising". Like planning, these 
operations are so comprehensive that their performance is 
inevitable, whatever the medium or type of writing. 
In conclusion then, we can describe the Hayes and Flower 
model as a model of writing operations of a general sort that can 
be performed in any medium and are independent of the genre of 
writing. This description seems to be a way of siting the model as 
the basis for a "consensus model of. writing" (Sharples & 
Pemberton 1992, p. 326). However; our summary of these 
operations leads us to re-label them as "thinking", "writing" 
(which Includes note taking and revising), and "reading". In other 
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words, the basis for a consensus is the observation that all writing 
involves thinking, writing and reading. Moving beyond this 
consensus, we would like to know how those activities are related; 
the answer to this question may vary with types of writing and 
writing technology. If we model writing as information processing, 
then the activities of thinking, writing and reading are confined to 
the data processing roles that this type of model imposes on them. 
Despite Flower and Hayes' criticism of the three-stage model of 
composing, a data processing model also imposes relations of 
sequentiality, and the result is a logical sequence of thinking, 
writing and reading -a model of writing that we can summarise 
as "Plan, Draft and Revise". 
4.4 WRITING STRATEGIES AND EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS 
Sharpies and Pemberton discuss a model of writing that aims to 
"rationalise and extend" what they call the "consensus model of 
writing" (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 326). The "consensus 
model" is a composite model, a general picture which the authors 
describe by summarising the results of ten years research into 
cognition and writing. It is also based on the Hayes and Flower 
model (Hayes & Flower 1980a). In addition, Sharples and 
Pemberton take into account recent research into writing 
behaviour, and the differences in general approaches that we 
discussed in the last chapter. 
Four limitations of the model are noted. Three of these 
limitations have already been mentioned. Firstly for example, 
Sharpies and Pemberton comment on the absence of the medium 
of writing: "the model does not account for the characteristics of 
different media-and the ways that these affect the practice of 
writing" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 326). A second limitation 
is the explanation of writing strategies, whose inadequacy we 
discussed above. As Sharpies and Pemberton remark, "the model 
offers no indication whether the list of writing approaches and 
strategies... Is complete, nor does it provide a framework within 
which to place them". Thirdly, our comment on the status of the 
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text as a sort of undifferentiated information is reflected in their 
observation that the model does not specify the various 
"representations of the text at each stage of its construction". 
Sharples and Pemberton's response to these limitations 
gives their model its distinctive feature. In their model, 
"representations of the text" play a central role and are used to 
describe writing strategies in relation to diverse media. However, 
this response is also guided by the fourth limitation of the 
"consensus model", which is the absence of a "clear distinction 
between mental structures and analogous ones on an external 
medium"; they point out that "physical marks are not ideas" 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Having distinguished 
between "mental structures" and "representational structures", 
Sharples and Pemberton then use the latter as the basis for a 
description of writing. We said above that writing is both a mental 
process that we generally call "thinking", and the manipulation of 
an external object. In this model, the latter aspect is emphasised. 
According to Sharpies and Pemberton, the process of writing 
is an activity which involves the symbolic representation of ideas 
in diverse external media (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, pp. 326- 
328). A writer may use a number of writing surfaces for recording 
ideas, keeping notes and writing continuous prose. These include 
paper note-pads, plastic marker-boards and electronic computer. 
Some may be more suited to the particular task at hand, and 
consequently some may be more associated with particular 
"representational structures". Sharpies and Pemberton define a 
representational structure by two typologies: firstly, of "text 
items", and secondly, of "views". They identify two main types of 
text item. The first is "instantiated" and has "the status of a piece 
of connected prose"; they call such items "notes" but point out that 
this category can include an entire document. The second item is 
"unInstantiated" and serves as an "idea-label" which acts "both as 
an index to a mental schema and as a place-holder for a piece of 
text that has still to be created". A third type of item is 
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"annotational", where the writer comments on other text items. 
Type of item 
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UNINSTANTIATED INSTANTIATED 
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Brainstorming Note-taking (verbatim) 
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C4 o Representations: Representations: 
Idea-labels Notes 
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Revising text 
Z Representations: Copying text 
w -0C List of idea-labels Representations: 
ao Table of contents Linear text 
FIGURE 3: 
EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE WRITING PROCESS 
They also identify three types of "views" or "arrangements of 
items on a page or screen": 
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"The items may be unordered, for instance when a writer 
creates an unsorted set of topics during a brainstorming 
session. They may be formed into a non-linear structure, 
such as an associative network or a taxonomic tree. Or they 
may be arranged linearly, as a series of words.... The two 
dimensions, of instantiation and view type, characterise a 
writer's representation of items on some external medium. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 328) 
The "representational structures" defined by these two 
typologies are the "external representations" that a writer 
manipulates during the process of writing. Figure 3 shows this 
framework for describing the writing process. 
Sharples and Pemberton go on to explain that the various 
writing strategies outlined above "can each be described in terms 
of transitions from box to box, or from representation to 
representation" (Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 329). Thus, 
although the normal goal of a writer is box six, there are various 
routes to get there. For example, the strategy of "Outline and 
Draft" is a movement from box five to box six, whereas the 
strategy of "Draft and Revise" is carried out entirely within box 
six. The strategy of "Plan, Draft and Revise" is a movement from 
box three to box six, while the strategy of "Cut and Paste" is a 
movement from box two to box six via box four. In the last 
chapter, we referred to the notion of writing behaviour as a cycle 
of engagement and reflection, a cycle that Sharples calls the 
"rhythm of writing" (Sharples 1993). Alluding to this rhythm, 
Sharpies and Pemberton point out here that "progression through 
the grid rarely happens just once". 
In comparison with these general approaches, a "technique" 
is "a means of creating all or part of a representational structure, 
such as a list of idea-labels or a network of notes", and "each type 
of representation will lend itself to a variety of creative 
techniques" (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 330). Techniques can 
be carried out using a variety of methods, where a method is 
defined as "a technique conducted on a particular medium". 
Sharples and Pemberton then go on to review the properties of 
various media in terms of the techniques that they support. For 
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example, the browsing of large documents is supported by a word 
processor and sheets of paper, but not by sticky notelets. 
Techniques include the following: 
" Brainstorming - 
The writer jots down notes without worrying how to 
organise them. 
" Following a thread - 
The writer creates a conceptual network around a topic, in 
the form of sub-topics, expansions, examples and definitions. 
" Filling a template - 
The writer recalls a template for a plot, event, or argument 
from long-term memory and then fills it out. 
The authors conclude with the claim that "the model can 
inform both the teaching of writing and the design of computer- 
based tools to support the writing process" (Sharpies & Pemberton 
1992, p. 335). In the last chapter, we concluded that flexible 
writing software should be able to accommodate a range of 
general approaches. We concluded further that this aim would 
best be served by considering the strategies that define 
behaviour. Sharples and Pemberton follow a similar path, 
distinguishing firstly between "general approaches" or "global 
strategies", and "specific strategies", chosen "to meet the task at 
hand". Here, a writer's behaviour is defined -by her general 
approach, with "planners" and "discoverers" occupying opposite 
poles of the behavioural spectrum, while specific strategies 
include the now familiar "Plan, Draft and Revise". They then make 
a second distinction; that Is, between a "strategy" and a 
"technique". Sharples and Pemberton then explore the methods 
that a writer might adopt in applying techniques to diverse media, 
and the "external representations" which result. In theory, if a 
design can incorporate the features of diverse media and 
accommodate a range, of "representational structures", then it 
should be able to accommodate a range of general approaches to 
writing. 
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At this point however, in considering the model from the 
perspective of a student writer of fiction, we discover that it 
raises some questions that remain unanswered. For example, what 
is the effect of genre on external representations? Are some 
representations preferable for particular types of writing? Would 
a student writer of fiction use the same representations as an 
experienced writer of academic papers? Is the list of represent- 
ations complete? 
In order to compare types of writing and describe 
differences between texts, we need to use some sort of meta- 
language. This requirement is also recognised by Sharpies and 
Pemberton: 
"An important aspect of the teaching of writing should be to 
describe the process of writing... This means developing a 
meta-language to communicate with the student about 
writing operations, strategies and approaches and to 
describe the structure of plans and texts. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 325) 
Elsewhere, Mike Sharples argues that the development of a meta- 
language is a stage of development in writing, a stage which is 
necessary in order for the child to gain conscious control of her 
language (Sharples 1985). However, a meta-language that 
describes the structure of texts may not be the same as one that 
describes writing operations. The meta-language that Sharples 
and Pemberton adopt here is one of "representations": "views", 
"instantiations", and so on. While this meta-language is designed 
to describe writing operations, a meta-language that describes 
textual structure has a linguistic foundation, as Jonathan Culler 
points out (Culler 1975). This sort of meta-language is absent from 
the model. 
According to Noel Williams, the absence of linguistics is "a 
common feature of cognitive models of writing. Criticising their 
adequacy, he writes: 
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"For example, writing can be viewed as a linguistic activity, 
a business of presenting words in appropriate linguistic 
form. If the cognitive model says nothing about how 
linguistic items are chosen, or how the conditioning factor of 
'appropriateness' works, that model will be to that extent 
inadequate. " 
(Williams 1991a, p. 40) 
The absence of linguistics in this model is accompanied by a 
rejection of textual analysis. In describing the "consensus model", 
Sharples and Pemberton point to a "shared conviction that we can 
find more about how people write by observing writers in action 
than by analysing finished texts" (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, 
p. 320). While this may be the case, it is difficult to describe 
textual structure without utilising the results of some sort of 
textual analysis. Moreover, the process model of writing, which 
Sharples and Pemberton aim to extend, is based on the results of 
protocol analysis, and this involves the analysis of writers' texts 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a). A hostility to the text may be a reflection 
of the emphasis on "process" rather than "product", and, in this 
emphasis, Sharples and Pemberton follow Flower and Hayes. Here, 
the consequence is not a failure to consider the product, but a 
particular way of describing it, and with this method of 
description, the text itself becomes insignificant. 
Another question which the model leaves unanswered is 
whether there are any links between mental structures, textual 
structures and representational structures. In the last section, we 
referred to the assumption made by product based models that 
thinking and writing are separate processes (Flower & Hayes 
1980a). Here, however, Sharples and Pemberton claim such a 
separation as an advantage of their model: 
"One advantage of the six box framework is that it allows an 
explicit distinction to be made between those' processes 
which a writer carries out on an external medium, and those 
which are performed mentally, or by=passed altogether. " 
(Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, p. 329) 
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Sharples and Pemberton thus perpetuate the distinction between 
thinking (as a process that involves "mental structures") and 
writing (as a process that involves the manipulation of 
"representational structures" or "representations of the text"). In 
this separation of "mental structures" and "representational 
structures", what connections might exist between the two are 
unclear. Although Noel Williams characterises this model as "a 
cognitive model with some behavioural components" (Williams 
1991a, p. 40), Sharples and Pemberton leave mental structures 
unexplored. Indeed, a recent summary of the model makes the 
comment: 
"Briefly, the model says that what goes on inside writers' 
heads is too difficult to analyze reliably: the processes are 
too complex, and are interfered with by observation. " 
(Headland 1994, pp. 12-13) 
However, in the assertion that we can understand writing by 
observing what writers do and what objects they work with, their 
approach to writing is similar to behavioural studies. Using this 
model, writing strategies can be inferred by tracing routes across 
the map of external representations. On the one hand, this makes 
it possible to imagine new strategies of writing by following 
untraversed routes across this map: 
"A further advantage is that the various strategies already 
identified by Flower and Hayes and others can be set in a 
broader context, so that they can be seen as possible choices 
of route out of a finite set of such choices, rather than an ad 
hoc listing. Other possible strategies now readily present 
themselves... " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 329) 
On the other hand, the exclusion of thinking processes from the 
model makes it impossible to imagine new representations of 
writing by following a deductive route that moves in the reverse 
direction. Instead of starting with representations and going on to 
infer strategies, we might consider how writing strategies relate to 
thinking processes, and then go on to explore the possibility of 
using technology to create new sorts of representations, and new 
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strategies of writing. If we use current types of representations to 
make inferences about writing strategies, then that possibility is 
not open to us. Following Sharples and Pemberton's method of 
inference, we can only discover a new strategy by traversing 
routes across the map of current types of representations. If this 
list is complete, then so is a list of strategies. 
4.5 MODELLING WRITING 
Having looked at examples of behavioural and cognitive models, 
we can now return to the question of what might constitute a 
model of writing. For a model to be as comprehensive as possible, 
Noel Williams identifies "four aspects of the writing process one 
would need to model": the physical process itself, behavioural 
elements, cognitive processes, and social and cultural processes 
(Williams 1991a, pp. 29-30). His major criticism of current models 
is that researchers have tended to concentrate on one of these 
elements while neglecting the others; consequently, models of 
writing are biased towards a certain perspective. 
In prescribing a list of ingredients and then comparing 
current models with this list, Williams follows a reverse path to 
the one we have just traversed. In chapter two, we referred to 
this method as moving from prescription to description. Compared 
with Williams' list of ingredients, any current model is bound to 
have shortcomings; the comprehensive model that he outlines 
does not exist. However, should a model of writing have to be this 
comprehensive? For example, Williams offers no guidelines on 
how one might model writing as a "social and cultural process", 
nor is this feature an obvious aspect of the software whose design 
Williams describes elsewhere (Williams' 1989, Williams 1991b). In 
relation to software design, modelling serves a specific purpose. 
Consequently, a biased perspective can sometimes be explained 
by looking at the purpose of the model. 
From the perspective of human-computer interface design, 
Sutcliffe identifies various types of "user models": 
104 
"User models come in several varieties depending on the 
interest of the authors. The terminology is further confused 
by ambiguity about who constructs the model, and what is 
being modelled. User models can be inside the user's head 
(often called mental models), the designer's idea of what is 
inside the user's head (conceptual models), and finally a 
piece of software enshrining the designer's model. " 
(Sutcliffe 1988, p. 56) 
The various types "current in the human-computer interface 
literature" include "theoretical cognitive models constructed by 
psychologists in order to understand human mental processes" 
and "models of user knowledge", which attempt to capture "the 
knowledge categories in a domain and the inter-relationships 
between the categories" (Sutcliffe 1988, p. 57). Here, a theoretical 
cognitive model is concerned with "human information processing" 
in general, and might include processes such as attention, 
perception and memory. Such a model may provide general 
guidelines for human-computer interface design. "Models of user 
knowledge" are inspired by computer based training and 
embedded in software; these models are concerned with a more 
specific domain of knowledge. 
Another sort of more specific modelling is concerned with 
"the user's model of a system structure"; these models are 
referred to as "user views" (Sutcliffe 1988, p. 58). This is the sort 
of modelling a systems analyst will undertake during the initial 
stage of system design. According to Sutcliffe, "user views are the 
way in which users describe and visualise the structure of the 
current system". A "system" can be manual or electronic. For 
example, a systems analyst might be faced with the task of 
converting a manual filing system to an electronic system, or 
making improvements to an established electronic, system. At this 
stage, the analyst will also develop another sort of specific model, 
which is concerned with "the user's concept of how a task is 
constructed in terms of its functions and operational sequence"; 
these models are referred to as "user task models" (Sutcliffe 1988, 
p. 57). If the analyst's assignment is to improve an established 
system, then she may re-organise this specification to produce a 
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more logical sequence of operations or a more comprehensible 
interface. 
How do these various models relate to the modelling of 
writing? In developing their process model, Flower and Hayes use 
the method of protocol analysis to identify writing operations 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a). At this stage, their approach to writing is 
similar to the systems analyst developing a "user task model". 
Here, however, it is not feasible to develop a "task model" in the 
same way as the analyst developing conventional systems. The 
operations themselves are not obvious, and the sequence in which 
they are performed is a variable factor that allows for differences 
in writing strategies. Despite these difficulties, Flower and Hayes 
succeed in identifying a set of writing operations, and provide a 
context for them; the operations are informed by the task 
environment and the writer's long-term memory. However, we 
now face the problems that we discussed above, of how these 
components are connected and how the entire process operates. In 
modelling writing as a cognitive process, Flower and Hayes turn to 
the "theoretical cognitive model" as their model. Consequently, 
they assume that writing is like information processing, and can 
be modelled in the same way as human attention or perception. 
Sharpies and Pemberton are "broadly in agreement" with 
this process model but aim "to rationalise and extend it" (Sharpies 
& Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Having noted the limitations that we 
discussed above, they respond by modelling writing as the 
handling of external representations. If we continue with the 
analogy between modelling writing and systems analysis, then 
this model has closer affinities with a "user view" rather than a 
"user task model". The relationship between the Sharpies and 
Pemberton model and the Flower and Hayes model is therefore 
similar to that between a "user view" and a "user task model"; the 
two are complementary. Just as the analyst might develop both 
sorts of model, in modelling writing we need both .a model of 
writing operations and a model of the external representations 
that a writer manipulates. 
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If we now return to the criticism that current models of 
writing are not comprehensive and offer a biased perspective, 
then we can respond by saying that, from the perspective of 
human-computer interface design, specific models are needed. 
"User views" and "user task models" both serve a specific purpose, 
and models of representations and operations are complementary. 
Our criticism is not that these models are too biased and 
uncomprehensive, but rather that they are either too general and 
not specific enough in relation to types of writing, or claim to be 
general when they are biased towards the writing of essays. 
When we compared the anecdotes of professional fiction 
writers with the findings of behavioural psychologists, we 
concluded that a taxonomy of "planners" and "discoverers" could 
only loosely be applied to the process of writing fiction. We said 
that when the imagination is involved in this process, planning 
can be visually orientated rather than text-bound. We also 
concluded that differences in writing behaviour among fiction 
writers may be related to the imagination, and that these 
differences may not be apparent in other sorts of writing. We also 
noted that a writer might adopt different behaviours for different 
types of writing. We concluded therefore that a behavioural 
taxonomy did not provide a useful basis for modelling; the logic of 
a rigid taxonomy is that different sorts of software need to be 
created for different categories of writer. 
On the other hand, if we adopt the notion of a "rhythm of 
writing" (Sharpies 1993) instead of a taxonomy of behaviour, then 
we can accommodate different behaviours by modelling the sorts 
of activities that are common to the majority of writers. While 
Sharpies and Pemberton (1992) take behaviour into account, they 
do not use it as a basis for modelling. They distinguish between a 
behaviour that is defined as a general approach, a strategy and a 
technique. For modelling purposes, it is not the general approach 
that is their starting point, nor is it the strategy, but" the 
technique. Although writing behaviour is one of the . ingredients 
that Williams prescribes for a comprehensive model of writing, it 
is not an aspect of writing that is feasible to model directly, if 
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one's aim is to produce a flexible piece of software that will 
accommodate different behaviours. 
The two cognitive models that we discussed above give two 
different accounts of writing strategies. We concluded that the 
account given by the Hayes and Flower (1980a) model was 
inadequate. We also concluded that this model represents writing 
as information processing, with limited roles for the memory, the 
text, and the processes of thinking and writing. On the other hand, 
Sharpies and Pemberton (1992) affirm a separation of thinking 
and writing, and view writing as the management of external 
rather than internal representations; "thinking processes" and 
"mental structures" are excluded from the model. Consequently, 
the deductive route of inferring strategies from external 
representations denies the possibility of relating strategies to 
thinking processes, and using technology to create new sorts of 
representations. 
The questions that we discussed in relation to the Sharpies 
and Pemberton model apply equally to the Flower and Hayes 
model. Both models fail to consider how different sorts of writing 
might affect the writing process, and both models are marked by 
the absence of a meta-language that is appropriate to the 
discussion of genre and types of writing. Both models are marked 
by the absence of the text and textual structures, and, in the 
Sharpies and Pemberton model, the connections between textual 
structures, representational structures, and mental structures, are 
unclear. 
. So, from the perspective of writing fiction, there are many 
questions still to be answered concerning models of writing, and 
we have yet to answer the general question of what might 
constitute a model. We have argued that specific models are 
needed, and these include models of writing operations and 
external representations. However, we have also found these 
models inadequate to our purpose. The models remain general 
models in relation to different sorts of writing, and say little about 
writing fiction. A characteristic feature of this lack of specificity is 
108 
the absence of the text and textual structures; we shall discuss 
structure in more detail when we investigate linguistic approaches 
to modelling in chapter six. 
After discussing the two models above, Holt (1992) reaches 
a similar conclusion regarding this lack of detail. He argues that 
"cognitive models of writing provide an important clue to how 
writing tools should be designed, but the models only allow us to 
identify the major components" (Holt 1992, p. 62). In his view, 
there is a need for more detailed models of all the tasks involved 
in writing, particularly the task of planning -a "vital part of 
writing" that is not well supported by writing software. In the 
next chapter, we shall look at notions of planning in more detail. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have continued our review of current models 
of writing by discussing cognitive models. We concentrated on two 
in particular partly because they are frequently cited in the 
literature; indeed, the Hayes and Flower (1980a) model has been 
called a "consensus" model of writing. The second reason for this 
concentration was that they offer two different answers to the 
question, how can a single model of writing accommodate a range 
of writing strategies? We found the one account of writing 
strategies to be inadequate, while the other failed to explain how 
writing strategies might be related to thinking processes. Both 
models are general models that make no reference to different 
types of writing or to the text that a writer is producing. 
Returning to the question of modelling writing, we argued that 
while there is a need for models of writing operations and models 
of external representations, the lack of detail in these models 
concerning the text, textual structures, and types of writing, made 
them inadequate to our purpose. Before we explore linguistic 
approaches to modelling, we continue with the question of how 
writing strategies are related to thinking processes by looking at 
notions of planning in more detail. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
PLANNING, THINKING, 
AND 
MODELS OF WRITING 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we discuss notions of planning. From the 
perspective of designing software tools to assist planning, we ask 
whether the planning observed in different writing behaviours is 
the same operation. We show how differences in writing strategies 
are related to differences in thinking processes, and how all these 
differences are tied up with differences in planning. We identify 
three kinds of planning. One is concerned with a writer's 
motivation, while the other two are concerned with metacognitive 
and cognitive processes. We also identify a problem with the 
literature on planning, which is whether a plan refers to a mental 
schema or an external representation of ideas. Having discussed 
this problem, we conclude that if we are consistent in our 
definitions, the planning observed in different writing behaviours 
is the same operation. 
As a way of resolving the ambiguities concerning notions of 
planning, we argue for a model of writing based on the three 
activities of thinking, writing, and reading. Further reasons for 
this kind of model are provided, and we discuss a basic model of 
writing based on observations of writing behaviour and the two 
cognitive models of chapter four. We show how the model 
accommodates different writing strategies, and how the model 
compares with other models. We then discuss the notion of 
cognitive planning as textual structuring, and show how the notion 
of a rhythm of textual structuring - or simply put, a rhythm of 
thinking - resolves the apparent divergence between invention 
and discovery in writing. Finally, we ask how writing software 
assists writers in textual structuring. 
5.2 WRITING STRATEGIES AND PROBLEMS WITH PLANNING 
In chapter three, we looked at writing technology and its effects 
on writing behaviour, paying particular attention to accounts of 
student writing. What are the consequences for a model of writing 
and for the design of writing software? We, concluded our 
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summary by recognising a need for on-line support for planning. 
At the same time, we recognised a need to take into account the 
different relationship between planning and other writing 
operations that occurs when writers compose with a computer. 
This last consideration takes us back to models of writing. 
Let's assume we are going to design a planning aid for 
student writers. Given the conclusions of chapter three, the 
question arises whether the sort of planning understood by the 
model of "Plan, Draft and Revise" is the same as the planning of 
the "recursive reviser" (Williamson & Pence 1989). If these are 
different operations, then what sort of planning should we assist? 
The sort of planning aid we might design is dependent on our 
model of writing. 
In chapter three we mentioned three problems in studying 
the effects of writing technology. The third problem was the 
adoption of a model of writing to measure those effects, a model 
based on observations of writing in a medium of pen and paper. 
From this perspective, technology is seen as a problem for writers 
and a source of bad habits in student writing (Haas 1989, Williams 
1992a). In that case, we might design writing software that is 
intended to eliminate those bad habits, for example a planning aid 
that will attempt to restore writing behaviour to its former 
homeostasis, to what it was like before computer technology. 
However, the second problem was the basis on which one can 
generalise about technological effects, given the evolution of 
writing technology. An alternative view of technology is that it 
represents a source of possibilities for the writer and a means of 
creating new strategies of writing. From this perspective, 
technology is seen as a potential benefit to student writers by 
providing "tools which encourage them to experiment with their 
texts" (Williamson & Pence 1989, p. 122). 
Using behaviour as the basis for software design presents 
the designer with a dilemma. On the one hand, if we use a model 
that describes behaviour in a medium of pen and paper, such as 
"Plan, Draft and Revise", then this model will not describe the 
112 
behaviour of the "recursive reviser". On a negative note, we might 
adopt this model given the first perspective above, in which the 
computer is seen as an advanced form of typewriter, and new 
strategies of writing are not encouraged. On the other hand, if we 
adopt a positive perspective on technology, we still face the 
problem that a behavioural model will not accommodate diverse 
behaviours. If we take into account the latest reports of 
technological effects, incorporate them into our model, and 
subsequently design a planning aid that is intended to assist on- 
line composition, the result will not accommodate writers who 
prefer to "Plan, Draft and Revise" - unless we can show that 
planning is the same sort of operation. 
Noel Williams suggests a solution to this problem by 
adopting a "flexible model of writing", a mutating model that will 
accommodate "the changing behaviour of writers" (Williams 
1991a, p. 43). However, such a model does not avoid the dilemmas 
associated with using behaviour as a basis for design. The paradox 
here is that, if we acknowledge that writing technology can change 
behaviour, then we also have to acknowledge that, whatever 
model we adopt, providing additional software tools based on our 
model might itself have an effect on writing behaviour. One could 
indeed argue that the main purpose in designing software is to 
change writing behaviour in some way, whatever perspective one 
adopts on technology - the planning aid that attempts to redress 
the apparent lack of planning is intended to change writing 
behaviour back to its former state. The mutating model that 
Williams envisages must therefore fulfil the impossible condition 
of being able to adapt to a behaviour that cannot be foreseen at 
the stage of the model's conception, and is therefore liable to a 
process of infinite revision. 
If we use a behavioural model as the basis - for: design, 
dilemmas such as the above appear to be inescapable. In chapter 
three, we concluded that as the notion of writing' behaviour is 
based on a writer's preferred writing strategies, we should, rather 
consider, the strategies that define the behaviour. In. the last 
chapter. we discussed two models of writing that gave different 
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accounts of writing strategies. In the first the writing process is 
monitored by a knowledge-based system, and we concluded that 
this explanation provided an inconsistent and inadequate account 
of different approaches to writing. In the second, mental processes 
are deliberately excluded from the model, and writing strategies 
to be inferred from the physical representations that a writer 
manipulates. This model has the advantage that alternative 
strategies of writing can be realised by following a variety of 
routes across the map of representations. However, we also 
suggested that we might consider how writing strategies relate to 
thinking processes, and we now attempt that task. 
Sharpies and Pemberton criticise the Hayes and Flower 
model of writing for the lack of differentiation between mental 
structures and representational structures. They make the 
comment that "there is no clear distinction between mental 
structures and analogous ones on an external medium"; they also 
point out that "physical marks are not ideas" (Sharpies & 
Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Having made this distinction, Sharpies 
and Pemberton use external representations as the basis for their 
model of writing. 
In order to discuss writing strategies in relation to thinking 
processes, we need to make a similar distinction between mental 
processes and physical operations. When we introduced the two 
models of writing in the last chapter, we said that the process of 
writing involves two activities: a mental activity that we call 
"thinking", and a physical one of manipulating external rep- 
resentations. We also said that while these aspects of writing may 
concur in practice, In descriptions of writing one may be 
emphasised more than the other. In their model of writing, 
Sharpies and Pemberton are more concerned with external 
representations, relating writing strategies to their manipulation, 
while' our current purpose is to consider how writing strategies 
relate to thinking processes. A strategy of writing Involves, both 
thinking and textual manipulation, and if we compare: the. four 
strategies that we described In the last chapter, strategies that 
have been identified by "research- into the writing process" 
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(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 324), we find a lack of differ- 
entiation between mental processes and physical operations 
carried out on external objects. 
For example, let's consider the strategy of "Cut and Paste". 
On the one hand, "Cut and Paste" refers to the physical operation 
of moving text, either by using scissors and glue in a medium of 
pen and paper, or by using a mouse or keyboard in an electronic 
medium. This operation of moving text might occur whenever a 
writer is composing or editing a draft, and whatever the strategy 
adopted for composing. On the other hand, in addition to its 
regular occurrence in composing or editing, the operation of 
moving text by "Cut and Paste" can feature more conspicuously as 
part of a writer's general strategy. With the strategy of "Draft and 
Revise", a writer may use "Cut and Paste" as a method of 
generating new text by copying samples of old texts. With the 
strategy of "Outline and Draft", a writer may use "Cut and Paste" 
as a method of generating an outline by collecting a set of 
quotations. In chapter three, we suggested ways in which a writer 
might develop the technique of "Cut and Paste" as a writing 
strategy using writing technology. In addition to using "Cut and 
Paste" when recycling text from old files or documents, a writer 
may anticipate the use of "Cut and Paste" at a later date, and 
organise her current writing accordingly. This involves file 
managing, or making decisions about what files to put text into, 
and this is the sort of activity that Hayes and Flower identify as 
the process of organising - an aspect of planning (Hayes & Flower 
1980a, p. 14). 
Compared with other strategies of writing, "Cut and Paste" 
refers to the physical operation of moving text, an operation that 
occurs regularly in composing and editing. However, an operation 
of moving text does not by itself constitute a strategy of writing. 
In relation to writing strategies, the operation of moving text is 
subordinate to a writer's general approach. As we said above, "Cut 
and. Paste" is a method of generating text or an outline when a 
writer is using the strategies of "Draft and Revise" or "Outline and 
Draft"; developing "Cut and Paste". as a writing strategy, for an 
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electronic medium involves file management or planning. We are 
suggesting that, while the other strategies might form a writer's 
general approach, "Cut and Paste" is an operation that is 
performed in connection with a broader strategy or plan. 
Let's now consider the other three strategies of "Plan, Draft, 
and Revise", "Outline and Draft" and "Draft and Revise". The 
strategies of "Plan, Draft, and Revise" and "Outline and Draft" both 
involve reflective activity in developing a plan or an outline. 
While developing a plan suggests a process of logical reasoning, 
creating an outline might involve brainstorming. An outline is a 
provisional table of contents that serves as a cue for generating 
text. Creating an "outline" rather than a "plan" suggests a process 
in which logical questions are largely postponed to a later stage of 
writing. Discussing the development of planning in writing, Burtis 
and colleagues suggest that the first type of identifiable planning 
is that of finding content for a composition; thus a primitive plan 
consists of "a listing of content possibilities" (Burtis et al 1983, 
p. 154). Compared with the other strategies, "Outline and Draft" 
varies in its similarity to "Plan, Draft, and Revise" and "Draft and 
Revise". The similarity depends on the extent to which logical 
questions have been resolved before a writer starts composing; an 
outline might serve equally as a cue for developing a plan as a cue 
for writing a draft. With the strategy of "Draft and Revise", a 
writer abandons reflective activity before writing and follows the 
advice of Sir Philip Sidney's muse, to "looke in thy heart and 
write" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 36; Flower & Hayes 1980b, p. 21). 
In relation to writing behaviour, the basic difference 
between these three strategies is whether a writer starts with a 
session of reflective activity or engaged writing, as Sharples 
comments (Sharples 1993). As we said above that developing "Cut 
and Paste" as an electronic writing strategy involves file 
management and organising, we are led to the conclusion that it is 
the initial presence or absence of some sort of reflective activity 
or planning that distinguishes all four strategies. Therefore, as our 
aim is 
,, 
to consider how writing strategies, relate to thinking 
processes, we need to explore the variety, , of processes that are 
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embraced by the term "planning". In comparing the absence of 
planning in "Draft and Revise" with its presence in the other 
strategies, we have used the term "planning" to describe three 
sorts of activity. Firstly, we referred to electronic file management 
or organising. Secondly, we referred to making a provisional table 
of contents before writing, and thirdly, we have used "planning" in 
the sense of logical reasoning. 
The first sort of activity involves the cutting and pasting of 
text, while the second results in a list that serves as a cue for 
generating text. An "outline" refers to the external representation 
that a writer produces, but does the third kind of "plan" refer to 
an external representation or some sort of mental schema? We 
have described the third sort of planning as logical reasoning. Does 
this process necessarily involve making external representations? 
If logical reasoning is associated with the "specificity of argument- 
ative planning" (Coirier, Dellerman & Marchand 1994), then this 
process might involve the management of polyphony by 
imaginary conversations -a process that does not necessarily 
involve the production of external representations. According to 
Flower and Hayes (1980a), each stage in the model of "Plan, Draft, 
and Revise" is marked by the production of an artefact, and the 
first stage is complete when the first is produced. Is this a plan, or 
the representation of a plan? Is a plan a mental schema, and its 
representation a physical object? Some would argue the reverse, 
that a plan is a mental representation of the text, rather than an 
external representation of ideas: 
"People produce plans, that is mental representations of the 
text to be produced according to which sentences and 
textual structures come about. " 
(Schilperoord 1994, p. 148) 
The problems with discussing planning are twofold. The first 
is that the term refers to all manner of activities; we have used it 
to describe three above. Secondly, we find the lack of differ- 
entiation between thinking processes and physical operations 
particularly marked when discussing planning. In chapter three, 
we said that the notion of "planning" either refers to a mental 
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process of reflective thinking (Burtis et al 1983, Haas 1989, 
Schilperoord 1994), or suggests the externalisation of ideas into 
some form of physical representation such as notes, diagrams, 
sketches or outlines (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, Galbraith 1991, 
Galbraith & Reed 1994). In the definition given by Hayes and 
Flower (Hayes & Flower 1980a, pp. 12-15), planning is both a 
mental process that generates ideas and an organising process 
that produces notes, and we have noted the criticism that the 
consensus model does not distinguish between the two (Sharples 
& Pemberton 1992, p. 326). Let's take a closer look at the different 
notions of planning. 
Some researchers have commented that "the term planning 
has a variety of meanings in current usage, and one can find it 
applied to almost any kind of constructive mental activity" (Burtis 
et al 1983, p. 154). One can go further, and find the term planning 
applied to any kind of mental activity, constructive or otherwise. 
The tendency to equate planning with any type of thinking is 
shown by temporal studies of writing. Temporal or "real-time" 
studies of writing involve the indiscreet observation of writers at 
work. A writer is recorded on video-tape, the tape is replayed, 
and the writer's body language is analysed in relation to the text 
in production: 
"The assumption throughout all of this chronographic 
analysis is that pauses - moments of scribal inactivity 
during writing - reflect time for the writer to engage in 
planning and decision-making behavior... Relying on pause 
data from one writer and additional observational data from 
his hand movements, gazing and rereading activity, I looked 
for behavior patterns that were associated with language 
choices in 'the text and that suggested planning activity... I 
assume not only that pauses reflect planning; but'also that 
patterns of body language associated with pauses will 
corroborate notions about the functions of pauses. " 
(Matsuhashi 1982, pp. 270-277) 
While a pause in writing is equated with planning, the length of 
the pause together with a writer's body language indicate what 
sort of planning is occurring. Here, Matsuhashi makes a distinction 
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that was mentioned in chapter three, between local and global 
planning : 
"The taxonomy of body language during long pauses 
suggests a distinction between global decisions and local 
ones. When the hand holding the pen remains tense, close to 
the previously written word, the decision is, most likely, a 
local one, one that the writer expects to resolve quickly... By 
contrast, when the writer relaxes his hand, removes it from 
the vicinity, and gazes away, he is involved in a 
substantially more complex, global decision concerning the 
writer's knowledge base or the overall semantic structure of 
the developing text. " 
(Matsuhashi 1982, p. 287) 
There is no suggestion here that the writer may also be thinking 
about liquid refreshment, what to buy for dinner, or any other 
distraction not connected with the task of writing. More recent 
temporal studies of writing also stress the significance of scribal 
inactivity in relation to planning (Chanquoy, Foulin & Fayol 1994, 
Schilperoord 1994). Discussing a "listening word processor", John 
Reece comments: 
"Our analysis of pause times revealed that, compared with 
dictation, the LWP encouraged a higher number of long 
pauses during composition, which can be interpreted as an 
increase in planning time. " 
(Reece 1994, p. 10) 
John Gould claims to have shown quantitatively that "planning is 
the main process in composition" (Gould 1980, p. 112). The results 
of his experiments on composing letters showed that "planning, on 
average, was two-thirds of composition time, regardless of 
composition method" (Gould 1980, p. 112). This observation also 
relies on the assumption that the absence of writing can be 
equated with planning; pausing replaces planning as one of the 
fundamental processes in Gould's model of writing (Gould 1980, 
p. 111). 
Given the tendency to equate planning and thinking, one can 
understand the concern about the apparent lack of planning when 
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students write with a machine. However, if the absence of writing 
is also equated with planning, then how does one design or 
evaluate writing software whose purpose is to assist planning? 
Given one side of these equations, such an aid would be an aid to 
thinking, however general or specific, but on the other, such an 
aid would not assist writing but encourage the pathological state 
of scribal inactivity that we described in chapter three. There is 
therefore a paradox in advocating planning as a worthwhile 
activity while measuring its presence by the absence of writing: in 
this light, writer's block, which is also marked by the absence of 
writing, appears to be a similar activity to planning. 
Temporal studies of writing appear to maintain the 
distinction between thinking and writing criticised by Flower and 
Hayes (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 32). We distinguished earlier 
between mental processes and physical operations in order to 
investigate the relationship between thinking processes and 
writing strategies, which led to this discussion of planning, but 
that was not to say that thinking and writing are mutually 
exclusive activities. However, to find out how they become 
inseparable, and when they become indistinct, we need to 
continue with this investigation of definitions. 
In a developmental study of planning in writing, Burtis and 
colleagues use a definition of planning as "the predetermination of 
a course of action aimed at achieving a goal" (Hayes-Roth & 
Hayes-Roth 1979): 
"That defines the ultimate or ideal form of planning activity, 
however. Most of our attention will be directed toward the 
rudimentary forms of goal-directed planning. " 
(Burtis et al 1983, p. 154) 
Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have studied goal- 
directed planning in their investigations of story comprehension 
(Schank 1972, Schank & Abelson 1977). They argue that a reader 
needs various kinds of, knowledge to understand stories, and in 
their attempts to model this knowledge, "it became apparent that 
an understanding of the plans and goals of characters in narrative 
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is essential to story understanding" (Ide & Veronis 1990, p. 43). 
According to Black and Bower, the knowledge that "most readers 
could be expected to have about planning" includes the knowledge 
that "goals are derived from basic personal themes such as 
survival, love, duty, service, greed, avarice... ", while plans are 
"(real or imagined) series of actions undertaken with the intention 
of bringing about one or more compatible goals within certain 
constraints" (Black & Bower 1980, p. 245). Summarising Schank 
and Abelson's taxonomy of goals, Black and colleagues distinguish 
satisfaction goals that are associated with biological needs, 
pleasure goals, achievement goals, and goals that are associated 
with self-preservation (Black, Wilkes-Gibbs & Gibbs Jr. 1982, 
p. 332). 
As Ide and Veronis point out, "the kinds of goals that are 
attributed to characters in a story and the plans and planning 
strategies that are assumed to achieve these goals, are not limited 
to modelling the behaviour of fictional characters but instead 
model human behaviour in general" (Ide & Veronis 1991, p. 171). 
Schank and Abelson's taxonomy of goals therefore apply not only 
to the characters in a story, but also to the readers and writers of 
stories. In the case of writing, a writer's goals may be associated 
with pleasure, with achievement, or both. However, these kinds of 
goals are all associated with the question of motivation. According 
to Charniak and McDermott: 
"... we recognize the intentions of others by attributing to 
them the same planning abilities that we have. When we see 
another person doing something, we ask 'Given this action, 
what task could it be in the service of? ' Thus determining 
motivation can be thought of as the inverse of the planning 
problem, 'Given a task, what action is appropriate to carry it 
out? " 
(Charniak& McDermott 1985, p. 557), 
Determining a writer's motivation may not be such an easy task, 
as this problem of interpretation takes us back to the, mystery of 
writing that we described in chapter. three. The. accounts of 
professional fiction writers show that a writer's motivation is not 
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necessarily the result of reflective thinking, or planning, but could 
equally be the product of unconscious factors. 
The above goals are concerned with a writer's motivation to 
write in the first place, and all could be described as satisfaction 
goals in one sense: the seeker anticipates that, once the goal is 
achieved, some personal benefit will be the result. However, 
having decided to write, or given a job of writing, a writer then 
faces another set of decisions that are concerned with the 
immediate task of writing. Flower and Hayes describe writing as a 
process of "juggling constraints" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 40). By 
juggling constraints, a writer reduces cognitive strain - the 
demand placed on short-term memory or attention (Miller 1956). 
Flower and Hayes classify constraints as follows: "the first 
constraint we describe as the demand for integrated knowledge; 
the second is the more inclusive linguistic conventions of written 
texts; and the third is the encompassing constraints of the 
rhetorical problem itself" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 34). Explain- 
ing the first, they refer to expository writing and the writer's need 
to sort out ideas when confronting a new or complex topic; thus 
"knowledge becomes a constraint... when it is not in acceptable 
form" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 34). Explaining the second, they 
point out that, "for the inexperienced or remedial writer, the rules 
of grammar and conventions of usage and syntax may make an 
enormous demand on time and attention" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, 
p. 36). Thirdly, solving the rhetorical problem is related to a 
writer's purpose when writing with a specific reader or group of 
readers in mind. An example of the rhetorical constraint is the 
need to be persuasive or entertaining; this type of constraint has a 
pervasive influence on the others. 
Flower and Hayes describe various strategies , 
for reducing 
constraints, such as setting priorities, breaking down, goals into 
sub-goals, and developing routine procedures. They conclude that 
"one of the most effective strategies... Is planning" and suggest the 
hypothesis that "writers draw on three major, kinds of plans which 
are hierarchically related to one another" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, 
p. 44). At the top of the hierarchy are plans for dealing with the 
122 
largest problem, the rhetorical problem; these plans are defined as 
plans for what the writer needs "to do". Lower down the hierarchy 
is the second type of plan, a content plan or outline, defined as a 
plan for what the writer wants "to say". At the same level as the 
second, the third type of plan is a plan for composing, and this 
sort of plan is a writing strategy such as one of the four that we 
discussed earlier. 
When we discussed Hayes and Flower's model of writing in 
the last chapter, we noted the potential for goal conflict between 
rhetorical goals set by the goal-setting process, and composing 
plans set by the monitor. In this hierarchical model of planning, 
the problem of goal conflict is resolved in favour of the rhetorical 
problem. However, Hayes and Flower's claim is that this model of 
planning applies to all writers, whereas the model is more a 
reflection of their model of teaching, in which the student is asked 
to solve a rhetorical problem presented by the written assignment 
or essay topic. They argue that the task of writing with a purpose 
for a specific audience improves student writing: 
"If you want to get better writing from your students, one of 
the most effective ways to do it is to create assignments that 
have a realistic purpose and a real audience (not a teacher), 
who actually needs to know something. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 45) 
The definition of this first level of planning presents, us with 
two problems, and both are associated with the confounding of a 
model of teaching with a model of planning. The first is that Hayes 
and Flower do not make a clear distinction between the rhetorical 
problem and its solution; neither is it clear who is doing the 
planning. ' In the following example, an instruction (or the 
problem) is equivalent to a plan (or the method of solving the 
problem): "... a rhetorical plan could be as conventional and limited 
as 'write another essay for Freshman Composition class"' (Hayes & 
Flower 1980a, p. 45). While'the rhetorical problem'isIpresented to 
the student in the form of a written assignment, the plan for its 
solution appears to be the student's interpretation of this task in 
forms of an instruction to be'' persuasive or entertaining, for 
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example. If a plan to do something is no more than an internalised 
instruction, then the only difference between the problem and its 
solution is that the first refers to a teacher's instructions while the 
second refers to a student's mental representation of those 
instructions. If a plan is the predetermination of a course of action 
aimed at achieving a goal, then it is the writing teacher rather 
than the student who is planning at this level. The teacher 
predetermines a student's writing by setting the rhetorical 
problem; the goal is to achieve better writing. 
The second problem with this level of planning is one that 
has a pervasive influence on the rest of the model. Hayes and 
Flower consistently refer to writing as a speech act (Searle 1970): 
"In essence, writing is also a speech act and therefore subject to 
all the constraints of any interpersonal performance" (Flower & 
Hayes 1980a, p. 40). Their model of teaching is based on the 
argument that "when people treat writing as a speech act, they 
are more likely to draw on many of the well-learned strategies 
adults use everyday for arguing, explaining, or describing" (Flower 
& Hayes 1980a, p. 45). The definition of high-level planning 
therefore reflects this notion, and solving the rhetorical problem is 
equivalent to performing a speech act: 
"To begin with, writers generate plans for dealing with their 
Rhetorical Problem. These rhetorical plans are called plans 
ToDo something in or by language. These are essentially 
plans for performing a speech act - for responding in some 
way to that rhetorical problem, which includes the writer, 
the reader, and a purpose. " 
(Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 44) 
In another context, developmental psychologists have shown 
that there is a close connection between speech and writing in the 
early stages of writing development. Describing the development 
of symbolism in play and drawing, Vygotsky claims that, in order 
to learn how to write, "the child must make a basic discovery - 
namely that one can draw not only things but also speech" 
(Vygotsky 1983, p. 289). Discussing the influence of speech on 
writing development, Burtis and colleagues note that "in the first 
two years of writing, children almost all show some indications of 
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vocalizing or subvocalizing as they write, and these vocal 
movements appear to be synchronized with their writing" (Burtis 
et al 1983, p. 155). Not only do children spell or sound words as 
they write them (Burtis et al 1983, p. 155), but "at the age of four, 
a child borrows production techniques and linguistic structures 
from conversation" (Sharples 1985, p. 18). The early phases of 
writing development are marked by "the gradual differentiation 
of written from spoken language" (Bereiter 1980, p. 75). When 
forms of speech continue to feature in children's writing, this is 
thought to be a sign of slow development. According to Sharples, 
"the speech forms found in immature writing are indications that 
the child is still producing text as if for conversation" (Sharples 
1985, p. 3 1). In chapter three we also noted the observation that 
"one fault of student word processing" is the intrusion of "speech 
characteristics" (Williams 1992a, p. 15). 
There appears to be an incongruity, therefore, in advocating 
a method of teaching that describes writing as a speech act: 
having learnt to distinguish written from spoken language, the 
student is then told to consider writing as a branch of oratory. 
Indeed, this model of planning appears to parallel the early stages 
of writing development. The next level is concerned with what a 
writer wants "to say", in the form of a content plan or outline. This 
type of planning is the same activity that Burtis and colleagues 
identify as the development of planning in writing: 
"In the course of writing development, planning becomes 
gradually differentiated from text production... Gradually, as 
writing ability develops, there is a separation of the problem 
of finding content for a composition from the problem of 
actually writing the composition. At this point, clearly 
identifiable planning can be seen, but the planningT. remains 
at the same time tied to the content needs of text 
production, so that the plan that is generated consists of a 
listing of content possibilities. " 
(Burtis et al 1983, p. 154) 
As writing develops, a child learns to distinguish between speech 
and writing, and planning evolves from a stage in which plans 
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reflect premeditated conversation. Here, a student learns that 
writing is a speech act, then plans what to say accordingly. 
Research into the planning of argumentative texts has 
highlighted a specific function of inner speech: 
"To argue is to confront different opinions, and formulate 
arguments and counter-arguments. In some way, argument- 
ation requires the integration of a potential dialog in the 
form of a monolog... Thus, to argue is to manage the 
polyphonic dimension. " 
(Coirier et al 1994, p. 80) 
While planning argumentative texts might involve imaginary 
conversations, the result of this mental discourse is somehow 
transformed into writing. Flower and Hayes refer to knowledge as 
a constraint when its form is unacceptable, and claim that "much 
of the work of writing can be the task of transforming incoherent 
thought" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 34). However, the model gives 
no indication that any process of knowledge transformation takes 
place. Bereiter and Scardamalia describe two types of planning, 
distinguished by two approaches to retrieving and using stored 
knowledge (Bereiter & Scardamalia 1987). The first, a strategy of 
"knowledge telling", is similar to the content plan in this model, 
while the second, a strategy of "knowledge transforming", is 
concerned with a rhetorical problem space that has some 
similarities with the rhetorical problem described by Flower and 
Hayes. In this model however, a rhetorical plan is an internalised 
instruction, as we noted above: the first level of planning 
represents a student's initial response to an assignment. Once this 
task is interpreted as an instruction to be persuasive or 
entertaining, for example, the student then proceeds to think 
about what to say, but not, apparently, about what-to write. 
Haas refers to this model of planning as an example of the 
distinction between "rhetorical plans for the writing situation and 
plans for the text" (Haas 1989, p. 183). Does a rhetorical plan have 
any connection with a textual plan? In this model, a rhetorical 
plan is an internalised instruction, while a textual plan Is a list of 
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what to say. Describing writing as a speech act, Flower and Hayes 
are unable to explain how a rhetorical plan might influence a 
textual plan. To meet a rhetorical requirement to be persuasive, 
for example, a writer must "constantly monitor the tone of voice 
projected" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 34). The idea that a writer 
has a voice or a tone is not uncommon: for example, Nash refers to 
a tone as the writer's "style of address" to the reader (Nash 1980, 
p. 128). However, Nash also identifies linguistic "indices of tone", 
and gives lexical and syntactic examples (Nash 1980, p. 135). For 
Nash, a writer's voice is expressed in writing; for Flower and 
Hayes, a writer's voice is projected and never leaves the realm of 
oratory. 
This model of planning assumes that planning is a 
hierarchical activity. We have already suggested a hierarchy of 
planning when we concluded that the strategy of "Cut and Paste" 
is subordinate to the other three strategies of writing. In a 
hierarchical model, there is some kind of process at the top or 
bottom which drives all the others. Discussing the plans and goals 
described by researchers into artificial intelligence, we concluded 
that those kinds of goals are all associated with motivation. A 
writer's motivation seems the most likely candidate for the 
driving process at the top of a hierarchical model of planning. We 
suggested that a writer's motivational goals may be associated 
with pleasure, with achievement, or both, and that the un- 
conscious might also be involved in these goals. For Flower and 
Hayes, the driving process is the rhetorical goal. Are rhetorical 
goals associated with motivation? A writer may be motivated by 
anger at social inequalities, for example; this anger may influence 
the writer's rhetorical purpose of informing a specific group of 
readers about the existence of social injustice. However, in the 
model of planning described by Flower and Hayes, this kind of 
motivation is absent. Apparently, lacking such motivation, a 
student receives it in the form of the writing assignment; for 
Flower and Hayes, a rhetorical goal associated with motivation is 
given by an internalised instruction. 
127 
Other writing researchers also describe planning as a 
hierarchical or multi-levelled activity. For example: 
"Writing texts involves different levels of planning: cognitive 
planning (activation and organization/linearization of the 
content); linguistic planning (linguistic translations). " 
(Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139) 
In addition to distinguishing between cognitive and linguistic 
planning, psychologists also distinguish between cognitive and 
metacognitive planning (Winter 1994). Metacognitive activities 
involve thinking about thinking. According to Hammond, "meta- 
cognition refers to people's ability to self-regulate their cognitive 
processes, and in many respects metacognitive skills can be 
considered much like other skills in that they can be learned and 
refined with experience" (Hammond 1993, p. 63). For a writer, 
such thinking might include thinking about the process of writing 
or thinking about writing strategies. Metacognitive planning might 
include structuring a timetable of writing activities or deciding on 
a strategy of writing; thus metacognitive processes are thinking 
processes that are not involved with mental representations of the 
text. In the model of planning described by Flower and Hayes, the 
third type of plan, at the same level of the hierarchy as a content 
plan, is a plan for composing - this kind of planning is an example 
of a metacognitive activity. 
If we assume that a writer's motivation is the "unquantif- 
iable element" (Boylan 1993, p. xi) that drives a writer's cognitive 
and metacognitive processes, then we can represent a writer's 
thinking processes by the Venn diagram of Figure 4. In 
mathematics, this kind of diagram Is used to represent sets of 
entities, or categories, and their intersections. In Figure 4 the 
entities consist of different kinds of thinking processes, and in this 
model we make the distinction between motivation, metacognitive 
processes, and cognitive processes. Cognitive processes in writing 
are concerned with mental representations of the text. The 
distinction between cognitive planning and linguistic planning is 
discussed in the next chapter; 'this distinction 1s based on 
assumptions concerning the relation between syntax ' and 
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semantics. At this stage, we include both types of activity in the 
category of cognitive processes. 
FIGURE 4: A MODEL OF A WRITER'S THINKING PROCESSES 
In the diagram, the circles are overlapping to represent 
areas where the distinctions between the three activities become 
indistinct. For example, a session of daydreaming might result in 
notes, and these notes might form the basis of a story. Is 
daydreaming a cognitive or a metacognitive process, or is it, as in 
Freud's analysis, a process of wish fulfilment that is associated 
with a writer's motivation? 
If cognitive processes in writing are thinking processes that 
are concerned with mental representations of the text, 'then what 
is cognitive planning? The study of mental representations is a 
research area of cognitive psychology (Roth & Frisby 1986), and 
we have to make a further distinction between mental represent- 
ations, mental schemata or mental structures and the represent- 
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ations that researchers use to investigate them. For example, 
psychologists have used a grammatical representation of story 
structure to investigate mental representations of stories. Jean 
Mandler points out that these representations are not the same: 
"A story grammar is a formal rule system used to describe 
regularities in the structure of stories. A story schema is a 
kind of mental structure or processing mechanism. " 
(Mandler 1982, p. 207) 
Likewise, a mental representation of the text is not the same 
as the external object that a writer produces, and we have yet to 
answer the question whether a plan refers to a mental schema or 
an external representation of ideas. Discussing divergent opinions 
about planning, Haas concludes that "planning is generally seen as 
a reflective activity" (Haas 1989, p. 182); she also remarks that 
writing notes helps this activity (Haas 1989, p. 185). For Burtis and 
colleagues, the production of notes indicates planning activity; that 
is, planning is also viewed as a thinking process (Burtis et al 1983, 
p. 154). Above, we referred to the idea that a plan is a mental 
representation of the text, rather than an external representation 
of ideas: 
"People produce plans, that is mental representations of the 
text to be produced according to which sentences and 
textual structures come about. " 
(Schilperoord 1994, p. 148) 
If we assume that a plan refers to a mental schema -a 
writer's mental representation of the text - cognitive planning 
must refer to the mental activity that produces this represent- 
ation. However, Schilperoord (1994) defines a plan as a mental 
representation of a "text to be produced", a text whose existence is 
only a future possibility. How is It possible to have a mental 
representation of an object that has no material existence? In the 
first instance, ideas that are visualised, or vocalised in the head 
have to be externalised into writing before a text exists, and 
before a mental representation of a text can be created. Writing of 
some kind, whether this Involves writing notes, or sentences, is 
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therefore a necessary rather than optional activity that creates a 
text and a writer's mental representation of that text. 
On the other hand, if we assume that a plan refers to an 
external representation of ideas, then cognitive planning must also 
refer to the thinking processes that produce such a representation. 
In the model of writing discussed in the last chapter, Hayes and 
Flower describe planning of this sort (Hayes & Flower 1980a, 
p. 12). The generating process is a cognitive process of remem- 
bering that also results in notes; this process is similar to their 
content planning above. The organising process orders these notes 
into a plan, and this plan is an external representation that is used 
as a guide to writing. The third type of planning in this model, 
that of goalsetting, involves the motivational input that we 
discussed above, while the monitoring process is a metacognitive 
activity that is concerned with managing a writer's strategy. For 
Flower and Hayes then, planning encompasses the triad of 
motivation, metacognitive planning and cognitive planning, and 
we have noted the criticism that they fail to distinguish between 
these activities. Our criticism of the Hayes and Flower model was 
that it represented writing as information processing, in which the 
logical sequence of operations is "Plan, Draft and Revise"; in this 
model, a plan is an external representation of ideas that is used as 
a guide to writing a draft. 
Let's adopt the definition of a plan as a writer's mental 
representation of the text. We have noted that writing of some 
kind is a necessary activity that creates a text and a writer's 
mental representation of that text. For the planner, this writing 
consists of note-taking; for the discoverer, it consists of continuous 
prose or sentences. Both approaches to writing involve the 
reflective activity that is called "planning" at some stage of 
writing. If we define cognitive planning as the mental activity that 
creates a mental representation of the text, then what is the 
relation between cognitive planning and the physical activity of 
writing? In the first instance, we said that writing is indispensable 
to creating a mental representation; but this mental represent- 
ation must also be modified as the text in production changes. If a 
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plan is defined as a mental schema, a plan is always changing with 
writing. 
Confusion is created when both definitions of a plan are 
used in the same text. For a planner, a plan does not change: but 
this plan is defined by the alternative definition of a plan as an 
external representation. The model of "Plan, Draft and Revise" 
assumes that a plan only changes at the reviewing stage: but this 
plan is defined by the definition of a plan as a mental schema. If 
we redefine cognitive planning as the mental activity that creates 
or modifies a mental representation of the text, then this is the 
activity that occupies a planner before writing sentences, and 
later when reviewing. A discoverer writes sentences before 
creating a mental representation of the text. 
Further 'confusion is created when two definitions of 
planning are also used in the same text; these correspond to the 
two definitions of a plan. The first is that planning is the activity 
that produces an external representation of ideas, while the 
second is that planning is the activity that produces a mental 
schema of the text. On the one hand, in the case of the planner, it 
appears that planning is an essential prelude to writing 
continuous prose; but this kind of planning is the planning activity 
that produces an external representation of ideas. On the other 
hand, in the case of the discoverer, it appears that writing 
continuous prose is an essential prelude to planning; but this kind 
of planning is the planning activity that produces a mental schema 
of the text. 
On the one hand then, in defining cognitive planning as the 
mental activity that creates or modifies a mental representation of 
the text, we have assumed the existence of a text; some kind of 
writing activity must serve as a prelude to this-type of thinking. 
On the other hand, some kind of thinking must precede writing, 
and to describe this initial thinking, we have to resort to a general 
definition of planning as a reflective activity, or the definition of 
planning as an activity that produces an external representation 
of ideas. 
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Is there a way of reconciling these different notions of plans 
and planning? The problem is that these notions are diametrically 
opposed, which suggests that the only escape is to avoid using the 
terminology of planning. The term is applied to different types of 
thinking, and can be equivalent to thinking. Sometimes a plan 
refers to a mental schema; sometimes it refers to an external- 
isation of ideas. Instead of using a term whose ambivalence 
appears to be unavoidable, perhaps we should return to the con- 
sensus that all writing involves thinking, writing, and reading. 
5.3 A BASIC MODEL OF WRITING 
There is another reason for basing a model of writing on these 
activities rather than writing operations. Writing operations 
require a medium of writing. In chapter three, we said that Hayes 
and Flower's definitions of planning, translating and reviewing are 
based on observations of writers who work in a medium of pen 
and paper, and that these definitions need to be reviewed in the 
light of electronic writing behaviour. Moreover, their definitions of 
writing operations confuse three types of processes, as we have 
seen above: motivational, metacognitive and cognitive. Discussing 
their model of writing in more detail in the last chapter, we 
looked for some way in which it might represent a consensus 
model of writing. We concluded that the operations of planning, 
translating and reviewing could be considered as general 
operations that apply to different. types of writing, and to 
different media of writing - but only if we translate them into the 
activities of thinking, writing and reading. So, instead of modelling 
operations, let's model these activities. 
We called the Hayes and Flower model of writing operations 
an information processing model. Modelling writing as information 
processing results in the sequential model of writing operations 
that Hayes and Flower attempt to escape. - the model of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise". In chapter three, we discussed- the. view of 
writing behaviour as a cycle of engagement and'reflection, a cycle 
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that Sharples refers to as the "rhythm of writing" (Sharples 1993). 
Here, we apply that notion to the three activities of thinking, 
writing and reading. Taking into account the discussion of writing 
behaviour, we suggest the model of writing given by Figure S. 
FIGURE 5: A BASIC MODEL OF WRITING 
The model accounts for, the strategies of "Plan, Draft and 
Revise", "Outline and Draft" and `"Draft and Revise" as follows. 
Pursuing the first strategy, a writer` engages in the thinking 
activity that we referred to as one definition of planning; that is, 
planning as an activity that produces an external representation 
of ideas. According to Hayes and Flower, this involves 
remembering (thinking), writing notes (writing), and organising 
these notes into a plan (reading; ' thinking and writing). On the 
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second cycle, a writer is engaged not only in externalising ideas 
but also in creating a mental schema of the text. The plan, which 
can refer to a mental schema or written notes, is then used as a 
guide to writing a draft (reading, thinking and writing). The 
reviewing stage involves a further cycle of reading, thinking and 
writing. 
Pursuing a strategy of "Outline and Draft", a writer engages 
in a similar cycle of remembering (thinking), externalising ideas 
into notes (writing), and either writing a draft while using the 
notes as an outline (reading, thinking and writing), or organising 
them further (another cycle of reading, thinking and writing). 
Pursuing a strategy of "Draft and Revise", a writer engages in a 
cycle of remembering (thinking), drafting (writing) and revising 
(reading, thinking and writing). However, on this occasion, a 
writer externalises ideas into continuous prose; that is, writes 
sentences rather than notes. In describing this method of writing 
as "writing without a plan", we are using a plan to refer both to a 
mental schema of the text and to written notes. 
How does the model account for discovery? Discussing the 
notion of discovery in chapter three, we compared the anecdotes 
of Hilary Mantel with the accounts of behavioural psychologists. 
We labelled Mantel a discoverer on the basis of her approach to 
writing, a method she describes as "growing a book" (Mantel 1993, 
p. 41). This involves writing notes and collecting index cards of 
words, phrases and ideas until "one day I see a sequence, a logic, 
begin to emerge" (Mantel 1993, p. 40). In relation to Figure 5 then, 
Mantel engages in several cycles of thinking, writing and reading 
before creating a mental schema of a text and writing sentences; 
this writer appears to discover a structure for, her novel. In 
contrast, Josephine Hart (1993) spends a long time thinking about 
an entire novel before writing a word, followed by a relatively 
short time writing. We labelled Hart a planner in comparing her 
approach. with Mantel's. However, the difference between these 
approaches can be explained by referring to the cycle of thinking, 
writing and reading. While Mantel, pursues; several circuits in 
accumulating notes, Hart pursues. . two ý or three in-writing 
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sentences. According to the romantic view, discovery occurs when 
a writer writes continuous prose. Although Mantel writes without 
a plan, her writing consists of notes rather than continuous prose. 
Referring to our model, we could label her as a planner who 
spends a long time planning; a plan as a mental schema is what 
she appears to discover. 
In the model is a line that delineates external represent- 
ations. This line marks the distinction between activities that do 
not involve handling external representations (above the line) and 
activities that do (below the line). Above the line, a writer is 
preoccupied with thinking. As Figure 4 shows, a writer's thinking 
includes motivational, metacognitive and cognitive processes. In 
Figure 5, it is the latter type of thinking that is represented. Below 
the line, a writer is engaged in the activities of writing or reading, 
and external representations are implied by these activities. 
The circles are overlapping to represent the cases where two 
activities are indistinct or concurrent. These cases are labelled as 
A (a concurrence of thinking and writing), B (a concurrence of 
writing and reading), and C (a concurrence of reading and 
thinking). Under what conditions do two activities become 
indistinct? These situations all occur below the line of external 
representations; above the line, a writer is preoccupied with 
thinking. In cases of concurrence then, thinking is not carried out 
as a separate activity, but remains attached to the activities of 
writing and reading. At A there is an overlap between thinking 
and writing. Here, a writer is externalising ideas into writing 
without the mediation of reflective thinking. This situation arises 
when a writer is pursuing a strategy of "Draft and Revise" and 
writing spontaneous continuous prose; in the romantic view, this 
is the strategy that leads to discovery. The situation also arises 
with the technique of brainstorming when a writer captures 
thoughts as soon as they occur, with confessional writing, and with 
the writing of the possessed that Plato mentions. 
At C there is an overlap between reading and thinking. This 
situation is a consequence of the techniques and strategies just 
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described. The results of Galbraith's experiments in discovery 
suggest that discovery occurs, not in the process of generating 
spontaneous prose, but in the subsequent process of reading and 
thinking (Galbraith 1991, p. 154; Galbraith & Reed 1994, p. 98). 
Discovery is achieved by the modifications to mental schemata 
that occur at this stage. Hilary Mantel discovers a mental schema 
over a long period of note writing and reflection. For some writers 
however, reflective activity only occurs when writing continuous 
prose and reading the results; for these writers, external rep- 
resentations are essential for reflective thought. In the case of the 
writer who pursues the strategy of writing spontaneous prose, the 
discovery that results from thinking is achieved in reading. 
The above observations take into account the discussion of 
writing behaviour in chapter three. However, while the strategy 
of "Draft and Revise" can be carried out in any medium, the 
concurrences that we have just described are frequently reported 
as a specific feature of composing with a computer. On the one 
hand, reports of writing behaviour show a two-fold concern for 
the absence of planning before student writers compose, and the 
absence of revision after composing. On the other hand, an 
alternative view of writing behaviour is given by Williamson and 
Pence (1989); the student writers who are labelled recursive 
revisers plan and revise as they write. In either case, the 
tendency that dominates student writing is the laboratory effect; 
that is, the tendency for all thinking, writing and reading to take 
place in the writing laboratory. In this situation, thinking, writing 
and reading are on-line activities; thinking occurs, not as a 
separate activity, but concurrently with the activities of writing 
and reading. At B there is an overlap between writing and 
reading, and we are suggesting that this situation arises with on- 
line composition. The recursive reviser, therefore, cycles around 
each of the zones labelled A, B and C. 
In the centre of Figure 5 is the hypothetical place where 
thinking, writing and reading all occur simultaneously. Following 
the, observations of Noel Williams on student writing (Williams 
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1992a, p. 15), one could argue that some writers seem to achieve 
this state of nirvana with minimal effort. 
How does the basic model compare with other models of 
writing? Is the model capable of handling information processing? 
Can the model be tested? What are the implications for software 
design? 
In chapter two, we noted that different kinds of models may 
undergo different kinds of tests, and that testing tends to reflect 
the derivation and purpose of the model. The basic model of 
Figure 5 is based partly on the observations on writing behaviour 
in chapter three, and partly on the two cognitive models discussed 
in the last chapter. It is a construction that serves to summarise 
the results of those investigations. We have taken into account the 
argument that differences in writing behaviour can be explained 
by the notion of a rhythm of writing (Nash 1980, Sharpies 1993), 
and found evidence to support that argument (Williamson & 
Pence 1989). As we pointed out in chapter two, a model based on 
writing behaviour may need to be revised in the light of new 
observations, and this is one test of the above model. If there is 
evidence of writing behaviour that can not be explained by the 
model, then the model will need to be amended. 
The second justification for the model rests on the two 
cognitive models discussed in the last chapter. Sharples and 
Pemberton (1992) make the distinction between external and 
internal representations, a distinction that is reflected in the basic 
model. However, this distinction becomes blurred in the Hayes 
and Flower (1980a) model, as does the distinction between 
motivational, metacognitive and cognitive activities. We also 
Identified problems with their notion of the "translation" process, 
in which semantic propositions are transformed into syntax. For a 
further discussion of the linguistic assumptions underlying this 
notion, we must wait until the next chapter. We have sometimes 
used the term "generate" to refer to the physical activity of 
writing text, whether notes or sentences, while Hayes and Flower 
use the term to denote recall. In the last chapter, we showed how 
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it was possible to deconstruct the operations of "planning", 
"translating", and "reviewing", and reconstitute the activities of 
"thinking", "writing", and "reading". We will now show how those 
operations can be reconstructed from the basic model. 
If we remove the motivational and metacognitive elements 
from Hayes and Flower's (1980a) definition of planning, then the 
remaining (cognitive) element of planning consists of "generating" 
or recall (included in thinking on the basic model), note-taking 
(included in writing), and organising (transforming notes into a 
plan). So for certain kinds of planning, writers are concerned with 
thinking and writing, but not with reading their text, and this 
activity is omitted from the cycle (Figure 6); we return to the case 
of organising below In the case of reviewing on the other hand, 
writers are concerned with reading and thinking, but not with 
writing, so that this activity is omitted from the cycle (Figure 7). 
In the case of editing, Hayes and Flower argue for a production 
rule system, so that editing is fired automatically under certain 
conditions. As editing is an automatic process, in this case it is 
thinking which is omitted from the cycle, while reading and 
writing - in this case, correcting - remain (Figure 8). 
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In the case of translation however, writers are engaged in 
all three activities of thinking, writing, and reading; reading is 
necessary in order to create the "acceptable" cohesive sentences 
that fit Hayes and Flower's (1980a, p. 15) definition of this 
operation. As translation consists of all three activities, this 
provides one explanation why student writers find this aspect of 
writing particularly difficult. In the case of organising, we face the 
problem we have discussed in this chapter - that of knowing 
whether a plan is a mental schema or a written outline. In the 
former case, organising is similar to reviewing and consists of 
reading and thinking; in the latter, organising is similar to 
translating and consists of all three activities. 
Given that the Hayes and Flower model can be reproduced 
from the basic model, we could argue, therefore, that the basic 
model is a consensus model, and that there is no need for any 
tests - all we have done is merely represent the consensus model 
in a different fashion, so that the test will be a coherent argument 
that the Hayes and Flower model cannot be interpreted in this 
way. Of course, we would need to add the task environment and 
the writer's long-term memory to the diagram of Figure 5. We 
would also need to add the monitor - the monitor would decide 
what activities are to be omitted from the cycle; the result would 
be the operations observed by Hayes and Flower. The model could 
then handle information processing by inserting the appropriate 
inputs and outputs in the appropriate places: an initial instruction 
(the input of "reading"), followed by various cycles of activities 
that merely reproduce the Hayes and Flower operations as shown 
above, with a final output stemming from "writing", or "reading", 
depending on how assiduous our machine is in reviewing and 
correcting. 
The basic model is lacking in details, apart from the obvious 
omission of the task environment and the writer's long-term 
memory: for example, of different kinds of reading strategies, of 
different kinds of thinking processes, -and of different kinds of 
memory input. However, these details can not be identified at this 
stage of our investigation, and may vary according to the type of 
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text a writer is producing. Our aim is now, therefore, to develop 
this basic model into a model of fiction writing, and to fill in those 
details as we proceed. Firstly however, we need to discuss the 
computational consequences of the model, and in order to do that, 
we need to return to the question that was asked at the beginning 
of the chapter. 
5.4 COGNITIVE PLANNING AS TEXTUAL STRUCTURING 
At the start of this chapter we raised the question whether the 
sort of planning understood by the model of "Plan, Draft and 
Revise" is the same as the planning of the "recursive reviser" 
(Williamson & Pence 1989), and we suggested that a planning aid 
would assist both types of writing behaviour if that were the case. 
The above discussion has highlighted the ambivalence in 
notions of plans and planning. Firstly, a plan can be defined as a 
mental representation of the text. On the one hand, a plan as a 
mental schema is created and modified by thinking; on the other 
hand, writing notes or sentences is necessary for this type of 
thinking to occur, and a mental schema changes with writing. 
Cognitive planning is a mental activity, but writing of some kind is 
a necessary preamble to this activity.. For some writers, this 
entails writing prose. Secondly, a plan can be defined as an 
external representation of ideas, and planning as the activity that 
results in this representation. This is the definition of planning to 
which we must turn when describing a writer's initial thinking, 
before any text has been generated and before a mental schema 
of a text can be created. 
In the light of these observations, let's return to the 
question whether the planning understood by the model of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise" is the same as the planning of the recursive 
reviser. In the first case, planning is a reflective activity that 
results In an externalisation of ideas. In the second case, planning 
is the mental activity that creates a mental representation of the 
text. As explained above, the recursive reviser cycles around the 
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A, B and C zones in Figure 5, and with this strategy of writing, a 
plan is achieved by on-line manipulation of the text (using the 
technique of cut and paste, for example). On the one hand 
therefore, these activities are not the same; but on the other hand, 
we are using different definitions of planning to describe these 
activities. 
If we reconsider these activities using the same definition of 
planning, then we arrive at two possible conclusions. On the one 
hand, if a plan is an externalisation of ideas, then both strategies 
involve planning; while the first involves externalising ideas by 
writing notes, the second involves externalising ideas by writing 
sentences. On the other hand, using the alternative definition of 
planning, both strategies involve creating a mental schema; the 
first by reading and manipulating notes, the second by sentences. 
If we are consistent and use the same definition of planning in 
considering these activities, they turn out to be the same. 
These remarks apply in a similar fashion to the behavioural 
taxonomy of planners and discoverers. Given the definition of a 
plan as an external representation of ideas, then the spontaneous 
prose generated by discoverers must also be a plan. On the other 
hand, planners and discoverers both create schemata; the first by 
reading and manipulating notes, the second by sentences. 
Because of the ambivalence in different notions of planning, 
we suggested abandoning the terminology. There is a further 
reason for an alternative terminology, and it concerns the labels of 
planners and discoverers. The problem with these labels is that 
they assume the romantic view of discovery; that is, that ideas are 
discovered by writing without a plan. In the classical view, ideas 
are discovered by invention or planned rhetorical organisation. 
Both positions assume that ideas are discovered, the difference 
between them Is how this occurs: by invention, or by writing 
without a plan. 
Flower and Hayes have a marked preference for planning. 
They point out that, as well as a benefit to the writer in reducing 
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constraints, "planning has another virtue; it is a highly teachable 
strategy" (Flower & Hayes 1980a, p. 43). In comparison, teaching 
discovery presents problems: 
"Discovery... is a perplexing notion. On the one hand, it 
metaphorically describes an intellectual process we want to 
teach. On the other hand, the metaphor and mythology of 
discovery itself often distorts our vision of the process. " 
(Flower & Hayes 1980b, p. 22) 
They argue that "the myth of discovery... is based on the premise 
that hidden stores of insight and ready-made ideas exist, buried 
in the mind of the writer, waiting only to be 'discovered"'; this 
mythology "obscures the fact that writers don't find meanings, 
they make them" (Flower & Hayes 1980b, p. 21). Invention, rather 
than discovery, seems a more appropriate term to describe a 
creative process of making meanings. If we adopted the classical 
view of discovery, we would attach alternative labels to writing 
behaviour: a division of writers into inventors and non-inventors, 
for example, rather than planners and discoverers. 
We defined cognitive planning as a mental activity that 
creates or modifies a mental representation of the text. All writers 
initially write without a plan as a mental schema, and all writers 
develop a schema by thinking. What is it that discoverers discover 
and inventors invent? In both cases, Galbraith claims the result is 
ideas (Galbraith 1991, Galbraith & Reed 1994). But these ideas are 
only achieved by writing. In both cases, these ideas are mental 
schemata that depend on writing for their existence and therefore 
obey the definition of a plan as a mental representation of the 
text. In the romantic view, cognitive planning is a process of 
discovery. In the classical view, cognitive planning is a process of 
invention. From the perspective of cognitive planning however, 
discovery is invention, and if we use the term "textual 
structuring" to describe this mental activity ofý making meanings, 
then we can abandon the terminology of writing behaviour - the 
terminology of planners and discoverers, or inventors and non- 
inventors. All writers engage in textual structuring, which is 
illustrated by Figure 9. 
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In Figure 1, the process of writing is represented as a cycle 
of engagement and reflection - the "rhythm of writing" (Sharples 
1993). Invention traditionally refers to the movement in Figure 1 
between reflective activity and planning or outlining activity. 
However, this movement is represented in Figure 5 by the cycle of 
thinking, writing (notes), reading (notes), and thinking. 
Meanwhile, discovery traditionally refers to the creation of 
continuous prose, the engagement in Figure 1. However, we have 
suggested that discovery occurs, not in writing, but in the 
movement between reviewing and reflective activity. This 
sequence of events is represented in Figure 5 as a cycle of 
thinking, writing (sentences), reading (sentences), and thinking. 
In Figure 5, the process of writing is represented as a cycle 
of thinking, writing and reading. On the one hand then, invention 
and discovery can both refer to a sequence of these activities. In 
this case, the difference between them is whether a writer is 
writing, reading and manipulating notes (invention) or sentences 
(discovery). On the other hand, invention and discovery can both 
refer to a mental activity, the creative process of making meaning. 
We have used the term textual structuring to describe this 
activity. In the cycle of activities illustrated by Figure 5, textual 
structuring is the mental activity that occurs before writing text, 
and after reading text. In this case then, invention is the mental 
activity of textual structuring that occurs before writing, while 
discovery refers to the textual structuring that occurs after 
reading. 
If we apply the rhythm of writing, illustrated in Figure 1, to 
the model of writing illustrated in Figure 5, the result, therefore, 
is Figure 9. Figure 9 represents the process of writing as a cycle of 
invention and discovery. Following Sharpies, we describe this 
cycle as the rhythm of textual structuring or, simply, the rhythm 
of thinking. 
To conclude, we defined cognitive planning as a mental 
activity that creates or modifies a mental representation of the 
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text. To escape the ambiguities that surround the terminology of 
planning, we have used the term textual structuring in a similar 
sense to describe the mental activity of creating meaning. The 
process of writing is a cycle of thinking, writing and reading 
(Figure 5), and textual structuring is the mental activity that 
occurs before writing (invention), and after reading (discovery). 
THINKING 
inuentl very 
WRITING RERDING 
(notes 
or 
sentences) 
FIGURE 9: THE RHYTHM OF THINKING 
This mental activity is assisted by writing notes or sentences, and 
by reading and manipulating them. Let's see how writing software 
helps writers in this activity. 
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5.5 WRITING SOFTWARE AND TEXTUAL STRUCTURING 
Textual structuring was defined as a mental activity of making 
meanings, in which a writer creates or modifies a mental schema 
of a text in production. Given the discussion of writing behaviour 
in chapter three, we can suggest two ways in which this activity is 
assisted. The first is by writing and manipulating notes: that is, by 
generating, reading, editing, and ordering notes. The second is by 
syntactic manipulation. There are three ways in which writing 
software, in turn, can assist writers in textual structuring. The 
first method is to provide help with the manipulation of notes or 
sentences. The second method is to provide direct assistance with 
creating a mental schema. In this case, writing software is helping 
a writer to think, and thinking is helping a writer to write. The 
third method is to provide assistance in generating text. In this 
case, writing software is helping a writer to write, and writing is 
helping a writer to think. Taking these methods in reverse order, 
let's look at how textual structuring is assisted by current writing 
software. 
WRITING 
According to Kellogg's (1989) review of planning and composing 
aids, there are two ways in which writing software can encourage 
a writer to generate text. The first method is to provide some kind 
of event if a writer pauses too long between keystrokes. In one of 
Kellogg's examples, the screen starts flashing. In another, the 
software "automatically types a series of "Xs" if the writer takes 
more than a second between keystrokes" (Kellogg 1989, p. 71). He 
calls this method an aid to "free writing" or "rapid writing": 
"free writing... refers to rapid writing, following whatever 
transient plan is available, without extensive planning or 
reviewing... It involves quickly writing off the top of one's 
head in a stream of consciousness manner. " 
(Kellogg 1989, pp. 70-71) 
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The second method of encouraging a writer to generate text 
is to provide a blank screen, so that the writer simply 
concentrates on the keyboard. Williams argues that this forces the. 
writer to generate text without having to think about editing or 
reviewing (Williams 1991a, p. 46). Kellogg calls both types of 
software "funnels"; given that writing is a process of juggling 
constraints (Flower & Hayes 1980a), he argues that funnels enable 
the writer to concentrate on one Hayes and Flower operation, such 
as "translating", while ignoring the others, such as "planning" or 
"reviewing". The second type of software - that of "invisible 
writing" - is also an aid to "free writing" according to Williams; in 
his view, "free writing is a useful technique for overcoming 
writer's block" (Williams 1991a, p. 46). 
THINKING 
Given that the model of writing most often found in writing 
software is "Plan, Draft, and Revise", software that is intended to 
assist thinking is usually called "pre-writing" software (Williams 
1991a, pp. 45-46). According to this model of writing, pre-writing 
is the stage where ideas are discovered or invented (Flower & 
Hayes 1980a, p. 32; Haas 1989, p. 182); thus the purpose of pre- 
writing software is to assist the writer in forming, clarifying and 
ordering concepts (Kellogg 1989, p. 72). Kellogg argues that "to 
assist with idea generation, a computer should serve the function 
of an inventor" (Kellogg 1989, p. 72). According to Kellogg, the type 
of software called "idea generators" or "inventors" adopts a 
question and answer dialogue with the user, and uses heuristics 
derived from rhetorical theory, such as Aristotle's Topics, or 
linguistic theory, such as Pike's "tagmemes" (Kellogg 1989, pp. 72- 
75). 
The aim of a second type of pre-writing software - the "idea 
processor" - is to encourage a writer to specify the relations 
between her ideas. There are two varieties of this type of 
software. Each offers a particular method of specifying relations 
between ideas, and these methods depend on the data structures 
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which the software uses to represent ideas and the relations 
between them. The two types of data structure are the tree and 
the graph (Bamford & Curran 1987, Kruse 1989). In either case, 
an idea is represented as a node. In the case of a tree, a node can 
be visualised as a leaf at the end of a branch, while the links 
between the nodes can be visualised as the branches that connect 
the leaves. In the case of a graph, a node is a vertex connected by 
edges or arcs. A graph can be visualised as a map of villages and 
footpaths, with the set of nodes as the villages, and the edges or 
arcs as the footpaths which connect them. The difference between 
the two data structures is that one is a hierarchy, while the other 
is a network. 
Kellogg describes these two methods of specifying relations 
as top-down and bottom-up. According to Kellogg, "the top-down 
method of organizing Is to impose a hierarchical outline or tree 
structure on ideas" (Kellogg 1989, p. 75). Using an example of this 
type of software, a writer creates a list of ideas and is helped to 
find the "hierarchical-category relationships" among them; "after 
developing the hierarchy, the program displays the resulting tree 
structure" (Kellogg 1989, p. 75). The second method is to create a 
network of relations between ideas; Kellogg calls this method of 
organising bottom-up. He cites one example in which a program 
asks for a list of ideas, arranges them as another list of all possible 
pairs, and presents each pair in turn. It asks the writer if each 
pair is related, and if so, the writer is asked to specify the nature 
of the relation from a menu of possible relations: "After the 
relations are specified, the program displays in a graphical 
network each idea as a node, the links from each node, and a label 
indicating the type of relation for each link" (Kellogg 1989, p. 75). 
Examples of such links are "is-an-explanation-of" and "is-an- 
example-of'. 
A third type of software assists thinking of the motivational 
rather than cognitive kind. While the aim of "rapid writing" 
software is to increase anxiety, the aim of "therapeutic" software 
is to reduce it: 
i 
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"To deal with affective problems connected with writing, the 
computer should serve as a therapist. Aids that try to 
reduce the anxiety, frustration, and lack of confidence of the 
writer serve the therapist function. " 
(Kellogg 1989, p. 76) 
Kellogg points out that a therapeutic approach is frequently 
"embedded" in the question and answer dialogue of "inventory" 
software; for example, the computer might offer praise or 
encouragement when the student responds (Kellogg 1989, p. 76). 
Finally, a fourth type of software "presents menus and prompts to 
lead a writer through a standardized genre, such as a monthly 
business report" (Kellogg 1989, p. 72). 
NOTE MANIPULATION 
Note taking and storing is supported by specialised hardware 
devices, by the software environment in which many word 
processors operate, and by dedicated software tools. Noel Williams 
discusses the use of portable computers and databases for this 
purpose, and claims that a database of factual information or 
quotations can be useful to student writers (Williams 1991a, 
pp. 52-53). The software environment of many word processors 
supports note taking and storage by the use of windows: multiple 
files can be open simultaneously, so that a writer can use a set of 
files for taking and accessing notes, another set for the text in 
production, and the technique of "Cut and Paste" for incorporating 
notes into the main text. Williams also discusses how to annotate 
the text in production by using particular markers, such as "p" for 
example (Williams 1991a, pp. 54-55). In addition, some writing 
software is designed specifically for taking notes, and runs in the 
background while the writer is using other software; Williams 
cites a program which displays notes in "pop-up" windows when it 
is invoked by the writer (Williams 1991a, p. 56). 
Ordering notes is an aspect of the operation that Hayes and 
Flower (1980a) call organising, a sub-process of planning. 
Traditionally, this is an activity that a writer has carried out with 
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pen and paper. Traditionally, it is also associated with pre-writing, 
and the kind of software that enables a writer to order notes is a 
variation of the pre-writing software that was described above - 
the "idea processor". Note ordering software is based on the same 
data structures (the tree and the graph) so that the two methods 
of ordering ideas (hierarchy and network) also apply to the 
ordering of notes. The hierarchical method is used in what are 
called "outliners" or "outline processors". Outliners enable writers 
to generate notes according to a hierarchy of headings, super- 
ordinate categories, titles, topics, themes, concepts or names 
(Wayner 1992; Smith & Lansman 1989, pp. 42-44). Compared with 
a table of contents, outlines are more dynamic in that they enable 
writers to re-order notes by moving the titles to which they are 
attached, rather than the notes themselves. However, Williams 
argues that students find outliners difficult to handle: "Essentially 
they constrain a writer to create a hierarchical tree structure, 
which some find foreign and which, for certain kinds of text, is not 
always the most natural approach" (Williams 1991a, p. 50). 
The second method of ordering notes is used in what are 
called "network processors". In this case, the arrangement of 
nodes and links that was described above is used to order notes 
rather than ideas; notes are attached to nodes, and the links 
between the nodes form a "notes network". This is one example of 
the ways in which hypertext can be used to design tools for 
writers. Kellogg describes one such application called 
"NOTECARDS", in which notes are stored on the "cards" of a 
hypertext: "the program permits the writer to label relations, 
using, for example, the rhetorical relations of evidence, comment 
and argument" (Kellogg 1989, pp. 75-76). Some writing 
environments give writers a choice of three methods of ordering 
notes. Sharples and colleagues describe a "Writer's Assistant", with 
which a writer can order text in a linear fashion, in an outline 
fashion, or by creating a "notes network" (Sharples, Goodlet & 
Pemberton 1989). Smith and Lansman describe a writing 
environment which also offers these three possibilities (Smith & 
Lansman 1989, pp. 40-42) 
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SENTENCE MANIPULATION 
There are two ways in which writing software assists sentence 
manipulation. The first allows for the manipulation of syntax by 
providing tools such as "grammar" or "style" checkers (Williams 
1991a, pp. 74-77). Such tools often give a measure of "readability" 
(Williams 1991a, pp. 64-68). However, grammar checkers do not 
always provide explanations for their suggestions, nor do they 
provide any explanation of the readability measures which they 
adopt. Writers therefore need to interpret the information which 
they provide, and students may find this information mystifying. 
In Williams' view, "the popularity of readability formulae is as 
much a result of the ease with which they can be implemented on 
a computer as of any validity they may have" (Williams 1991a, 
p. 66). On the other hand, grammar checkers can be useful in 
detecting features that the writer may not otherwise notice. 
The second way in which writing software assists sentence 
manipulation is through a variation of the "outline processor". 
Some outliners enable the writer to manipulate sentences within a 
document by displaying the topic sentences of each paragraph. 
Kellogg cites a program that displays the first and last sentences 
of each paragraph; in another example, a program can select "any 
sentence specifically designated by the writer as a topic sentence" 
(Kellogg 1989, p. 70). This type of software therefore enables the 
writer to manipulate a paragraph by manipulating the topic 
sentence, in a similar fashion to the manipulation of notes 
described above. With this type of software, a writer can structure 
a document by writing, editing and ordering topic sentences. 
SOME PROBLEMS 
There are two basic problems with some of the writing software 
described above. The first is a result of the model of writing which 
has informed their design, while the second is a result of the data 
structures on which the software is based. As Williams points out, 
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most writing software is based on the model of "Plan, Draft, and 
Revise", or "Pre-write, Compose, and Post-write" (Williams 1991a). 
Pre-writing is the stage where ideas are discovered or invented. 
From this perspective, ideas are seen as separable from language, 
as Saussure comments. For example, Collins and Gentner argue "it 
is important to separate idea production from text production" 
(Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 53), and it is this view of writing which 
informs the design of "inventors" and "idea generators". The 
assumption is that writers need to sort out "ideas" before text, and 
that the clarification of ideas is an autonomous process that has no 
connection with writing. Yet writing involves the ordering of notes 
rather than ideas, and as Sharples and Pemberton remark, 
"physical marks are not ideas" (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, 
p. 326). The problems of using this type of software have been 
indicated by Winterbauer (1992), who discusses a pre-writing aid 
intended for student writers. This discussion highlights the 
problems that can arise when the activities of thinking and 
writing are separated: 
"Students generally thought the approach was interesting 
but they objected to the time required to develop a topic. 
They believed that the approach was too exhaustive, and it 
caused them to spend more time than they wanted on an 
activity (prewriting) that they did not particularly enjoy. " 
(Winterbauer 1992, pp. 175-176) 
Although "inventors" and "idea generators" might assist 
logical thinking, this thinking may not have any relation to the 
text a writer needs to produce. A related problem with inventors 
is that the Aristotelian exercises which they often incorporate 
may be too abstract for students to transfer the results to the text 
they need to write. A further problem is that the question and 
answer dialogue, which is intended to have a therapeutic function, 
also attributes the computer with an "intelligence" that it does not 
possess. ' 
I See, for example, Greene's discussion of "ELIZA", in Greene 1986, pp. 105- 
107. 
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"Idea processors" merely perpetuate this distinction 
between thinking and writing, so forming relations between ideas, 
whether by a hierarchy or by a network, may also not have any 
connection with the text that a writer needs to produce. This only 
occurs when idea processors allow for note taking; that is, with the 
software known as "outline processors" and "network processors". 
In that case however, we face the second problem concerning the 
data structures on which the software is based. With the "out- 
liner", the problem is whether the tree is an appropriate model for 
structuring the text. With the non-linearity of a network, we face 
the linearisation problem. Notes can be "cut and pasted" from a 
hypertext into the text in production, but in developing the 
linearity of an argumentative text, these notes may still have to go 
through a process of re-ordering. 
In this review of writing software, we have been guided by 
the basic model of writing represented by Figure 5, and by the 
subsequent discussion of textual structuring. In other words, the 
model has provided a framework for examining how software 
tools assist writers; this is one of its computational consequences. 
Kellogg (1989) assumes a "pre-write", "write" and "post-write" 
model of writing, and as we have seen, this model is implicit in 
many of the tools we have discussed. If we view the tools from 
the perspective of an alternative model of writing, then we would 
have to impose a different set of categories onto the tools in 
question, as we have done above. The second implication of the 
model is that tools intended to help "pre-writing" will not be of 
much use to writers, unless they offer the facility for note-taking, 
and unless they are integrated into the writer's software 
environment. In addition, they should also be seen as relevant to 
the text that a writer is producing. As noted above, "pre-writing" 
tools that consist of Aristotelian exercises are generally seen as 
interesting but irrelevant to the task at hand (Winterbauer 1992). 
A further implication of the model is that software designers need 
to cater for the different reading strategies of writers who work 
with electronic text; we shall discuss strategies of reading in 
chapter nine. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we identified three kinds of planning. One sort is 
concerned with a writer's motivation, while the other two are 
concerned with metacognitive and cognitive processes. We showed 
how differences in writing strategies are related to differences in 
thinking processes, and how all these differences are tied up with 
differences in planning. We also identified a problem with the 
literature on planning, which is whether a plan refers to a mental 
schema or an external representation of ideas. From the 
perspective of software design, we asked whether the planning 
observed in different writing behaviours is the same operation, 
and concluded that if we are consistent in our definitions, the two 
sorts of planning were the same. 
As a way of resolving the ambiguities concerning notions of 
planning, we argued for a model of writing based on the three 
activities of thinking, writing, and reading. Further reasons for 
this kind of model were provided. We discussed a model of 
writing based on observations of writing behaviour and the 
cognitive models of chapter four. We showed how the model 
accommodates different writing strategies, and how it compares 
with other models. We then discussed the notion of cognitive 
planning as textual structuring, and showed how the notion of a 
"rhythm of thinking" resolves the apparent divergence between 
invention and discovery in writing. Finally, we asked how 
software tools assist writers in textual structuring, and identified 
some problems with tools intended to support planning. 
Having looked at writing behaviour, cognitive models of 
writing, and notions of planning, we now have a basic model of 
writing. The basic model lacks many details, but these details may 
vary according to the type of text a writer is producing. Our aim is 
to develop the basic model into a model of fiction writing, and to 
do this, we need to identify the kinds of thinking activities that 
produce fictional texts. What constitutes cognitive planning or 
textual structuring in the case of fiction writing? The models we 
have discussed offer no guidance on how different kinds of 
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writing influence the process of writing. To seek an answer, we 
now turn to consider linguistic approaches to modelling writing. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
LINGUISTICS 
AND 
MODELS OF WRITING 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we look at the ways in which linguistics is used to 
model writing. In the first part, we discuss the problem of 
identifying structures in written language. This involves a 
discussion of Chomsky's (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. 
The reason for this discussion is that the ideas and arguments of 
that work, although "out-of-date" in the context of the 
development of Chomsky's theories, continue to have a major 
influence on current writing research, and on the ways in which 
linguistics is used to model writing. We compare traditional 
grammar with Chomsky's transformational grammar, and show 
how the latter has influenced the development of story grammars 
and text grammars. We also show how Chomsky's (1965) ideas 
influence Culler's (1975) discussion of linguistic approaches to 
literature. We conclude this discussion of structure by making a 
distinction between semiological and structural analyses of 
written language. 
In the second part of the chapter, we look at explanations of 
how the structures identified by textual analysis figure in the 
structuring activities of writers. One explanation is given by 
Frederiksen's (1986) model of discourse comprehension and 
production, and we show how this model is influenced once again 
by Chomsky's transformational grammar. A further influence of 
Chomsky lies in the distinction between cognitive and linguistic 
-planning, a distinction that features in current writing research 
(eg Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139). We argue that the notion of 
linguistic planning be replaced by that of syntactic planning, and 
that syntactic planning is an aspect of cognitive planning. In the 
course of this argument, we discuss two explanations of how 
syntax figures in the structuring activities of writers, comparing 
Witte and Cherry's (1986) account of sentence semantics with 
Cooper and Matsuhashi's (1983) functional sentence perspective. 
In conclusion, we highlight Chomsky's influence on linguistic 
approaches to modelling writing, and., identify some problems with 
the approaches discussed in this chapter. 
4 
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6.2 STRUCTURE 
Some years ago, Graham Hough claimed that "one of the principal 
dogmas of current critical thought" was the rejection of the 
distinction between form and content in the literary work (Hough 
1969, p. 4). In the prevailing view, "the work of literary art is seen 
as an organic unity, in which matter and manner, thought and 
expression are indissolubly one" (Hough 1969, p. 4). How is this 
unity to be perceived? One critic who looks for organic wholes is 
Jean Rousset. He explains: 
if... reading, which is developed in duration, will have to 
make the work simultaneously present in all its parts in 
order to be global... Similar to a painting in movement, the 
book is revealed only in successive fragments. The task of 
the demanding reader consists in overturning this natural 
tendency of the book, so that it may present itself in its 
entirety to the mind's scrutiny. The only complete reading is 
the one which transforms the book into a simultaneous 
network of reciprocal relationships... " 
(Rousset 1962, p. xiii) 
According to Derrida, "a structuralist reading, by its own 
activity, always presupposes and appeals to the theological 
simultaneity of the book, and considers itself deprived of the 
essential when this simultaneity is not accessible" (Derrida 1978a, 
p. 24). For some critics, the difficulty of achieving a simultaneous 
reading is associated with the linearity of the printed book 
(McLuhan 1969, McLuhan 1973, Howell & Douglas 1990). In 
contrast, the electronic book is seen as a non-linear document 
which encourages a different kind of reading (Bolter 1991a); the 
environment of hypertext, for example, can provide "an effective 
illusion of the simultaneity of experience" (Dickey 1991, p. 144). 
We shall return to this notion of different kinds of reading 
in chapter ten. Here, our concern is the structural, unity that is 
perceived when the literary work is presented in its entirety. 
What kind of structures are perceived in a global reading? 
According to Derrida, Rousset refers to "spatial models, mathe- 
matical functions, lines, and forms" (Derrida 1978 ä, p. 16). While 
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using spatial or geometrical metaphor, Rousset reduces time to a 
dimension; "it is only the element in which a form or a curve can 
be displayed" (Derrida 1978a, p. 16). And it is the temporal aspect 
of reading that must be overturned in order to perceive structure. 
As Derrida comments, structure is inseparable from space: 
"Now, stricto sensu, the notion of structure refers only to 
space, geometric or morphological space, the order of forms 
and sites. Structure is first the structure of an organic or 
artificial work, the internal unity of an assemblage, a 
construction ;a work is governed by a unifying principle, 
the architecture that is built and made visible in a location. " 
(Derrida 1978a, p. 15) 
Now, strictly speaking, although Derrida concatenates spatial 
models and mathematical functions, there is a significant 
difference between Euclidean geometry and differential calculus. 
Euclidean geometry is concerned with the properties of abstract 
shapes or structures in one, two or three dimensional space, 
shapes such as lines, squares, and circles. Calculus, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the relationship between two or more 
variables, and one of the variables might be time. The formula 
expressing this relationship, for example y= 1/x, produces a 
particular shape or curve when values for the variables are 
plotted graphically. In the case of y= 1/x, the formula results in a 
hyperbola. 
Moving from geometry to calculus then, we turn from 
structure to structuring; we are less concerned with the properties 
of abstract shapes than with the formulae that produce them. 
Euclidean geometry involves shapes that are static and bounded; 
differential geometry involves curves of infinite extension in time 
and space. At the same time, differential calculus is, concerned 
with the infinitely small quantity, with what happens when the 
difference between consecutive values of a continuous variable 
approaches zero. Recent discoveries of formulae such as the 
Mandelbrot set (Gleick 1987) enable computers to represent 
complex shapes found in nature, shapes which recur. in objects of 
increasingly infinitesimal size: the outlines of clouds, coastlines, 
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trees, leaves, crystals, grains of sand. Within the framework of 
Euclid, whose concern is the properties of regular shapes and 
solids, such discoveries would be impossible to achieve. 
While calculus deals with infinitely small and infinitely large 
quantity, formulae such as the Mandelbrot set raise the question 
whether an infinite number of shapes can be generated by a finite 
number of formulae. In the realm of popular fiction, a basic 
formula of romance and mystery produces an endless number of 
best-sellers. Yet to generate an infinite number of shapes, do we 
not require an infinite number of formulae? 
This question arises when we consider the problem that 
prompted much of Chomsky's work in linguistics. He describes this 
problem in the preface to Aspects of the Theory of Syntax: 
"The idea that a language is based on a system of rules 
determining the interpretation of its infinitely many 
sentences is by no means novel. Well over a century ago, it 
was expressed with reasonable clarity by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt in his famous but rarely studied introduction to 
general linguistics in 1836... His view that a language makes 
'infinite use of finite means' and that its grammar must 
describe the processes that make this possible is, 
furthermore, an outgrowth of a persistent concern, within 
rationalistic philosophy of language and mind, with this 
'creative' aspect of language use... " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. v) 
According to Halliday and Hasan, the sentence is "the highest unit 
of grammatical structure" (Halliday & Hasan 1976, p. 8). Crystal 
refers to a consensus among linguists that "the sentence Is the 
maximal unit of grammatical analysis" (Crystal 1971, p. 201). He 
qualifies this claim by pointing out that, although there are units 
of text larger than the sentence, "the sentence is the largest unit 
recognized by the linguist as being capable of accounting for the 
range of grammatical classes and structures which turn up in a 
language". So, the sentence is seen by most linguists as the 
principal structure of written language. It Is finite in length, with 
a well defined spatial boundary marked by the full stop. 
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Chomsky's task is to define the finite set of resources that can 
comprehend an infinite number of sentences: 
"A fully adequate grammar must assign to each of an 
infinite range of sentences a structural description indicating 
how this sentence is understood by the ideal speaker- 
hearer. " 
(Chomsky 1965, pp. 4-5) 
The resources are rules and grammars: "by a generative grammar 
I mean simply a system of rules that in some explicit and well- 
defined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences" 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 8). Chomsky defines the descriptive adequacy 
of a grammar as follows: 
"A grammar can be regarded as a theory of a language; it is 
descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly 
describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized native 
speaker. The structural descriptions assigned to sentences 
by the grammar, the distinctions that it makes between 
well-formed and deviant, and so on, must, for descriptive 
adequacy, correspond to the linguistic intuition of the native 
speaker (whether or not he may be immediately aware of 
this) in a substantial and significant class of crucial cases. " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 24) 
In turn, Chomsky defines a linguistic theory as descriptively 
adequate "if it makes a descriptively adequate grammar available 
for each natural language" (Chomsky 1965, p. 24). 
One problem with these definitions is quantity: how large is 
a substantial class of cases? In distinguishing between well- 
formed and deviant sentences, a descriptively adequate grammar 
would need to be consistent. However, logical consistency in 
dealing with an infinite number of cases is difficult to achieve. 
Mathematicians have problems proving the consistency of 
Euclidean geometry: 
"In the various attempts to solve the problem of consistency 
there is one persistent source of difficulty. It lies in the fact 
that the axioms are interpreted by models composed of an 
infinite number of elements. This makes it impossible to 
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encompass the models in a finite number of observations; 
hence the truth of the axioms themselves is subject to doubt. 
In the inductive argument for the truth of Euclidean 
geometry, a finite number of observed facts about space are 
presumably in agreement with the axioms. But the 
conclusion that the argument seeks to establish involves an 
extrapolation from a finite to an infinite set of data. How can 
we justify this jump? " 
(Nagel & Newman 1989, p. 21) 
One area where well-formed and deviant sentences are well 
defined is computer programming. Programming languages vary 
in their similarity to human languages, but each has its own 
lexicon and its own syntax. The sequence of symbols written by 
the programmer is checked for errors by programs called 
compilers or interpreters. At some stage of writing a program, a 
programmer will ask the machine to interpret the program; a 
compiler will then inform the programmer of incomprehensible 
lexical items and errors in syntax. Chomsky's structural analysis of 
sentences has been invaluable for the development of computer 
software, and most compilers are based on this method of analysis 
(Chomsky 1957, Bornat 1979). 
Programming a machine to understand programming 
languages is a task that requires finite resources. However, using 
mathematical logic to explain how humans can understand an 
infinite number of sentences is a task that requires an infinite 
number of rules: 
"Unfortunately, most of the postulate systems that constitute 
the foundations of important branches of mathematics 
cannot be mirrored in finite models... Finite models suffice, 
in principle, to establish the consistency of certain sets of 
postulates; but these are of slight mathematical importance. 
Non-finite models, necessary for the interpretation of most 
postulate systems of mathematical significance, can be 
described only in general terms; and we cannot conclude as 
a matter of course that the descriptions are free from 
concealed contradictions. " 
(Nagel & Newman 1989, pp. 22-23) 
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In Nagel and Newman's summary, Godel's work on logic showed 
firstly "that it is impossible to give a meta-mathematical proof of 
the consistency of a system comprehensive enough to contain the 
whole of arithmetic" (Nagel & Newman 1989, p. 58). Secondly, 
Godel showed that any system "within which arithmetic can be 
developed... is essentially incomplete " (Nagel & Newman 1989, 
p. 58): 
"In other words, given any consistent set of arithmetical 
axioms, there are true arithmetical statements that cannot 
be derived from the set. " 
(Nagel & Newman 1989, pp. 58-59) 
The essence of Godel's proof is the construction of an arithmetical 
formula G that represents the meta-mathematical statement: "The 
formula G is not demonstrable" (Nagel & Newman 1989, p. 85). 
Godel then showed that, although G is not formally demonstrable, 
it is nevertheless a true arithmetical formula (Nagel & Newman 
1989, p. 86). 
The mathematical basis of Chomsky's grammar is 
arithmeticl, and if we translate Godel's proof into its implications 
for a linguistic theory based on mathematical logic, then Godel 
showed that there is always a context for the deviant sentence. 
Jonathan Culler, discussing the meaningless sentence, points out in 
a similar fashion: 
"When anyone proposes an example of a meaningless 
sentence, listeners can usually imagine a context in which it 
would have meaning; by placing a frame around it, they can 
make it signify. " 
(Culler 1983, p. 122) 
1 "It seems clear that certain kinds of grammatical information are 
presented in the most natural way by a system of rewriting rules, and we 
may therefore conclude that rewriting rules constitute part of the base of 
the syntactic component. Furthermore, we shall assume that these rules are 
arranged in a linear sequence... Thus... the grammar consists of the 
sequence of rules R1, ..., Rn... " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 67) 
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One context for the deviant sentence is a book on linguistics. For 
Chomsky, the object of study is the isolated sentence, but written 
sentences are usually found in some kind of text, such as a 
linguistic text; we return to a typology of texts below. Syntax and 
semantics are separate components in Chomsky's (1965) model of 
sentence comprehension. However, psychologists have concluded 
that humans do not carry out a syntactic analysis before under- 
standing a sentence (Greene & Coulson 1995). In the case of 
speech, the sentence does not exist as the well defined spatial 
entity that we can study on the printed page or computer screen; 
there is no spatial boundary marked by the full stop. In addition, 
sounds, words and "sentences" form part of a discourse or 
conversation (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 19). The nature of 
the discourse, or the textual context of the sentence, is one factor 
that influences the assumptions people make about the meaning 
of a sentence, as text linguists and psychologists have pointed out 
(van Dijk 1979, van Dijk 1980, Beaugrande & Miller 1980, Beau- 
grande & Dressler 1981, Greene & Coulson 1995). 
In The Gutenberg Galaxy, McLuhan shows that a concern for 
English grammar originated in the transition from an oral to a 
print culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As 
McLuhan claims, "nobody ever made a grammatical error in pre- 
literate society" (McLuhan 1969, p. 285). The use of printing 
technology for the mass production of literature as a commodity 
demanded the standardisation of spelling and syntax. The 
authoritative King James version of the Bible, for example, was 
printed in 1611. According to Hawkes, seventeenth century 
rhetorical theory is characterised by the Aristotelian notion of 
metaphor as ornamentation, a notion that found expression in the 
concern for "Plain Style" in the English language' (Hawkes 1989, 
p. 28). This dominant view of metaphor Involved a "cleavage 
between form and content, metaphor and language" (Hawkes 
1989, p. 29), a disjunction which Hough (1969) seeks to reinstate 
through the notion of style, as we noted at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
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From a different perspective, McLuhan claims that 
"schizophrenia may be a necessary consequence of literacy" 
(McLuhan 1969, p. 32). In McLuhan's view, one effect of printing 
technology is a disjunction between eye and ear, between the 
visual and oral senses. However, McLuhan's notion of cognition is 
the subject for a debate that is not our current concern (Miller 
1971, pp. 92-133). A more modest claim is that traditional 
grammar treats the sentence as a structure which is split into two 
parts: the subject and the predicate. Phythian gives a 
psychological explanation of this grammatical division: 
"If you look at the sentence 
The museum is closed on Sundays. 
you will see that it has two parts. The first part names what 
the sentence is about: The museum. The second part tells us 
something about the museum. 
... the first part - that which names what we are thinking about in the sentence - is called the subject. The 
remainder of the sentence, making a statement about the 
subject, is called the predicate. 
In every sentence... there is always a subject, naming 
the person or thing we are thinking about, and a predicate, 
which states what we are thinking about the subject. " 
(Phythian 1980, p. 5) 
In this explanation of sentence structure, Phythian refers to the 
thinking processes of the person who produces a sentence: the 
sentence producer names a subject, then thinks about the subject. 
However, the name of the sentence is also an attribute of sentence 
structure, an attribute that is Identified and named by the 
grammarian. For the sentence producer, does the grammatical 
subject necessarily name "what we are thinking about in the 
sentence"? In a similar fashion to Chomsky, traditional grammar 
only deals with the meaning of isolated sentences, and we need to 
provide a context for the exemplary sentence: a conversation, for 
example. We also need to provide a context for the conversation. 
. Let's imagine a Sunday afternoon on the: Isle of Skye. A 
family are staying in self-catering accommodation for their 
summer holidays, it's raining, and the children are bored. Wendy 
wants to complete her latest novel, and suggests to Brian that 
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perhaps he could take the kids out for the afternoon. Brian has no 
objections to going out, but where do you take kids on a 'wet 
Sunday afternoon on the Isle of Skye? Wendy suggests the craft 
centre: 
"The craft centre is dosed on Sundays. " 
"What about the otter sanctuary? " 
"The otter sanctuary is closed on Sundays. " 
"The osprey centre? " 
"The osprey centre is dosed on Sundays. The museum is dosed on 
Sundays. The pub is closed on Sundays. Even the local shop closes on a 
Sunday. What a place! Those Presbyterians certainly have a stranglehold on 
Sunday opening. The only place that is open on Sundays is the local church. " 
Wendy smiled. 
"Perhaps you could take the kids there? " 
Brian did not reply to this last suggestion, but sat holding his head, 
wondering where other kids went on wet Sunday afternoons on the Isle of 
Skye. 
In this example, we have provided a context for the 
exemplary sentence. In this context, if we were to name what 
Brian is thinking about when making this utterance, we might 
name the subject of his thoughts as "Sunday closing" or "wet 
Sunday afternoons on the Isle of Skye". If we describe his 
thinking activity as problem solving (Newell & Simon 1972, 
Kahney 1986), then we might name the problem he is trying to 
solve as "Where can we go? " In any case, the name of what he is 
thinking about when making the utterance is not the same as the 
grammatical subject of the sentence. Indeed, we might argue that 
the grammatical predicate, rather than the grammatical subject, is 
naming the subject of his thoughts. Following, McLuhan, it is also 
tempting to ask whether sentences have names in pre-literate 
societies. 
Naming is an important activity, for writers, for 
grammarians and for natural scientists since the days of Adam. As 
the Water Genie tells Haroun in: Salman Rushdie's novel, Ifaroun 
and the Sea of Stories: 
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"To give a thing a name, a label, a handle; to rescue it from 
anonymity, to pluck it out of the Place of Namelessness, in 
short to identify it - well, that's a way of bringing the said 
thing into being. " 
(Rushdie 1990, p. 63) 
By naming the sentence, the grammarian brings the sentence into 
being, but Phythian confuses this activity of naming the sentence, 
which is the activity of the grammarian, with the activity of the 
sentence producer, who is vocalising his thought. To explain a split 
in sentence structure made by the grammarian, Phythian invokes 
a split between naming and thinking on the part of the sentence 
producer. Naming is itself a thinking process, and the schism 
between naming and thinking is the result of an attempt to 
explain the meaning or semantics of an isolated sentence by 
attributing to the sentence producer the naming activity of the 
traditional grammarian. We return to naming as an activity of the 
sentence producer below. 
How does Chomsky's transformational grammar differ from 
traditional grammar? Traditional grammar provides a lexical 
taxonomy consisting of nouns, verbs, adjectives and so on. It also 
provides a taxonomy of sentence structure which consists of 
phrases and clauses on the one hand, and the binary division into 
subject and predicate on the other. Chomsky, however, makes a 
distinction between grammatical categories and grammatical 
functions (Chomsky 1965, p. 68). While a noun phrase is a 
grammatical category, the notions of subject and predicate are 
functional notions that suggest logical relations between 
grammatical categories; it is these logical relations, rather than 
grammatical categories, that determine sentence comprehension. 
However, the traditional division of the sentence into subject 
and predicate frequently results in a lack of correspondence 
between the grammatical subject of the sentence on the one hand, 
and the logical subject of the sentence on the other. While the first 
traditionally represents the name of the sentence, the second 
functions as the subject in the sequence of subject, verb, and 
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object. In Chomsky's view, the order of words in a sentence 
represents the surface structure of the sentence, and the 
traditional categories of subject and predicate are a feature of this 
surface structure (Chomsky 1965, p. 70). The logical relations 
expressed in the sentence (those of subject, verb, and object) 
represent the deep structure of the sentence. In Chomsky's 
transformational grammar, a set of rules transforms surface 
structure into deep structure (Chomsky 1965, p. 135). When the 
grammatical subject of the sentence is the same as the logical 
subject, then surface structure is equivalent to deep structure. 
In Chomsky's model of sentence comprehension, the word 
order or surface structure of a sentence conveys no meaning. 
Chomsky equates the semantics of a sentence with grammatical or 
logical relations; these relations are "semantically significant 
functional notions" which are represented by the deep structure 
of a sentence (Chomsky 1965, p. 117). On the one hand, if we 
entertain the notion that a sentence has two structures, then we 
are not likely to see a sentence as an organic whole, in the way 
that some critics see the literary work. Chomsky's structural 
distinction is also a distinction between sentence form and 
sentence content: 
"... one major function of the transformational rules is to 
convert an abstract deep structure that expresses the 
content of a sentence into a fairly concrete surface structure 
that indicates its form. " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 136) 
On the other hand, both kinds of structure can be represented as a 
tree. A generative grammar consists of a set of rewrite rules that 
divide a sentence (or the crown of the tree) into a noun phrase 
and a verb phrase; each phrase Is successively divided until we 
are left with the words of the sentence (the roots of the tree) at 
the bottom. Although a sentence might have two structures, both 
structures are represented by the same method of the tree. In 
computer software, the tree Is a data structure that is often used 
to represent logical relations or structural hierarchies (Bamford & 
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Curran 1987, Kruse 1989); it is used, for example, to design 
outlining tools for writers (Wayner 1992). 
The problem which this notion of sentence semantics leaves 
unresolved is how is it possible to comprehend global discourse? 
If the semantic elements of a sentence are purely its logical 
relations, then the semantics of a discourse must be constructed 
by adding up the logical relations expressed in each sentence. 
Discussing the exemplary sentence, we mentioned that the 
grammatical subject was not necessarily the name that best 
describes the subject of the sentence producer's thought. Referring 
to other linguists who point to the possibility that the subject and 
predicate are not necessarily words in the sentence, Chomsky 
comments that, "Whatever the force of such observations may be, 
it seems that they lie beyond the scope of any existing theory of 
language structure or language use" (Chomsky 1965, p. 163). He 
concludes that the relation between syntax and semantics is a 
mystery: 
"To conclude this highly inconclusive discussion, I shall 
simply point out that the syntactic and semantic structure of 
natural languages evidently offers many mysteries, both of 
fact and of principle, and that any attempt to delimit the 
boundaries of these domains must certainly be quite 
tentative. " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 163) 
However, is the relation between, syntax and semantics a 
relation between the mysterious structures that Chomsky 
attempts to define? While Chomsky's work has had immense con- 
sequences for developing machine understanding of programming 
languages, Greene and Coulson claim that it has had "little impact 
on psychological theories of language" (Greene 
,& 
Coulson 1995, 
p. 34). As we explained, syntax and semantics are separate 
components in Chomsky's model of sentence comprehension; 
according to Greene and Coulson, his transformational grammar 
"represents in its most extreme form the claim that syntax and 
semantics are quite distinct types of analysis" (Greene & Coulson 
1995, p. 32). Before computers can execute a program written in a 
"high-level" language such as COBOL, the program code has to be 
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checked for errors by programs called translators, compilers, or 
interpreters (Bornat 1979); in this analysis of program code, 
syntax and semantics are separate components. However, after 
testing Chomsky's model on humans, psychologists concluded that 
humans do not carry out a syntactic analysis before under- 
standing a sentence, as we mentioned above: 
"People make assumptions about what a sentence might 
plausibly mean and, indeed, may sometimes bypass 
syntactic analysis altogether... " 
(Greene & Coulson 1995, p. 32) 
Yet cognitive psychologists have an ambivalent relation to 
Chomsky. On the one hand, psycholinguists have shown that 
Chomsky's theory of sentence comprehension is not valid for 
humans. On the other hand, psychologists investigating story 
comprehension and story memory have adopted Chomsky's 
notions of two structures, rewrite rules, and transformational 
grammar in analysing story structure (Rumelhart 1975, 
Thorndyke 1977, Mandler & Johnson 1977, Mandler 1978, 
Johnson & Mandler 1980). Rumelhart applies Chomsky's notion of 
the "well-formed" sentence to stories: "... the notion of 'well- 
formedness' is nearly as reasonable for stories as it is for 
sentences" (Rumelhart 1975, p. 211). Giving an example of a 
simple story that consists of "a string of sentences", he then 
reorders the string so that the temporal sequence of events is 
jumbled. While the first string "seems to form a sensible whole" 
and exemplifies a "well-formed" story, the jumbled version 
"seems to be analyzable into little more than a string of sentences" 
(Rumelhart 1975, p. 212). Yet if there is always a context for the 
meaningless sentence, then there are also ways in which a 
temporal reordering of events can be rendered "sensible". In 
Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie, for example, "temporal reference is 
deliberately sabotaged", as Genette remarks (Genette 1980, p. 35), 
but the novel can be read "as the interior monologue of a husband 
spying on his wife and imagining her adventures" (Genette 1980, 
p. 219). As Jonathan Culler points out: 
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"... the reader may treat anything anomalous as the effect of 
the narrator's vision or cast of mind. In the case of first 
person narration, choices for which the reader can find no 
other explanation may be read as excesses which display the 
narrator's individuality and as symptoms of his obsessions. 
But even when there is no narrator who describes himself 
we can explain almost any aspect of a text by postulating a 
narrator whose character the elements in question are 
designed to reflect or reveal. Thus, Robbe-Grillet's 'La 
Jalousie' may be recuperated... by postulating an obsessed 
narrator with paranoiac suspicions so as to explain certain 
fixations of description; 'Dans La Labyrinthe' can be 
naturalised by reading it as the speech of a narrator 
suffering from amnesia. The most incoherent text could be 
explained by assuming that it is the speech of a delirious 
narrator. " 
(Culler 1975, p. 200) 
Rumeihart's approach to story structure involves the 
development of a grammar which, in a similar fashion to 
Chomsky, assumes a separation of syntax and semantics: 
"The grammar consists of a set of syntactical rules which 
generate the constituent structure of stories and a 
corresponding set of semantic interpretation rules which 
determine the semantic representation of the story. " 
(Rumelhart 1975, p. 213) 
A set of rewrite rules turns a story into the type of tree structure 
that Chomsky (1957,1965) uses to represent the syntactic 
structure of a sentence. Just as a sentence can be rewritten as a 
noun phrase plus verb phrase, a story can be rewritten as 
"Setting" plus "Episode"; "Episode" is broken down further into 
"Event" plus "Reaction" (Rumelhart 1975, pp. 213-216). In 
Thorndyke's elaboration of Rumelhart's story grammar, a story is 
rewritten as "Setting" plus "Theme" plus "Plot" plus "Resolution" 
(Thorndyke 1977, p. 79). In a similar fashion to Chomsky's 
representation of deep structure, Rumelhart's semantic 
interpretation rules represent the logical relations between story 
constituents. In this rationalistic approach to semantics, logical 
relations include the temporal ordering of events, the causal 
relations between events, and the representation of a character's 
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motivation in terms of the plans and goals that were discussed in 
the last chapter. 
In these attempts to represent story structure by a story 
grammar, Chomsky's dualism seems to be inescapable. Thorndyke 
presents the distinction between story syntax and story semantics 
in terms of structure and content, in a similar fashion to 
Chomsky's distinction between sentence form and sentence 
content: 
"The term structure refers here to the functional 
relationships among the components of the plot, 
independent of any particular set of characters or the 
specific actions they perform. Content refers to the 
semantics of the individual propositions of the story: the set 
of characters, specific setting information, and the actions 
involving the characters. " 
(Thorndyke 1977, p. 97) 
Mandler and Johnson's story grammar (Mandler & Johnson 1977) 
is based on Rumelhart's (Rumelhart 1975). On the one hand, 
Mandler and Johnson criticise the dualism of Rumelhart's 
separation of syntax and semantics. According to Mandler and 
Johnson, Rumelhart's grammar 
"... was seminal work because of its emphasis on global 
structures which specify suprasentential relationships and 
because it suggested useful ways to characterize such 
higher-order structure. However, our attempts to apply his 
analyses to new stories frequently failed. The structure 
described a very narrow range of stories, namely, those with 
single or embedded episodes. It also depended on a set of 
dual structures, one containing syntactic relations, the other 
semantic relations, which are unwieldy to work with and 
frequently redundant. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, pp. 113-114) 
In a later development of their story grammar, Mandler and 
Johnson refer to the psycholinguistic research on, sentence 
comprehension which suggests that "it is often possible to go 
directly to comprehension without calling upon a great deal of 
syntactic knowledge" (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 56). In the case 
173 
of story comprehension, they emphasise a closer interdependence 
of syntax and semantics: "a major difference between stories and 
sentences is that the semantic and syntactic aspects of the former 
are more intertwined" (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 57). Yet on the 
other hand, Mandler and Johnson's grammar has more similarities 
with Chomsky's than does Rumelhart's. Chomsky's two structures 
are resurrected through the notion of surface structure and 
underlying structure (Mandler & Johnson 1977, Mandler 1978, 
Mandler & DeForest 1979, Johnson & Mandler 1980). While "the 
surface structure of a story consists of sentences", "the underlying 
structure of a story can be represented as a tree structure which 
makes explicit the constituent structure and the relations between 
constituents" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 115). Mandler and 
Johnson describe a set of rewrite rules that amalgamate 
Rumelhart's rules governing syntax and semantics (Mandler & 
Johnson 1977, p. 117). In a similar fashion to Rumelhart, the 
semantics of a story are equated with the logical relations of 
temporal ordering, causal relations, and the plans and goals that 
motivate characters. 
In Chomsky's (1965) model of sentence comprehension, a 
set of transformational rules transforms surface structure (syntax) 
into deep structure (the logical relations expressed in the 
sentence). Mandler and Johnson's (1977) rewrite rules rewrite the 
surface structure of a story (its sentences) into the underlying 
tree structure of logical relations between story constituents. As 
we mentioned, logical relations include the temporal ordering of 
events; Mandler and Johnson point out that one example of "the 
interdependence of semantic and syntactic elements in stories 
derives from the fact that stories primarily involve statements 
about events which are causally and/or temporally ordered" 
(Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 57). 'However, sometimes the 
temporal sequence of events is jumbled: 
". '.. the surface realizations of stories may-be more or less 
ideal. For example, the surface. structure may express all of 
the basic nodes, but the order In which they, occur may not 
match the underlying structure. In this case, the numbers 
+. 
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representing the surface propositions would be out of order 
in the tree diagram. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 129) 
Mandler and Johnson's rewrite rules are not adequate to 
represent a temporal reordering of events, and this example 
provides one argument for a set of transformational rules. 
Chomsky's transformational grammar includes a rule that 
transforms the passive sentence into an active one (Chomsky 
1965, p. 105). According to Chomsky's equation of sentence 
semantics with logical relations, these variants in surface 
structure have the same deep structure, and both types of 
sentence have the same meaning. Mandler and Johnson argue in A 
Tale of Two Structures that "there is an obvious need for 
transformational rules which can describe regular mappings 
between underlying and surface structures" (Johnson & Mandler 
1980, p. 70). In a similar fashion to Chomsky, they argue that 
variants in the surface structure of stories have the same 
underlying structure and the same meaning: 
"The base rules... provide an adequate characterization of 
many folktales and other stories from the oral tradition. 
However, it is possible to tell many of these stories in a 
slightly different way without changing their meaning. 
Occasionally a constituent which appears in one version of a 
story is omitted from another, and sometimes a constituent 
is found in a different location. Since there seem to be 
relatively few variations of this type, it might be possible to 
expand the base rules to account for them. However, this 
procedure would miss the generalization that each' version 
has the same underlying meaning. " 
(Johnson & Mandler 1980, pp. 69-70) 
Mandler and Johnson then elaborate on the sort of 
transformational rules that allow for events to be deleted or 
reordered on the surface, while preserving-the underlying 
meaning. In a similar discussion elsewhere, Mandler and Johnson 
appear to be searching for the closest possible mapping of 
Chomsky's sentence grammar onto their story grammar, and the 
problem of defining a permissible transformation is equated with 
the problem of defining a well-formed story: 
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"Unless we assume that only those stories which do not 
deviate at all from the proposed underlying structures are 
well formed, we will have to specify which transformations 
of the underlying structure are permissible and which are 
not. If we had an independent definition of a well-formed 
story, the search for transformational rules would be easier. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, pp. 129-130) 
A permissible transformation allows for events to be deleted or 
reordered while preserving a well-formed story. A well-formed 
story is defined "on the basis of what people can and cannot 
remember and on the nature of the distortions that occur in 
memory" (handler & Johnson 1977, p. 130). 
We discuss the results of psychological research into story 
memory in chapter eight. Here, our concern is the application of 
Chomsky's linguistics to textual analysis. We have shown how the 
story grammarians have adopted Chomsky's notions of well- 
formedness, two structures, rewrite rules, and transformational 
grammar in their representation of story structure. Mandler and 
Johnson go further, adopting Chomsky's criterion of descriptive 
adequacy in their discussion of how to evaluate models of story 
structure, while modifying the criterion of explanatory adequacy 
to observational adequacy (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 77). 
However, Chomsky's influence is not only pervasive among story 
grammarians, but is also apparent in attempts to develop text 
grammars (van Dijk 1972). According to Beaugrande and Dressler, 
van Dijk was the "major force in this movement" (Beaugrande & 
Dressler 1981, p. 221). Van Dijk (1980) reviews the historical 
development of text grammars in an introduction to a special 
issue of Poetics devoted to story comprehension. He explains: 
"According to the fashion of the period, my, own text- 
grammar should be an account of the native speaker's 
competence to produce and understand any 'grammatical' 
discourse of the language. So, the grammar should 
enumerate all and only texts underlying, the possible 
discourses of a language, together. with their structural 
descriptions. The rather programmatic and not yet very 
substantial grammatical fragments pertained on the one 
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hand to all kinds of coherence phenomena holding between 
propositions of texts... and on the other hand introduced so- 
called 'semantic deep structures' of the text-as-whole, viz. 
macrostructures. How such global semantic structures were 
linked to those of the actual sentences was a problem which 
could not yet be solved. " 
(van Dijk 1980, p. 9) 
In van Dijk's work on text grammars, Chomsky's two structures 
initially feature as "macrostructures" and "microstructures" (van 
Dijk 1972). Later however, van Dijk makes a further distinction 
between "macrostructures" and "superstructures" (van Dijk 1980, 
p. 12). The reason for this distinction is that macrostructures 
represent the logical relations of causation and motivation which, 
as we have seen, the story grammarians attribute to the deep 
structure of stories (Johnson & Mandler 1980). Van Dijk however, 
referring to the research into artificial intelligence that we 
mentioned in the last chapter (eg Schank & Abelson 1977, Black et 
al 1982), attributes this level of semantics to a general knowledge 
of the world; this general knowledge is possessed by all readers 
and writers and influences their real-world interactions (van Dijk 
1980, pp. 11-16). In modelling story comprehension, Van Dijk 
therefore suggests an independent grammar of macropropositions 
that is concerned with "the philosophy and logic of action" (van 
Dijk 1980, p. 13). On the other hand, a narrative grammar that 
determines the "superstructure" of a narrative discourse is a more 
specific knowledge that is acquired through reading stories. This 
sort of grammar might resemble Propp's morphology, of the 
folktale (Propp 1968), for example, while a grammar that deals 
with the semantics of macropropositions would have closer 
affinities with Chomsky's transformational grammar. 
One problem with text grammars is the problem we have 
already encountered when discussing Chomsky's goal of defining a 
finite set of resources that can comprehend an infinite number of 
sentences. Godel's theorem is as relevant to text grammars as it is 
to sentence grammars. Beaugrande and Dressler explain the 
general failure of attempts to develop a text grammar: 
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"During the ascendancy of transformational grammar, 
proposals were advanced for a 'generative poetics': a special 
grammar designed to 'generate' literary structures via 
modified rules. However, it gradually became evident that 
no such grammar could be set up for any large set of texts. 
The diversity of literature and poetry would lead to an 
explosion of special rules, some of which, in the worst case, 
would be required for one single instance. The rules would 
also generate many undesirable structures not found in any 
samples. Indeed, the explosion of the grammar would 
eventually allow the generating of every conceivable 
structure, so that nothing would have been explained at all. " 
(Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 214) 
Yet Chomsky's influence on linguistic approaches to textual 
analysis is still manifest in Beaugrande and Dressler's claim, that 
"It is probably safe to conclude that virtually all models of texts 
and text grammars will make some use of the notion of 
'transformation', but probably not the same use made in 
Chomskyan grammar" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 28). 
Story grammars and text grammars both involve an 
application of Chomsky's sentence grammar to global discourse. 
However, if Chomsky's sentence grammar is an inadequate theory 
of sentence comprehension, then is it feasible that an application 
of Chomsky's notions to global discourse will represent an 
adequate theory of discourse comprehension? One problem with 
Chomsky's notions is the lack of psychological support for the 
separation of syntax and semantics, but a more fundamental one 
is the relevance of Godel's theorem to the notion of rules and 
grammars. This problem is perpetuated with the notion of an 
exhaustive text grammar. . 
A further fundamental problem with grammars that deal 
with semantics is the assumption that semantics, like the 
sentence, can be represented as astructure. Semantics however, 
unlike syntax, is a question of textual interpretation; semantics 
does not have the easily identifiable spatial existence possessed 
by the sentence on a printed page. To' represent meaning as a 
structure requires the kind of simultaneous reading of the text 
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with which we began this chapter, a reading that takes a 
synchronic view of structure. From this perspective, meaning can 
be fixed in terms of a static representation, and can be shared by 
different texts. As Mandler and Johnson claim, different tellings of 
a tale have "the same underlying meaning" (Johnson & Mandler 
1980, p. 70). This view of semantics is not restricted to 
grammarians who see two structures, but is also maintained by 
literary critics who see organic wholes. In Frye's anatomy of 
archetypal structures, for example, "the meaning of a poem, its 
structure of imagery, is a static pattern" (Frye 1990, p. 158). This 
view of the literary work is the subject of Derrida's observations 
above (Derrida 1978a); from this point of view, whether the 
literary work is perceived as a unity or a duality, its entirety is 
perceived as a static structure. 
In his essay on Levi-Strauss' structuralism, Derrida 
concludes: 
"There are... two interpretations of interpretation, of 
structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams 
of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and 
the order of the sign... The other, which is no longer turned 
toward the origin, affirms play... " 
(Derrida 1978b, p. 292) 
The perception of meaning as a static entity entails an essentialist 
view of interpretation. Todorov describes the historical 
development of this perspective in his Symbolism and 
Interpretation, showing how It stems from the interpretation of 
religious texts and the preservation of sacred truths (Todorov 
1982a). In a similar fashion, some would argue that the purpose 
of literary criticism Is interpretation of the literary text; 
consequently, the reader must be encouraged to find the true and 
unique meaning that has been revealed to the critic (Todorov 
1982a). --The alternative view of Interpretation is the playful one 
endorsed by Jonathan Culler: 
"Many works of literary criticism are interpretations in that 
they talk about particular works, but their aim may be less 
to reconstruct the meaning of those works than to explore 
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the mechanisms or structures by which they function... Just 
as linguistics does not seek to interpret the sentences of a 
language but to reconstruct the system of rules that 
constitutes it and enables it to function, so a good deal of 
what may be mistakenly seen as overinterpretation... is an 
attempt to relate a text to the general mechanisms of 
narrative, of figuration, of ideology, and so on. " 
(Culler 1992, pp. 115-116) 
However, while Derrida and Culler argue for two 
interpretations of interpretation, one can also argue for two 
interpretations of linguistics. The linguistic approach we have 
described in this chapter is based on rules and grammars. To 
establish such a system requires some kind of consensus on 
semantics: 
"The rationalistic approach to meaning... is founded on the 
assumption that the meanings of words and of the sentences 
and phrases made up of them can be characterized 
independently of the interpretation given by individuals in 
a situation. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 111) 
Comparing the rationalistic notion of meaning with Heidegger's 
notion of the ubiquity of Interpretation, Winograd and Flores point 
out that "meaning always derives from an interpretation that is 
rooted in a situation" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 111). Despite 
Culler's denial, Chomsky's model of sentence comprehension is 
based on the interpretation of many exemplary sentences, and an 
interpretation of what constitutes sentence semantics. In 
Chomsky's model, the semantics of a sentence is equated with the 
logical relations expressed in the sentence, and this notion of 
semantics is adopted by the story grammarians. An alternative 
interpretation of sentence semantics is discussed below. 
Culler consistently refers to linguistics as a unified 
discipline, while blurring the distinction between structuralism 
and semiology. Introducing his OnDeconstruction, he explains the 
aims of a linguistic approach to textual analysis as follows:. 
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"The categories and methods of linguistics, whether applied 
directly to the language of literature or used as the model 
for a poetics, enable critics to focus not on the meaning of a 
work and its implications or value but on the structures that 
produce meaning. Even when linguistics is explicitly enlisted 
in the service of interpretation, the fundamental orientation 
of the discipline, which does not devise new interpretations 
for sentences but attempts to describe the system of norms 
that determine the form and meaning of linguistic 
sequences, works to focus attention on structures and to 
identify meaning and reference not as the source or truth of 
a work but as the effects of the play of language. " 
(Culler 1983, p. 21) 
Culler describes the difficulty of distinguishing "structuralism" 
from "post-structuralism" in the case of theorists such as Barthes, 
whose S/Z defies attempts to place it into either category (Culler 
1983, p. 26). Yet on the other hand, Culler makes a well-defined 
distinction between these categories by equating structuralism 
with grammars: 
"In simplest terms, structuralists take linguistics as a model 
and attempt to develop 'grammars' - systematic inventories 
of elements and their possibilities of combination - that 
would account for the form and meaning of literary works; 
post-structuralists investigate the way in which this project 
is subverted by the workings of the texts themselves. " 
(Culler 1983, p. 22) 
In his earlier work on linguistic approaches to literature, Culler 
also equates structuralism with semiology, claiming that "it would 
not be, wrong to suggest that structuralism and semiology are 
identical" (Culler 1975, p. 6). Yet later in the same work, Culler 
claims that "the lack of a semiological. perspective leads Levi- 
Strauss to concentrate on the structural" (Culler 1975, p. 49). 
On the one hand then, structuralism is equated, with the 
development of grammars; but on the other hand, structuralism is 
equated with semiology. It is the lack of differentiation between 
these different approaches that allows Culler. to present linguistics 
as'a unified discipline. Describing the linguistic foundation of a 
structuralist poetics, he sketches the historical development of 
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linguistics, and uses the term structuralism to refer to "the work 
of a restricted group of French theorists" (Culler 1975, p. 6). 
Consequently, Culler can claim that Chomsky's influence on 
structuralism is minimal: his "generative grammar plays no role in 
the development of structuralism" (Culler 1975, p. 7). Yet Culler 
also claims that Chomsky's work represents "a methodological 
statement of exemplary clarity": 
"That is to say, Chomsky's theory of language enables us to 
see what structural linguists were actually doing, what their 
practice implied, and how accounts of their discipline were 
misleading or insufficient. Although within linguistics itself 
the differences between Chomsky's approach and that of his 
predecessors are extremely important, at the level of 
generality which concerns those looking to linguistics for 
models to apply elsewhere, Chomsky's work can be taken as 
an explicit statement of the programme implicit in 
linguistics as a discipline but not hitherto adequately or 
coherently expressed. References to Chomsky in the 
following discussion are not therefore meant to indicate 
points on which he influenced structuralists but only to 
clarify basic concepts and analytical procedures which 
comprise the 'linguistic model' that structuralists have 
adopted. " 
(Culler 1975, pp. 7-8) 
On the one hand then, the difference between Chomsky and 
other linguists is a matter of detail, and this detail is of interest 
only. to linguists. Yet on the other hand, Chomsky's methods 
illuminate not only "linguistics as a discipline", but also the use of 
"the linguistic model" in textual analysis. Culler's endorsement of 
Chomsky's methods Is shown in this work (Culler 1975). Culler 
adopts Chomsky's notion of "linguistic competence" in a discussion 
of "literary competence", and the evaluation of a semantic theory 
is discussed in terms of "operational and descriptive adequacy" 
(Culler 1975, p. 76). In a point of detail, Culler claims that "two 
versions of the same plot need have no sentences in `common, nor 
need ° they, perhaps, have any linguistic deep-structures In 
common" (Culler 1975, p. 205). Culler also refers to "Chomsky's 
claim; that attempts to work out discovery procedures are 
fundamentally misguided"; according to Culler, "a discovery 
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procedure would be a mechanical method... for actually 
constructing a grammar, given a corpus of sentences" (Culler 1975, 
p. 21). 
Discussing the future perspectives for a structuralist poetics, 
Culler concludes by placing linguistic approaches to literature into 
four categories: 
"First there is the problem of whether linguistic methods 
should be applied directly or indirectly... Second, there is the 
question of whether linguistics, applied directly or 
indirectly, provides a 'discovery procedure' or precise 
method of analysis which leads to correct structural 
descriptions, or whether it offers only a general framework 
for semiotic investigation which specifies the nature of its 
objects, the status of its hypotheses, and its modes of 
evaluation. If these two sets of alternatives are combined 
they provide a schematic resume of four different positions. " 
(Culler 1975, p. 256) 
However, in his discussion of a linguistic foundation, Culler points 
out the strengths and weaknesses of calling upon binary 
oppositions as a device for "establishing distinctive classes" (Culler 
1975, p. 14). The strength and weakness both lie in the fact that 
binary oppositions "permit one to classify anything" (Culler 1975, 
p. 15). Culler explains that "given two items one can always find 
some respect in which they differ and hence place them in a 
relation of binary opposition" (Culler 1975, p. 15). Referring to the 
ubiquity of binary oppositions in literature, he concludes that: 
"... the very flexibility and power of binarism depends on the 
fact that what it organizes are qualitative distinctions, and if 
those distinctions are irrelevant to the matter in hand, then 
binary oppositions can be very misleading, precisely 
because they present factitious organization. The moral is 
quite simple: one must resist the temptation to use binary 
.., oppositions merely to devise elegant structures. If A is 
opposed to B and X is opposed to Y then one could, in 
seeking further, unification, set these oppositions together in 
a four-term homology and say that A is to B as'X is to Y (in 
that the relation is one of opposition in both cases). But the 
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formal symmetry of such homologies does not guarantee 
that they are in any way pertinent... " 
(Culler 1975, pp. 15-16) 
In this introduction, Culler points out the inadequacy of the four- 
term homology as an analytical tool. The four-term homology also 
receives a negative treatment when Culler discusses Greimas' 
Semantique Structurale (Greimas 1966) and Levi-Strauss' analysis 
of the Oedipus myth (Levi-Strauss 1977). However, the four-term 
homology receives a positive treatment when Culler discusses a 
poetics of the lyric and the notion of the organic whole. Culler 
suggests that the notion of literary texts as organic wholes is 
misleading: "Their unity is produced not so much by intrinsic 
features of their parts as by the intent at totality of the 
interpretive process: the strength of the expectations which lead 
readers to look for certain forms of organization in a text and to 
find them" (Culler 1975, p. 91). Culler refers to research in the 
field of artistic perception, and to the Gestalt principles of 
perceptual grouping, such as continuity and closure (Roth & Frisby 
1986, pp. 97-106). He argues that similar principles may apply in 
reading poetry, thus "one must have at least rudimentary notions 
of what would count as unity": 
"The most basic models would seem to be the binary 
opposition, the dialectical resolution of a binary opposition, 
the displacement of an unresolved opposition by a third 
term, the four-term homology, the series united by a 
common denominator, and the series with a transcendent or 
summarizing final term. It is at least a plausible hypothesis 
that the reader will not feel satisfied with an interpretation 
unless it organizes a text according to one of these formal 
models of unity. " 
(Culler, 1975, p. 174) 
Returning to Culler's conclusion on linguistic approaches to 
literature, the moral is quite simple. Culler establishes a four-term 
homology as a framework for discussing a structuralist poetics. 
This homology consists of direct versus indirect applications of 
linguistics, and the presence versus absence of discovery 
procedures. Are these categories pertinent, or is this homology an 
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attempt to impose some kind of organic unity on a complex 
subject in order to write a conclusion? 
Culler gives two examples of the direct application of 
linguistics to literature. The first is Jakobson's distributional 
analysis of poetry (Jakobson 1973) and the second is Greimas' 
Semantique Structurale (Greimas 1966). In the first case, 
"Jakobson's basic technique in analysing poems is to divide them 
into stanzas and show how symmetrical distribution of 
grammatical items organizes the stanzas into various groupings" 
(Culler 1975, p. 59). Culler points out that "poems contain... 
structures other than the grammatical" (Culler 1975, p. 73), and 
that Jakobson's emphasis on numerical symmetry "leads to the 
indiscriminate postulation of structures" (Culler 1975, p. 66). In 
this example then, a direct application of linguistics consists of a 
grammatical analysis; this analysis is used as "a technique for 
discovering patterns in a text" (Culler 1975, p. 69). 
In the second case, Greimas represents semantics as a 
structure (Greimas 1966). In the first instance, this involves an 
interpretative process to identify the meaning of a text. Having 
identified the semantic features of a text, Greimas follows Levi- 
Strauss in arranging these features as a system of binary 
oppositions (Culler 1975, p. 84). Greimas then faces the problem of 
how these semantic features are related to syntax. We have 
already discussed the problem of the relation of syntax to 
semantics in the case of Chomsky. Chomsky's notion of sentence 
semantics leaves the problem of comprehending global discourse 
unresolved. We suggested that, if the semantic elements of a 
sentence are purely its logical relations, then the semantics of a 
discourse must be constructed by adding up the logical relations 
expressed in each sentence. This procedure is adopted by Greimas. 
In his construction of semantic structure, he establishes the 
connection between syntax and semantics by "a process of 
reducing the sentences to a series of subjects and predicates 
which will be cast in a constant form so that they can be related to 
one another and, as it were, added up". (Culler 1975, pp. 81-82). 
According to Culler, Grelmas assumes that "the meaning of texts is 
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automatically derivable from the meanings of lexical items" 
(Culler 1975, p. 85). In this case then, the direct application of 
linguistics consists of a grammatical analysis of syntax. This 
analysis is combined with an interpretative process that identifies 
the meaning of a text; semantics is represented as a system of 
binary oppositions. In his development of a text grammar, Van 
Dijk follows Greimas in attempts to integrate syntax and semantics 
(van Dijk 1972). 
According to Culler's four-term homology, the first example 
is also an example of the presence of a discovery procedure, while 
the second also exemplifies the absence of a discovery procedure. 
However, in the first case, a discovery procedure is present 
because this is what Jakobson claims for his method of analysis: 
Jakobson claims "that linguistics provides a discovery procedure... 
which will bring to light poetic structures" (Culler 1975, p. 256). In 
the second case, a discovery procedure is absent because of 
Culler's claim that Greimas fails the test of "operational and 
descriptive adequacy" (Culler 1975, p. 76): the example of Greimas 
"illustrates that... linguistics does not provide a procedure for the 
discovery of literary structure" (Culler 1975, p. 257). A further 
mark of Culler's inconsistency is the claim elsewhere that "both 
Jakobson and Greimas start from the assumption that linguistic 
analysis provides a method for discovering the patterns or 
meanings of literary texts" (Culler 1975, p. 95) (my italics). One 
cannot avoid the conclusion therefore that Culler's four-term 
homology is an attempt to impose an artificially contrived unity 
on a complex subject in order to write a conclusion. 
Linguists have pursued a diversity of discovery procedures 
in order to reach the same goal of constructing a grammar (Crystal 
1971), but Culler appears to adopt Chomsky's criticism of 
discovery procedures as a rhetorical device for establishing the 
third and fourth terms of his homology. As a rhetorical device, the 
term "discovery procedure" refers not only to a method of 
constructing a grammar, but also to a process that results in 
discovery; Jakobson also uses the term in this metaphorical sense. 
In the case of Greimas, a discovery-procedure is both a method of 
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constructing a grammar, and a process whose goal is "the 
discovery of semantic effects" (Culler 1975, p. 256); in the case of 
Jakobson, a discovery procedure, is the use of grammatical 
analysis to reveal poetic structures. 
Barthes' analysis of fashion (Barthes 1967) and Todorov's 
work on a narrative grammar (Todorov 1977a) are both cited by 
Culler as examples of the indirect application of linguistics. Both 
are also examples of discovery procedures. Here, Culler defines an 
indirect application as the metaphorical use of linguistic 
categories. In the first case, Culler concludes that "the problems 
encountered by Barthes indicate that this kind of reliance on 
linguistic models may lead to a failure to determine what one is 
attempting to explain" (Culler 1975, p. 257). On the one hand, 
Barthes' aim seems to be the construction of a grammar - in this 
case, a grammar of fashion. Barthes' use of linguistics is therefore 
metaphorical in the sense that he is applying linguistic categories 
to a non-linguistic phenomenon. But on the other hand, Barthes 
appears to use a semiological method of analysis. Elsewhere, Culler 
defines semiotics, the science of signs, as "the attempt to identify 
the codes and mechanisms through which meaning is produced in 
various regions of social life" (Culler 1992, p. 116). One of those 
regions is the fashion advertisements that Barthes analyses in this 
example. In this case then, Barthes appears to adopt a semiological 
method of analysis while attempting to construct a grammar. It is 
Barthes' tendency to combine structuralist and semiological 
approaches which leads to the difficulty of categorising him; Culler 
presents this problem in terms of structuralism versus post- 
structuralism, as we noted above (Culler 1983, p. 26). 
In his discussion of "literary competence", Culler claims that 
"literature is a second-order semiotic system which has language 
as its basis" (Culler 1975, p. 114). Barthes defines myth in a similar 
fashion In his analysis of contemporary mythologies (Barthes 
1973); language is a first-order semiological system, while myth is 
a metalanguage. If literature is also a metalanguage, then any 
linguistic approach to literature, whether grammatical or 
semiological, is bound to be metalinguistic (if not metameta- 
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linguistic), and is bound to use linguistic categories as metaphors. 
We noted above that traditional grammar provides a lexical 
taxonomy and a taxonomy of sentence structure. If the sentence is 
the largest unit of structure "capable of accounting for the range 
of grammatical classes and structures which turn up in a 
language" (Crystal 1971, p. 201), then any use of grammatical 
terms to refer to units longer than the sentence is bound to be 
metaphorical. Todorov uses verb and adjective to refer to textual 
sequences in his Grammar of Narrative (Todorov 1977a). But is 
Todorov's metaphorical use of grammatical categories any 
different to Jakobson's metaphorical use of discovery procedures? 
Todorov's approach to narrative, like Barthes' approach to fashion, 
is a combination of structuralist construction and semiological 
analysis. 
Culler's final term of the homology is exemplified by 
Barthes' S/Z (Barthes 1990). The fourth position is marked by the 
metaphorical use of linguistics and the absence of discovery 
procedures. Here, one uses linguistics "not as a method of analysis 
but as the general model for semiological investigation" (Culler 
1975, p. 257). Culler claims that "this is the most appropriate and 
effective use of the linguistic model, and it has the particular 
advantage of making linguistics a source of methodological clarity 
rather than of metaphorical vocabulary" (Culler 1975, p. 257). 
However, we have shown that Culler himself sometimes uses 
linguistics as a source of metaphor rather than methodological 
clarity, and the source of methodological clarity that he espouses 
is also used for rhetorical effect, creating rather than clarifying 
obfuscation. How is the fourth position marked by the 
metaphorical use of linguistics and, at the same time, the absence 
of a metaphorical vocabulary? How is S/Z marked by the absence 
of discovery procedures while it also presents a reading of the 
text "as an exploration of writing" (Culler 1975, p. 260)? And how 
does one use linguistics as a general model of semiological 
investigation? Why does Barthes' analysis of a short story by 
Balzac succeed while his analysis of fashion fails? 
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These questions cannot be answered by the arguments 
Culler presents in his Structuralist Poetics. Returning to the point 
of departure for this discussion, the source of the problem lies in 
Culler's presentation of linguistics as a unified science. Linguistics 
is not the unified discipline that Culler presents, and one can 
argue for two interpretations of linguistics, which rely on a 
distinction between structuralism and semiology. How is it 
possible to use Chomsky's model of sentence comprehension as a 
model for semiological investigation? Linguistics does not supply a 
ready-made package that can be bought off the shelf, transported, 
opened and immediately applied to literary texts; the sort of 
methodical meccano that Culler calls "the general model" does not 
exist. If we dismiss Culler's four-term homology as a rhetorical 
device, then another way of categorising linguistic approaches to 
literature is by the kind of linguistics that textual analysis uses as 
a model. Using this method of analysis, the basic difference 
between Culler's first three categories and the fourth is the 
difference between a rationalistic approach to linguistics and a 
semiological approach. A rationalistic approach is exemplified by 
Chomsky and the notion of rules and grammars. This route is 
followed by the story grammarians (Rumelhart 1975, Thorndyke 
1977, Mandler & Johnson 1977, Mandler 1978, Johnson & 
Mandler 1980, Mandler 1982) and by text linguists such as 
Greimas and van Dijk (Greimas 19GG, van Dijk 1972). For an 
alternative approach, we must turn to Saussure. 
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6.3 STRUCTURING 
Above, we referred to the notion that the literary work, presented 
in its entirety to the reader, is a static structure. Whether this 
structure be perceived as a unity or a duality, the temporal aspect 
of reading must be denied for entirety to become manifest 
(Derrida 1978a, p. 24). In essentialist views of interpretation, the 
literary work has a unique meaning (Todorov 1982a), and in 
rationalist views of semantics, meaning can also be represented as 
a structure (Winograd & Flores 1986). Hough however, discussing 
the notion of a literary work as an organic whole, affirms that 
unity is the result of a creative process: 
"The organic unity of a work of literature is not something 
ready-made; it is not an entire and perfect chrysolite found 
lying about in nature; it is something achieved. " 
(Hough 1969, p. 11) 
Culler claims that organic unity is a result of the reader's 
structuring activity (Culler 1975, p. 91). In his evaluation of 
Greimas' structural semantics (Greimas 1966), Culler also points 
out that "semantic description must provide a representation of 
the structuring activity of the reader" (Culler 1975, p. 92). In the 
last chapter, we referred to Flower and Hayes' claim that writers 
don't . find meanings but make them (Flower & Hayes 1980b, 
pp. 21-23). So how are unities achieved in writing? How are 
structures created, and what is the relation between structures 
that have been identified by a process of textual analysis on the 
one hand, and structuring activities of the writer on the other? 
Witte and Cherry argue that "important insights into writing 
processes can, be gleaned from careful analyses of written 
products" (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 112). They argue that this 
proposal is not uncontroversial, because, in American composition 
studies, there has been a shift of emphasis from analysis of 
product to investigations of process (Witte & Cherry 1986, 
pp. 113-115), a shift which Flower and Hayes endorse in their 
model of writing (Hayes & Flower 1980a). According to Witte and 
Cherry,, "Much of the research on writing processes in fact 
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assumes that processes cannot be inferred from products" (Witte 
& Cherry 1986, p. 114). However, product and process are difficult 
to separate, as we pointed out in chapter four. In Hayes and 
Flower's model of writing, the emphasis is on process (Hayes & 
Flower 1980a); but they use the technique of protocol analysis to 
identify writing processes, and protocol analysis includes textual 
analysis. In their linguistic approach to writing, Cooper and 
Matsuhashi (1983) also recognise that process and product are 
inseparable. They argue that: 
"The best process studies move back and forth between 
observations of writing process and examination of the 
writing produced by the process. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 6) 
This cycle of observation and examination, of shifting attention 
between process and product, suggests that a linguistic approach 
to writing represents a hypothesis about structure and structuring 
-a hypothesis that suggests a relation between structures derived 
from textual analysis on the one hand, and structuring activities of 
the writer on the other. However, there are diverse ways of using 
linguistics to model writing, and this diversity results in different 
kinds of hypotheses. 
Frederiksen introduces a linguistic model of writing with the 
following claim: 
"The goal of cognitive studies of written discourse is to 
describe how meaning and language structures are 
constructed by a writer and interpreted by a reader. Such a 
description includes a specification of the meaning and 
language structures, called 'representations', that writers 
and readers construct and the rules upon which these 
representations are based. To achieve such a description, 
cognitive psychologists and researchers in the field of 
artificial intelligence have constructed models of cognitive 
representation of language and meaning. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 227) 
Frederiksen's approach to modelling writing is embedded in the 
rationalistic tradition that we discussed in chapter two. One of the 
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assumptions in that tradition is that meaning can be represented 
as a structure. Frederiksen's main concern is the modelling of 
semantics, and his distinction between representations of 
language and representations of meaning is crucial to this 
purpose. He explains that cognitive scientists have hitherto 
studied semantics by investigating text comprehension. Following 
Chomsky, "the prevailing psycholinguistic model of discourse 
comprehension was an interpretive one in which text 
comprehension was viewed principally as a process of extracting 
meanings from sentences" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 228). Using the 
terminology of information processing, this type of model is a 
linear model in which information is processed from the bottom 
upwards (Greene & Coulson 1995, p. 55); that is, the meaning of a 
discourse is constructed from the meaning of each element in the 
discourse, beginning with lexical items at the bottom. Winograd 
and Flores characterise a bottom-up model of discourse comp- 
rehension as follows: 
"In a complete rationalistic analysis of meaning, we would 
be able to explicate the meaning of each utterance by 
showing how it is built up systematically from smaller 
elements, each with its own determinate meaning. At the 
bottom, the smallest elements would denote objects, 
properties, and relations of interest in the external world. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 64) 
The recognition that context is a factor in discourse 
comprehension led psychologists to identify a more active role for 
memory in their models. Memory of previous discourse produces 
expectations and assumptions which influence comprehension. 
Psychologists therefore revised their models of comprehension to 
feature top-down as well as bottom-up processes (Greene & 
Coulson 1995, p. 56). However, psychologists developed two 
conflicting theories about top-down processes. In text-based 
theories of comprehension, top-down processes' make use of 
cohesive devices provided by the text (Halliday & Hasan 1976), 
while In knowledge-based theories, comprehension is "a' process of 
fitting' text information into preexisting semantic structures in 
memory (frames, schemata)" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 229). In both 
cases comprehension also makes use of a general knowledge of 
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the world that is represented by the logical relations of causation 
and temporal ordering. Frederiksen claims that "from 
experimental work designed to demonstrate the constructive 
nature of text comprehension emerged the notion of semantic 
memory representations that are related to but independent of 
language codes" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 228). This notion is similar 
to van Dijk's proposal for an independent grammar of macro- 
propositions that is concerned with "the philosophy and logic of 
action" (van Dijk 1980, p. 13). Just as van Dijk distinguishes 
between macrostructures (the elements in a grammar of logical 
relations) and superstructures (the elements in a textual 
grammar, such as a narrative grammar), Frederiksen makes "a 
major distinction... between semantic structures in memory and 
linguistic structures" (Frederik-sen 1986, p. 228). 
Frederiksen uses this distinction to describe a "multilevel 
model of cognitive representation of discourse", a model that 
incorporates text-based and knowledge-based theories of 
comprehension: 
"There is now general agreement among cognitive 
researchers, supported by experimental evidence, that there 
are multiple levels and types of representations underlying 
discourse. All major theories distinguish between conceptual 
or semantic structures that represent the structures of 
meaning and knowledge expressed in texts and understood 
by readers and listeners, and the textual language structures 
used to encode and communicate meanings. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 230) 
There. are four levels of representations in Frederiksen's model. 
Conceptual or semantic representations are divided into two 
levels. The first consists of high-level frames or schemata; these 
represent the sort of recurring patterns that are formulated in 
story grammars and van Dijk's notion of superstructures, for 
example. The second consists of a system of propositions (similar 
to van Dijk's macrostructures) that represent the logical relations 
of causation, temporal ordering, and so on. Textual structures are 
also divided into two levels. At the bottom level is the- sentence, 
while the second level (similar to van Dijk's microstructures) 
193 
consists of cohesive devices that extend beyond the sentence. 
Frederiksen's main concern is semantic representations, "since 
research linking semantic to clausal and text-level linguistic 
structures is less well developed" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 231). 
Discussing the use of semantic networks to model meaning, 
Frederiksen concludes that "the specification of a representational 
model would... have to involve specification of rules for forming 
particular structures defined as a type of semantic network" 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 234). Frederiksen's model is therefore a 
rule-based model, and "rules for forming structures are defined 
by means of a formalism developed in computer science for 
defining the syntax of programming languages" (Frederiksen 
1986, p. 234). 
Frederiksen's multilevel model is a model of structures in 
which textual representations are distinguished from semantic 
representations. In this model, semantic structures are stored in 
the memory and consist of logical propositions and frames or 
schemata for recurring patterns or genres. What kind of 
hypothesis does this model represent? How does such a model 
represent the structuring activities of readers and writers, and 
how does a model of comprehension become a model of writing? 
Frederiksen explains: 
"In cognitive psychology, semantic models were developed 
as theories of the cognitive representation of texts by 
readers or writers and not primarily as methods for the 
analysis of texts... However, models of semantic 
representation are also the basis for discourse analysis 
procedures that are used in analyzing texts in, experimental 
research. These analyses provide an important link in 
testing cognitive models of text representation... " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 235) 
However, semantic models are developed by analysing written 
language. They depend on an interpretation of semantics as a 
system of logical relations, and they are the result of applying this 
interpretation to textual analysis. Frederiksen reverses this order 
of events by presenting a semantic model as though it were the 
natural consequence of developing a cognitive theory of 
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representation (Roth & Frisby 1986), and only applied to textual 
analysis as an afterthought. The alms of cognitive science coincide 
with those of artificial intelligence in developing a theory of 
human cognition that can be formulated in symbolic terms 
(Winograd & Flores 1986). Consequently, such a theory can be 
implemented and tested on a computer, and some would argue 
that the purpose of developing an understanding of discourse 
comprehension is to design intelligent computer systems. A 
cognitive theory of representation that deals with discourse 
comprehension must therefore be tested, and textual analysis is 
an unavoidable part of this process: 
"In discourse communication, a writer constructs a cognitive 
representation of meaning and produces a text that 
expresses this meaning. A reader constructs a cognitive 
representation on the basis of this text (and other relevant 
sources of knowledge such as context or prior knowledge)... 
As cognitive structures cannot be observed directly, they 
must be inferred from some application of a semantic model 
to the analysis of text: either that presented to a reader or 
that produced by a reader or writer. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 235) 
Here, Frederiksen makes an assumption about the process of 
writing. A writer firstly constructs a cognitive representation of 
meaning, then produces a text that expresses this meaning. But 
cognitive representations of meaning have been constructed in the 
first place by cognitive psychologists, not by writers. As Winograd 
and Flores comment, "It Is the observer who describes an activity 
as representing something else" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 99). 
Just as Phythian confuses the naming activity of the grammarian 
with that of the sentence producer, ' Frederiksen confuses the 
activity of the cognitive psychologist with that of the writer. It is 
only from the observational stance of someone who is developing 
a cognitive theory of representation that the writer is constructing 
a cognitive representation of meaning. Frederiksen's scenario, is 
the inverse of Chomsky's analysis of, sentence structure: a writer 
mentally, formulates the logical relations expressed in the 
semantic structure of a sentence, then transforms this deep 
structure into surface structure or syntax, and proceeds to write. 
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In Frederiksen's account, the cognitive structures used by 
readers are inferred by comparing an experimental reader's recall 
of a text with a semantic analysis of the text: 
"Thus discourse analysis is a methodology used to 
investigate cognitive theories of representation and 
processing of text. The models employed, however, are not 
tested directly but rather by means of experiments that 
investigate their adequacy as models of cognitive 
representation. In carrying out such experimental tests, a 
subject's knowledge structure is inferred from models of 
text structure. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 236) 
Frederiksen's model of representations is therefore a hypothesis 
about mental structures. A semantic model of a text is first 
obtained by textual analysis. This model is then compared with a 
person's recall of the text In a comprehension experiment, for 
example. However, the text which a person remembers needs to 
be translated into a semantic model in order to compare the two. 
In this type of experiment, the subject of the test is not a person's 
ability to comprehend, but the adequacy of the semantic model. 
However, when Frederiksen discusses the applications of this 
model, another inversion occurs. It is no longer the adequacy of 
the model that is the subject of an experiment, but a person's 
ability to comprehend. To explain this inversion, we need to look 
in more detail at the high-level frame structures that are 
Frederiksen's main concern. 
Schema theory is a theory of memory originally suggested 
by Bartlett (1932). In Greene's summary, "the basic idea is that 
human memory consists of high level structures known as 
schemas, each of which encapsulates our knowledge about 
everything connected with a particular object or event" (Greene 
1986, p. 34). In terms of language understanding, schemas 
"represent the general knowledge which aids the understanding of 
conversations and texts" (Greene 1986, p. 35). Frame is a term 
originally proposed by Minsky (1977). According to Greene, 
frames are similar to schemas; frames are "knowledge schemas for 
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representing different kinds of situations" (Greene 1986, p. 35). In 
Frederiksen's model of representations, the semantic structures at 
the highest level of the model are frame structures. 
Frame structures are defined "by a grammar and a 
specification of types of entities... that can occupy nodes in the 
network" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 242). Examples of frames include 
state descriptive frames, which represent "descriptions of various 
types of states of the world, including attribute structures, 
classifications, part structures, taxonomies, locative structures, 
numerical structures, and similarity relations" (Frederiksen 1986, 
p. 243). Process descriptive frames represent "descriptions of 
processes in the world including causally and conditionally 
organized systems" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 243). Problem frames 
represent "the structure of problems and procedures for their 
solution" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 243). Conversational frames 
represent "social interaction structures composed of related turns 
and conversational acts as they occur in conversational discourse" 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 243). Finally, Frederiksen describes 
narrative frames: 
"Narrative frames represent the organization of sets of 
events in time and space. Narrative frame structures are 
relevant to the comprehension and production of most 
fictional texts and informative texts that relate sequences of 
events... A narrative frame is composed of an event 
structure and (optionally) one or more scene structures. 
Event structures represent temporal relations among events, 
and scene structures represent spatial/locative relations. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 243) 
Frederiksen's grammar of events differs from 
generalisations about the order of events in stories, such as 
Propp's Morphology of the Folktale (Propp 1968), in that 
Frederiksen's events take place in the real world. The object of 
Propp's, study is a collection of Russian folktales, and his analysis 
leads. 
, to generalisations about the 
kind, of events and their 
sequential ordering in this type of story. Frederiksen's grammar is 
an abstract one which refers to the temporal ordering of events in 
the real world. This rationalistic view of events leads to the 
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inevitable conclusion that there is some ideal order of real-world 
events to which the label "true" can be attached, while the 
temporal distortions that occur in the world of fiction can be 
labelled "false". As Winograd and Flores comment: 
"The rationalistic tradition regards language as a system of 
symbols that are composed into patterns that stand for 
things in the world. Sentences can represent the world truly 
or falsely, coherently or incoherently, but their ultimate 
grounding is in their correspondence with the states of 
affairs they represent. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 17) 
Discussing the applications of frame grammars, Frederiksen 
describes their use "as tools to study children's comprehension 
and story production" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 252). In these 
experiments, the grammars are used to measure comprehension. 
The first step is to calculate the number of textual propositions 
that a person can remember after reading a text. Subsequently: 
"By expressing measures of recall and Inference for 
propositions associated with particular frame structures as 
percentages, it is possible to measure the conditional 
probability of recalling a proposition given that it reflects a 
particular frame structure. If frame structures are being 
generated by a reader to process text propositions 
selectively, these probabilities should vary as a function of 
frame structure, reflecting the processing of text 
propositions in terms of frame structures. Furthermore, if an 
experimental text reflects more than one frame structure, 
then we can investigate subjects' comprehension of the text 
in terms of one frame structure versus another. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, pp. 252-253) 
In Frederiksen's experiments on comprehension, children are 
given texts that reflect a mixture of frames, such as 
conversational, problem and narrative frames. The results show 
that "conversational frames are relatively well understood" by the 
children in these experiments, whereas "problem frame structures 
are much more difficult" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 253). Narrative 
frames are also well comprehended. 
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In these experiments then, Frederiksen is using the frame 
grammars of his model to "investigate comprehension abilities" 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 254). Yet Frederiksen reverses this 
procedure to draw the conclusion that these experiments also 
validate the grammars: 
"These results support the view that children understand 
these texts by applying rules associated with particular 
kinds of semantic frame structure, and that they differ in 
their facility with or knowledge of rules of different types of 
frame structures. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, p. 254) 
On the one hand then, the grammar is used to measure 
comprehension abilities. From this perspective, the subject of the 
experiment is a person's ability to comprehend, not the adequacy 
of the model. But on the other hand, the ability to comprehend 
represents a validation of the grammar. From this perspective, the 
subject of the experiment is the adequacy of the model, not a 
person's ability to comprehend. In other words, what appeared to 
be a constant at the design stage of the experiment turns into a 
variable when the results are discussed, and what appeared to be 
a variable turns into a constant. Frederiksen (1986, p. 254) also 
concludes that "children differ in how they understand the same 
text"; for example, the same text may be interpreted in terms of a 
narrative frame or a problem frame. His conclusions show that 
experimental results can also be interpreted in different ways, 
and that an alternative interpretation of experimental variables 
can also turn a narrative Into a problem. 
Frederiksen draws a similar conclusion when discussing the 
use of frame grammars to study children's oral story production 
in English and French. In this experiment, "children viewed a 
sequence of pictures depicting a series of related events, and 
afterwards were asked to tell a story to accompany the pictures as 
they viewed them a second time" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 255). Some 
children were asked to produce a conversational structure, while 
others were asked to produce a narrative account. The resulting 
stories were then analysed In terms of frame structures, and "the 
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results indicated that children were able to control their 
production of narrative and conversational structures", but were 
more successful in producing narrative than conversational 
frames (Frederiksen 1986, p. 255). The conclusions that one can 
make from these results would seem to be, firstly, that children 
are able to respond to instructions, secondly, that children can tell 
stories by using their imagination when looking at pictures, and 
thirdly, that children can make some kind of distinction between 
conversation and narrative. However, once again Frederiksen is 
able to make the significant leap and claim that: 
"Thus, we have evidence that children use specific frame- 
production rules, and that these rules are language 
independent (as they should be if they reflect semantic 
representations)... The results we have obtained thus far in 
our production studies are consistent with the rule-based 
model of text production outlined earlier. " 
(Frederiksen 1986, pp. 255-256) 
We have therefore yet to answer the two questions raised 
above. Firstly, how does a model of structures represent the 
structuring activities of readers and writers, and secondly, how 
does a model of comprehension become a model of writing? To 
answer these questions, we have to exercise some top-down 
processing in comprehending Frederiksen's model by placing it in 
a context; that is, the context of the plans and goals of cognitive 
science and artificial intelligence (AI). The aim of Al research into 
language comprehension is to design computer systems that can 
understand "natural language"; that is human language that is 
unmediated by any encoding into the symbolism of programming 
languages. Initial attempts to develop Al focused on computer 
vision in the 1940's, and AI research into this area is generally 
more developed than research Into natural language under- 
standing (Charniak & McDermott 1985). Al. systems that are 
designed to simulate human vision have adopted Marr's modular 
approach (Marr 1982), in which vision requires "a sequence of 
representations, each one derived from predecessors by an 
appropriate set of processes" (Roth & Frisby 1986, p. 141): 
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"Each representation can be thought of as being delivered by 
a 'vision module' specified in terms of its input 
representation (the starting information), an output 
representation (the derived information which acts as input 
for another module), and the solution to one or more 
computational problems (description of a method for 
deriving the output representation from the input 
representation). " 
(Roth & Frisby 1986, p. 141) 
The first stage of Marr's model involves drawing a primal sketch, 
a two-dimensional description of light intensities in the input 
image. In Marr's approach, vision is a process of extracting 
information from scenes. However, the purpose of designing a 
system of computer vision is to enable machines to interpret 
visual information. Cognitive research into perception has 
highlighted the role of top-down processes in pattern recognition 
(Roth & Frisby 1986, pp. 106-115); top-down processes must occur 
at some stage so that information can be interpreted. The problem 
in designing computer vision is identifying the stage where such 
processing occurs. At what stage of the system is prior knowledge 
used to make inferences about Incoming data? Scrivener describes 
a knowledge-based system of picture interpretation that is based 
on Marr's modular approach but also uses the results of cognitive 
research into human perception (Scrivener 1989). We have 
discussed the low level algorithms of this system elsewhere (Bloor 
1990), and the conclusions to that discussion suggest that top- 
down processing occurs at the earliest stage in the system. 
AI models of language understanding, as exemplified by 
Frederiksen's model of comprehension, have similar features to Al 
models of perception. In both cases, a model is a hierarchy of 
representations. In both cases, the computational problem is to 
define the processes that transform one sort of representation into 
another sort of representation on the next level of the hierarchy. 
A further problem in both cases is identifying the stage where 
prior knowledge is used to make inferences about incoming data. 
In a model that is based on representations or structures, 
structuring is the upward or downward movement between levels 
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of a hierarchy, a movement that transforms one sort of 
representation into another. In the rationalistic tradition exempli- 
fied by AI and cognitive science, the notion of representations is 
essential to computer modelling. This notion is but one aspect of 
the tradition that is criticised by Heidegger; as Winograd and 
Flores comment, "human cognition includes the use of represent- 
ations, but is not based on representation" (Winograd & Flores 
1986, p. 99). Whether the purpose is to design a computational 
system of language understanding or one of picture interpretation, 
the first task is to identify the kinds of representations in the 
system. The next task is to establish the processes that will 
transform one sort of representation into another. Justification for 
the model is based on the validity of the representations, not on 
the validity of the transforming process; the latter is viewed as 
"the computational problem" (Roth & Frisby 1986, p. 141). From 
this perspective on modelling, the question whether or not the 
transforming process represents some kind of human activity 
becomes irrelevant. What is more important is whether the 
process is successful in transforming the designated input into the 
required output. 
When the final output is intended to represent recognition 
or understanding, a computational system makes the necessary 
assumption that intangibles such as intelligence and under- 
standing can be represented in symbolic form. In Frederiksen's 
model, the hierarchy of representations is composed of two levels 
of semantic structures (frames and propositions), and two levels 
of textual structures (cohesive devices and syntax). Frame 
grammars are used as a measure of comprehension, so that 
understanding is represented by the semantic structures at the 
top of the hierarchy. In this model however, a grammar not only 
represents the structure of texts and meanings, but the 
structuring activity of readers and writers. As we mentioned 
above, grammars are an appropriate computational mechanism 
for representing and transforming written language (Bornat 
1979). However, Frederiksen claims that humans use such devices 
when thinking; that Is, in cognitive processes associated with text 
production and comprehension. When discussing methodology, 
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Frederiksen points out that "as cognitive structures cannot be 
observed directly, they must be inferred from some application of 
a semantic model to the analysis of text" (Frederiksen 1986, 
p. 235). A grammar cannot be observed directly in structuring 
activities, and the claim that humans use them is an inference 
based on the observation that an input representation (a text) and 
the output representation (a remembered version of the text) can 
both be mapped onto the grammar. 
As we mentioned above, Frederiksen's main concern is 
semantic representations; he notes that "research linking semantic 
to clausal and text-level linguistic structures is less well 
developed" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 231). Van Dijk makes a similar 
comment when discussing macrostructures and the development 
of a text grammar: "How such global semantic structures were 
linked to those of the actual sentences was a problem which could 
not yet be solved" (van Dijk 1980, p. 9). In terms of designing a 
system of natural language understanding, the computational 
problem is to define the processes that will transform sentences 
and cohesive devices into the semantic structures on the upper 
levels of the model. Viewed in these terms, the problem is to find 
appropriate maps between structures, maps that will convert low- 
level structures into high-level structures or vice versa. Reading is 
seen as an activity that involves an upward movement from 
sentences to semantic structures (comprehension), and the 
problem is identifying how this bottom-up process (extracting 
meaning from sentences) Is related to top-down processing 
(making inferences on the basis of prior knowledge). A model of 
comprehension becomes a model of writing by reversing the 
direction of movement between structures. Writing is seen as a 
downward movement from semantic structures to sentences, and 
the problem is identifying how this downward movement 
(translating semantics into syntax) is combined with bottom-up 
processes (manipulating syntax to make meaning). 
In the last chapter we explored some of the problems 
associated with notions of plans and planning; these include the 
use of the term plan to refer to mental as well as external 
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representations. We deferred discussion of a further problem to 
this chapter, and that was the distinction between cognitive and 
linguistic planning. The distinction between semantic structures 
and textual structures which we find in Frederiksen and van Dijk 
takes us back to that distinction: 
"Writing texts involves different levels of planning: cognitive 
planning (activation and organization/linearization of the 
content); linguistic planning (linguistic translations). " 
(Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139) 
Here, Passerault and Coquin suggest that linguistic planning 
is equivalent to the Hayes and Flower process of translating 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 15). In the Hayes and Flower model of 
writing, the generating process is concerned with finding an 
appropriate semantic representation, which is stored in memory, 
while the translating process translates this semantic represent- 
ation into syntax. We criticised the model for assuming a linear 
process of translating semantic representations into syntax, and 
concluded that a data processing model imposes relations of 
sequentiality, resulting in a logical sequence of planning, drafting 
and revising. There are two reasons why the distinction between 
cognitive and linguistic planning appears to be justified, and the 
first takes us back to a sequential model of writing. 
The argument that planning operates at different levels 
refers to text structure. For example: 
"Text structures occur at different levels, with longer texts 
having more levels. For simplicity, we will assume that there 
are just four levels: the text level, the paragraph level, the 
sentence level (syntax), and the word level (spelling). " 
(Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 59) 
In a similar fashion to Flower and Hayes, Collins and Gentner 
argue 'that writing is "a process of generating and editing text 
within a variety of constraints" (Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 52). 
They prescribe a sequential model of writing - the model of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise" - as a method of handling these constraints. 
Consequently, at the first stage "it is Important to separate idea 
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production from text production" (Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 53), 
while "the next stage is to Impose text structures on the ideas" 
(Collins & Gentner 1980, p. 59). To impose text structures, a writer 
must follow the sequence of global planning, paragraph planning, 
sentence planning and word planning. In a similar fashion, Cooper 
and Matsuhashi argue that planning is a hierarchical activity: 
"... the crucial plans are superordinate to other plans, are 
further up in a hierarchy. The small-scale sequential plans 
are useless unless they are under the control of a higher 
plan ... " (Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 9) 
As we discussed in the last chapter, the problem here is whether 
the higher plan refers to a writer's motivation and goals of 
achievement, or to some kind of representation of semantic 
structure, such as van Dijk's macrostructures or Frederiksen's 
frame grammars. 
Firstly then, the argument that planning operates at 
different levels refers to text structure. This argument relies on 
the distinction between semantic structures and textual 
structures, a distinction made by text linguists such as van Dijk 
and Frederiksen. Using this taxonomy of representations, 
psychologists distinguish between cognitive and linguistic 
planning. Cognitive planning is therefore concerned with semantic 
structures or representations, while linguistic planning is 
concerned with textual units identified by linguistic analysis, such 
as paragraphs, sentences and words. Levels of planning are 
therefore tied to levels of text structure, beginning with global 
discourse or semantic plans at the top of the hierarchy, and 
moving down through paragraphs and sentences until we reach 
lexical planning at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
The distinction between cognitive planning and linguistic 
planning, and the distinction between semantic structures and 
textual structures, both reflect the influence of Chomsky's 
transformational grammar. Above, we discussed Chomsky's 
influence on the development of story grammars, and we also 
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noted the use of transformations in van Dijk's text grammar. 
Likewise, Frederiksen's model of discourse comprehension 
appears to be the result of applying Chomsky's model of sentence 
comprehension to a complete text: 
"We have also analyzed the topical structure of the 
children's stories, examining the correspondences between 
topical structure (an aspect of 'text surface structure') and 
frame structure (an aspect of 'deep semantic structure'). " 
(Frederiksen 1986, pp. 255-256) 
As we mentioned above, in Chomsky's (1965) model of sentence 
comprehension, syntax and semantics are separate components. 
The semantic structure of a sentence is composed of the logical 
relations expressed in the sentence, and a transformational rule 
transforms syntactic structure (surface structure) into semantic 
structure (deep structure). In Frederiksen's multilevel model of 
text comprehension and text production, semantic structures and 
textual structures are also separate features, and semantic 
structures are also composed of logical relations. The objective of 
Frederiksen's research is to find the appropriate rules that will 
transform semantic representations into a textual surface 
structure. 
In a multilevel model of structures, a model of 
comprehension becomes a model of writing by reversing the 
direction of movement between representations. In Chomsky's 
model of sentence comprehension, syntactic structure is 
transformed into a semantic representation, and in Hayes and 
Flower's notion of translating, this process is reversed: 
"The function of the TRANSLATING process is to take 
material from memory under the guidance of the writing 
plan and to transform it into acceptable written English 
sentences. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a, p. 15) 
From a planning perspective, semantic structures are the deep 
structures of a future text and the result of cognitive planning, 
while syntax is the textual surface structure which results from 
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linguistic planning. Finally, while the distinction between cognitive 
planning and linguistic planning reflects Chomsky's distinction 
between deep structure and surface structure, Flower and Hayes' 
notion of a plan "To Say" or a plan of contents (Flower & Hayes 
1980a, p. 45) reflects Chomsky's equation of deep structure with 
content and surface structure with form: 
"... one major function of the transformational rules is to 
convert an abstract deep structure that expresses the 
content of a sentence into a fairly concrete surface structure 
that indicates its form. " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 136) 
In this context, a cognitive plan is a plan of content, while a 
linguistic plan is a plan of form. 
There is a second reason why a distinction between 
cognitive and linguistic planning appears to be justified, and that 
is the different kinds of textual representations that a writer 
produces, such as notes and sentences. In this context, we might 
distinguish cognitive planning from linguistic planning by claiming 
that the first activity results in notes while the second results in 
finished sentences or syntax. However, this distinction between 
notes and syntax suggests the notion of syntactic planning, rather 
than linguistic planning. Writing is a linguistic activity, so that 
some kind of linguistic planning is always occurring in writing; 
whether writing notes or sentences, a writer must retrieve lexical 
items from memory. 
We concluded the last chapter with the observation that the 
spontaneous prose generated by the strategy of "Draft and Revise" 
is no different to the notes generated by the strategy of "Plan, 
Draft and Revise"; in both cases, a writer pursues a cycle of 
thinking, writing and reading according to the basic model of 
writing In figure S. In Sharpies and Pemberton's taxonomy of text 
items '(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 327), the category of notes 
includes, an entire text. They make the distinction, not between 
notes and sentences, but, between "Instantiated" and" 11un- 
instantiated" text items; from this perspective, "uninstantiated" 
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text items serve as "idea-labels" that mark a place where text is 
still to be created (Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 327). In terms 
of writing strategies however, there is a difference between 
generating notes or spontaneous prose and the kind of syntactic 
manipulation that Williamson and Pence observe in students 
writing with a computer (Williamson & Pence 1989). From the 
perspective of writing strategies, some "instantiated" text items 
might also serve as "idea-labels" - in this case, marking a place 
where text is still to be manipulated into finished sentences. 
Cooper and Matsuhashi (1983) also distinguish between global 
discourse plans and sentence plans, giving an account of sentence 
planning that we discuss below. 
We also concluded the last chapter by defining cognitive 
planning as textual structuring, a mental activity of making 
meaning. Syntactic planning, or syntactic structuring, must be part 
of this activity of making meaning. In Chomsky's approach to 
sentence comprehension, the object of study is the isolated 
sentence, so that the meaning of a string of sentences is the sum 
of the logical relations expressed in each sentence. We have 
mentioned the occurrence of sentences in some kind of context or 
discourse, such as a work of fiction, and the use of context to make 
inferences about meaning. In a model of comprehension that 
represents the structuring activity of the reader as a movement 
between structures, the use of prior knowledge to make 
inferences would be labelled a top-down process, while the 
extraction of meaning from sentences a bottom-up process. Using 
this terminology, the writing strategy of "Plan, Draft, and Revise" 
is a kind of top-down processing, in which a writer starts with 
some kind of mental representation of semantics and works 
downwards to create sentence structure, while the syntactic 
manipulation of the recursive reviser is a kind of bottom-up 
processing, In which a writer plays with syntax to create a mental 
representation of meaning. This characterisation of writing 
behaviour assumes a hierarchical model of plans or structures, 
with syntactic structures on the bottom of the hierarchy and 
semantic structures on the top. In this type of model, the process 
of writing is represented as a series of movements between 
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different levels of a hierarchy of representations, structures, or 
plans. 
In the last chapter however, we described a basic model of 
writing that represents writing as a cycle of activities, a cycle of 
thinking, writing, and reading. We have yet to identify what kind 
of thinking processes or structuring activities are involved in 
fiction writing. The linguistic approaches to modelling writing 
discussed in this chapter have all been concerned with the 
identification of structures. We have referred to the consensus 
among linguists that "the sentence is the maximal unit of 
grammatical analysis" (Crystal 1971, p. 201). While the sentence Is 
a structure that is defined by Its existence as an external 
representation, semantic structures are defined by linguists as a 
result of textual analysis. Can we use texts to identify structuring 
activities rather than structures? We have identified syntactic 
structuring as one of these activities, but this is based on an 
identification of the sentence as a basic structure. Sentences form 
part of a larger discourse, such as a short story or novel, and this 
consideration leads to the question, what is the relation between 
syntax and semantics in the context of fiction writing? To answer 
these questions, we need to investigate two further applications of 
linguistics to the study of writing. 
Introducing their linguistic approach to writing, Witte and 
Cherry describe "two lines of research" into written products 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 115). The first line is marked by studies 
of syntactic features, which have tended to follow Chomsky's 
model of transformational grammar, while the second is marked 
by studies, of "features that reach beyond sentence boundaries" 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 115 ). According to Witte and Cherry, the 
first line of study has provided "very little Insight into the 
processes of producing written texts" (Witte & Cherry 1986, 
p. 116). Referring to research Into writing processes, such as the 
work of Flower and Hayes, they conclude that "more of a writer's 
conscious attention is devoted to creating semantic relationships 
across the boundaries of sentences than is devoted to mapping 
meaning onto particular syntactic forms" (Witte & Cherry 1986, 
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p. 117). The second line of study "has looked beyond the sentence 
to larger units of discourse" (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 117), and this 
line of study is marked by the assumption that thinking processes 
can be inferred from written products: 
"Informing many of the studies that look beyond the level of 
the sentence in their examinations of written products is the 
sometimes explicit but usually implicit assumption that 
suprasentential structural patterns in written texts reflect 
thinking processes of the mind that produced the text. " 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 119) 
Texts can therefore be used to identify structuring activities or 
thinking processes, rather than structures. However, Witte and 
Cherry's method of inferring process from product, and the 
structuring activity which they infer, both take us back to 
Frederiksen's model of writing. 
Witte and Cherry set out to investigate a hypothesis. 
Discussing Hayes and Flower's model of writing and their notion of 
planning (Hayes & Flower 1980a, Flower & Hayes 1980a, Flower & 
Hayes 1981), they conclude that "both their cognitive process 
model of composing and their conceptualization of planning lacks 
a certain specificity" (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 124). To add this 
specificity, they discuss recent work by Bracewell, Frederiksen, 
and Frederiksen (1982), which "helps add specificity to the Flower 
and Hayes theoretical model by hypothesizing certain 
relationships among planning, translating, and text" (Witte & 
Cherry 1986, p. 124). According to the hypothesis of Bracewell and 
colleagues (Bracewell et al 1982), the operation that Hayes and 
Flower label translating Is Influenced by framing processes. 
Framing is the process of creating a framework or context in 
which sentences can be interpreted. The process of writing 
sometimes Involves discovering a framework through translating, 
and in this case, the text already written may need to be revised 
in order. to produce a coherent text. In other. words, a frame 
appears to be similar to the plan of a text that writers sometimes 
discover. through the process of writing, as we mentioned in the 
last chapter. 
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We have also seen how Frederiksen uses the notion of 
frames as semantic structures in his multilevel model of text 
production and comprehension. According to the hypothesis of 
Bracewell and colleagues, translating processes provide the link 
between semantic and textual representations, or, to be more 
specific, between conceptual frames and sentence topics. Witte 
and Cherry's hypothesis is that framing processes, and hence 
conceptual frames, can be inferred by the analysis of sentence 
topics. 
According to Witte and Cherry, "the concept of topic is a 
useful and valid one for discussing individual sentences within a 
discourse, semantic relationships among sentences in a discourse, 
and whole discourses" (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 127). However, 
Witte and Cherry define a topic in terms of the sentence: the topic 
is usually the grammatical subject of the sentence. In a similar 
fashion to Phythian's definition of the grammatical subject 
(Phythian 1980, p. 5), Witte and Cherry explain that the topic 
names "what the sentence Is about" (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 128). 
Thus the topic is the name of the sentence, and, usually, its 
grammatical subject. On the unusual occasions when the topic is 
not the grammatical subject, then identifying the topic is a 
question of interpretation. Witte and Cherry look at "patterns of 
sentence topics in texts", and use these patterns to infer framing 
processes (Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 130). This analysis involves 
three stages. Firstly, they identify the topic of each sentence and 
secondly, allocate the topics to a category of noun or noun-phrase. 
Thirdly, the number of occurrences of each category is calculated, 
and the framing process is identified by the most frequent 
category that occurs In the text. 
Witte and Cherry give the following example. Students were 
given a writing task in which they were asked "to describe to an 
acquaintance a place or landmark that was near their home or 
that they had visited while on vacation or on a day trip" (Witte & 
Cherry 1986, p. 130). Analysing the results, Witte and Cherry 
identify four "framing strategies": narrative, framing, descriptive 
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framing, sequence framing, and locative framing (Witte & Cherry 
1986, pp. 131-135). In the case of narrative framing, sentence 
topics are dominated by the first-person pronoun, while in the 
case of descriptive framing, sentence topics are dominated by the 
names of objects. Locative framing is a variant of descriptive 
framing in which topic and comment change places. Thus, 'A piano 
is in the living room' is an example of descriptive framing, while 
'In the living room is a piano' is an example of locative framing. In 
the case of sequence framing, sentence topics are dominated by 
the second-person pronoun. Sequence framing is therefore a 
variant of narrative framing, with a change of subject. 
However, sequence framing is also marked by the use of the 
present tense. While narrative framing is past tense narration, 
sequence framing is present tense narration. The choice of tense 
appears to be determined by a student's interpretation of the 
writing task. Sequence, locative, and descriptive framing all 
appear to be responses to the first alternative of describing a 
nearby place and are written in the present tense. On the other 
hand, narrative framing seems to be a response to the second 
alternative of describing a place visited during vacation and is 
written in the past tense. 
One problem with Witte and Cherry's method of inferring 
process from product is therefore that, to give an adequate 
explanation of differences in framing processes, we need to refer 
to verbs as well as nouns. Witte and Cherry assume that sentence 
topics are a sufficient basis to give an account of the semantic role 
of sentences. A further problem is that, in order to illustrate 
locative framing, Witte and Cherry use the flexibility of their 
definition of sentence topic; this seems to be the unusual occasion 
when the topic is not a grammatical subject but a preposition such 
as "above", "below" or "beyond". Both problems show that framing 
processes cannot be inferred by simply making a list of sentence 
topics or sentence names. 
Underlying the assumption that this is possible is an 
assumption concerning the structuring activity that is inferred, 
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and underlying Witte and Cherry's notion of a framing strategy is 
Frederiksen's notion of frames. Despite their observation that 
"more of a writer's conscious attention is devoted to creating 
semantic relationships across the boundaries of sentences than is 
devoted to mapping meaning onto particular syntactic forms" 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 117), Witte and Cherry are more 
concerned with the latter process. They assume the existence of a 
direct mapping between sentence topics and frames. Whereas 
Frederiksen is more concerned with frame grammars or high- 
level representations, Witte and Cherry's objective is to identify 
types of frames by analysing low-level representations, 
specifically, sentence topics. Rather than a test of Frederiksen's 
model, Witte and Cherry's investigation represents a method of 
creating it, a method of establishing categories of frames. The 
underlying assumption is that the structuring activity of the 
writer is a reverse process, choosing sentence topics on the basis 
of a chosen frame. The notion of structuring syntax is therefore 
assimilated by the notion of "topicalization". 
Topicalization refers to a problem identified by Flower and 
Hayes - that of "finding a focus" when beginning a writing task. 
Witte and Cherry claim that: 
"... 'focus' in Flower and Hayes's sense of the term may be 
related to choices writers make about 'topics' at both the 
level of the discourse and at the level of the sentence. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the difficulties writers 
, experience in 'finding a focus'... would be reflected in 
discernible patterns of sentence topics in texts and that 
these patterns would help us identify relationships between 
written products and writing processes. " 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 130) 
According to Witte and Cherry, the writer's problem of finding a 
focus is a problem of finding a topic. However, this problem is not 
only one of finding a discourse topic, but of finding a topic for 
each sentence. But, if the topic of a discourse is reflected in each 
sentence topic, as Witte and Cherry suggest, then the discourse 
topic must be equivalent to the frame. Topicalization is indeed 
seen as "connected to framing processes during text production", 
213 
and Witte and Cherry assume "that the four patterns of topical 
focus reveal different framing strategies that writers can use in 
composing descriptive or informative discourse" (Witte & Cherry 
1986, p. 130). 
However, the topic of a discourse is not equivalent to 
Frederiksen's notion of a frame; neither is it reflected in each 
sentence topic. As we have mentioned, a frame Is a high-level 
representation of semantic structure, and each frame is 
represented by a grammar. Witte and Cherry's goal is to create 
mappings from sentences to frames via sentence topics. In 
assuming a one-to-one mapping between sentence and frame, 
Witte and Cherry's object of study is still the isolated sentence, 
and their prime concern is its name. The map that connects high- 
level and low-level structures is a correspondence between nouns. 
The priority that they attach to sentence topics is a reflection of 
traditional grammar's binary division of the sentence into 
grammatical subject and predicate, and the notion that the 
grammatical subject or topic Is the name of the sentence. This 
binary division of the sentence and priority given to the noun is 
also found in Chomsky's analysis of sentence structure and his 
notion that active and passive forms of the verb have the same 
meaning. 
In Witte and Cherry's account of sentence semantics, 
semantic relationships that cross sentence boundaries are only 
created when topics can be mapped onto the same frame. This is 
achieved by a flexible interpretation of sentence topic, and the 
numerical method of adding up the topics of each sentence and 
calculating the most frequent occurrence. A one-to-one map of 
frame onto sentence suggests that a text is a string of sentences. If 
that, is the case, then Phythian's psychological explanation of 
sentence topics suggests that writing is a cycle of naming and 
thinking, a schizophrenic view of writing that we questioned 
above. To infer structuring activities from Witte and Cherry's 
findings we need to re-Interpret their evidence by considering 
verbs as well as nouns. We can make a similar distinction between 
narrating, and describing by looking at the verbs in a string of 
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sentences. The result is a different account of these activities, but 
this is an argument that is developed in the next chapter. 
In Witte and Cherry's account, the relation between syntax 
and semantics is a one-to-one map between sentence topic and 
frame. Above, we noted Culler's criticism of Jakobson's numerical 
analysis of poetry (Jakobson 1973); this analysis is used as "a 
technique for discovering patterns in a text" (Culler 1975, p. 69). 
Culler claims that "the discovery of formal structures is an infinite 
process and must, if it is to be fruitful, be grounded on a theory of 
how the literary text functions" (Culler 1975, p. 109). He adds that 
"a work has a structure only in terms of a theory which specifies 
the ways in which It functions, and to formulate that theory is the 
task of poetics" (Culler 1975, p. 109). A functional approach to 
textual analysis can be used to look at entire texts, chapters, para- 
graphs, or sentences. Discussing the boundaries between syntax 
and semantics, Chomsky appears to recognise the need for such an 
approach when he remarks: "it seems that beyond the notions of 
surface structure (such as 'grammatical subject') and deep 
structure (such as 'logical subject'), there is some still more 
abstract notion of 'semantic function' still unexplained" (Chomsky 
1965, p. 163). 
An alternative explanation of the relation between syntax 
and semantics is given by functional sentence perspective. This is 
the approach adopted by Cooper and Matsuhashi (1983) in their 
discussion of sentence semantics and sentence planning. Function- 
al sentence perspective looks at the semantic role of sentences. 
From this perspective, the semantics of a sentence is represented 
by the function of the sentence in extended discourse, not by the 
logical relations expressed in the sentence. Cooper and Matsuhashi 
identify various semantic roles which are grouped into the five 
categories of "generalizing, rhetorical, sequencing, relationship and 
development roles" (Cooper & Matsuhashl 1983, p. 16). They note 
that "the discourse type and the writer's corresponding schema 
will constrain, if not fully determine, the writer's choice of the 
appropriate semantic roles for the next sentence" (Cooper & 
Matsuhashi 1983, p. 19). 
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The problem is, how does one classify text types? Cooper 
and Matsuhashi classify text or discourse types according to their 
"language" (Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 14), which can be 
"expressive" (exemplified by notes, diaries or personal letters), 
"poetic" (this category is not restricted to poems but includes short 
stories) and "transactional" (in which a writer is informing, 
persuading or instructing). However, there is a disparity here 
between a functional approach to sentence semantics, and a 
method of classifying text types according to their language. This 
disparity gives rise to the problem of explaining how a specific 
text type determines sentence semantics. The difficulty of 
classifying text types is discussed by Beaugrande and Dressler, 
who report that a colloquium held in 1972 failed to reach any 
agreement on the subject: 
"Attempts to apply or convert traditional linguistic methods 
failed to meet the special needs of a typology of texts. We 
might count the proportions of nouns, verbs, etc or measure 
the length and complexity of sentences... without really 
defining the type... Statistical linguistic analysis of this kind 
ignores the functions of texts in communication and the 
pursuit of human goals. " 
(Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 183) 
The functional approach that Cooper and Matsuhashi use to 
identify the semantic role of sentences is one method suggested 
by Beaugrande and Dressler to identify text types. From this 
functional perspective, "descriptive texts would be those utilized 
to enrich knowledge spaces whose control centres are objects or 
situations", while "narrative texts, in contrast, would be those 
utilized to arrange actions and events in a particular sequential 
order" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 184). Another type of text 
is the argumentative text, which is "utilized to promote the 
acceptance or evaluation of certain beliefs or ideas as true vs. 
false, or positive vs. negative" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, 
p. 184). Beaugrande and Dressler point out that "in many texts, we 
could find a mixture of the descriptive, narrative, and argument- 
ative functions", and they identify these three functions in the 
American Declaration of Independence (Beaugrande & Dressler 
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1981, p. 184). However, as the literary text also contains "various 
constellations of description, narration and argumentation", these 
categories are inadequate to identify the literary text as a distinct 
entity (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 185). To solve this problem, 
Beaugrande and Dressler define the literary text as a text "whose 
world stands in a principled alternativity relationship to the 
accepted version of the 'real world"' (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, 
p. 185). However, with this definition we enter the realm of fiction 
as non-truth and the problems of definition that we discuss in the 
next chapter. 
With Beaugrande and Dressler's functional approach to text 
types, there is an obvious connection between the textual 
functions of narration, description, and argumentation on the one 
hand, and sentence function on the other. Beaugrande and 
Dressler's textual functions of narration, description and 
argumentation are also found in Cooper and Matsuhashi's 
taxonomy of sentence roles. Sequencing roles include the role of 
narrating, while development roles include the role of describing: 
"Narrate: the Narrate role has the function in discourse of 
naming an event or a series of events in a time sequence... 
... Describe: the Describe role seems to provide one or more details of an object or person in order to assist the reader in 
seeing the object precisely or understanding it fully. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, pp. 17-18) 
All the linguistic approaches to writing that we have considered in 
this chapter would agree that narrating and describing are two 
activities which occupy fiction writers. From Frederiksen's 
perspective of high-level frames, a narrative frame is composed of 
event structures and scene structures. From a similar perspective 
of framing processes, Witte and Cherry identify narrative and 
descriptive framing. Beaugrande and Dressler identify the textual 
functions of narration, description, and argumentation, and Cooper 
and Matsuhashi identify these functions in sentence roles. 
In all four cases however, the notions of narration and 
description are embedded in the rationalistic tradition. 
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FrederiCsen's narrative frame is a grammar of events that take 
place iii the real world. Similarly, narration is primarily concerned 
with a particular ordering of events (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, 
p. 184), or a series of events in a temporal sequence (Cooper & 
Matsuhashi 1983, p. 17). Description serves to inform, to enrich 
knowledge spaces (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 184), or to 
provide details that enable understanding (Cooper & Matsuhashi 
1983,, p. 18). In the next chapter, we argue that fiction writing 
does not involve the sort of factual reporting that is suggested by 
these notions of narration and description. A rationalistic 
definition of narration and description gives rise to Beaugrande 
and Dressler's problem of defining a literary text; their solution is 
to refer to notions of truth and non-truth in order to distinguish 
real and fictional worlds. 
From the perspective of writing fiction, the problem with 
Cooper and Matsuhashi's definitions of sentence roles is that, 
while the' two functions of narration and description have a role 
each, the other thirteen roles are an amplification of the 
argumentative function. This suggests that the basis of their 
taxonomy''is primarily an analysis of argumentative texts. On the 
oilier hand, the sentence roles are presented as a universal 
taxonomy that applies to all text types, and three of the thirteen 
roles are given a supplementary definition that accounts for their 
occurrence in narrative texts. Yet the lack of any consensus on 
how to define text types suggests that a universal taxonomy is not 
possible. On the one hand, a functional definition of text types 
looks at the dominant sentence roles such as argumentation or 
narration; on the other hand, a universal taxonomy of sentence 
roles assumes a definition of text types to account for variants. In 
other words, sentence roles are defined according to text type, but 
text types are defined according to sentence roles. To escape this 
hermeneutic circle, we may have to resort to the notion that a 
literary or a fictional text contains not only argumentation, 
narration, and description, but some extra ingredient, such as 
Beaugrande and Dressler's "principled alterna tivity relationship to 
the accepted, version of the 'real world"' (Beaugrande & Dressler 
1981, p. 185). ea, 
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A prime concern with argumentation partly explains the 
rationalistic view of narration and description that we mentioned 
above. In the context of argumentative texts, Cooper and 
Matsuhashi note the use of narration to substantiate an argument 
or an explanation. A similar notion of narrative as evidence or 
testimony is exemplified In Edgar Allan Poe's tale, The Narrative 
ofArth ur Gordon Pym: 
"Even though Narrate is placed here with Sequence roles, it 
often plays an important part in persuasive and explanatory 
writing along with other Development roles. Like these 
latter roles - Exemplify, Define, Describe - Narrate can 
produce a short narrative incident which is being presented 
as an example in an argument or an illustration in an 
explanation. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashl 1983, p. 17) 
Cooper. and Matsuhashi also point out that "certain forms of 
discourse" such as "expressive, personal-experience narrative, 
biography, history, journal, reportage" may consist largely of 
sentences whose function is narration, and in these cases, "Narrate 
may be interrupted occasionally by only one other role - Evaluate" 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 17). The role of evaluation is one of 
the three roles that have a supplementary definition to account 
for, their occurrence-in narrative texts. In argumentation, the role 
of evaluation is to judge or reflect on previous assertions, while in 
narration, it is events that are evaluated: 
"Evaluate plays an Important role in narrative, where it may 
occur at any point that the writer steps aside to comment or 
reflect on, or evaluate, the action. In narrative it is 
recognised as a definite break in the narrative line, usually 
with a shift in verb tenses. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 17) 
The other roles that are given supplementary definitions are 
"State'. ' and "Qualify": 
"State: the State role Is the role of generalization or theme or 
thesis. It asserts the controlling and central idea of the 
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discourse. The State role will usually appear in the first few 
sentences of explanatory or persuasive discourse... In 
expressive or personal-narrative writing the State role may 
be used to cover what Labov... calls the Abstraction role. 
State nearly always occurs at a high level of abstraction in 
the discourse. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 16) 
This definition of "State" provides an alternative explanation of 
the relation between syntax and the topic of a discourse. In Witte 
and Cherry's analysis, a discourse topic is equivalent to a frame 
and is mapped onto each sentence topic. In this functional view, a 
discourse topic is mapped onto a sentence topic when the topic or 
theme is named; subsequent sentences involve a discussion or 
elaboration of the theme. This is the first paragraph of Milan 
Kundera's novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being: 
"The idea of eternal return is a mysterious one, and 
Nietzsche has often perplexed other philosophers with it: to 
think that everything recurs as we once experienced it, and 
that the recurrence itself recurs ad infinitum! What does 
this mad myth signify? " 
(Kundera 1985, p. 3) 
Kundera's first sentence is an example of Cooper and Matsuhashi's 
"State". role. The first two chapters of Kundera's novel are 
concerned with "the idea of eternal return", an idea that is named 
in the first sentence. The topic of the first sentence is also the 
topic ofdiscourse for the next two chapters, and the ensuing 
discussion also introduces the title of the novel. 1 
The "State" role is associated with the "Qualify" role: 
"Qualify: the Qualify role functions generally to restrict the 
meaning of an earlier assertion. In narrative writing Qualify 
functions to narrow and focus an opening State role 
establishing the occasion for the narrative. In this way 
Qualify may be used to cover what Labov... calls the 
Orientation role in narrative. " 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 17) 
,C 
220 
In argumentative texts, "State" and "Qualify" are both concerned 
with abstraction. However, the definition of "Qualify" is qualified 
to account for its occurrence in narrative texts, and in this context, 
"Qualify" appears to be similar to "Setting" In Rumelhart's story 
grammar (Rumelhart 1975, pp. 213-216). Both roles can be 
illustrated by Kundera's novel. The second paragraph begins: 
"Putting it negatively, the myth of eternal return states that 
a life which disappears once and for all, which does not 
return, is like a shadow... " 
(Kundera 1985, p. 3) 
The second paragraph qualifies the assertions or the abstract 
"State" of the first paragraph, while the orientational "Qualify" 
begins the third chapter: 
"I have been thinking about Tomas for many years. But only 
in the light of these reflections did I see him clearly. I saw 
him standing at the window of his flat and looking across 
the courtyard at the opposite walls, not knowing what to 
do. " 
(Kundera 1985, p. 6) 
We have now discussed two different accounts of how 
writers - create semantic relationships that cross sentence 
boundaries. In Witte and Cherry's account, the relation between 
syntax and semantics Is a one-to-one correspondence between 
sentence topic and frame; the choice of frame determines the 
choice , of sentence 
topic. In Cooper and Matsuhashi's account, the 
type of discourse determines the choice of appropriate semantic 
roles for sentences. Functional sentence perspective suggests that 
the relation between syntax and semantics Is dependent on the 
type of text a writer is producing. The creation of argumentative 
texts Involves discursive thinking, a thinking activity that is 
dependent on language. Argumentation also involves the applic- 
ation of; logic to some kind of problem, and the representation of 
this process In writing. To claim that cognitive planning includes 
the . "linearization of content" 
(Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139), 
while linguistic planning is equivalent to the operation that Hayes 
and Flower, call ", translating" (Hayes & Flower 1980a, -p. 15), is to 
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suggest the separation of syntax and semantics represented by 
the °ý model of "Plan, Draft, and Revise". While the cognitive 
planning of argumentative texts includes a process of linear- 
isation, this process involves the manipulation of form as well as 
content - and the manipulation of syntax can result in semantic 
exploration. 
The strategy of manipulating syntax to create meaning was 
noted in chapter three, where we discussed the writing behaviour 
of students who compose with a computer. The relation between 
logic and grammar is also a topic of discussion in Frye's Anatomy 
of Criticism (Frye 1990). Frye argues, on the one hand, that logic 
cannot be reduced to grammar. However, Frye also notes that the 
effect of manipulating grammar is to change semantics: 
"Logic grows out of grammar, the unconscious or potential 
. 
logic inherent in language, and we often find that the 
containing forms of conceptual thought are of grammatical 
origin, the stock example being the subject and predicate of 
Aristotelian logic... 
... Logic may have grown out of grammar, but to grow out of 
something is in part to outgrow it. For grammar may also be 
a hampering force in the development of logic, and a major 
source of logical confusions and pseudo-problems. These 
confusions extend much further than even the enormous 
brood 'of fallacies spawned by paronomasia, which is, like so 
many of our phenomena, a structural principle in literature 
and an obstacle in discursive writing. For instance, many 
long arguments may be annihilated by a grammatical 
change from definite articles and statements of identity to 
indefinite articles and active verbs. To say, "Reason is a 
function of the mind", is unlikely to lead to dispute; to say 
"reason is the function of the mind" involves one in a 
.,, pointless struggle 
for the exclusive . possession of an 
essence. " 
(Frye-1990, p. 332) 
The relation between logic and grammar, and the observations on 
writing behaviour, both suggest that syntactic planning or 
syntactic . structuring assists 
discursive thinking and 
argumentation. As we mentioned above, Cooper and Matsuhashi's 
taxonomy-'of sentence roles includes two for narration and 
222 
description, and thirteen for argumentation. If their taxonomy 
applies to all text types, then choosing the semantic role of 
sentences - or the process of syntactic structuring - will demand 
more attention when a writer is creating an argumentative text. 
6.4 STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURING 
In his review of linguistic approaches to literature, Culler 
concludes by defining the role of a structuralist poetics as "the 
theory of the practice of reading" (Culler 1975, p. 259). A "theory 
of reading" is exemplified by Levi-Strauss' account of myth (Levi- 
Strauss 1986), which Culler describes as a hypothesis: "one should 
consider his proposals concerning the reading of myth as 
hypotheses about semiotic operations that may be performed 
intuitively in the reading of literature" (Culler 1975, p. 51). 
According to Culler, it is easier to make hypotheses about the 
process of reading than the process of writing, partly because "the 
meanings readers give to literary works and the effects they 
experience are much more open to observation"; thus "hypotheses 
about the conventions and operations which produce these effects 
can therefore be tested" (Culler 1975, p. 117). Culler proposes 
Chomsky's transformational grammar as the basis for a model of 
"literary competence" and a method of testing hypotheses about 
reading; but as we concluded above, how Chomsky's grammar can 
be used to test hypotheses about semiotic operations remains a 
mystery. 
Culler's view on the process of writing merely confirms that 
writing is a mystery, as we discussed in chapter three; another 
reason' for his assertion Is that "the statements authors make 
about the process of composition are notoriously problematic" 
(Culler, 1975, p. 117). An attempt to model writing- using the 
statements of authors is bound to be problematic, but despite 
Culler's, pessimism, researchers have used the . results of textual 
analysis as the basis for a model of writing. However, as we have 
shown in this chapter, linguistic approaches to modelling writing 
are dominated by the influence of Chomsky's transformational 
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grammar, while modelling cognitive processes from the 
perspective of cognitive science is dominated by a concern with 
representations. Both approaches to modelling are embedded in 
the rationalistic tradition that we discussed in chapter two. 
There are seven aspects to Chomsky's influence on the 
methodology of using linguistics to model writing. The first is the 
use of rules and grammars to represent structure and structuring, 
while the second is the claim that such grammars have a universal 
validity. The third is the justification of grammars by the 
distinction between competence and performance, and the fourth 
is the evaluation of models by Chomsky's criteria of descriptive 
and explanatory adequacy, or by some version of these criteria. 
The fifth is a dualistic assumption that is inherited from the 
rationalistic tradition; this assumption concerns the relation 
between thinking and language, and is explained in the next 
chapter. This dualism underlies the sixth aspect, which is the 
separation of syntax and semantics, while the seventh is an 
interpretation of semantics in terms of logical relations. 
Cognitive science is so concerned with representations 
because one of Its alms is to design computer systems that 
simulate human information processing. Al approaches to 
modelling language comprehension, are shaped by the goal of 
designing machines that can understand natural language. 
Frederiksen's (1986) approach to modelling writing is from this 
perspective. His model is a hypothesis about mental represent- 
ations or structures, structures that are derived from linguistic 
analysis. Frames are high-level semantic structures that are 
represented . 
by rules and grammars. Making a similar claim to 
Chomsky's for the universal validity of his grammar, Frederiksen 
plans "to. test the hypothesis that the rules subjects use in 
comprehending expository texts are independent of specific 
content, providing Important evidence for the generality of frame 
production rules" (Frederiksen 1986, p. 255). This multi-level 
model of discourse comprehension and production consists of four 
layers, with semantic structures on the top, and syntax on the 
bottom. In, this type of model, structuring is a movement between 
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levels of structure; comprehension is an upwards movement, 
while production is a downwards movement. 2 Witte and Cherry 
also use the notion of frames to explain production processes 
(Witte & Cherry 1986). Their topic analysis is also based on the 
traditional grammatical division of the sentence into subject and 
predicate, or topic and comment. Claiming that high-level frames 
are mapped onto each sentence topic, Witte and Cherry use topic 
analysis to characterise the framing strategies of descriptive and 
narrative framing. 
Although the separation of syntax and semantics has been 
questioned by psycholinguists, this aspect of Chomsky's influence 
is a feature of linguistic models of writing, in which writing is 
represented as a movement between levels of a structural or 
representational hierarchy. In their criticism of the rationalistic 
tradition, Winograd and Flores refer to Heidegger's question 
whether representations are necessary for human cognition: 
"It is the observer who describes an activity as representing 
something else. Human cognition includes the use of 
representations, but is not based on representation. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 99) 
Does meaning have a structure? Trees and networks are used in 
computer science to represent logical relations. Trees are also used 
by 'Chomsky to represent syntactic structure, and we have 
explained the significance of Chomsky's analysis for compiler 
writing and computer programming. Story grammarians have also 
used trees to represent the semantics of stories. However, this 
entails' ä rationalistic view of semantics, in which meaning is 
limited to the sort of logical relations expressed in Chomsky's 
notion of deep structure. We have noted that the sentence is 
generally seen by linguists as the principal structure of written 
language; it is finite in length, has a well defined spatial boundary 
marked by the full stop, and is easily identified on a printed page. 
2 In Beaugrande and Dressler's application of information theory to text 
linguistics, "production" and "reception" are also reversible processes, in 
which receivers extract from a surface text the underlying concepts, ideas 
and plans encoded by the senders (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, pp. 42-43). 
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In comparison, meaning is a question of textual interpretation, 
and, in Culler's playful interpretation of interpretation, semantic 
representations are in the eyes of the beholder. While Culler 
claims that "linguistics does not provide a method for the 
interpretation of literary works" (Culler 1975, p. 109), the 
linguistic models of writing discussed above provide a method for 
interpreting the meaning of a text in terms of logical relations. 
We commented above that Cooper and Matsuhashl's cycle of 
process observation and product examination (Cooper & 
Matsühashi 1983, p. 6) suggests that a linguistic approach to 
writing represents a hypothesis about structure and structuring - 
a hypothesis that suggests a relation between structures derived 
from textual analysis on the one hand, and structuring activities of 
the writer on the other. We also made the comment that there are 
diverse ways of using linguistics to model writing, and therefore 
different kinds of hypotheses. Having used linguistic analysis to 
identify levels of structures, Frederiksen hypothesises that 
structuring activities involve the application of grammars to move 
from one level to another. Chomsky justifies grammars by making 
the distinction between competence and performance (Chomsky 
1965); thus humans use grammars, but are unaware that they do 
so. Frederiksen claims to have found evidence that humans use 
frame grammars, but these claims are based on questionable 
inferences. Witte and Cherry's hypothesis is that structuring 
activities involve choosing an appropriate frame and subsequently 
choosing a sentence topic; frames can be inferred by the reverse 
process of analysing sentence topics and allocating them to 
appropriate categories. In both types of hypothesis, categories of 
frames or, structures are constructed by the observer using 
linguisticp analysis, and, as Winograd and Flores point out, these 
representational categories do not necessarily identify the 
structuring activities or thinking processes of writers. 
Culler uses criteria derived from Chomsky in an attempt to 
evaluate Grelmas' structural semantics (Greimas 1966), claiming 
that the ultimate test of a semantic theory is a computational test: 
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"A semantic theory must aim at both operational and 
descriptive adequacy; that is to say, it must use concepts 
which can be defined in terms of empirical techniques or 
operations and it must account for intuitively attested facts 
about meaning. A theory of description is operationally 
adequate only if it is sufficiently explicit for different 
. linguists using its apparatus to reach the same results or, more precisely, for a computer to be programmed to use its 
techniques in producing descriptions. " 
(Culler 1975, p. 76) 
Greimas' hypothesis, like van Dijk's work on text grammars and 
Frederiksen's model of discourse comprehension, is another 
hypothesis about semantic representations. Culler's ultimate test 
of this type of hypothesis is whether machines can be 
programmed to comprehend discourse. As we mentioned above, 
the first stage of designing AI systems, such as a system of 
natural language understanding, is to identify the representations 
that the system will handle. The computational problem is then to 
identify the processes that will transform an input representation 
into the required output representation. Grammars are an 
appropriate computational mechanism for transforming linguistic 
representations, and it is an Irrelevant question whether this 
mechanism simulates human activity. With the kind of hypothesis 
represented by this type of system, the purpose of a computa- 
tional test is to find out whether the grammar can produce the 
required output. 
If our purpose is to design systems that will assist writers in 
their structuring activities or thinking processes, then one of our 
tasks Is to identify those activities. Can we use textual analysis to 
infer structuring activities rather than structures? Witte and 
Cherry give an affirmative answer: 
"In short, a fair amount of the research on writing that 
focuses on extended written texts sees formal properties, 
particularly semantic properties, of texts as reflections of 
the thinking processes that produced them. ", 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 120) 
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However, Witte and Cherry's hypothesis is still concerned with 
maps 'between representations; in this case, frames and sentence 
topics. 
.. = An alternative view of structuring activity is given by 
Cooper and Matsuhashi's functional sentence perspective. Using 
Beaugrande and Dressler's taxonomy of text types, we concluded 
that syntactic structuring or sentence planning is influenced by 
the type of text a writer is producing, and that sentence planning 
is more of a problem for writers when writing argumentative 
texts, compared with writing narrative or descriptive texts. We 
also referred to the observations on writing behaviour in chapter 
three, noting that syntactic manipulation can assist argumentatidn 
and the process of making meanings. Syntactic planning is 
therefore one aspect of cognitive planning or textual structuring, 
rather than the distinct activity suggested by the notion of 
linguistic planning. The distinction between cognitive planning 
and linguistic planning assumes the separation of syntax and 
semantics, and a hierarchical model of writing based on notions of 
text structure. 
This argument should be further clarified in the next 
chapter, ' where we discuss Saussure's approach to linguistics. As 
we have seen, the representational models of writing discussed in 
this chapter are dominated by Chomsky's transformational 
grammar. In this type of model, a model of comprehension 
becomes a model of writing by reversing the direction of 
movement between levels of structure. Is it possible to construct 
an alternative model of writing by adopting an alternative 
approach to linguistics - that Is, by adopting a semlological view of 
language? This is the question that we pursue in the forthcoming 
chapters. Culler defines semiotics, the science of signs, as "the 
attempt to identify the codes and mechanisms through which 
meaning is produced in various regions of social life" (Culler 1992, 
p. 116). ýA'semiotic model of fiction writing, therefore, would have 
to identify the codes whereby meaning is produced in fictional 
texts: Culler's goal for a structuralist poetics is to develop a 
semiotic theory of reading, and as theories of reading are more 
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developed than theories of writing, to establish this type of model 
would necessitate a look at alternative models of reading, such as 
that provided by Barthes (1990) in S/Z. We discuss Barthes' 
account in chapter nine. Firstly however, we need to discuss 
Saussure's approach to linguistics. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have looked at the ways in which linguistics is 
used to model writing. In the first part, we discussed the problem 
of identifying structures in written language. We showed how 
Chomsky's transformational grammar has influenced not only the 
development of story grammars and text grammars, but also 
Culler's (1975) discussion of linguistic approaches to literature. We 
concluded this discussion of structure by making a distinction 
between semiological and structural analyses of written language. 
In the second part of the chapter, we looked at explanations 
of how the structures Identified by textual analysis figure in the 
structuring activities of writers. One explanation is given by 
Frederiksen (1986), and we showed how his model of discourse 
comprehension and production Is influenced once again by 
Chomsky's transformational grammar. A further influence of 
Chomsky lies in the distinction between cognitive and linguistic 
planning, a distinction that features in current writing research 
(eg Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139). We argued that the notion 
of linguistic planning be replaced by that of syntactic planning, 
and that syntactic planning is an aspect of cognitive planning. In 
the course of this argument, we discussed two explanations of how 
syntax figures In the structuring activities of writers, comparing 
Witte and Cherry's (1986) account of sentence semantics with 
Cooper and Matsuhashl's (1983) functional sentence perspective. 
In conclusion, we summarised the ways in which Chomsky's ideas 
have influenced linguistic approaches to modelling writing, and 
identified some problems with the approaches discussed in this 
chapter. 
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We concluded the last chapter by describing a basic model 
of writing that represents writing as a cycle of activities, rather 
than a movement between structures. We pointed out that to 
develop the basic model into a model of fiction writing, we needed 
to identify the kinds of thinking activities that produce fictional 
texts. What constitutes cognitive planning or textual structuring in 
the case of fiction writing? The conclusion to this chapter is that 
thinking activities in fiction writing are somehow concerned with 
narrating, describing, and arguing, and that syntactic planning is 
one of these activities. To identify further thinking processes in 
fiction writing, we shall have to adopt an alternative approach to 
linguistics, and consider narration and description in more detail. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we concluded that thinking activities in fiction 
writing are somehow concerned with narrating, describing, and 
arguing, and that syntactic planning is one of these activities. In 
this chapter we discuss narration and description in more detail, 
and identify further thinking activities in fiction writing. 
We begin by discussing Saussure's view of linguistics. His 
view, of language as a system of sequential and associative 
relations is supported by Jakobson, who discusses similarity and 
contiguity disorders in speech impairment, and poles of metaphor 
and metonymy in literature. We find similarity and contiguity 
disorders in definitions of narrative. These include the notion of a 
minimal narrative, and we compare Genette's ideas with those of 
Todorov. We argue that although a narrative can be treated as the 
expansion of a verb, verbs can signify scenes as well as events, 
and we argue that iterative narration is a form of description. 
In cognitive terms, events are verbal representations, while 
scenes are visual representations; we discuss a model of short- 
term memory developed by cognitive psychologists that features 
this distinction. Comparing this model with Jakobson's observat- 
ions on metaphor and metonymy, we identify events, scenes, and 
syntax as distinct objects of thought in fiction writing - the objects 
of remembering and imagining. In the course of this discussion, 
we refer to accounts of magical or primitive thought, and argue 
that magical thought is evident in fiction writing. Fiction writers 
are not obliged to follow rationalistic orderings of events; in fiction 
writing, the imagination is restrained not by reason, but by the 
sequential and associative relations of long-term memory. 
In the final part of this chapter, we discuss Genette's 
analysis of narrative discourse. In his discussion of perspective or 
"point-of-view", Genette uses the term "focus" to classify narrative 
texts. Using his analysis and the accounts of fiction writers on 
their characters, we identify the process of focusing the 
Imagination in fiction writing. Focusing the imagination is a 
232 
process in which a writer imagines she is someone else, and we 
show how this process also applies to events, scenes, and syntax. 
7.2 METAPHOR, METONYMY, AND A MINIMAL NARRATIVE 
Discussing the anecdotes of professional fiction writers in chapter 
three, we turned to Freud for an explanation of the "mystery of 
writing". Consequently, we asked how one can model a process 
that is tied to the unconscious and tied to the imagination, given 
that the former is inaccessible and the latter is the unique 
property of individuals. Jacques Lacan's oft-quoted assertion gives 
us a clue: 
"The unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on 
the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is 
determined in the development of the effects of speech, 
consequently the unconscious is structured like a language. " 
(Lacan 1979, p. 149) 
If the unconscious is structured like a language, then modelling 
unconscious processes must be like modelling a language. But how 
is a language structured? 
In Saussure's view, a language is a social institution; some of 
its features are shared with other social institutions, while some 
are unique: 
F "Alanguage is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence 
comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, 
symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so 
on: It is simply the most important of such systems. It is 
therefore possible to conceive of a science which studies the 
role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social 
psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call It 
semiology... Linguistics Is only one branch of this general 
science. " 
(Saussure 1983, pp. 15-16) 
What distinguishes Saussure's view of language from Chomsky's 
approach in -Aspects of the Theory of Syntax is firstly the notion 
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that language is a social institution. For Saussure, "the sign must 
be studied as a social phenomenon" (Saussure 1983, p. 16). For 
Chomsky however, "the structure of particular languages may 
very well be determined by factors over which the individual has 
no conscious control and concerning which society may have little 
choice or freedom" (Chomsky 1965, p. 59). Discussing a child's 
acquisition of language, Chomsky refers to Plato's Meno and the 
notion that ideas and knowledge are innate rather than acquired: 
"On the basis of the best information now available, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that a child cannot help constructing a 
particular sort of transformational grammar to account for 
the data presented to him, any more than he can control his 
perception of solid objects or his attention to line and angle. 
Thus it may well be that the general features of language 
structure reflect, not so much the course of one's experience, 
but rather the general character of one's capacity to acquire 
knowledge - in the traditional sense, one's innate ideas and 
innate principles. " 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 59) 
There is another significant feature which distinguishes 
Saussure's approach from Chomsky's. According to Saussure, one 
reason why semiology is not recognised as an autonomous science 
is the traditional view of language as a nomenclature: "a list of 
terms corresponding to a list of things" (Saussure 1983, p. 65). One al 
objection to this conception is its assumption that ideas already 
exist independently of words. In Chomsky's rationalist approach 
to language, there are two objects of thought: "the idea, which is in 
the mind, and the thing which is represented by it" (Chomsky 
1965, pp. 199-200). He justifies the notion of two structures by 
referring to these "two senses of having an idea", a distinction 
which features in seventeenth century rationalist philosophy 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 200). In Saussure's view, Ideas do not have an 
existence independent of words: 
"Psychologically, setting aside its expression In words, our 
thought Is simply a vague, shapeless mass. Philosophers and 
linguists have always agreed that were it not for signs, we 
should be incapable of differentiating any two, ideas in a 
clear and constant way. In itself, thought is, like a swirling 
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cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas 
are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before 
the introduction of linguistic structure. " 
(Saussure 1983, p. 110) 
In Chomsky's theory of two structures, syntactic structure is the 
result of a transformation, the transformation of a semantic 
structure that represents logical relations on the one hand and 
some kind of innate idea on the other. In Saussure's account of the 
linguistic sign, "a linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a 
name, but between a concept and a sound pattern" (Saussure 
1983, p. 66). In Barthes' terminology, a concept is the signified, 
and a sound pattern is the signifier (Barthes 1973, p. 112). These 
two elements of the sign "are intimately linked and each triggers 
the other"; thus the linguistic sign is a "two-sided psychological 
entity" (Saussure 1983, p. 66). Chomsky's dualistic view of 
linguistic structure reflects the notion that there are two objects of 
thought; in Saussure's view, there is only one object, and the 
linguistic sign is one entity with two aspects. 
One feature of the linguistic sign is that the signifier or 
sound pattern exists in time: "the linguistic signal, being auditory 
in nature, has a temporal aspect, and hence certain temporal 
characteristics" (Saussure 1983, p. 69). The first is that it occupies 
a temporal space, and the second is that this space is measured in 
just one dimension: "it is a line" (Saussure 1983, pp. 69-70). In 
Chomsky's analysis of syntax, the sentence exists only in space, 
and lacks a temporal dimension. Chomsky's object of study is 
finite in length, with a well defined spatial boundary marked by 
the full stop. 
According to Saussure, language is a system of sequential 
and associative relations. These two kinds of relations "correspond 
to two different forms of mental activity" (Saussure 1983, p. 121). 
The : linguistic signifier has a temporal dimension; similarly, 
"linearity precludes the possibility of uttering two words 
simultaneously" (Saussure 1983, p. 121) and words have to be 
arranged in spoken sequence or syntagma. Syntax is therefore an 
aspect of sequential relations: "All syntagmatic facts are not to be 
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classed as syntax, but all syntactic facts belong to syntagmatics" 
(Saussure 1983, p. 135). The second kind of relation is associative: 
"Outside the context of discourse, words having something in 
common are associated together in the memory... This kind 
of connexion between words is of quite a different order. It 
is not based on linear sequence. It is a connexion in the 
brain. Such connexions are part of that accumulated store 
which is the form the language takes in an individual's 
brain. " 
(Saussure 1983, pp. 121-122) 
Saussure's view of language marks a distinct break from the 
structural methods of traditional grammar. Discussing the 
traditional division of grammar into morphology and syntax, 
Saussure argues that morphology "cannot constitute a discipline 
distinct from syntax" (Saussure 1983, p. 134). On the other hand, 
he asks: 
"... is it reasonable to exclude lexicology from grammar? At 
first sight, words as listed in the dictionary do not seem to 
lend themselves to grammatical analysis. For grammar is 
usually limited to studying relations between units. But it 
soon becomes apparent that many of these relations may be 
expressed by words just as well as by grammatical devices. " 
(Saussure 1983, p. 134) 
Giving examples from Latin, Russian, Greek, French and German, 
he concludes that "from a functional point of view, lexicological 
and syntactic devices overlap" (Saussure 1983, p. 134). A more 
rational division of grammar will be achieved by referring to a 
theory of. syntagmas and a theory of associations, and so 
organising "the whole subject matter of grammar on its two 
natural axes" (Saussure 1983, p. 135). 
Following Saussure, Jakobson also takes ' the view of 
language as a system of sequential and associative relations. In his 
discussion of the problem of aphasia or speech Impairment, he 
identifies two extreme types of 'aphasia which he labels 
"contiguity disorder" and "similarity disorder" (Jakobson 1987). In 
the case of contiguity disorder; the path of sequential relations is 
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blocked, word order is chaotic, and the extent and variety of 
sentences is drastically diminished. In the case of similarity 
disorder, the path of associative relations is blocked, and speech is 
context bound; for example, the phrase "it is raining" can only be 
produced when it is raining. Jakobson concludes that, although 
"the varieties of aphasia are numerous and diverse", they all 
range between these two polar types (Jakobson 1987, p. 109). He 
characterises the two extremes in terms of metaphor and 
metonymy: 
"Metaphor is alien to the similarity disorder, and metonymy 
to the contiguity disorder. " 
(Jakobson 1987, p. 109) 
Jakobson uses the results of this analysis to make 
observations on thinking in general and literature in particular. 
Firstly, he describes an experiment that uses the psychoanalytic 
technique of free association. In this experiment, humans are 
asked, to reply spontaneously to a word stimulus given by the 
experimenter, such as the noun "hut". Jakobson concludes that 
responses generally follow the paths of associative or sequential 
relations. Someone who follows the first path will give a 
substitutive response, such as "den" or "thatch", while someone 
who' follows the second will give a complementary or predicative 
response, such as "burnt out" or "is a poor little house". In 
addition, the responses are either metaphorically or metonym- 
ically associated with the stimulus. Following the path of 
associative relations, a metaphoric response, such as "den", is 
"semantically similar" to the stimulus, while a metonymic 
response, such as "thatch", is "semantically contiguous" (Jakobson 
1987, p. 110). 
The problem with Jakobson's notion of "semantic contiguity" 
is the assumption that semantics, like syntax, has, a spatial 
existence. In the last chapter, we referred to Derrida's comments 
on spatial metaphor and questioned the notion that semantics can 
be represented as a structure. Here, Jakobsön classifies signifiers 
by locating the signified in semantic space. In classical rhetoric, 
metonymy signifies a change of name, and names refer to objects 
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or persons in the physical world (Aristotle 1965, Longinus 1965). 
Metonymy is a rhetorical device in which two objects or persons 
are spatially connected, and the name of one is substituted for the 
name of the other. Hawkes gives the examples of "The White 
House" for the American President and "The Crown" for the Queen 
(Hawkes 1989, p. 4). Jakobson's analysis suggests that, in terms of 
human perception, physical objects can be remembered 
metaphorically by their visual attributes such as size, shape and 
colour, or metonymically by the temporal-spatial context in which 
they were seen. In the case of signifiers that are semantically 
similar, "hut" and "den" are related visually but not necessarily 
temporally or spatially, while in the case of semantic contiguity, 
"hut" and "thatch" have a spatial and a possible temporal 
correspondence. We return to these aspects of memory below. 
Following the path of sequential relations, responses also 
diverge into metaphor and metonymy. In a similar fashion, 
Jakobson points out that a metaphoric response, such as "is a poor 
little house", is "semantically similar" to the stimulus, while a 
metonymic response, such as "burnt out", is "semantically contig- 
uous" (Jakobson 1987, p. 110). Here, however, semantic similarity 
is not like the previous case of visual correspondence, but takes 
the form of a reply to the question, "What is a hut? " In this case, 
the noun "hut" seems to be interpreted as the subject for a 
sentence, and the predicate is supplied by the response. In the 
metonymic example, semantic contiguity is not like the previous 
case of a general spatial correspondence, but takes the form of a 
verb which creates a narrative context, suggesting a temporal- 
spatial correspondence with a specific "burnt out" hut. 
According to Jakobson's summary of the responses in this 
experiment, there are two types of connection, metaphoric and 
metonymic, and two aspects of each: syntactic and semantic. A 
metaphoric connection involves semantic similarity with syntactic 
similarity or contiguity; a metonymic connection involves 
semantic contiguity, again with syntactic similarity or contiguity. 
If we 'attempt an alternative summary from the perspective of 
associative and sequential relations, there are also two types of 
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connection, in this case associative and sequential, and two aspects 
of each: metaphoric and metonymic. In the associative case, a 
noun is a prompt for a noun, and the connection is visual 
similarity (metaphor) or spatial proximity (metonymy). In the 
sequential case, a noun is a prompt for a verb, which is either "to 
be" (metaphor), or the signifier of an event (metonymy). 
Jakobson speculates on metaphor and metonymy in the 
development of discourse: 
"The development of a discourse may take place along two 
different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another 
either through their similarity or through their contiguity. 
The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term 
for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, 
since they find their most condensed expression in 
metaphor and metonymy respectively. " 
(Jakobson 1987, pp. 109-110) 
Discussing metaphor and metonymy in literature and visual art, 
Jakobson concludes that "a competition between both devices, 
metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest In any symbolic process, 
be it intrapersonal or social" (Jakobson 1987, p. 113). Metaphoric 
and metonymic devices are found in Frazer's analysis of magic 
(Frazer 1993) and Freud's analysis of dreams (Freud 1976a); we 
return to these examples below. In the case of literature, Jakobson 
describes metonymic and metaphoric poles. At the metonymic 
pole are fictional works in which events dominate and description 
"follows the path of contiguous relationships", such as Tolstoy's 
War and Peace (Jakobson 1987, p. 111). Jakobson points to the 
dominance of metonymy In Russian heroic epics and late 
nineteenth century realism. At the metaphoric pole, description is 
dominant and events are connected by verbal or visual association 
rather than sequence. Metaphoric constructions dominate Russian 
lyrical! songs and the literary schools of romanticism and 
symbolism. 
Can we apply Jakobson's analysis to modelling fiction 
writing? In chapter three, we discussed the Idea that poles of 
writing behaviour represent pathological cases while, for the 
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majority, writing is a cycle of engagement and reflection (Sharpies 
1993). Here, if we argue by analogy, then poles of metaphor and 
metonymy in fiction writing would represent the extreme cases, 
similar to the contiguity and similarity disorders in the studies of 
aphasia. For the majority of fiction writers, writing would be a 
cycle of metaphor and metonymy. But what might this cycle 
involve? 
Above, we summarised the results of the free association 
experiment from the perspective of associative and sequential 
relations. In the case of sequential relations, a noun is a prompt to 
a verb, either the verb "to be" or the signifier of an event. A 
narrative also requires a verb. Discussing the notion of a minimal 
narrative, Genette uses "a kind of linguistic metaphor that should 
certainly not be taken too literally" (Genette 1980, p. 30): 
"Since any narrative... is a linguistic production undertaking 
to tell of one or several events, it is perhaps legitimate to 
treat it as the development - monstrous, if you will - given 
to a verbal form, in the grammatical sense of the term: the 
expansion of a verb. I walk, Pierre has come are for me 
minimal forms of narrative... " 
(Genette 1980, p. 30) 
The problem with terms such as "fiction", "narrative", and 
"story", is that attempts to define them are not only themselves 
prone to similarity disorder, but are also culturally determined by 
the rationalistic tradition that we discussed in chapter two. The 
following definition of a typical story is a typical example: , 
"A coherent story differs from a set of isolated sentences in 
that it has a unifying context, a recognizable temporal 
sequence of events, and a fixed set of actors or topics. A 
typical story presents events in' an orderly manner, 
supplying (either explicitly or Implicitly) motivations for the 
characters, causes and consequences of the events, and cues 
to the temporal sequence In which the events occur. The 
extent to which these conventions are preserved in a text 
determines how comprehensible the text is. " 
(Thorndyke & Yekovich 1980, p. 32) 
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Another aspect of the rationalistic tradition is the notion of 
narrative as testimony, evidence, or factual reportage, a notion 
that is found in Aristotle's Rhetoric in the context of oratorical 
persuasion and proof. This notion is also found in the tales of 
Edgar Allan Poe, such as the Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym. 
Narrative is to be contrasted with fiction, which, as Poe's prefatory 
note to this tale points out, is simply not true, perhaps a product 
of fantasy and the imagination. In comparison, both terms are 
used to describe Rimmon-Kenan's book Narrative Fiction, but her 
distinction between fictional and non-fictional events suggests 
that Fictional Narrative might have been a more appropriate title 
(Rimmon-Kenan 1989, pp. 2-3). 
The terms "story" and "storytelling" are often used to refer 
to the oral tradition, as exemplified by the tales and fables used 
by researchers into story memory (Rumelhart 1975, Thorndyke 
1977, Mandler & Johnson 1977). However, Genette uses the term 
"story" for the "signified or narrative content", while "narrative" 
refers to the "signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text 
itself" (Genette 1980, p. 27). From this distinction arises the notion 
that some ideal temporal ordering of events can be reconstituted 
by the reader from the text (Genette 1980, p. 35), or is in the mind 
of ! the writer before the process of writing has begun (Genette 
1980, p. 244), a notion to which we return below. This ideal order 
of events is the story, and this definition of a story is also used by 
Rimmon-Kenan (Rimmon-Kenan 1989, p. 3). 
Although Genette treats a narrative as the expansion of a 
verb, the verb is determined by the other equation of a story with 
events. The idea that a narrative is the expansion of a verb is 
perhaps not as monstrous as the Idea that a verb can only signify 
events. A cycle of metaphor and metonymy suggests that the 
fictional work is at least a combination of events and scenes, and 
that-fiction writing is a cycle of narrating and describing; in 
Beaugrande and Dressler's discussion of text types, literary texts 
"contain various constellations of description, narration, and arg- 
umentation" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 185). In Genette's 
account of narrative discourse, the event is the main feature. 
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Using the distinction between story and narrative, Genette 
identifies four types of narrative movement: pause, scene, 
summary, and ellipsis (Genette 1980, p. 94). In the latter case, 
events in the story are simply omitted from the narrative, while 
in the case of summary, the tempo of the narrative is faster than 
the story. However, Genette defines a scene as detailed narrative, 
so that in this case there is an "equality of time between narrative 
and story" (Genette 1980, p. 94), exemplified by the direct 
reporting of conversation, while a pause is a pause for description, 
in which there is no report of the story's events in the narrative. 
In our use of the term, a "scene" refers to the visual 
representation that a writer has in mind when describing, or a 
reader constructs when reading a descriptive text. In this sense, 
the scene plays a minor role in Genette's narrative discourse; a 
scene is a pause or a gap between events. Elsewhere, Genette 
claims that "narrative recognizes only events or speeches (which 
are a particular type of event... )" (Genette 1988, p. 61), so that 
speech is both an event and a "scene", in Genette's sense of the 
term. So, in Genette's view, a narrative recognises events only. 
A metonymic view of fiction, narrative or story is commonly 
found in literary criticism (Forster 1962, Liddell 1965), and 
dominates attempts to develop a story grammar (Rumelhart 
1975, Thorndyke 1977, Mandler & Johnson 1977, Mandler 1978, 
Johnson & Mandler 1980). In Rumelhart's schema for stories, 
"Event is the most general category of our entire grammar" 
(Rumelhart 1975, p. 215). In Liddell's apology for the moral value 
of the novel, fiction is "the delineation of character In action" 
(Liddell 1965, p. 110), and in descriptive writing, "a novelist Is not 
getting on with his story" (Liddell 1965, p. 111). As an example of 
metonymic extremity, Liddell advocates some kind of aesthetic 
terrorism usually reserved for the fine art masterpiece: "It is time 
for an attack to be made upon the pictorial element in literature" 
(Liddell 1965, p. 110). This criticism Is not aimed at rhetorical 
theory, an area where the study of metaphor has dominated the 
study of metonymy (Jakobson 1987, p. 114), but at fiction writers. 
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Despite such threats, it is tempting to rewrite Genette's claim 
and argue that fiction writers recognise only events and scenes. In 
that case, we also need to rewrite Genette's minimal narrative: 
"For me, as soon as there is an action or an event, even a 
single one, there is a story because there is a transformation, 
a transition from an earlier state to a later and resultant 
state. 'I walk' implies (and is contrasted to) a state of 
departure and a state of arrival. That is a whole story... " 
(Genette 1988, p. 19) 
From French into English, "Je marche" can be translated as "I 
walk" or "I am walking". In Genette's minimal narrative, "I walk" 
is an event that implies departure and arrival, and a story is a 
transformation from an earlier state to a later state. However, this 
notion of transformation assumes a linear notion of time - time as 
a measurable straight line. Mythologists and anthropologists have 
described an alternative view of time as a cycle, a view held by 
non-literate societies (Harrison 1963, Levi-Strauss 1972). Dseagu 
argues that "time, as far as the traditional African is concerned, is 
not a linear progression but rather a circular progression", and 
that this view of time finds expression in several African novels 
(Dseagu 1992, p. 601). In his analysis of a story by Poe, Barthes 
points out that chronological references such as "three years later" 
are terms that form a cultural code: 
"... the chronological code: 'dating', which seems natural and 
objective to us today, is in fact a highly cultural practice - 
which is to be expected since it implies a certain ideology of 
time ('historical' time is not the same as 'mythical' time); the 
set of chronological reference points thus constitute a strong 
cultural code (a historical way of cutting up time for 
purposes of dramatisation, of scientific appearance, of 
reality-effect)... " 
(Barthes 1981, p. 155) 
According -to Frye's theory of myth, narrative also involves 
movement, but here "the fundamental form 'of process is cyclical 
movement" (Frye 1990, p. 158). Selmer Bringsjord (1991) also 
discusses the notion of the plot as a circular movement, in which 
an initial situation of stability is followed by a conflict; there 
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follows a resolution of conflict and thus a return to a stable 
situation. He has developed a computational method of writing 
stories based on this notion of the plot, which he ascribes to 
Aristotle, and is using this method to write his second novel, 
Eternal Return (Bringsjord 1991, p. 3 1). In Finnegans Wake, the 
final words loop back to the beginning of the novel, and in TS 
Eliot's Four Quartets, the state of departure is also a state of 
arrival: 
"Time past and time future 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. " 
In a similar fashion to Genette, Todorov has also described 
the minimal narrative as a transformation. However, this 
transformation is formulated in terms that also suggest a circular 
rather than linear movement, and reflect the Aristotelian notion 
of a disturbed state of equilibrium. In his Grammar of Narrative, 
Todorov writes that "the minimal complete plot consists in the 
passage from one equilibrium to another" (Todorov 1977a, p. 111): 
"An 'ideal' narrative begins with a stable situation which is 
disturbed by some power or force. There results a state of 
disequilibrium; by the action of a force directed in the 
opposite direction, the equilibrium is re-established; the 
second equilibrium is similar to the first, but the two are 
never identical. " 
(Todorov 1977a, p. 111) 
From this formulation, Todorov reaches the conclusion that "there 
are two types of episodes in a narrative: those which describe a 
state (of equilibrium or of disequilibrium) and those which 
describe the passage from one state to the other" (Todorov 1977a, 
p. 111). While the first type will be "relatively static" and possibly 
iterative, the second "will be dynamic and in principle occurs only 
once" (Todorov 1977a, p. 111). Unlike Genette's reference to 
narrative as the expansion of a verb, Todorov's definition of 
narrative episodes pays equal attention to the verb and the 
adjective: 
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"This definition of the two types of episodes... permit us to 
relate them to two parts of speech, the adjective and the 
verb... Narrative 'adjectives' will therefore be those 
predicates which describe states of equilibrium or 
disequilibrium, narrative 'verbs' those which describe the 
passage from one to the other. " (Todorov 1977a, p. 111) 
Elsewhere, Todorov follows Greimas in using a four-term 
homology to give a similar characterisation of narrative episodes: 
"The only category we have for describing the variety of 
predicates is... that of static/dynamic, which adopts and 
makes explicit the grammatical opposition between 
adjective and verb... It seems that all we can assert about 
predicates, on the syntactic level, is exhausted by this 
characteristic: 'static/dynamic', 'adjective/verb'. " 
(Todorov 1977b, p. 220) 
Todorov's "narrative verb" describes the sort of 
transformation or event that Genette identifies as a minimal 
narrative. However, his notion of "narrative adjective" provides a 
further argument that a minimal narrative can also be constituted 
by a scene, and that a scene can be treated as an expansion of the 
verb "to be". Discussing the free association experiment above, we 
concluded that, in the case of a sequential response, a noun serves 
as the prompt to a verb; the verb is either "to be" or the signifier 
of an event. While a narrative suggests sequential relations 
(Jakobson's "syntactic contiguity") and the expansion of a verb, we 
need to extend Genette's definition of a story so that "I am 
walking" Is also a minimal narrative. 
Moreover, the type of episode that Todorov calls "narrative 
adjective" Includes not only description but also what Genette calls 
"iterative narrative"' (Genette 1980, p. 116). We have shown that 
Genette's distinction between story 'and narrative leads to a 
typology of narrative movements (pause, scene, ' ellipsis and 
summary). This distinction also leads to a typology of "relations of 
frequency" ý (Genette 1980, p. 114). The first type is singulative 
narrative, where an event occurs 'n' times in the story and is 
reported 'n' times in the narrative (Genette 1980, pp. 114-115). - 
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The second type is repeating narrative, where an event occurs 
once but is reported 'n' times (Genette 1980, pp-115-116). The 
third type is iterative narrative, where an event occurs 'n' times 
but is reported once only (Genette 1980, p. 116). One problem with 
this typology is the underlying assumption. To distinguish 
singulative from repeating narrative, we must be able to infer the 
ideal order of events given by the story, and this is not always 
possible. Has an event occurred once or more than once in Robbe- 
Grillet's La jalousie, for example? In addition, it is the obvious 
presence of several narrators that seems to identify a repeating 
narrative (Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury for example), so 
that a repeating narrative is also a narrative with multiple 
focalization, which we discuss below. 
However, the iterative narrative is more easily identified. 
The following extract is from George Eliot's introduction to Felix 
Holt: 
"Five-and-thirty years ago the glory had not yet 
departed from the old coach-roads: the great roadside inns 
were still brilliant with well-polished tankards, the smiling 
faces of pretty barmaids, and the repartees of jocose ostlers; 
the mail still announced itself by the merry notes of the 
horn; the hedge-cutter or the rick-thatcher might still know 
the exact hour by the unfailing yet otherwise meteoric 
apparition of the pea-green Tally-ho or the yellow 
Independent; and elderly gentlemen in pony chaises, 
quartering nervously to make way for the rolling swinging 
swiftness, had not ceased to remark that times were finely 
changed since they used to see the pack-horses and hear the 
tinkling of their bells on this very highway. " 
I 
Here, iterative narration is marked by the pluperfect tense, the 
verb "to be", and the iterative "still"; for example: "had not yet 
departed", "were still brilliant", "still announced itself ', "might still 
know", and "had not ceased to remark". In this example, iterative 
narration extends for several pages before any markers Indicate a 
transition to singulative narration, such as "one day", "once", or "it 
was abright morning In July when". Alternatively, one could say 
that the reader has to plough through several pages before 
anything happens. Genette remarks that in classical narrative, "the 
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iterative sections provide an informative frame or background" to 
singulative narration (Genette 1980, p. 117). Thus "the classic 
function of iterative narrative is... fairly close to that of 
description, with which, moreover, it maintains very close 
relations" (Genette 1980, p. 117). Together with Todorov's notion 
of "narrative adjective", the narrative episode that describes a 
state, Genette's observations suggest that iterative narrative can 
be treated as a scene, in our sense of the term; that is, as an 
expansion of the verb "to be". 
So far in this discussion, we have shown that notions of 
story and narrative are prone to what Jakobson has called a 
similarity disorder. However, notions of narrative can also suffer 
from a contiguity disorder. Following Saussure's definition of 
semiology as a social science whose object of study is the sign, 
Levi-Strauss claims that anthropology is "the bona fide occupant 
of that domain of semiology which linguistics has not already 
claimed for its own" (Levi-Strauss 1978a, p. 9). In his criticism of 
Propp's Morphology of the Folktale (Propp 1968), Levi-Strauss 
compares his method of structural analysis with what he 
describes as Propp's formalism (Levi-Strauss 1978b). According to 
Levi-Strauss, Propp's formalism lies in the assumption that 
structure is equivalent to syntagmatic or sequential relations; 
structural analysis must also take into account paradigmatic or 
associative relations. Yet while Propp gives priority to the event 
and sequential analysis, one could argue that Levi-Strauss is "the 
champion of paradigmatic structural analysis" (Dundes 1968, 
p. xii). - Levi-Strauss' method Is to construct a matrix of binary 
oppositions by analysing a corpus of myths; the result is a reading 
of myth that consists entirely of antithesis (Levi-Strauss 1977, 
Levi-Strauss 1986). 
In the next chapter we argue that the symbolic is generally 
equivalent to antithesis in the context of the scene, but has other 
connotations when applied to events. Levi-Strauss' reading of 
myth in terms of antithesis extends to events. If Propp's analysis 
of folk-tales suffers from similarity disorder, then Levi-Strauss' 
analysis of myth suffers from contiguity disorder. Frye's notion of 
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structure as "a constellation of images" is a similar form of this 
disorder (Frye 1990, p. 151). According to Frye, meaning is 
represented by a static pattern of imagery (Frye 1990, p. 158). In 
Levi-Strauss' structuralism, form and content are united by the 
notion that structure is equivalent to antithesis, and a static 
pattern of meaning is represented by a matrix of binary 
oppositions. In this case, an application of Saussure's concept of 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations takes us away from 
structuring activities and back to the representation of meaning as 
a static structure existing in space. 
Definitions of narrative, and notions of narrative structure, 
are therefore also prone to similarity and contiguity disorders, to 
the poles of metonymy and metaphor that Jakobson notes in 
literature itself. A balanced view is again provided by Todorov. 
Comparing Propp, whose analysis he describes as "fundamentally 
syntagmatic", with Levi-Strauss and Greimas, "who enclose 
themselves in an equally exclusive paradigmatism", Todorov 
concludes: 
"For our part, we refuse to choose between one or the other 
of these perspectives; it would be a pity to deprive the 
analysis of narrative of the double benefit it can gain from 
both Propp's syntagmatic studies and Levi-Strauss' 
paradigmatic analyses. " 
(Todorov 1977b, p. 224) 
Following Todorov's avoidance of polar extremities, we return to 
both types of analysis in the next chapter. 
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7.3 REMEMBERING, IMAGINING, EVENTS AND SCENES 
Cognitive psychologists researching into human memory also 
make the distinction between scenes and events (Cohen, Eysenck 
& LeVoi 1986, p. 31). They have also distinguished between long- 
term and short-term memory (Cohen et al 1986, p. 60); short-term 
memory is often referred to as working memory (Baddeley & 
Hitch 1974, Hitch & Baddeley 1976). A generally accepted model 
of working memory is illustrated by Figure 10 (Cohen et al 1986, 
p. 67). 
Central Executi 
(limited capaci 
modality free; 
an attentional 
,, system) , 
Articulatory Loop Visuo-Spatial 
(verbal rehearsal Scratch Pad 
system; time-based (spatial and/or 
capacity; phonemic visual rehearsal 
processing; the system; limited inner voice) capacity; the 
inner eye) 
Primary 
Acoustic Store 
(Phonemic non-lexical system 
of limited capacity; accessed 
directly via auditory input or 
indirectly via articulatory loop; 
the inner ear) 
FIGURE 10: A MODEL OF WORKING MEMORY 
(from Cohen et al 1986. p. 67) 
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The principle function of working memory is to manage the 
information which humans need when performing activities. This 
involves transporting items to and from long-term memory, and 
retaining those that are essential to the current activity until they 
are processed or sufficiently "rehearsed" (Cohen et al 1986, p. 61). 
For example, working memory retains speech when humans are 
engaged in conversation, or numbers when performing arith- 
metical calculations. Working memory also manages sensory 
information, the continuous stream of sights, sounds and smells 
that occurs whether or not humans are occupied with activities. 
The capacity of working memory is limited, and tests using lists of 
words or numbers suggest that the usual limit is seven chunks of 
information (Miller 1956). 
The model of working memory illustrated by Figure 10 has 
four components. The "central executive" carries out the task of 
managing attention. The "articulatory loop" or inner voice 
organises information in a temporal and sequential fashion, 
rehearsing words about to be spoken for example, or a telephone 
number about to be noted. In relation to the process of writing, 
this component would be responsible for rehearsing words about 
to be written and organising them sequentially. The "visuo-spatial 
scratch pad" or inner eye deals with visual and spatial inform- 
ation, while the "primary acoustic store" or inner ear handles 
phonemic but non-lexical information. While this model is the 
result of cognitive research, clinical research into brain damage 
has concluded that the right hemisphere of the brain manages 
tasks 'that deal with visual or spatial information, while the left 
manages verbal and analytic tasks (Douglas 1991, p. 57), a division 
of labour that harmonises with the model of working memory. 
Cohen and colleagues (1986, p. 68) describe three codes used 
by each component of the model: the visual code, the acoustic 
code, and the articulatory code. The visual code represents 
information as visual features like size, shape and colour, while 
the auditory code represents information as auditory features 
such as pitch and loudness. The articulatory, code- represents 
information "as it would be spoken" (Cohen et al 1986, p. 68). ý _' 
250 
Can we use this model of working memory to develop a 
model of cognitive processes in fiction writing? A distinction 
between metonymy and metaphor is reflected in the distinction 
between temporal-sequential and visual-spatial components. Thus 
our model might include the separate processes of remembering 
events and remembering scenes. However, both components in 
the model of working memory have two aspects in the context of 
fiction writing. The temporal-sequential component might handle 
sequential relations, but sequential relations in fiction writing 
include the "articulatory" code of syntax as well as the 
syntagmatic code of events. The visual-spatial component might 
handle the associative relations of scenes, but this component has 
a metonymic aspect of spatial correspondences and a metaphoric 
one of visual correspondences. This last observation tends to 
confirm our conclusion above on Jakobson's distinction between 
semantic similarity and semantic contiguity: that physical objects 
can be remembered metaphorically by their visual attributes such 
as size, shape and colour, or metonymically by the temporal- 
spatial context in which they were seen. 
In the case of the free association experiment, Jakobson 
concludes that there are two types of connection, metaphoric and 
metonymic, and two aspects of each, syntactic and semantic. Our 
alternative conclusion was that there are also two types of 
connection from the perspective of sequential and associative 
relations, and metaphoric and metonymic aspects of each. The two 
aspects of associative relations are defined by Jakobson's semantic 
distinction that we have just discussed. The two aspects of 
sequential relations that Jakobson defines by a syntactic 
distinction can also be defined by the verbal distinction: to be, or 
not to be - that is to say, that a fiction writer is mostly engaged in 
describing or narrating. 
In comparing Jakobson's analysis with the model of working 
memory, there are now three problems we need to resolve to 
develop a model of thinking processes in fiction writing. On the 
one hand, the comparison suggests a need for sequential and 
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associative components in our model; on the other hand, a 
distinction between remembering events and remembering 
scenes. The first problem is whether a sequential component is 
not only responsible for remembering events but ordering them 
into some kind of sequence. Does the "linearization of content" 
that is an aspect of "cognitive planning" (Passerault & Coquin 
1994) apply to fiction writing? The second problem is that a 
sequential component needs to handle syntax as well as events. 
The third problem is that the metaphoric aspect of a sequential 
component, defined by the verb "to be", appears to replicate the 
associative component of remembering scenes. We shall discuss 
these problems in reverse order. 
The last problem is resolved by the consideration that it is 
only the phonemic processing of the inner voice that produces 
writing. McLuhan claims that one result of literacy is the split 
between eye and ear, a schizophrenic split produced by the 
phonetic alphabet, "with its abstraction of meaning from sound 
and the translation of sound into a visual code" (McLuhan 1969, 
p. 32): 
"Only the phonetic alphabet makes a break between eye and 
ear, between semantic meaning and visual code... " 
(McLuhan 1969, p. 38) 
According to Ian Watt's account of the English novel (Watt 1972), 
the growth of literacy and the reading public parallels the 
development of capitalism and the rise of the individual. In non- 
literate societies organised on a tribal basis, the individual does 
not : have much of an existence, and "Inner verbalization is 
effective social action" (McLuhan 1969, p. 30). McLuhan quotes a 
paper by Carothers (1959), who claims that individual thinking is 
hardly recognised In non-literate societies, so that voices in the 
head are generally attributed to possession by demons. I 
While the inner voice is a product of literacy, the concept of 
the event as a phenomenon that occurs once only is also culturally 
determined. In his discussions of history, Levi-Strauss has 
compared the Western notion of civilisation and cultural 
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progression with the ideas of so-called primitive societies (Levi- 
Strauss 1972, Levi-Strauss 1978c, Levi-Strauss 1978d). The latter 
are marked by a resistance to the notion of historical development 
or change (Levi-Strauss, 1978c, p. 322). In these societies, the 
event is absorbed by structure, the diachronic by the synchronic: 
"Several types of historical sequences will still have to be 
distinguished. Some, while existing in duration, are of a 
recurrent nature; the annual cycle of the seasons, for 
instance, or that of individual life or that of exchanges of 
goods or services within the social group. These sequences 
raise no problem because they are periodically repeated in 
duration without their structure necessarily undergoing any 
change... " 
(Levi-Strauss 1972, p. 234) 
On the other hand, it is essential that "non-recurrent chains of 
events whose effects accumulate to produce economic and social 
upheavals... should be broken as soon as they form" (Levi-Strauss 
1972, ' p. 235); alternatively, that "the society should have an 
effective procedure to prevent their formation" (Levi-Strauss 
1972, p. 235). While events are recuperated by social structure, 
the notion of a one-off event has a specificity that is tied to 
mythological ancestry or the life-cycle of an individual, such as 
the initiation rite that occurs once in a person's lifetime. In this 
context, "once upon a time" signifies a recurring event in terms of 
the social structure of the tribe, but a non-recurring event in 
terms of an individual life-cycle. 
Returning to the model of working memory, ' we can now 
identify a cultural determination in the temporal and sequential 
ordering' performed by the articulatory loop. In so-called 
primitive thinking, verbal rehearsal Is absent, and the event is 
absorbed by the scene. In Genette's narrative discourse, It Is the 
alternation between singulative and Iterative narration that 
distinguishes Proustian from classical narrative, which is marked 
by the' alternation of detailed narration and summary (Genette 
1980, p. 143). In a similar way to primitive thinking, the'iterative 
Involves a'denial of temporal segmentation: 
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"To keep his thoughts fixed on two moments at the same 
time is almost always, for the Proustian creature, to consider 
them identical and to merge them: this strange equation is 
itself the law of the iterative. " 
(Genette 1980, p. 143) 
However, the "law of the iterative" is not only found in primitive 
thinking. According to psychological research into human memory, 
a denial of temporal segmentation is a phenomenon that often 
occurs in the process of remembering "everyday events"; in 
Cohen's summary, "autobiographical memories which involve 
repeated occurrences of similar events become difficult to 
distinguish from each other" (Cohen et al 1986, p. 54). 
Genette characterises Proustian narrative as a "game with 
time" (Genette 1980, p. 155). In Proust's "defiance of all chrono- 
logy", events are connected by spatial proximity, climatic identity, 
or thematic kinship; thus Proust "made clear, more than anyone 
had done before him and better than they had, narrative's 
capacity for temporal autonomy" (Genette 1980, p. 85). We argued 
above that iterative narration is a form of description and can be 
treated as an expansion of the verb "to be"; the iterative therefore 
reflects primitive thinking in its absorption of the event by the 
scene. In addition, the ways In which events are connected in 
Proustian narrative also show a similarity with primitive thought. 
On the one hand, primitive thinking is marked by the 
absence of verbal rehearsal, and the absorption of diachrony by 
synchrony, metonymy by metaphor, sequential by associative 
relations. On the other hand, it is also marked by metonymy as 
well as metaphor in the sphere of associative relations (Levi- 
Strauss' 1972, Frazer 1993, Freud 1985a). This is apparent in 
Frazer's explanation of magic. 
According to Frazer, "if we analyse the principles of thought 
on which magic is based, they will probably be found to resolve 
themselves into two" (Frazer 1993, p. 11). The first principle, 
which Frazer calls the law of similarity, gives rise to homeopathic 
or imitative magic. The principle here is that "like produces like, 
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or that an effect resembles its cause" (Frazer 1993, p. 11). The 
second principle, which Frazer calls the law of contact or 
contagion, gives rise to contagious magic, and the principle here is 
that "things which have once been in contact with each other 
continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical 
contact has been severed" (Frazer 1993, p. 11). Frazer points out 
that the principles which apply to the practice of magic represent 
a kind of primitive logic; this logic, to the magician's way of 
thinking, "regulates the operations of inanimate nature" (Frazer 
1993, p. 11). 
Frazer explains the basis of primitive logic as "two different 
misapplications of the association of ideas" (Frazer 1993, p. 12). 
Imitative magic is founded on the association of ideas by 
similarity, contagious magic on the association of ideas by 
contiguity (Frazer 1993, p. 12). However, Frazer describes the first 
kind of "mistake" as the assumption that "things which resemble 
each other are the same" (Frazer 1993, p. 12), while the second 
type of mistake lies in the assumption that "things which have 
once been in contact with each other are always in contact" 
(Frazer 1993, p. 12). So, according to Frazer's own account, in 
primitive thought it is things or objects that are associated by 
similarity or contiguity, not ideas. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether primitive thinking is 
indeed guilty of the first error of assuming that things which 
resemble each other are the same. According to Levi-Strauss, 
American Indians display an "extreme familiarity with their 
biological environment" which is shown by their comprehensive 
taxonomies, one tribe for example employing a botanical 
vocabulary that approaches two thousand terms (Levi-Strauss 
1972, p. 5). An alternative view of primitive thinking is that things 
which resemble each other have some kind of intimate 
relationship: 
"The 'real question is not whether the touch of a 
woodpecker's beak does In fact cure toothache. It is rather 
whether there Is a point of view from which a woodpecker's 
beak and a man's tooth can be seen as 'going together' (the 
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use of this congruity for therapeutic purpose being only one 
of its possible uses), and whether some initial order can be 
introduced into the universe by means of these groupings. " 
(Levi-Strauss 1972, p. 9) 
In this view of primitive thinking, "things which have once been 
in contact with each other" will also have some kind of intimate 
relationship. 
Freud points out that "the associative theory of magic 
merely explains the paths along which magic proceeds"; as an 
explanation of magic, Frazer's account is inadequate (Freud 1985a, 
p. 141). Saussure's claim that associative relations in language are 
"connexions in the brain" (Saussure 1983, p. 122), Jakobson's 
notion of semantic similarity and contiguity, cognitive research 
into human memory - all these considerations suggest that what 
Frazer calls principles of association are methods that humans 
have adopted for organising perceptual memory, methods that 
apply to humans in general rather than primitive thought in 
particular. The process of remembering physical objects, for 
example, follows the metaphoric path of visual similarities and 
contrasts, or the metonymic path of temporal-spatial contexts. In 
primitive thought, if the event is integrated into a synchronic or 
cyclic view of the world, then spatial contexts or scenes are not 
necessarily ordered on a temporal basis. In this case, metaphoric 
and metonymic paths in perceptual organisation are paths that 
pursue visual and spatial correspondences only. 
Therefore, instead of arguing, as Frazer does, that primitive 
logic is based on the association of ideas by similarity or 
contiguity, we could argue that the reverse is the case: that the 
association of ideas by similarity or contiguity is based on 
primitive logic. To be more precise, given the absence of a clear 
definition of primitive logic, we can at least argue that the 
association of ideas is based on the metaphoric and metonymic 
organisation of perceptual memory. With these observations in 
mind, let's now return to the problems of modelling cognitive 
processes in fiction writing. 
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The third problem was resolved by the consideration that it 
is only the phonemic processing of the inner voice that produces 
writing. From this point of view, it is only the sequential 
responses in Jakobson's experiment that are our concern: that is, 
the responses that produce a verb. The associative responses 
merely serve to illuminate the process of remembering. From the 
same point of view, it would also be a mistake to label 
components of the model as sequential and associative. Our aim is 
to identify thinking processes in fiction writing, such as 
remembering and imagining. As activities, these verbs require 
objects, and the crucial distinction we have made is between 
event and scene. The result is that we have now identified the 
four distinct processes of remembering and imagining events and 
scenes. The specificity of events and scenes is not our concern; the 
how or why of remembering and imagining is the realm of 
associative relations or "connections in the brain", and this will 
depend on the individual writer. 
As syntax is an aspect of sequential relations, we described 
the second problem in terms of a sequential component and the 
need to handle syntax as well as events. This problem is resolved 
firstly by the observation above: that we are more concerned with 
identifying thinking processes rather than what might constitute 
sequential and associative components. Secondly, by rejecting 
Chomsky's dualism in favour of Saussure's view of language, in 
which there is only one object of thought, syntax and events 
become distinct concerns. While ideas are inseparable from 
language, we have referred to the visual aspects of remembering 
and imagining scenes and events in chapter three. In addition, 
events already have some kind of temporal ordering because of 
the sequence in which they are remembered or Imagined. 
However, ' syntax is defined by the full stop In the process of 
writing. 
, 
To remember syntax Is to remember the sequence of 
lexical items that the writer has just read. Imagining syntax Is the 
process, of verbal rehearsal, a process that might Include the 
sequential ordering of lexical Items. This is the activity that 
Cooper and Matsuhashi call sentence planning (Cooper & 
Matsuhashi' 1983), and we concluded the last chapter by 
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observing that this activity generally demands more attention 
when writing argumentative texts. 
The first problem was also described in terms of a 
sequential component, but the relevant question remains the 
same: does the "linearization of content" that is an aspect of 
"cognitive planning" (Passerault & Coquin 1994) apply to fiction 
writing? If that is the case, is the process of remembering events 
a separate activity from ordering them into some kind of 
sequence? This problem is partly resolved by the discussion in the 
last chapter. Chomsky's dualism in the separation of syntax and 
semantics reflects the distinction between form and content. In 
hierarchical models of planning, the first stage is to create content, 
while subsequent stages involve the linearisation of content, the 
arrangement of form, and the consideration of style. Applied to 
fiction writing, this suggests a model in which a writer first 
remembers or imagines the events that will form the content of 
the story. The next stage will be to arrange them into some kind 
of sequence. However, we have already noted that some kind of 
temporal ordering is implicit in the activity of remembering or 
imagining. The question is whether linearisation is an additional 
activity that occupies fiction writers, and to answer this question, 
we have to continue the discussion of magical thought. 
Frazer's tendency to make moral judgements on the 
rectitude of science and the progress of civilisation is perhaps not 
the most sympathetic way of understanding primitive thinking. 
His comparison of magic and science reveals a Victorian concern 
for illegitimate children: 
"The principles of association are excellent in themselves, 
and indeed absolutely essential to the workings of the 
human mind. Legitimately applied' they yield science; 
illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister of 
science. " 
(Frazer 1993, pp. 49-S0) 
On the other hand, Levi-Strauss argues that magic and science are 
equally. legitimate: 
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"One deprives oneself of all means of understanding magical 
thought If one tries to reduce it to a moment or stage in 
technical or scientific evolution... Magical thought is not to be 
regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a sketch, a part of a 
whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well- 
articulated system, and is in this respect independent of that 
other system which constitutes science... It is therefore 
better, Instead of contrasting magic and science, to compare 
them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge. " 
(Levi-Strauss 1972, p. 13) 
Describing the technological achievements that produced the 
Neolithic age, Levi-Strauss points out that these achievements 
"required a genuinely scientific attitude" of observation, experi- 
mentation, and a desire for knowledge for its own sake (Levi- 
Strauss 1972, p. 14). Discussing the paradox that modern science is 
a fairly recent phenomenon, while in some societies science has 
not, progressed beyond the achievements of the Neolithic age, he 
concludes: 
"There is only one solution to the paradox, namely, that 
there are two distinct modes of scientific thought. These are 
certainly not a function of different stages of development 
of the human mind but rather of two strategic levels at 
which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: one roughly 
adapted to that of perception and the imagination: the other 
at a remove from it. " 
(Levi-Strauss 1972, p. 15) 
In-a similar fashion, Frankfort and colleagues have argued that 
what'distinguishes primitive thinking is the inability to withdraw 
from perceptual reality (Frankfort, Frankfort, Wilson & Jacobsen 
1949, p. 24). They argue that it is not the notion of cause and 
effect that is alien to primitive thought, but the Newtonian notion 
of causality: 
"If science... reduces the chaos of perceptions to an order in 
which typical events take place according to universal laws, 
the, instrument of this conversion Is the postulate of 
causality. Primitive thought naturally recognized . the relationship of cause and effect, but it cannot recognize our 
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view of an impersonal, mechanical, and lawlike functioning 
of causality. " 
(Frankfort et al 1949, pp. 23-24) 
According to Frankfort and colleagues, primitive thinking when 
searching for a cause looks for a 'who', not for a 'how': 
"If the rivers refuse to rise, it is not suggested that the lack 
of rainfall on distant mountains adequately explains the 
calamity. When the river does not rise, it has refused to rise. 
The river, or the gods, must be angry with the people who 
depend on the inundation. " 
(Frankfort et al 1949, p. 24) 
Mythologists and anthropologists (Graves 1955, Harrison 
1963, Thomson 1973) generally agree that what characterises 
primitive thought is the animistic attitude that invests nature and 
natural phenomena with a will, a motivation, a personality, or the 
kind of spiritual essence embodied in the Oglala Sioux's notion of 
"Wakan-Tanka " (Black Elk 1971). In a similar fashion to Levi- 
Strauss' characterisation of magical thought as a "well-articulated 
system" (Levi-Strauss 1972, p. 13), Freud describes animism as a 
"system of thought" that "does not merely give an explanation of a 
particular phenomenon, but allows us to grasp the whole universe 
as a single unity from a single point of view" (Freud 1985a, 
p. 134). However, unlike Levi-Strauss, Freud claims that human 
views of the universe have evolved through three stages: an 
animistic or mythological phase, a religious phase, and a scientific 
phase, (Freud 1985a, p. 134). Freud describes magic as the 
"technique" of the animistic mode of thinking (Freud 1985a, 
p. 143), and the principle governing magical thought, the "dynamic 
factor" that Frazer omits from his explanation of magic (Freud 
1985a, p. 141), is what Freud calls the "omnipotence of thoughts" 
(Freud 1985a, p. 143). 
The omnipotence of thoughts is a principle that Freud 
defines in, terms of the duality of mind and, reality; it is an 
overvaluation of thought in relation to the external world (Freud 
1985a,, p. 142). Elsewhere,, Freud refers to the omnipotence of 
thoughts as "an over-estimation of the influence which our mental 
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acts can exercise in altering the external world" (Freud 1985b, 
p. 360). Thus the assumption that underlies the practice of magic is 
the belief that thought can change reality. Freud describes the 
lack of a temporal order in primitive thought as a triumph of the 
will: 
"Since distance is of no importance in thinking - since what 
lies furthest apart in time and space can without difficulty 
be comprehended in a single act of consciousness - so, too, 
the world of magic has a telepathic disregard for spatial 
distance and treats past situations as though they were 
present. " 
(Freud 1985a, p. 143) 
The relevance of this world of magic to artistic creation is noted 
by Freud (Freud 1985a, p. 148). In fiction writing, an implicit 
belief in the omnipotence of thoughts is possibly the "unquantifi- 
able element" (Boylan 1993, p. xi) that drives a writer's imagin- 
ation. In fiction writing, a writer is not tied to the demands of 
argumentation. With the imagination unbound, a writer is free to 
remember past events and imagine different outcomes, to imagine 
oneself in unusual situations or to imagine oneself as someone 
else, or to create past and future worlds, landscapes, and peoples. 
The omnipotence of thoughts, like the imagination, unites the 
mental'life of creative writers with that of children at play (Freud 
1985b, p. 360; Freud 1985c). 
In Freud's discussion of the "uncanny" (Freud 1985d), the 
omnipotence of thoughts is related to a class of events that occur 
in adult life which, according to Freud, revive the animistic beliefs 
repressed since infancy: "an uncanny experience occurs 'either 
when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once 
more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs 
which have been surmounted seem once more to be' confirmed" 
(Freud 1985d, p. 372). Sometimes this -distinction is blurred as 
infantile complexes are tied to primitive beliefs. One example of 
the uncanny is the experience of thinking about someone who one 
has not seen or heard in a long while; this person then appears on 
the street or telephones (Freud 1985d, p. 362; Freud 1975, p. 326). 
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It is as though our thoughts have conjured the person into life. 
Freud observes: 
"It seems as if each one of us has been through a phase of 
individual development corresponding to this animistic 
stage in primitive men, that none of us has passed through it 
without preserving certain residues and traces of it which 
are still capable of manifesting themselves, and that 
everything which strikes us as 'uncanny' fulfils the condition 
of touching those residues of animistic mental activity 
within us and bringing them to expression. " 
(Freud 1985d, p. 363) 
Apart from the uncanny experience, perhaps the most 
frequent type of event to revive animistic mental activity is the 
accidental trip, fall or knock, where physical objects such as chairs 
or doors are credited with malevolent Intentions and are thumped 
or kicked in retribution. In poetic writing, attributing a 
benevolent or malevolent intention to natural phenomena is what 
Ruskin in 1856 called the "pathetic fallacy" (Ruskin 1972). 
According to Ruskin, "all violent feelings have the same effect", 
which is to produce "a falseness in all our impressions of external 
things" (Ruskin 1972, p. 603). Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy" is "caused 
by an excited state of the feelings, making us, for the time, more 
or less irrational" (Ruskin 1972, p. 603). 
While everyday life is riddled with bungled actions, slips of 
the tongue, errors, coincidences, and the forgetting of names and 
intentions (Freud 1975), some have found a remedy to this chaos 
of irrationality in narrative. In a recent essay titled Narrative and 
Chaos, ` Alex Argyros argues that traditional narrative needs to be 
defended from attacks by deconstructionists, radical feminists, 
neo-marxists, and other cultural theorists (Argyros 1992). 
According to Argyros, "one of the chief selective pressures for the 
evolution of the human brain was the challenge to create a 
network öf individual and intersubjective models of the world" 
(Argyros 1992, p. 661). One such model of the world is the 
narrative model: 
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"Narrative is among the most powerful of these maps 
because it allows for the constitution of a representational 
structure whose basic unit is the causal frame: actor-action- 
object. The essential feature of narrative is that it maps the 
world causally. Given the universality of narratival 
structures, both in everyday discourse and in the myths, 
cosmologies and fictions generated by all human cultures, 
we must assume that the world is sufficiently causal to offer 
a species able to represent it in narratival forms a selective 
evolutionary advantage. " 
(Argyros 1992, p. 662) 
With this definition, a narrative is not only a verb that signifies an 
event but one that assumes a cause and produces an effect. 
Narrative is therefore synonymous with causality: "The causal 
operator generates narrative automatically" (Argyros 1992, 
p. 668). However, the logic of this essay leads to a conclusion that 
negates its initial assumption. The thread of the argument is that 
narrative imitates nature (p. 662). Nature is chaotic (p. 665); 
therefore narrative must also be chaotic (p. 667). Consequently, 
narrative cannot be linear (pp. 667-668); in fact, narrative 
structure is a sort of fractal geometry (p. 670). Yet, chaos theory 
raises the question whether the causal frame is indeed the most 
appropriate framework for understanding natural phenomena 
(Gleick 1987). If narrative imitates chaos, we can only, conclude 
that narrative is not equivalent to causality after all. 
_, 
The notion of causality is based on the notion of time as a 
linear sequential order. In his Aspects of the Novel, Forster 
defines the story as a temporal ordering . of events- 
A story Is "a 
narrative of events arranged In their. time sequence - dinner 
coming after breakfast, Tuesday after Monday, decay after death, 
and so on" (Forster 1962, p. 35). In Forster's account, it is causality 
that defines the plot: 
I "A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on 
causality. 'The king died and then the queen died', is a story. 
'The king died, and then the queen died of grief', is a plot. 
-The time-sequence is preserved, but the sense of causality 
overshadows it. " 
(Forster 1962, p. 93) 
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However, while a temporal dimension is essential to the notion of 
cause and effect, a sequential order of events suggests that effects, 
in turn, can also be causes, as Edgar Allan Poe observed. 
In Poe's tales and essays, the notion of cause and effect is a 
recurring concern and a reflection of his interest in science and 
verisimilitude. In his essay on the American drama, Poe compares 
human constructions with the constructions of the divine creator, 
as exemplified by the world of nature. According to Poe, God's 
work is marked by "the complete mutuality of adaptation" (Poe 
1967, p. 457), In which cause and effect are mutually 
interchangeable: 
"... in human constructions, a particular cause has a 
particular effect -a particular purpose brings about a 
particular object; but we see no reciprocity. The effect does 
not re-act upon the cause - the object does not change 
relations with the purpose. In Divine constructions, the 
object is either object or purpose as we choose to regard it, 
while the purpose is either purpose or object; so that we can 
never... decide which is which. " 
(Poe 1967, p. 457) 
This reciprocity of cause and effect which is a feature of the 
natural world is also a feature of the perfect plot. A plot is perfect 
if we are "unable to detach from it or disarrange any single 
incident involved, without destruction to the mass" (Poe 1967, 
p. 457). Poe's notion of the perfect plot therefore takes us back to 
the organic whole. As such perfection has never been achieved, 
Poe describes a more attainable objective by defining a plot as 
excellent "when no one of its component parts shall be susceptible 
of removal without detriment to the whole" (Poe 1967, p. 457). 
The perfect plot moreover, although attainable In theory, is 
unattainable in fact, because it is a human construction. In 
comparison, "the plots of God are perfect"; "the Universe is a plot 
of God" (Poe 1967, p. 458). Poe's notion of the reciprocity of cause 
and effect In nature is similar to the picture of natural phenomena 
presented by chaos theory, a picture that Argyros misrepresents 
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by his emphasis on the causal frame and its equation with 
narrative. 
While Poe's tales show a concern for causality, science, veri- 
similitude, and reason, they also show a concern for pathological 
states of consciousness, for madness and the irrational. However, 
verisimilitude and the irrational are not mutually exclusive 
concerns. Culler discusses five levels of verisimilitude or 
vraisemblance from the point of view of intertextuality; these are 
"five ways in which a text may be brought into contact with and 
defined in relation to another text which helps to make it 
intelligible" (Culler 1975, p. 140). The first is the unwritten 
assumptions that a text makes about the real world (in the context 
of Culler's intertextuality, the real world is also a text), and 
conventional attitudes to human behaviour form part of those 
assumptions. In the rationalistic tradition, humans are guided by 
plans, goals and motivations that are explicit and the result of a 
conscious process of decision making. Human actions can be 
mapped onto the causal frame, and irrational behaviour can be 
explained by referring to Ruskin's "heightened emotional states" 
(Ruskin 1972, p. 603). In Beaugrande and Dressler's rationalistic 
approach to textuality, causal relations illustrate textual coherence 
(Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 4), and in the story grammarians' 
rationalistic approach to stories, semantic structure is represented 
by the causal relations between events. 
Culler's second level of verisimilitude is what he calls 
cultural vraisemblance; this is the "cultural code" in Barthes' 
analysis (Barthes 1990). Cultural conventions include general- 
isations about race or gender. Three further levels of 
vraisemblance are conventions of genre, conventional attitudes to 
fiction (for example, Poe's contrast between narrative as truth and 
fiction as non-truth), and parody or irony. 
From the perspective of fiction writing, all these aspects of 
verisimilitude are part of the cultural traditions that writers both 
inherit and create. In Poe's case, while a tale . such as Eleonore 
questions assumptions about rationality, other conventions of 
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verisimilitude still serve to make the tale comprehensible. In Ian 
Watt's dualistic scenario, fiction writers might emphasise external 
behaviour or internal psychology; in either case, the English novel 
has developed within a realist tradition (Watt 1972, pp. 335-337). 
On the other hand, in his comparison of the post-war English novel 
with its American counterpart, Bernard Bergonzi characterises the 
first as nostalgic and embedded in tradition, while the second is 
apocalyptic and open to experimentation (Bergonzi 1972). Mean- 
while, Christine Brooke-Rose has recently referred to the 
apocalyptic as a variety of "magic realism" or what she, following 
Salman Rushdie, calls "palimpsest history" (Brooke-Rose 1992). 
Rushdie's Satanic Verses begins with the fall to earth of the two 
central characters from an aeroplane, a fall that does not end in 
death but rebirth. Here we have a story that seems to flout the 
laws of verisimilitude from the viewpoint of events in the real 
world, but from the viewpoint of intertextuality (animism in 
myths and fairy stories, the fall of man and the fall of Satan, 
Hinduism and rebirth, the jinn in the Koran and the Arabian 
Nights), there are ways of rendering the story comprehensible, as 
in Poe's case, by referring to other conventions and traditions. 
Yet, whether a writer decides to write a classic realist text, 
an apocalyptic nightmare, or a modern Arabian Nights, a writer's 
thinking will include the four basic processes of remembering and 
imagining events and scenes. Moreover, metaphoric and 
metonymic associations will in any case guide the processes of 
remembering and imagining. In Freud's work on jokes and dreams 
(Freud 1976a, Freud 1976b), unconscious processes are marked 
by certain mechanisms such as condensation, displacement, and 
substitution; these devices can be characterised as metonymic and 
metaphoric devices. Although Freud refers to these devices as a 
specific feature of the unconscious, Todorov has pointed out that 
the operations that Freud Identifies "are simply those of any 
linguistic symbolism, as they have been Inventoried, most notably, 
by the rhetorical tradition" (Todorov 1982b, p. 248). According to 
Todorov, Freud Is describing "the forms of all symbolic processes, 
not those of an unconscious symbolism" (Todorov 1982b, p. 248). 
Lacan's claim that "the unconscious Is structured like a language" 
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is based on the effects of speech (Lacan 1979, p. 149). However, it 
is possible to reach the same conclusion by a different route; that 
is, by referring to Saussure's notion of language on the one hand, 
and Freud's observations on the unconscious on the other. The 
common denominator is the organisation of human memory, and 
this provides another reason why the unconscious is structured 
like a language; in this context, remembering and imagining will 
also be guided by metaphoric and metonymic associations. 
Following this discussion of magical thought, causality and 
verisimilitude, we can now return to the question whether the 
linearisation of events is an additional activity that occupies 
fiction writers. Some kind of temporal ordering is implicit in the 
activity of remembering or imagining. Events from a writer's 
personal experience will have some kind of metonymic 
organisation in episodic memory: "chronological (by time of 
occurrence) or spatial (by place of occurrence)" (Cohen et al 1986, 
p. 47). Stories that a writer has read will also be metonymically 
organised in a writer's story memory. Story memory assists a 
writer's imagination from the point of view of intertextuality, so 
that the process of imagining events will be partly influenced by 
the ordering of events in story memory. 
In addition, notions of causality and verisimilitude are part 
of the cultural traditions that a writer inherits, and some would 
argue that these conceptual concerns are organised in semantic 
memory (Cohen et at 1986, p. 46). The extent to which a writer is 
conscious of those traditions will influence a writer's identification 
with those traditions. A writer may not be wholly aware of the 
conventions that he assumes; on the other hand, she may be 
consciously working against them. Assumptions about causality, 
temporal ordering, human behaviour and. motivation, the 
behaviour of fictional characters, verisimilitude - such 
assumptions will influence how events'and scenes are imagined, 
and how a story is formulated and developed. Conventions of 
causality: might guide a writer's imagining, but in exercising the 
omnipotence of thoughts, fiction writers are not bound to consider 
rational: codes, of behaviour, or rational orderings of events, as 
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Genette's analysis of Proustian narrative makes clear. All these 
considerations do not give much support to the idea that a writer, 
having created the contents of a story in terms of events, then 
carries out a separate process of linearisation, of ordering these 
events into some kind of sequence. 
7.4 FOCUSING THE IMAGINATION 
While it appears that fiction writers do not carry out a separate 
process of linearising events, it appears from Genette's (1980) 
analysis of narrative discourse that they may create the contents 
of a narrative in terms of events, and then ask the separate 
question: "How shall this story be told? ". 
As we mentioned above, Genette makes the distinction 
between story and narrative, so that a story is the signified 
content of the text, while a narrative is the signifier given by the 
narrative text itself (Genette 1980, p. 27). A story is therefore an 
ideal order of events that a reader can infer from the text 
(Genette 1980, p. 35), or that a writer has in mind before the 
process of writing has begun, a notion that becomes evident in 
Genette's discussion of "person": 
"Readers may have noticed that until now we have used the 
terms 'first-person - or third-person - narrative' 'only when 
paired with quotation marks of protest. Indeed, these 
, common 
locutions seem to me inadequate, in that they 
stress variation In the element of the narrative situation 
that is in fact invariant - to wit, the presence (explicit or 
implicit) of the 'person' of the narrator. This presence is 
invariant because the narrator can be in his narrative (like 
every subject of an enunciating in his enunciated statement) 
only in the 'first person' - except for an enallage of 
convention as in Caesar's Commentaries; and, stressing 
, 
'person' leads one to think that the choice the narrator has 
to make -a purely grammatical and rhetorical choice - is 
always of the same order as Caesar's In deciding to write his 
Memoirs 'in' one or another person. In fact, of course, this is 
not the issue. The novelist's choice, unlike the narrator's, is 
not between two grammatical forms, but between two 
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narrative postures (whose grammatical forms are simply an 
automatic consequence): to have the story told by one of its 
'characters', or to have it told by a narrator outside of the 
story. " 
(Genette 1980, pp. 243-244) 
Genette argues that "the presence of first-person verbs in a 
narrative text can therefore refer to two very different situations 
which grammar renders identical but which narrative analysis 
must distinguish" (Genette 1980, p. 244). The first situation is "the 
narrator's own designation of himself as such" (Genette 1980, 
p. 244); for example, the "I" when Virgil writes "I sing of arms and 
the man... ". The second situation is "the identity of person between 
the narrator and one of the characters in the story" (Genette 1980, 
p. 244); for example, the "I" when Crusoe writes "I was born in the 
year 1632, in the city of York... ". According to Genette, the term 
"first-person narrative" refers "only to the second of these 
situations" (Genette 1980, p. 244). 
However, while these two 'T's are not the same, the "I" of 
Virgil's Aeneid is the same kind of "I" who appeals to the muse at 
the beginning of Homer's Iliad, which Lattimore translates as: 
"Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus and its 
devastation... ". Both exemplify Genette's first type of narrative, in 
which the narrator is absent from the story he tells, while 
Robinson Crusoe exemplifies the second type, in which the 
narrator is present as a character in the story he tells (Genette 
1980, ' pp. 244-245). But Homer's Iliad is a story that was handed 
down by oral tradition for generations before it was written down, 
and part of that tradition is that "Homer" was the poet who made 
this particular story famous. While we cannot refer to Isomer as a 
writer; but as a narrator in the oral tradition of story-telling, we 
also know that Defoe, rather than Crusoe, was the author of 
Robinson Crusoe, and that the writing of this particular novel is 
coincident with the development of printing and the growth of a 
"reading public" (Watt 1972). 
These two different "I"'s, therefore, also reflect a difference 
between speech and writing, between oral tradition and the 
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technology of printing. In Genette's ahistorical view of narrative, 
writing is seen as a type of speech, a view that Derrida has called 
"phonocentrism" or the "privileging of voice" (Culler 1983, p. 92). 
According to Genette's narrative discourse, a narrator is someone 
who tells a story, but above all, a narrator is someone who speaks. 
Genette's treatment of a narrative as the expansion of a verb 
allows him to formulate "the problems of analyzing narrative 
discourse according to categories borrowed from the grammar of 
verbs", categories that he reduces to "three basic classes of 
determinations" (Genette 1980, pp. 30-31). The first is "those 
dealing with temporal relations between narrative and story" 
which he arranges under the heading of tense (Genette 1980, 
p. 31); these are the relations of order, duration and frequency 
that we have discussed above. The second is "those dealing with 
modalities (forms and degrees) of narrative 'representation', and 
thus with the mood of the narrative" (Genette 1980, p. 3 1). Finally, 
the third is "those dealing with the way in which the narrating 
itself is implicated in the narrative" (Genette 1980, p. 31). By 
narrating, Genette refers here to "the narrative situation or its 
instance", and the term that he uses to discuss this class of 
determinations is voice (Genette 1980, p. 31). 
Under the heading mood, Genette discusses the notion of 
distance, considering, for example, the amount of detail given by 
the narrator, and the difference between direct and reported 
speech. Under the same heading he also discusses the notion of 
perspective or "point of view". The notion of voice on the other 
hand leads to various considerations which Include person - for 
example, the difference between "first person" and "third person" 
narrative that we have already mentioned. According to Genette, 
past theoretical work on the subject of "point of view" has 
suffered "from a regrettable confusion between what I call here 
mood and voice, a confusion between the question who is the 
character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective? 
and the very different question who is the narrator? - or, more 
simply; the question who sees? and the question who speaks? ' 
(Genette 1980, p. 186). 
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According to Genette, mood and voice have provided the 
basis for various taxonomies of narrative, but these taxonomies 
have presented both mood and voice under the single category of 
"point of view" or perspective. Leaving aside the question of voice, 
he concludes that there is a consensus for a "purely modal" 
typology that consists of three terms: 
"The first term corresponds to what English-language 
criticism calls the narrative with omniscient narrator..., and 
which Todorov symbolizes by the formula Narrator > 
Character (where the narrator knows more than the 
character, or more exactly says more than any of the 
characters knows). In the second term, Narrator = Character 
(the narrator says only what a given character knows); this 
is the narrative with 'point-of-view' after Lubbock... In the 
third term, Narrator<Character (the narrator says less than 
the character knows); this Is the 'objective' or 'behaviourist' 
narrative... To avoid the too specifically visual connotations 
of the terms vision, field, and point of view, I will take up 
here the slightly more abstract term focalization... " 
(Genette 1980, pp. 188-189) 
In Genette's typology, the first term is nonfocalized narrative, or 
narrative with zero focalization (for example, Fielding's Tom 
Jones). The second is narrative with internal focalization , which 
can also be fixed (What Maisie Knew), variable (Lawrence's The 
Rainbow), or multiple (epistolary novels such as Richardson's 
Pamela, or Smollett's Expedition of Humphry Clinker). The third 
type is the narrative with external focalization, "popularized 
between the two world wars by Dashlel Hammett's novels, in 
which the hero performs in front of us without our ever being 
allowed to know his thoughts or feelings" (Genette 1980, p. 190). 
- Can . we use Genette's typology of mood, to ; 
develop our 
hypothesis of cognitive processes in fiction writing? The first 
problem, is that, for Genette, mood and voice are separate issues. 
However, are the concerns of perspective and person separate 
questions for the writer? Let's now return to the notion that, 
having created the contents of a narrative in ; terms of events, a 
writer then asks _the question: 
"How shall this story be told? ". We 
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now encounter two further problems in trying to translate or 
interpret Genette's textual analysis into a hypothesis of fiction 
writing. The first is Genette's phonocentrism, in which a narrator 
is someone who speaks, rather than someone who writes. The 
second is that Genette's "narrator" is given or implied by the 
narrative text, and this narrator is not the same person as the 
author of the text (Genette 1980, p. 213). 
On the one hand, Genette presents the choice of person as a 
decision that faces the novelist: 
"The novelist's choice, unlike the narrator's, is not between 
two grammatical forms, but between two narrative postures 
(whose grammatical forms are simply an automatic 
consequence): to have the story told by one of its 
'characters', or to have It told by a narrator outside of the 
story. " 
(Genette 1980, p. 244) 
In this scenario, the narrator, unlike the novelist, does not have 
any, decision to make; the narrator can only be present in the first 
person. Yet on the other hand, Genette presents a choice of person 
as a decision that faces the narrator. "The real question is whether 
or not the narrator can use the first person to designate one of his 
characters " (Genette 1980, p. 244). If the narrator can only be 
present in the first person, and is given or Implied by the 
narrative text, then this "real question" is one which faces the 
writer, not the narrator. It is the writer who creates "characters", 
including the "I" of the "first-person narrative" who, as Barthes 
has also pointed out, also constitutes a character (Barthes 1990, 
p. 68). ',, - 
For a theory of writing, the implication of Genette's 
distinction between mood and voice is that there is a difference 
between the novelist's relation to her characters (a question of 
mood), and the novelist's relation to her story (a question of 
voice). However, this Implication gives rise to two problems. 
Firstly, -, If-, a writer decides to have a story told by one of its 
characters, then the question of voice immediately becomes a 
question of mood. The second Is the problem that we have already 
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mentioned: that histoire has a prior existence to narration, the 
story to its telling, so that, having a story in mind, the writer now 
asks the question "How shall the story be told? ". 
This question would appear to have more relevance for 
story-tellers in the oral tradition, such as the poets and bards of 
the Middle Ages who might have been expected to recite yet 
another version of King Arthur's European conquests. The 
question is also relevant to writers who decide to produce a re- 
telling of myths or folk-tales from an alternative perspective or in 
a contemporary setting. But for some writers, it is clearly not the 
case that a story has a prior or a separate existence to its writing 
or narrating. The anecdotes of professional fiction writers show 
the extent to which character dominates their thinking, while the 
plot is a marginal concern (Boylan 1993). Deborah Moggach is one 
of the few writers in Boylan's collection of essays who mention 
plot. However, while she remarks that she always starts with the 
outline of a story, she also adds that "once a character gets going 
they push it off in their own direction" (Moggach 1993, p. 135). For 
some . writers then, characters drive the story, and provide a 
further method of organising or linearising events. 
The anecdotes in Boylan's compilation provide a basis for 
arguing that it is through the realisation of character that fiction 
writers exercise the omnipotence of thoughts. While the omni- 
potence of thoughts suggests a triumph of the will in Freud's 
Totem and Taboo (Freud 1985a, p. 143), according to Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra, "willing is creating" (Nietzsche 1969, p. 223). 
We can therefore distinguish a further thinking process in 
fiction writing which we shall call "focusing the imagination", after 
Genette's use of the term "focus" in his typology of perspective. 
Focusing the imagination is the process in which a writer imagines 
he is someone else. The imagination still has to focus "on" 
something, and one way of focusing the imagination is to focus on 
syntax. To focus on syntax, one might imagine how. someone 
speaks, a method of creating "character" that is described by Plato. 
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According to Genette, the question of a narrator's distance 
from his story is first discussed in Plato's Republic, where the 
technique of simple narrative (telling or reporting) is contrasted 
with that of representation (showing or imitating) (Genette 1980, 
p. 162). Plato approaches this subject by referring to the beginning 
of Homer's Iliad, where "the poet is speaking in his own person, 
and does not attempt to persuade us that the speaker is anyone 
but himself" (Plato 393). However, Plato continues, "afterwards he 
speaks in the person of Chryses, and does his best to make us 
think that it is not Homer but an aged priest who is talking". 
According to Plato, when Homer speaks in the person of someone 
else,: "he is imitating as nearly as he can the manner of speech of 
the character concerned". In Desmond Lee's commentary, "direct 
speech... requires the poet or narrator to put himself in the 
position of the character speaking, think his thoughts and feel his 
feelings" (Lee 1955, p. 130). Thus the poet imagines he is someone 
else, and in Lee's characterisation of direct speech, the poet 
becomes an actor. 
- In, fiction writing, characters are created when imagining 
events or scenes that involve people. A character can be imagined 
metaphorically by their appearance, or metonymically by their 
actions or behaviour. In either case, to describe or to narrate in 
this instance is to produce a narrative with zero or external focal- 
ization, in Genette's typology. According to Genette, the difference 
between: these text types is whether the narrator knows more or 
less than the characters In the story. From the point of view of the 
writer, who must always know more than her creations, the 
difference would seem to be that the events and scenes which 
some writers Imagine include the event of writing or the scene of 
the . 
book ' (or the page in the case of Sterne's Tristram Shandy), 
and that these thoughts are incorporated into the story. In Tom 
Jones and Joseph Andrews for example, the omniscient. narrator 
whose voice=is a projection of Fielding or the "implied author" 
(Rimmon-Kenan 1989, p. 8G) reminds his readers that characters 
are the product of his creative powers. In the case of external 
focalization on the other hand, a writer creates a character merely 
by describing someone's behaviour, and does not provide any 
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intrusive commentary; this reporting is an example of Plato's pure 
narrative., 
In the case of epistolary novels such as Pamela and 
Humphry Clinker, where characters are created by their letters, 
the events that a writer imagines also include the act of writing. 
However, these examples also exemplify Genette's multiple 
focalization, where the same events are seen through the eyes of 
different characters. In this case, characters are created not only 
by-their differences in perception, but also by the differences in 
how they write. We can argue, therefore, that they are also the 
result of focusing the imagination on syntax. However, instead of 
the phonocentric question, "If I were someone else, how would I 
speak? ", the question here Is: "If I were someone else, how would 
I write? ". A further example of multiple focalization is Faulkner's 
The Sound and the Fury, where characters are once again created 
by their differences in perception. In this case however, they are 
also created by a further kind of difference, that of "thinking". In 
this context, thought Is speech (Genette 1980, p. 178), and a 
difference in thinking is also represented in writing by a 
difference in syntax. So, a third way of focusing on syntax is given 
by the question: "If I were someone else, how would I think? ". 
It is the description of someone's thoughts that, in Genette's 
typology, distinguishes internal from external focalization, where 
description is limited to behaviour. Like multiple focalization, 
internal focalization must be the result of what we have called 
focusing the imagination, a process in which the writer imagines 
he is someone else, so that events and scenes are seen through the 
eyes of a character. So far, we have only mentioned syntax, and 
the question "How, If I were someone else, would I think, speak, 
or writeT'. But what do characters think, speak, or write about? 
Metaphor and metonymy are relevant here, as one can focus the 
imagination 'by imagining a character's thoughts about the scenes 
in which they are situated, or about the events in which they are 
an active participant; the syntactic question might be avoided 
altogether. 
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However, we have yet to explain how characters may drive 
the plot. Characters need models, and this suggests two possible 
ways in which a writer imagines that "I am someone else". Firstly, 
I can choose myself as a model; secondly, I can choose the other, 
where the other is taken from real or textual worlds. 
For example, I decide to write a semi-autobiographical novel 
based on events from my own life or personal experience. I take 
myself as a model for a character, and "I become someone else" by 
becoming the main character (hero/heroine) in the story or novel 
that I am in the process of writing, whether this story is written 
in the first person (Dickens as David Copperfield, Charlotte Bronte 
as Jane Eyre), or the third person (Dickens as Pip in Great 
Expectations, John Cowper Powys as Wolf Solent in Wolf Solent, DH 
Lawrence as Paul Morel in Sons and Lovers). In writing this novel 
and: in exercising the omnipotence of thoughts, events may not 
produce the same outcome as they produced in real life. I may 
also take t myself as a model and imagine myself in a different 
place or time, in a different occupation, or behaving in a different 
way. 'In either case, "I become someone else" by becoming the 
main character in the story I am writing, and the result is a 
narrative with internal focalization, where the narrative is focused 
on one character. 
t. On the other hand, I might take the other as a model for a 
character, where the other Is a fictional character or someone 
from the real world. I Imagine what life would be like if I were 
that person, how I might think or behave in particular situations, 
what would be my preoccupations, and "I become someone else" 
in'this process. If this activity Is combined with the previous one, 
or if . 
I. take several others as models, the result might be a 
narrative with multiple or variable focalization. 
Yet whether I take the self or the other as a model, this 
process of focusing the imagination by "becoming someone else" 
does not explain what prompts a writer to choose the first or third 
person. Taking the self as a model, I may attempt to observe the 
self as I would the other, so that the "I" becomes a "he" or a "she". 
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Taking the other as a model, I may attempt to absorb the other so 
that the other becomes part of me, and the "she" or the "he" 
becomes an "I". These examples would appear to represent two 
extremes in focusing the imagination or "becoming someone else", 
but we cannot make the equation that these extremes necessarily 
produce a third person narrative in the first case, or a first person 
narrative in the second. 
... e According to Genette, the writer's question is whether to 
have a story told by one of its characters (first-person narrative), 
or to have it told by a narrator who remains outside of the story 
(third-person narrative); an alternative form of this question is 
whether or not the first person can be used to designate a 
character. We have argued that it is not always the case that a 
writer has prior knowledge of the events in a story, and that 
characters can drive the plot by the process we have just 
described. In this case, the second form of Genette's question 
would . seem to be more relevant than the first, although we 
cannot explain how a writer makes a final choice of person. The 
first variant is more appropriate when a writer takes an existing 
story and. decides to write another version by changing the 
perspective or the setting. 
In either case, the choice of person is an aspect of the 
relations. not only between the writer and his story (in Genette's 
phonocentrism, a question of voice) but also between the writer 
and her characters (a question of mood), so that mood cannot be 
separated from voice. Equally in either case, Genette's typology of 
narrative suggests that In order to produce .a narrative with 
internal, multiple or variable focalization, some kind of focusing of 
the. Imagination, Is necessary on the part of the writer. In 
comparison, a narrative with zero or external focalization would 
appear to be the result of simply Imagining events and scenes. 
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we discussed narration and description in fiction 
writing. We began with Saussure's view of linguistics, and his 
view of language as a system of sequential and associative 
relations. We discussed Jakobson's discoveries of similarity and 
contiguity disorders in speech Impairment. and of metaphoric and 
metonymic poles in literature. WC found similarity and contiguity 
disorders in definitions of narrative, including the notion of a 
minimal narrative, and we compared Genette's ideas with those of 
Todorov. We argued that although a narrative can be treated as 
the expansion of a verb, verbs can signify scenes as well as 
events, and we argued that Iterative narration is a form of 
description. 
In cognitive terms, events are verbal representations, while 
scenes are visual representations. We discussed a model of short- 
term memory developed by cognitive psychologists that features 
this distinction, and compared it with Jakobson's observations on 
metaphor and metonymy. In this discussion we identified events, 
scenes, and syntax as distinct objects of thought in fiction writing 
- the objects of remembering and lnmagining. We also referred to 
accounts of magical or primitive thought. and argued that magical 
thought is evident in fiction writing. Fiction writers are not 
obliged to follow rationalistic orderings of events; in fiction 
writing, the imagination is restrained not by reason, but by the 
sequential and associative relations of long-term memory. 
In the final part of the chapter, we discussed Genette's 
analysis of narrative discourse. In his discussion of perspective or 
"point-of-view", Genetic uses the term "focus" to classify narrative 
texts. Using his analysis and the accounts of fiction writers on 
their characters, we Identified the process of focusing the 
imagination In fiction writing. focusing the imagination Is a 
process in which a writer Imagines she Is someone eise, and we 
showed how this process also applies to events, scenes, and 
syn to x 
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In summary, we have now Identified three thinking 
processes In fiction writing: remembering, Imagining, and focusing 
the Imagination. Each of these activities can be applied to events, 
scenes, and syntax. In addition, we have Identified two ways of 
focusing the Imagination, which depend on the model that Is 
chosen for a character. In the case of syntax, the Imagination can 
focus on inner speech (someone's thought), outer speech 
(conversation), or writing. Finally, to account for Genette's notion 
of "narrative levels" (Genette 1980, pp. 227-243), we need to add 
that events Include narrating. story-telling, and writing, while 
scenes Include the text, the book, and the page. In the case of halo 
Calvino's If on a ; %'inter's night a traveler, events Include reading 
and the reader's activity, which we discuss In chapter nine. Firstly 
however, as we suggested that the process of Imagining events 
may be Influenced by the ordering of events in story memory, we 
need to look at story memory In more detail. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
STORY MEMORY 
AND 
THE SYMBOLIC 
}ý 
}' 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we identified some of the basic thinking 
processes in fiction writing as remembering, imagining, and 
focusing the imagination, each of which can be applied to events, 
scenes, and syntax. The notion that events require a separate 
process of linearisation was discounted for two reasons: firstly 
because some kind of ordering is inherent in remembering and 
imagining, and secondly because of the likely influence of the 
ordering of events in story memory. 
In this chapter we look at story memory in more detail. We 
begin by looking at the feats of story tellers in the oral tradition. 
Psychologists researching into story memory argue that story 
tellers, writers and readers have mental schemata for different 
types of story. They have used stories from the oral tradition to 
investigate accuracy when listeners and readers recall stories. We 
discuss their findings and identify two problems with their 
research. The first arises from their use of grammars to represent 
the structure of stories, which leads to the question of how a story 
grammar is related to a story schema. The second is that people 
not only comprehend but also interpret the stories they read or 
hear. We find evidence for this observation in their research, and 
we argue that the function of a story schema is to guide 
interpretation rather than comprehension. 
Research into story memory suggests that "the kind of story 
schema developed from hearing stories from the oral tradition 
may . -be ,a , cognitive universal" 
(Mandler 1982, p. 210). To 
investigate whether this is the case, we discuss the representation 
of stories at different levels of abstraction, referring to Propp's 
Morphology of the Folktale and Aristotle's writings on the plot. We 
find sequential similarities between folktales from different 
cultures, so that there is evidence to support the claim for a 
cognitive universal. We then look for an explanation of why this 
should be the case. One explanation is that the similarities reflect 
a common experience in the human mind - this is the explanation 
given by Jung, Freud, and Levi-Strauss. 
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A second explanation is that sequential similarities reflect a 
common experience in social development. To investigate this 
claim, we digress into a discussion on the social origins of Greek 
tragedy, and its evolution from ancient festivals and mysteries. 
This digression also serves a three-fold purpose. Firstly, it gives us 
a definition of "the plot", and an explanation of why the plot and 
mystery are inseparable. Secondly, it gives us a clue to an 
alternative definition of a story schema, and thirdly, it provides us 
with specific examples that show how story schemata guide 
interpretation. We find sequential similarities between tribal 
initiation rites and folktales, but the evidence that folktales reflect 
a common tribal stage in social development is inconclusive. 
Returning to the discussion of story memory, we argue that 
interpretation has a role in generating new stories. In fiction 
writing, 'interpretation fills a gap between remembering events 
(either from a writer's story memory or from her personal 
experience) and imagining the events of her fictional work. We 
show how story schemata are used in this process. Looking at the 
results of research into story memory, we find evidence of the 
operations noted by Freud in his accounts of the unconscious, and 
we argue that these operations also apply to the process of 
interpretation in the generation of new stories. 
In the course of this chapter we have reason to refer to 
symbolism on several occasions; Todorov (1982a, p. 19) argues 
that symbolism and interpretation are inseparable. We conclude 
by discussing different notions of the symbolic, and we identify 
three different kinds of symbolism in the context of literary texts. 
The first' is a narrative symbolism based on the creation of 
correspondences between events, the second is a poetic 
symbolism based on the use of verbal symbols, and the third is a 
structural symbolism based on antithesis. 
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8.2 THE ORAL TRADITION AND STORY MEMORY 
Ji 
In Plato's Phaedrus, one of the criticisms levelled at the new art of 
writing is its likely effect on the art of memory. In the story 
narrated by Socrates, Thoth brings the invention of writing to 
Ammon in Egypt, but Ammon is not impressed: 
... you, who are the father of writing, have out of fondness for your offspring attributed to it quite the opposite of its 
real function. Those who acquire it will cease to exercise 
their memory and become forgetful; they will rely on 
writing to bring things to their remembrance by external 
signs instead of on their own internal resources. What you 
have discovered is a receipt for recollection, not for 
memory. " 1 
For story tellers in the oral tradition, the art of memory was a 
skill that required many years of training. According to Robert 
Graves, prodigious demands were placed on the memory of the 
Irish ollave or "master-poet": 
,, "The ollave in ancient Ireland had to be master of one hundred and fifty Oghams, or verbal ciphers, which allowed 
him to converse with his fellow-poets over the heads of 
unlearned bystanders; to be able to repeat at a moment's 
notice' any one of three hundred and fifty long traditional 
:.. histories and romances, together with the incidental poems 
they contained, with appropriate harp accompaniment; to 
have memorized an immense number of other, poems of 
different sorts; to be learned in philosophy; to be a doctor of 
'civil law; to understand the history of modern, middle and 
ancient Irish with the derivations and changes of meaning of 
every -word; to be skilled in music, augury, 
divination, 
medicine, mathematics, geography, universal history, astro- 
nomy, rhetoric and foreign languages; and to be able to 
extemporize poetry in fifty or more complicated metres. " 
(Graves 1961, p. 457) 
Graves adds that "among the Maoris of New Zealand where a 
curiously. similar system prevailed, the capacity of the ollave to 
memorize,: ' comprehend, elucidate and 'extemporize staggered 
1 p. 96 in' Walter Hamilton's translation for Penguin (1973). 
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Governor Grey and other early British observers" (Graves 1961, 
p. 457). To recite just one heroic poem as long as Homer's Iliad or 
Odyssey would seem to make a prodigious demand on the 
memory of the story teller. One technique to alleviate these 
demands is the use of formulaic expressions; Finley estimates that 
one third of the Iliad is composed of lines which occur more than 
once in the work (Finley 1972, p. 34). However, the choice of 
expression is determined at the time of the recitation by the 
demands of metre. According to Finley, "the bard composes 
directly before his audience; he does not recite memorized lines" 
(Finley 1972, p. 34). He recounts the following example: 
"In 1934, at the request of Professor Milman Parry, a sixty- 
; year-old Serbian bard who could neither read nor write 
recited for him a poem of the length of the Odyssey, making 
it up as he went along, yet retaining metre and form and 
building up a complicated narrative. The performance took 
two weeks, with a week in between, the bard chanting for 
two hours each morning, and two more in the afternoon. " 
(Finley 1972, pp. 34-35) 
As Finley points out, the bard has at his disposal a stock of myths 
and tales handed down by the oral tradition: "Out of these 
building-blocks the poet constructs his work, and each work - 
each performance, in other words - is a new one, though all the 
elements may be old and well known" (Finley 1972, p. 35). 
How do story tellers who have no recourse to writing 
organise their material in memory? Some psychologists argue that 
familiar events are organised by human memory into schemata 
(Bartlett 193 2). Al researchers have adopted the alternative 
notion" of frames (Minsky 1977) or scripts (Schank & Abelson 
1977). According to the explanation of Cohen and colleagues: 
,'' "The*use of past experience to deal with new experience is it fundamental feature of the way the human -mind works. 
According to schema theory the knowledge we have stored 
in memory is organized as a set of schemas or mental rep- 
resentations, each of which incorporates all the knowledge 
of a'given type of object or event that we have acquired 
from past experience. Schemas operate in a; top-down 
284 
direction to help us interpret the bottom-up flow of 
information from the world. " 
(Cohen, Eysenck & LeVoi 1986, p. 26) 
The aim of research into story memory is to investigate story 
schemata. Mandler also describes "one of the tenets of schema 
theory" as the notion that "schemata consist of expectations built 
up from experiencing regularities in the environment" (Mandler 
1982, p. 207). Describing one such regularity as "the structure of 
traditional stories, such as folktales, fables and myths", she 
continues: "It is assumed that people incorporate knowledge about 
the typical structures of traditional stories through listening to 
and reading them" (Mandler 1982, p. 207). It is stories from the 
oral tradition that Mandler and Johnson use to investigate story 
schemata. They explain this choice as follows: 
"In attempting to uncover the details of story schemata, 
folktales, fables and myths can be used to great advantage. 
Such stories, which stem from an oral tradition, have very 
similar and unusually clear structural characteristics 
compared to many other types of prose. The reasons seem 
obvious. If a story is not written down, but is preserved 
only through retelling, it must respect the limitations on 
'memory. We assume that an orally transmitted story will 
survive only if it conforms to an ideal schema in the first 
place or has gradually attained such a structure through 
., repeated retellings. Thus, the structure of a folkstory must be one which has been influenced by, what people can 
remember. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 113) 
Schema . researchers have represented story structure by story 
grammars (Rumelhart 1975, Thorndyke 1977, Mandler & Johnson 
1977, Mandler 1978, Johnson Mandler 1980). Mandler explains 
that "a ' story grammar is a formal rule system used to describe 
regularities in the structure of stories", whereas "a story schema is 
a kind of mental structure and processing mechanism" (Mandler 
1982, p. 207). 
Recent research into story memory seems to have received 
its initial impetus from Propp's Morphology of the Folktale, first 
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published in Russian in 1928 but not translated into English until 
1958. In his introduction to the second edition of that work, Alan 
Dundes outlines a research agenda which includes the implication 
of. Propp's work for "studies of thinking and learning processes", 
particularly the acquisition of fairy tale structures in children 
(Dundes 1968, p. xv). Colby, who describes the development of a 
grammar for Eskimo folk tales, and Rumelhart, who describes a 
generalised schema for stories, both acknowledge Propp's 
influence (Colby 1973, Rumelhart 1975). Thorndyke develops 
Rumelhart's schema into a grammar which he uses to investigate 
story comprehension and recall (Thorndyke 1977). He finds that 
structural similarities assist remembering, and that high-level 
structures in the grammar are more memorable. Mandler and 
Johnson also develop Rumelhart's schema, and describe a 
grammar that represents "the ideal structure of simple stories" 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 132). 
Both Thorndyke's story grammar and that of Mandler and 
Johnson are influenced by Chomsky's work in linguistics, as we 
showed in chapter six. In Mandler and Johnson's grammar, a story 
can be re-written as a setting plus an event structure. An event 
structure can be re-written as a sequence of connected episodes. 
An episode consists of a beginning, a development, and an ending, 
with, causal connections. A development can be re-written as a 
simple reaction which causes an action, or as a complex reaction 
which causes a goal path. A goal path can be re-written as an 
attempt which causes an outcome, or recursively as a , further goal 
path. The basic unit or node of the grammar is the event; events 
are connected by simultaneity (the and connector), by temporal 
order, (the, then connector), or by causal sequence (the cause 
connector). The surface structure of the story (its sentences) may 
require transformational rules in order to construct the canonical 
sequence "defined by the grammar (Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
pp. 129-132). In further research, Mandler and Johnson develop 
their grammar as a transformational grammar, and adapt 
Chomsky's methods to evaluate story grammars (Johnson & 
Mandler 1980). 11, ý11. I- 11 1 
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- Mandler and Johnson claim their long-term goal is "to be 
able to predict precisely what people will and will not remember 
from connected discourse" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 148). They 
use their grammar as a basis for making four sets of predictions 
about the remembering of stories. These concern the extent of 
recall, the recall of particular constituents, likely inversions of 
sequence, and likely additions and distortions. The first prediction 
is that "the more a story conforms to an ideal structure, the better 
recall will be" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 132). Evidence that 
confirms this prediction can be found in Thorndyke's research 
(Thorndyke 1977). He investigates the recall of different versions 
of, the, same story, and finds that the canonical version is more 
memorable than the jumbled version. 
The second prediction is that the basic units defined by the 
grammar will be better recalled than elaborations, such as 
descriptive adjectives, and optional deletions; that is, units that 
can be deleted from a story without violating the canonical 
sequence. In addition, Mandler and Johnson predict that "causally 
connected episodes will be better recalled than temporally 
connected episodes" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 133). These 
predictions are generally confirmed by the results of an empirical 
investigation, in which Mandler and Johnson compare children's 
recall abilities with those of adults. For example, "descriptive 
adjectives were poorly recalled" by adults and children (handler 
& Johnson 1977, p. 145). Units called reactions in the grammar 
were also poorly recalled, particularly in the case of children, who 
tend to recall "the outcomes of action sequences rather than the 
actions, themselves or the internal events motivating them" 
(Mandler &, Johnson 1977, p. 145). An unexpected result is that 
settings and beginnings were better recalled than endings, by 
both experimental groups, children and adults (Mandler & 
Johnson 1977, p. 145). 
The'lthird set of predictions concerns sequential re- 
orderings. While "a story with an ideal structure will produce few 
if any inversions in the order of recall", the likelihood of inversion 
increases the more the story departs from the ideal structure 
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(Mandler & Johnson 1977, pp. 133-134). In addition, the inversion 
of -phrases within episodes will be more frequent than the 
inversion of episodes themselves (Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
p. 134). These predictions are also confirmed by experiment, 
where results support "the hypothesis that well-structured stories 
produce well-ordered recall" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 146). 
The most frequent inversion was the re-ordering of events into a 
causal -sequence (handler & Johnson 1977, p. 147). In further 
research, Mandler investigates the recall of a story with two 
episodes, in which the events of one episode are interwoven with 
the events of the other (Mandler 1978). Adults and children find 
this interwoven structure difficult to recall, and tend to reproduce 
each episode as separate sequences (Mandler 1978, p. 33). When 
younger children were asked to reproduce an interwoven 
structure, they were "essentially unable to recall the stories in any 
other. than their canonical form" (Mandler & DeForest 1979, 
p. 886). 
The fourth set of predictions concerns additions and 
distortions. Mandler and Johnson predict that the additions of new 
material will supply canonical units missing from the story, while 
distortions will occur when the story violates the ideal structure 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 134). Their empirical evidence does 
indicate the addition of new material, but less than one third 
consists of units omitted from the story (Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
p. 148)' To account for the range of additions, Mandler and Johnson 
adopt three categories (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 147). The first 
consists of adjectival expressions added for rhetorical. emphasis. 
The repetition of phrases for a similar purpose is also included in 
this category. The second consists of reasonable elaborations; here 
the purpose is to explain events or supply reactions missing from 
the story. The third consists of irrelevant elaborations and 
inaccuracies. According to Mandler and Johnson, children are more 
likely to produce "irrelevant" or "fanciful" additions (Mandler & 
Johnson 1977, p. 148). 
In I further research, Mandler distinguishes between 
"reasonable additions" and "distortions" (handler 1978, pp 23-24). 
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The first consists of redundancies, reasonable presuppositions, and 
exaggerations, while the second consists of repetitions, irrelevant 
elaborations, the substitution of irrelevant or incorrect material, 
and character and event confusions. The last sort of distortion was 
frequently found in the experiment using a two-episode story 
with an interwoven structure. In the case of character confusion, 
"the, two-episode structure of a story was kept relatively intact, 
but a single character became the common protagonist of the two 
episodes" (Mandler 1978, p. 33). In the case of event confusion, a 
single episode is created out of material taken from both episodes. 
Empirical research into the recall of stories has therefore 
tended. to confirm the four sets of predictions. However, this 
research has set out to investigate human abilities to reproduce an 
accurate version of a story. What do the results tell us about story 
schemata and the organisation of story memory? How do story 
tellers and fiction writers use their story memory to generate new 
stories? 6, 
To' answer these questions, we face an initial problem 
concerning the relation between a story schema and a story 
grammar. In her summary of recent research on story grammars, 
Handler makes a clear distinction between a schema and a 
grammar, as we saw above (Mandler 1982). In the literature 
however, sometimes this distinction becomes blurred, and 
sometimes the two are viewed as equivalent. According to 
Thorndyke for example, a story grammar constitutes a framework 
or schema (Thorndyke 1977, p. 78). He describes a story grammar 
as "a stereotypical narrative framework" which "can be modified 
to fit the characteristics for a particular story by specifying how 
the- details detäils of the story map onto the abstract rules and 
relationships" (Thorndyke 1977, p. 83). Following Minskys notion 
of "frames" as a way of representing knowledge (Minsky '1975), 
Thorndyke explains that his grammar describes, the specific 
knowledge domain of stories: 
"The ' domain of stories... may be ` co'nceptuälized as 
comprising a "frame" that encodes the invariant structure 
1 common to all exemplars of the domain. The components of 
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the frame, the abstract story elements, are "slots" that 
become instantiated according to the grammar with the 
specific details or content of the particular story in 
question. " 
(Thorndyke 1977, p. 83) 
Thorndyke assumes "a hierarchical organisational framework of 
stories in memory, determined by the grammar" (Thorndyke 
1977, 'p. 77). In this account, a schema, a framework, and a frame 
are all `equivalent terms, and a story schema is determined by a 
story grammar. 
In the work of Mandler and Johnson however, the relation 
between a story grammar and a story schema is an ambiguous 
one. On the one hand, a story schema is defined as a mental 
representation: 
"We use the term "story schema" to refer to an idealized 
-internal representation of the parts of a typical story and 
the relationships among those parts. It is claimed that 
people use this type of representation of stories to guide 
comprehension during encoding and as a retrieval 
mechanism during recall. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 111) 
On the other hand, a story schema is a set of expectations: 
"We will use the term "story schema" to refer to a set of 
expectations about the internal structure of stories which 
serves to facilitate both encoding and retrieval. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 112) 
According to these definitions, a story schema is both a mental 
. representation of an ideal structure, and a set of expectations 
about structure. However, Mandler and Johnson also claim that 
their grammar describes "an ideal structure of simple stories", and 
erpress the belief that "people use story schemata, based on such 
structures, to guide encoding and retrieval processes" (handler & 
Johnson 1977, p. 132). If a story schema is a mental representation 
of an ideal structure, and is based on an ideal structure described 
by the grammar, then does the grammar not describe a schema? 
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Whereas Thorndyke's grammar determines a story schema, the 
relation between Mandler and Johnson's grammar and a schema is 
not defined in such explicit terms. 
.... This ambiguity becomes more evident when the grammar is 
used to explain comprehension rather than recall. Mandler and 
Johnson point out that "although the schemata used to encode a 
story and to retrieve it are related, we do not assume that they 
are identical" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 112). Comparing the 
process of encoding with that of retrieval, they claim that memory 
is more flexible in the former process rather than the latter 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 149). Mandler also makes the 
distinction between the use of a story schema for encoding, and 
the., -use for retrieval (Mandler 1978, pp. 15-19). However, the 
same grammar is used to explain how a schema for traditional 
stories influences both types of processing, listening and 
remembering. The same grammar also serves to represent an 
ideal structure. It therefore appears that in this case, there is only 
one kind of schema, and that this schema is represented by the 
grammar. 
This raises the question of how such a schema or grammar is 
constructed in the first place. Story grammars and schemata guide 
reading and listening in a "top-down" fashion. In Thorndyke's 
account, comprehension is a top-down process of activating a 
frame or schema, represented by the grammar, and filling in the 
slots, of the frame with the incoming information (Thorndyke 
1977). Mandler explains the use of a schema for encoding in a 
similar fashion, pointing out that "the set of grammatical rules 
which" specify whether or not a story is well formed is intended to 
represent, expectations which a listener has incorporated in the 
form of a cognitive schema" (Mandler 1978, p. 15). She explains 
that a', schema for traditional stories becomes activated by 
linguistic cues such as "Once upon a time" (Mandler 1978, p. 15). 
According to Johnson and Mandler, it is the regularity of structure 
in traditional, stories that strengthens expectations and results in 
top-down processing (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 52). Mandler 
argues that the use of a schema in comprehension is indicated by 
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a slowing down in the speed of reading at episode boundaries 
(Mandler 1982, pp. 211-213). 
However, Johnson and Mandler argue that in comparison 
with traditional stories, printed texts "are not subject to the same 
limitations in form", so that reading is more of a constructive or 
"bottom-up" process (Johnson & Mandler 1980, pp. 52-53). 
Responding to the criticism that story grammars provide a purely 
top-down account of reading and comprehension, Mandler 
comments that "a story schema does not need to work on the basis 
of, expectations that force incoming material into a particular 
mold"; (Mandler 1982, p. 213). As an alternative explanation of 
how schemata influence reading, she suggests that "a schema can 
be. useful as a hypothesis-forming mechanism" (Mandler 1982, 
p. 213). Elsewhere, she suggests that readers may draw on a 
multitude of schemata to make inferences when reading, and may 
change their schemata as a story proceeds (Mandler 1978, p. 15). 
From this point of view, reading is neither a strictly top-down nor 
strictly bottom-up process, but rather one of textual interaction in 
which the two kinds of processing are interrelated. The notion of 
reading as a kind of hypothesis testing is one that we return to in 
the next chapter. 
In the case of traditional stories, Mandler and Johnson offer 
the explanation that a story schema is partly the result of bottom- 
up processing in reading development, and partly the result of 
developing a more general knowledge of the world: 
"People construct story schemata from two sources. One 
source comes from listening to many stories and consists of 
knowledge about the sequencing of events in stories, 
including how they typically begin and end. The other 
source comes from experience and includes knowledge 
about causal relations and various kinds of action sequences. 
However, the units which eventually form a story schema 
either condense or ignore many . aspects of 
logical and 
" experiential knowledge about the world. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 112) 
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However, other schema theorists would argue that "logical and 
experiential knowledge" is not as unessential to story under- 
standing as Mandler and Johnson claim. Thorndyke and Yekovich 
characterise formulations of schema theory by the influence of 
"the class of memory processes under consideration" (Thorndyke 
& Yekovich 1980, p. 26). From this perspective, one formulation, 
exemplified by frames and scripts, is concerned with "input 
processes" and the use of schemata to guide encoding. The second, 
exemplified by story grammars, is concerned with "output 
processes" and the use of schemata to guide retrieval. However, 
story grammars have also been used to explain input processes, as 
we have seen, while Thorndyke refers to a grammar as a frame 
and uses his grammar to explain output processes (Thorndyke 
1977). 
, The difference between story grammars on the one hand 
and frames and scripts on the other does not concern input and 
output processes, but the domain of representations. Al theorists 
claim that frames and scripts represent general knowledge 
(Minsky 1975, Schank & Abelson 1977), while story grammarians 
claim that their grammars represent story structure. Al theorists 
also argue that story understanding requires a general knowledge 
of causal relations, temporal ordering, and human psychology and 
behaviour, (Black & Wilensky 1979, Black & Bower 1980, Black et 
al. 1982).. This knowledge can be represented by frames and 
scripts, 'and AI researchers argue that comprehension does not 
require additional story schemata. In their rationalistic view of 
human behaviour and understanding, fictional characters pursue 
the same well-formed plans and goals as real humans (Black & 
Bower 1980). 
However, the sort of general knowledge that Al researchers 
represent by frames and scripts is not a cultural invariant, as was 
pointed out in the last chapter. In the myths, legends and folktales 
of non-literate societies, characters do not behave according to 
these rationalistic models. Psychological motivation is frequently 
absent; and causality does not necessarily- operate according to a 
Newtonian model. While Mandler and Johnson's grammar tries to 
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capture the structural similarities of traditional tales, the strange 
experiences which they contain are such that others have sought 
to interpret their meaning and explain their perpetual popularity 
with children (Bettelheim 1978). 
Following Chomsky's rationalistic methods, Mandler and 
Johnson develop a grammar to describe a sequence of events in 
which motives and logical relations are often absent. This task is 
not without its difficulties. On the one hand, they claim that the 
units that form a story schema ignore much of the experiential 
knowledge that Al theorists argue is more influential in under- 
standing. On the other hand, the grammar clearly specifies causal 
connections between units, a feature that AI theorists would 
argue belongs to a general knowledge of events rather than a 
specific knowledge of folktales. Yet having specified causal conn- 
ections in the grammar, Mandler and Johnson then acknowledge 
that they may be absent from traditional tales, and are inferred 
by-the listener. "a canonical story need not specify causal conn- 
ections between nodes in the surface structure; these are 
automatically supplied by the listener" (Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
p. 131). This acknowledgement suggests that the grammar not only 
represents story structure, but also reflects the interpretative 
strategies of listeners and readers. Moreover, while Mandler and 
Johnson incorporate causal links into their story schema, this 
acknowledgement supports the argument that listeners also use 
experiential schemata to comprehend stories. 
However, so far in this discussion we have. not made a 
distinction between comprehension and interpretation. In his 
discussion of symbolism and interpretation, Todorov claims that 
the decision to interpret is triggered by the gap between two 
meanings; in the case of patristic exegesis, the gap between the 
literal meaning of the biblical text, and the spiritual meaning as 
determined by Christian doctrine (Todorov 1982a, p. 98). Thus 
interpretation "is nothing other than the course which allows us, to 
relate, and thus to identify, the one with the other, by means of a 
series -of equivalences" (Todorov 1982a, p. 98). Strictly speaking 
then, comprehension refers to the process of understanding . the 
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literal meaning of the text in question. Interpretation, on the other 
hand, refers to the process of finding correspondences between 
the text in question on the one hand, and a set of expectations 
about the text on the other. Such expectations may stem from 
other texts, or from worldly experience, and constitute what 
psychologists define as schemata. 
.i. 
Y 
Given these definitions, the function of a schema is to guide 
interpretation rather than comprehension. For comprehension it is 
linguistic knowledge, rather than experiential schemata, which 
suffices., Al researchers would argue that linguistic knowledge 
also constitutes a schema, but they do not distinguish between 
knowledge, as represented by frames or scripts, and expectations 
which are based on knowledge. On the other hand, Mandler and 
Johnson's experiments show firstly that reading and listening are 
processes that involve both comprehension and interpretation. 
Secondly, they show that interpretation is influenced not only by 
story schemata, but also by schemata that are derived from 
worldly experience. Thirdly, they show that how stories are 
interpreted influences how those stories are remembered. 
More evidence that confirms these proposals is provided by 
the remembering of "reactions". The grammar is the basis for 
predicting ,. that "simple reactions and goals" will tend to be 
forgotten, as their omission does not violate the canonical 
sequence described by the grammar (handler & Johnson 1977, 
p. 130). Yet the results of the empirical investigation show that 
simple. reactions were not forgotten to the predicted extent 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 145). Moreover, the additions of new 
material include elaborations that provide reactions where these 
are omitted from the story, additions that were predicted on the 
grounds that their omission does violate the canonical sequence. 
In this context, Mandler and Johnson point out that: -- 
"... if the underlying reaction or goal is ambiguous or counter 
to our, expectations about the world, its omission would lead 
to a violation. It is this kind of omission which makes a well- 
formed story from one culture appear ill-formed I to another. 
A' goal path may be clearly motivated for one audience 
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whether the goal is stated or not because it fits a cultural 
stereotype; that same goal path may be utterly mysterious 
to another group without specific statement of the 
underlying goal. " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 130) 
In a 'similar fashion, Mandler and Johnson acknowledge that 
characters in traditional tales sometimes appear to lack any 
motive for their behaviour, but claim that this is because their 
motive is not relevant to the story: 
"Characters sometimes respond in a relatively planless way, 
especially when the simple reaction consists of an emotion. 
In this case, the protagonist simply engages in an action 
rather than in an attempt to reach a goal. This is not to say 
that the behavior of the protagonist is unmotivated, but 
merely that his or her goal is irrelevant to the story line. We 
:. r -assume that all behavior in stories is motivated... " 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 120) 
The. results of the empirical investigation show that in 
remembering, listeners were also supplying psychological 
motivation. where this was lacking in the story, and trying to 
understand traditional tales in the light of a broader semantic 
knowledge of the world. Once again therefore, our "expectations 
about the world" play a role in interpreting and remembering 
stories, so story schemata are not the only schemata that influence 
these processes. 
Mandler and Johnson try to resolve this problem by 
incorporating interpretative strategies into the grammar, so that 
the grammar represents an "ideal" story, a story that readers or 
listeners have never read or heard. It is the "idealized form of a 
story"; which they attempt to capture (Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
p. 150), and it is this ideal form that listeners remember: "recall 
will be, in part, a function of... the extent to which the story 
matches an ideal schema" (handler & Johnson 1977, p. 113). 
However, : they also claim that the relevance of, this ideal story is 
not confined to a specific cultural group of Western Europeans, but 
has a universal application. 
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According to Johnson and Mandler, the problem of cultural 
specificity is one that causes difficulties in developing a 
transformational grammar of stories (Johnson & Mandler 1980). 
They discuss how to evaluate such a grammar by using a version 
of Chomsky's criteria of observational and descriptive adequacy 
(Chomsky 1965). In this context, one problem is whether the 
'. 'well-formed story" is a cultural invariant: 
"A further complication arises when one encounters a story 
whose structure is not straightforwardly related to the 
current rules of one's grammar. Is the story well-formed 
and the grammar inadequate, or vice versa? " 
(Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 79) 
As a specific example, they discuss the question whether a 
grammar that characterises the structure of European folktales 
can also characterise that of American Indian stories. Researchers 
have found that Europeans have difficulties in remembering the 
latter, and suggest that difficulties in comprehension arise partly 
from the absence of causal or temporal connections between 
episodes (Kintsch & Greene 1978). However, Johnson and Mandler 
dispute the absence of temporal ordering and argue that 
American Indian stories are not recorded accurately by Western 
observers. 'In addition, they argue that "differences in cultural 
conventions can obscure causal connections when one attempts to 
transport a story from one culture to another" (Johnson & Mandler 
1980, p. 80). The arguments that were applied above to the 
apparent strangeness of European folktales is applied here to 
American Indian stories. Johnson and Mandler point out that 
"motivations that are apparent to one cultural group may not be 
apparent to another", and similarly, that because causal 
connectiöns are not apparent, "it does not mean that causal 
connections did not exist in the story as understood in the original 
culture" (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 80). 
In'short, Johnson and Mandler argue that their'grammar is 
an'. adequate characterisation of structures in both European 
folktales and American Indian stories. As further evidence for this 
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claim, they cite a cross-cultural study which compared the 
performance of Liberians with that of Americans in remembering 
the. same European folktales, which found "few differences in 
memory" between the two groups (Johnson & Ivlandler 1980, 
p. 80). They conclude that "some types of story formats are 
universal" (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 80). In Mandler's 
summary of story grammar research, the same evidence provides 
an argument that the schema itself has universal application: 
"Groups of Liberian subjects ranging in age from six to fifty, 
schooled and unschooled, literate and nonliterate, all 
produced the same patterns of recall as did American 
university subjects hearing the same stories. 
On the basis of these data we suggested that the kind of 
story schema developed from hearing stories from the oral 
tradition may be a cognitive universal. " 
(Mandler 1982, p. 210) 
If some story structures are universal structures, and the schema 
of, the ideal story a cognitive universal, then the grammar that 
captures the ideal story must be construed as some kind of 
universal grammar. However, the grammar not only reflects story 
structure but also the interpretative strategies of European 
listeners, the strategies that create ideal versions of a story. Can 
such a grammar be construed as a universal grammar, and a 
schema- of the ideal story as a cognitive universal? Are the 
structures of traditional tales universal structures? 
., 
8.3 THE UNIVERSAL STORY 
To answer these questions, we need to look firstly at the tales 
themselves.. This was the task that Propp set out to achieve in his 
Morphology, of the Folktale, in which he analyses a corpus of 
Russian folktales and formalises their structural similarities 
(Propp. 1968). In summary, these similarities are twofold. Firstly, 
the tales-contain a similar set of characters, or rather protagonists 
who play similar roles in the tales: the, hero, the villain,. the 
princess, the helper, the donor or provider, the dispatcher, and the 
false hero. Secondly, the tales contain a similar sequence of 
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events, which Propp segments into thirty-one units. The units are 
defined according to the functions of the protagonists. The results 
of this syntagmatic analysis is summarised in Figure 11. 
Colby develops a grammar of Eskimo folktales by a similar 
syntagmatic analysis, but segments a sequence of events into 
"eidons" rather than functions. According to Colby, "eidons are 
classes of narrative actions of the same type as Propp's thirty-one 
Russian fairy tale functions, except that eidons are additionally 
defined in terms of sequencing rules and higher level categories" 
(Colby 1973, p. 645); in other words, sequential units of the tales 
are defined according to grammatical functions rather than 
functions of character. Some eidons are similar to Propp's units, 
but most are distinct, and Colby argues that "the set of Eskimo 
eidons are culture specific, not universal" (Colby 1973, p. 646). 
According to Colby, "with minor regional variations, the narrative 
elements and rules resulting from this analysis appear to apply to 
the folktales of all Eskimo, but not to the folktales of neighbouring 
peoples" (Colby 1973, p. 645). 
However, most eidons are distinct from Propp's functions 
because of this cultural specificity. For example, one eidon is 
defined as: "The protagonist asks a herdsman to lasso his reindeer 
wife" (Colby 1973, p. 648). Colby admits that "some eldon varieties 
are more specific than others because only one or two examples 
occurred in the stories analyzed" (Colby 1973, p. 646). -In addition, 
Colby's purpose is not only to analyse a sequence of events, but to 
construct a hierarchical grammar, including a set of rules that 
show how the basic units (eidons) are to be selected, combined, 
and placed in the hierarchy. According to Colby, if one used a 
transformational grammar to analyse Russian folktales, the 
resulting tree structure would be quite different to one that 
represents Eskimo folktales (Colby 1973, p. 661). 
Conversely, if one used Propp's methods to analyse Eskimo 
folktales, the results would probably indicate structural 
similarities between the folktales of the two countries. Colby's 
analysis indicates the presence of similar protagonists (hero, 
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0. Initial situation 
1. One of the members of the family is absent from the home 
2. An interdiction is addressed to the hero 
3. The interdiction is violated 
4. The villain makes an attempt at reconnaissance 
5. The villain receives information about his or her victim 
6. The villain attempts to deceive his victim in order to take 
possession of his or her belongings 
7. The victim submits to deception and thereby unwittingly helps his 
enemy 
, 8. The villain causes harm or injury to a member of the family 
8a. One member of the family lacks something or desires to have 
something2 
9. The misfortune or lack is made known; the hero is approached with 
a request or command; is allowed to go or dispatched 
10. The seeker hero agrees to or decides upon counteraction 
11. The hero leaves home 
-------------------------------- 
12. The hero is tested, interrogated, or attacked, which prepares the 
way for receiving a magical agent or helper 
13. The hero reacts to the actions of a future donor 
14. The hero acquires the use of a magical agent 
15. The hero is transported, delivered or led to the whereabouts of the 
object of the search 
16. The hero and the villain join in direct combat3 
17. The hero is branded 
18. The villain is defeated 
19. The initial misfortune or lack is liquidated 
20. The hero returns 
---------------------------- 
2 1. The hero is pursued 
22. The hero is rescued from pursuit 
23. The hero, unrecognised, arrives home or in another country 
24. The false hero presents unfounded claims 
.:. , 25. A difficult task is proposed to the hero 26. The task is resolved 
27. The hero is recognised 
28. The false hero or villain is exposed 
29. The hero is given a new appearance 
30. The villain is punished 
31. The hero is married and ascends the throne 
FIGURE 11: PROPP'S MORPHOLOGY OF TI IF FOLKTALF 
2 Element 8 or 8a is an obligatory element. 
3 The pair of elements 16 & 18 and the pair 25 & 26 are mutually exclusive. 
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villain, helper, donor) and although only a few eidons are similar 
to Propp's functions, they turn out to be key elements in the 
Proppian sequence (the lack, an act of villainy, a departure, a 
contest, a victory, the return of the hero, with, sometimes, a 
marriage as the conclusion). If one defines sequential units in the 
culturally specific manner of Colby, then these similarities 
disappear. Stories can be represented at different levels of 
abstraction, and the perception of structural similarities is partly 
dependent on the level that is used to compare them (Gick & 
Holyoak 1980). 
According to van Dijk, the development of a story grammar 
requires a level of abstraction that Propp's analysis fails to 
provide: 
"It should be noted -a point often overlooked by literary 
theorists - that Propp's functions are not proper narrative 
categories, but rather fixed 'themes' characterizing the 
specific content of simple narratives like folktales. Only 
sufficient abstraction from these functions allows the 
establishment of more general narrative categories (e. g. 
'initial state of balance', 'disruption' ... 're-establishment of 
the state of balance')... " 
(van Dijk 1980, p. 8) 
The story grammarians acknowledge Propp's influence on their 
work while seeking to develop this general grammar. For example, 
Rumelhart comments that his approach is "designed to be a 
systematization of Propp's analysis", and that the rules of his 
grammar "are designed to capture the relationships among the 
structures developed by Propp" (Rumelhart 1975, p. 235). In this 
process of abstraction, Rumelhart, Thorndyke, and Mandler and 
Johnson all agree on a basic rule, a rule that is also suggested by 
van Dijk'and Todorov. In Mandler and Johnson's formulation, an 
episode has a beginning, a development,, and an outcome. In 
Thorndyke's grammar, an episode also has, three, units: an initial 
state that describes a goal, an attempt, to attain the goal, and an 
outcome (Thorndyke 1977, p. 79). In Rtimelhart's schema, an event 
structure involves a change of state (Rumelhart 1975, pp. 214- 
215). In Todorov's formulation of narrative episodes, a minimal 
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narrative also involves two states and a transformation or 
movement from one to the other. 
If the highest level of abstraction is number, then there 
appears to be a general consensus that at this level, a narrative is 
a sequence of events with three distinct phases, a formulation that 
seems to derive from Aristotle. Discussing the scope of the plot in 
Greek tragedy, he comments: 
"I have already laid down that tragedy is the representation 
of an action that is complete and whole and of a certain 
amplitude - for a thing may be whole and yet lack 
amplitude. Now a whole is that which has a beginning, a 
middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not 
necessarily come after something else, although something 
else exists or comes about after it. An end, on the contrary, 
is that which naturally follows something else either as a 
necessary or as a usual consequence, and is not itself 
followed by anything. A middle is that which follows 
something else, and is itself followed by something. " 
(Aristotle 1965, p. 41) 
Aristotle ý adds that the length or amplitude of a plot should be 
long-'enough to cover a change of fortune, from misery to 
happiness or vice versa (Aristotle 1965, p. 42). For Aristotle then, 
the simple plot consists of three episodes and a transformation or 
change of fortune. Propp's sequence of functions also breaks down 
into. three distinct phases. The beginning phase, consisting of 
functions 1 to 10, all take place at the hero's home, and ends with 
the hero's departure (function 11). The middle phase, consisting of 
functions 12 to 19, recount the hero's adventures away from 
home, ýand ends with the hero's return (function 20). The third 
phase, consisting of functions 21 to 31, recount the subsequent 
adventures of the hero on his return. At the numerical level of 
abstraction, the Eskimo tales in Colby's analysis have a parallel 
structure to the Russian tales in Propp's. Moreover, both sets of 
tales not, only have these three distinct phases, but also have a 
metonymic equivalence in terms of the hero's movements, 
consisting: of home and departure, adventures away from home, 
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and a return. More parallels also exist at the specific functional 
level: the act of villainy, the contest, the victory. 
" These sequential similarities are also found in African 
folktales. According to Dseagu, "many, if not all, African folktales 
involvea movement from home into the forest wilderness and 
back again to the homestead" (Dseagu 1992, p. 590). Dseagu also 
points out that this movement in space is interpreted as a 
movement in time: "The tale teller and the audience clearly see 
the journey motif in allegorical terms as a reflection of a person's 
progress in life" (Dseagu 1992, p. 590). Dseagu argues that in Zulu 
folktales, for example, the episodes "tend to mark important 
epochs in the rites of passage of the individual", and that the three 
most important phases are birth, adulthood, and old age (Dseagu 
1992, p. 590). 
However, according to anthropological studies of tribal 
cultures in Africa, Australia, and America, the rites of passage 
from child to adult and from adult to elder are both marked by 
this change of location. In George Thomson's account, both rites 
consist of three episodes: a departure from the home, a sequence 
of initiation rites, and the return of the initiated as an adult or 
elder (Thomson 1973, pp. 91-119). The departure of the child is 
marked by much weeping, because the event is viewed as a death 
and resurrection: "At puberty the child dies as a child and is born 
again as a man or woman" (Thomson 1973, p. 91). The rites 
themselves involve a surgical operation in which some part of the 
body is removed, followed by "rites of purification and ordeals" 
(Thomson 1973, p. 92). In Australia, this process generally consists 
of the following: 
"The novices are washed in water or blood, they bathe in a 
stream or the sea, or are scorched in front of a fire; they run 
races, sometimes with painful handicaps; they engage in 
sham fights, often with fatal consequences, they are 
scourged until they are unconscious; their cars and noses are 
bored, their flesh gashed or tattooed. The physical pain 
incidental to most of these rites is universally explained as. a 
trial of strength or endurance... " 
(Thomson 1973, pp. 92-93) 
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After undergoing these ordeals, the novice then "receives 
instruction in the customs and traditions of the tribe" (Thomson 
1973, p. 93). According to Thomson, this might include a further 
test in the form of a catechism, the revelation of sacred objects, 
and an explanation of their significance. The entire ceremony is 
strictly secret: 
"It is performed at a distance from the tribal settlement, 
usually on a specially prepared ceremonial ground... In 
many tribes the actual initiation is preceded by a period of 
seclusion, which may last for months... " 
(Thomson 1973, p. 93) 
Thomson also points out that "among most hunting tribes, 
initiation is followed immediately by marriage" (Thomson 1973, 
p. 93). In addition, the initiates are given new names to mark their 
re-birth. Thomson's account of the child's initiation into adulthood 
is summarised in Figure 12. 
1. Departure from home as a child 
(symbolic death) 
2. Removal of part of body 
: 3. Purification ordeals and contests, including fights 
4. Instruction 
5. Further tasks, Including catechism 
6. Discovery of sacred objects 
7. Return to home as an adult 
(symbolic re-birth) 
8. Marriage 
FIGURE 12: TRIBAL, INITIATION - CHILD INTO ADULT 
Sequential similarities therefore exist not : only between 
folktales' from different, parts of the ; world, but also between 
folktalcs and tribal initiation rites. These similarities exist at two 
levels: an abstract or Aristotelian level that specifies number and 
relation. (three episodes and a transformation), and a-detailed 
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level. that specifies the location of each episode (the home, the 
journey, and the return). 
Given that these correspondences have such a global extent, 
it is . tempting to seek some sort of explanation. 
Mandler and 
Johnson offer two conflicting reasons for structural similarities in 
European folktales. Firstly, they observe that if a story is not 
written down, it must respect the limitations on human memory 
(Mandler & Johnson 1977, p. 113). On that basis they argue that 
the structural similarities of such tales must reflect these limits 
and, therefore, their conformity to an ideal schema. The second 
explanation is that "the recurring themes of traditional stories are 
presumably a reflection of commonalities in human experience" 
(Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 52). 
The problem with the first explanation is the assumption 
that the capacity of human memory is itself a cognitive universal. 
Plato's prediction suggests that this is not the case, and that a 
culture of literacy encourages humans to use writing as an aid to 
memory. Evidence that the memory of non-literate peoples is not 
limited to simple stories comes from a range of sources, such as 
the vast taxonomies employed by American Indians, and the two- 
week: recitation by the Serbian story-teller. While the capacity of 
working memory is limited, it would appear that long-term 
memöry`in oral cultures contains far more than Mandler and 
Johnson allow, and that structural similarities are not the result of 
a universal limit on human memory. 
It therefore seems more plausible that structural similarities 
reflect commonalities in experience. However, some would argue 
that uniformities are to be found in the human mind, while' others 
seek uniformities in social, historical and cultural development. 
Jung's theory of archetypes is one example of the first approach 
(Jung 1959). In Kirk's characterisation, archetypes are images that 
recur ad infinitum In myths, dreams and folktales, and are 
products of the collective unconscious (Kirk'1974, p. 77). According 
to Jungian theory, myths and folktales can be explained in purely 
psychological terms, as poetic expressions of unconscious fears 
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and ý desires. The characters in myths and folktales are to be 
interpreted in a similar fashion, and personify aspects of the 
unconscious mind. The Greek god Poseidon, for example, is an 
archetypal image of the "serious, mature, bearded man", and 
represents "the anima introvertedly expressed though the 
cyclothymic masculine mode" (Hope 1989, p. 22). 
-In Frye's application of Jungian theory to literary criticism, 
archetypes are "communicable symbols", at the centre of which is 
"a group of universal symbols" (Frye 1990, p. 118). He explains: 
"I do not mean by this phrase that there is any archetypal 
code book which has been memorized by all human societies 
without exception. I mean that some symbols are images of 
things common to all men, and therefore have a 
communicable power which is unlimited. Such symbols 
include those of food and drink, of the quest or journey, of 
light and darkness, and of sexual fulfilment, which would 
usually take the form of marriage. " 
(Frye 1990, p. 118) 
InJ Jungian theory, the quest or journey is a universal and 
archetypal symbol, and is to be understood as a quest of the 
psyche for integration and wholeness, a process that Jung calls 
"individuation" (Walker 1957, pp. 94-95). To realise her full 
potential, the individual must recognise the unconscious and 
undeveloped aspects of his personality, and integrate them into a 
new one. Jungians interpret folktales in terms of this psychological 
narrative, so that the hero and the villain represent conflicting 
aspects of the individual's personality, and the contest between 
them a mental conflict (Hope 1989, pp. 78-90). This psychological 
narrative also involves a symbolic death and re-birth, in this case 
of the old personality and the new one. 
Above, we referred to Todorov's discussion of symbolism 
and interpretation, and his claim that the decision to interpret is 
triggered by the gap between two meanings; in, the case of 
patristic exegesis, between the literal meaning of the biblical text, 
and the spiritual meaning as determined by Christian doctrine 
(Todorov 1982a, p. 98). In Todorov's formulation, interpretation ', 'is 
306 
nothing other than the course which allows us to relate, and thus 
to identify, the one with the other, by means of a series of 
equivalences" (Todorov 1982a, p. 98). When these meanings 
conflict, it is the spiritual meaning which is viewed as the "true" 
meaning. 
cnj 
Psychoanalytic interpretation operates in a similar fashion; 
in this case, a psychological narrative provides the model for the 
metaphorical or true meaning of the text in question. In 
Bettelheim's interpretation of fairy tales, it is Freud's model of the 
unconscious, rather than Jung's, that provides the means of 
discovering the "true" meaning. Thus some of the characters in 
fairy tales personify the ego, the id or the super-ego, while the 
sequence of events represents the conflict between them. For 
example, birds (particularly doves) "symbolize the higher 
aspirations of the superego and ego ideal" (Bettelheim 1978, 
p. 102), whereas frogs and toads represent genitalia (p. 290). The 
Freudian narrative is a narrative in which the child overcomes 
their infantile sexuality and becomes a sexually mature adult with 
a life-long partner. 
In, psychoanalytic interpretation, archetypal or sexual 
symbolism, operates without restraint, embracing civilisations and 
cultures far removed in time and space. In Frye's qualified 
archetypalism however, some symbols are universal, but some are 
not: 
"It is inadvisable to assume that an Adonis or Oedipus myth 
is`universal, or that certain associations, such as the serpent 
with'the phallus, are universal, because when we discover a 
group of people who know nothing of such, matters we must 
assume that they did know and have forgotten, or do know 
and won't tell, or are not members of the human race. " 
(Frye 1990, p. 118) 
Freudians assume that an association between frogs, and genitalia, 
for example, has universal relevance, but were such associations 
made by, the people who. created the tales? One problem with 
traditional European folktales and fairy stories is that the cultures' 
which. produced the tales have disappeared, and there are no 
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informants to enlighten us. According to Levi-Strauss, it is the lack 
of an ethnographic context that characterises Propp's morphology 
of the folktale (Levi-Strauss 1978b, p. 131). Consequently, Propp is 
unable to show any correspondence between the tale and the 
missing context. In his analysis of myths of the American Indians, 
Levi-Strauss is able to provide an ethnographic context, and point 
out correspondences (Levi-Strauss 1986). For example: 
;.. "In the mythology of Guiana the hummingbird is presented 
as being in correlation with, and opposed to, the bunia bird... 
together they help a man who is trapped at the top of a tree 'to get down, then to find his way back to his village. But 
whereas the bunia bird is a foul-smelling creature whose 
droppings are transformed into creepers... the hummingbird 
emits a delightful perfume, although it is occasionally soiled 
by excrement... We have therefore a twofold contrast: bad 
smell/pleasant smell, and defiling/defiled... " 
"(Levi-Strauss 1986, p. 205) 
So, Levi-Strauss not only explains the cultural significance of the 
specific' animals and plants that feature in Indian myths, but also 
awards these items a semantic value. He then uses these semantic 
values to construct a system of correspondences between myths, a 
system based on binary oppositions. According to Levi-Strauss, 
the human mind has a universal propensity to structure, and a 
universal tendency to use antithesis as a structuring device. 
However, demonstrating this tendency by using myths of the 
American Indians is another process that requires textual inter- 
pretation. ' As Culler indicates, it is not necessarily the case that the 
semantic values awarded by Levi-Strauss are values that are used 
by the 'natives themselves (Culler 1975, pp. 45-46). ' Levi-Strauss' 
purpose is to show that primitive thought operates in a logical 
fashion. In pursuing this objective, he does ' not -use contextual 
knowledge to interpret myth, but the principle of antithesis to 
interpret both. 
So, structural similarities are interpreted by Jungfans as an 
argument for archetypes and the universal narrative of 
individuation, by Freudians as an argument for sexual symbolism 
and the universal narrative of sexual development. For Levi- 
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Strauss, the use of antithesis as a structuring device is also a 
cognitive universal. In the first. two examples, a process of textual 
interpretation maps the text in question onto another narrative; in 
the third, onto a system of binary correspondences. 
Let's now turn from those who seek uniformities in the 
human mind, to those who seek uniformities in social and cultural 
development. Above, we referred to Todorov's discussion of 
patristic exegesis, in which the decision to interpret is triggered 
by the gap between two meanings, the literal and the metaphor- 
ical (Todorov 1982a, p. 98). In the case of myths and folktales, one 
could-argue that it is the difficulties of constructing a literal 
meaning - an absence rather than a gap - that triggers the 
psychoanalytic interpretation. For readers removed from the 
cultures that created such tales, difficulties in comprehension 
would seem to be caused by the lack of contextual knowledge. Yet 
according to Dseagu, a metaphorical meaning is still preferred 
even where contextual knowledge is available (Dseagu 1992). He 
claims, that the journey motif in African fölktales is seen in 
allegorical rather than literal terms, "as a reflection of a person's 
progress in life" (Dseagu 1992, p. 590). 
However, the journey is also a feature of the initiation rites 
that mark a person's progress in life in tribal societies, and the 
question ° arises whether this similarity reflects a relationship 
between the African folktale and the tribal' background of African 
society, or indeed, a general one between folktale and ritual. Is 
the sequence of events in the European folktale a reflection of a 
tribal stage of development in European societies? To answer this 
question, we shall look firstly at the history of ancient Greece, and 
secondly at the origins of Greek tragedy. This'excursion will also 
provide'usý with examples of interpretation in the context of 
stories, -and with an alternative definition of a story schema. 
. , ',,. 
ý 
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8.4 THE PLOT IN ANCIENT GREECE 
George Thomson argues that the evolution of Indo-European 
societies is marked by increasing social divisions (Thomson 1973). 
Prior, to the economic changes caused by the neolithic revolution, 
Indo-European societies were generally organised on the basis of 
tribal co-operation. The tribe is ruled by a group of elders, who 
appoint a king with responsibilities of a magical nature. With the 
growthýW private ownership stimulated by the domestication of 
cattle, warfare becomes a prominent feature of society, and the 
king's function changes: "warfare requires unity of leadership, and 
consequently these tribes" (le pastoral) "develop a type of 
kingship which is primarily not magical, but military" (Thomson 
1973, ''p. 29). The tribe devolves more powers from its group of 
elders to the king, and more land becomes privately owned: 
"The Homeric evidence shows clearly that, while power or 
privilege was in the gift of the king, land was in the gift of 
the people, who bestowed on their leaders, in reward for 
military service, estates which differed from the others in 
that they were not assigned by lot to tribe or clan, but by 
special gift to an individual. " 
(Thomson 1973, p. 38) 
So a monarchic society evolves into an aristocratic one, a society 
that is, still ruled by a king with military responsibilities, but one 
that is now marked by the rift between peasant and landowner. 
Thomson argues that this evolutionary process can be traced 
in the archaeological and documentary records of ancient Greece. 
Classical 
, 
scholars generally agree that although the Homeric 
poems were composed some time around 750BC, the Trojan war 
occurred some time around 1200BC (Burn 1966,. p. 53; Kitto 1957, 
p. 18; Finley 1971, p. 21; Finley 1972, p. 32). At that time, the 
Achaean,, civilisation celebrated by Homer was a federation of 
monarchies that were to be wiped out around 1000ßC by the 
Dorians, military invaders who re-organised Greek society along 
aristocratic lines. Following these invasions, some of the Achaean 
Greeks settled in Asia Minor, where the Homeric poems 
originated: "In these conditions, the minstrels no longer sing of 
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contemporary victories, because there are none to sing of, and so 
they turn back to the idealised traditions of the past" (Thomson 
1973, p. 61). According to Thomson, "It was in this environment, 
with the monarchy already in decline, that Greek epic matured" 
(Thomson 1973, p. 61). He disagrees with the tendency to attribute 
the Homeric poems to a single composer, and claims they are the 
result of several generations of story-telling: 
"The masterly construction of these poems is so impressive 
that it has been adduced as evidence of single authorship; 
but there is no reason why the same effect should not have 
been produced over a number of generations in the 
conditions of oral transmission. One may still encounter 
among the peasantry sagas or folk-tales which are 
artistically perfect - not because they are the work of a 
conscious artist, but because in the course of centuries they 
have been progressively shaped and polished by a sort of 
natural erosion, which has worn away excrescences and 
., fashioned by slow 
degrees a final unity. " 
r. n .: (Thomson 1973, p. 61) 
The period following the Dorian invasions is characterised by the 
growth of trade, the rise of a merchant class, and the building of 
towns (Thomson 1973, p. 79). Economic and political change is 
intensified in the seventh and sixth centuries BC by the 
exploitation of gold and silver and the introduction of coinage. 
Merchants become more powerful, some becoming tyrannoi, a 
new breed of king in the developing "city-states". The ensuing 
conflict between the peasantry, the aristocracy and the middle 
class of traders and merchants leads to the development of 
Athenian democracy, and a shift in the balance of power away 
from the aristocracy towards the middle class. 
In this process of social change, 'certain features of the tribal 
system are carried over by the aristocracy, and are still retained 
in the new democracy. Thomson points to the preservation of the 
tribe or, phratry in the military organisation of the emerging 
aristocracy. While the relationship of king to vassal is a personal 
one, in which the vassal is rewarded for his military service by a 
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gift of land, the vassal's armed forces are drawn from the old 
tribal unit: 
"We learn from a single verse of the Iliad that the Achaean 
army, like those of Athens and Sparta many centuries later, 
was organised on a tribal basis; but the fact is mentioned 
incidentally, and it is never mentioned again. This reticence 
on the subject of tribal institutions does not mean that they 
had ceased to exist, but that the poems belonged to the 
tradition of a ruling class which instinctively made little of 
the loyalties it had defied. The common soldiers continued to 
be marshalled phratry by phratry, but the vassal followed 
his lord. " 
`='_ (Thomson 1973, p. 58) 
Thomson argues that in its conflict with the emerging middle 
class,, the Athenian aristocracy continued to exercise power and 
privilege by appealing to the old tribal loyalties. Under the new 
democracy, the merchants and traders sought to undermine this 
influence by a process of tribal re-construction, and "when the 
primitive tribal system was superseded, the external features of 
the old order were faithfully reproduced in the new" (Thomson 
1973, P. 193): 
I "The vital unit in the new system was the demos, or parish. 
As a territorial unit, the demos had existed since prehistoric 
times. In a great many cases it bore the name of a clan... " 
(Thomson 1973, p. 193) 
Membership of the demos was initially determined by an electoral 
register, but was then made hereditary, so that kinship traditions 
were continued. However, the major change consisted of a new 
arrangement of phratrys. With the new method'of defining tribal 
membership, the urban population was able to exercise an 
influence disproportionate to its numbers: 
"Thus the middle class of merchants, ' manufacturers, -and 
artisans, secured a permanent advantage' over, the land- 
owners, farmers and peasants, and at the; same time the 
interests of the country were subordinated, to those of, the 
town. " 
.,. ' (Thomson 1973, p. 194) 
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In this change "from tribe to state", the heritage of a tribal 
culture is apparent not only in military and political organisation 
but also in religion. Jane Harrison (1962) finds documentary 
evidence for two different notions of sacrifice in ancient Greece. 
The first type of sacrifice is performed as a prelude to a 
communal feast, in which Olympian deities are invited to partake; 
the second type of sacrifice is performed to placate chthonic or 
underworld deities (Harrison 1962, pp. 1-31). The latter kind of 
ritual, she argues, shows the presence of a "lower stratum" of 
thought, more magical rather than religious, and it is this kind of 
ritual that marks many of the seasonal festivals in the Greek 
calendar (Harrison 1962, p. 29). She finds evidence that many of 
these festivals have a pre-Olympian antiquity. Two examples are 
the Anthesteria, a spring festival, and the Thesmophoria, an 
autumn festival. Before we can discuss the origins of Greek 
tragedy, we need to discuss some examples of ancient festivals, 
which also include the Eleusinian mysteries and the Dionysia. The 
festivals are summarised in Figure 13. 
The Anthesteria takes its name from the Greek month 
Anthesterion, which roughly corresponds to February in the 
Roman calendar. According to Apollodorus, it was celebrated in 
honour of Dionysus, and its three parts were known as pithoigia 
(cask-opening), shoes (cups), and chytroi (pots). Documentary 
sources record that the festival was viewed as a wine-festival and 
an occasion for much drunkenness. However, Harrison argues that 
a closer examination of the sources "reveals beneath the surface 
rejoicings... another and more primitive ritual, and a ritual of 
widely different significance" (Harrison 1962, p. 34). This closer 
examination shows that the festival was-traditionally viewed as a 
festival of ghosts or ancestral spirits. 
According to Harrison, the name of pots refers not only to 
storage jars but also to holes in the ground, which "were in many 
parts of Greece regarded as the constant haunt of ghosts going up 
and down" (Harrison 1962, p. 38). The name of cups refers to a 
specific type of cup, one that was used for libations to ancestral 
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ANTHESTERIA 
1. pithoigia (cask-opening) = letting out the ghosts 
2. choes (cups) = remembering the dead 
3. chytroi (pots) = putting away the ghosts 
THESMOPHORIA 
1. kathodos and anodos (downgoing and uprising) = sacrifice 
2. nestela (fasting) = abstention 
3. kalligeneia (fair birth) = fertilisation 
HALOA 
1. purification 
2. secret ceremony, which includes the offering of first fruits 
3. feasting 
ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES 
1. agon (contest) 
= ordeals of purification (bathing, sacrificing, fasting) 
2. pompe (ceremonial departure) 
3. anagnorisis (discovery) 
secret ceremony, which includes revelation of sacred objects, a 
sacred marriage and a divine birth 
4. komos (triumphal return) 
DIONYSIA (first day) 
1. pompe (ceremonial departure) V 
= procession with statue of Dionysus 
2. agon (contest) or sparagnios (tearing apart) 
sacrifice of bull 
3. komos (triumphal return) 
= return procession with statue of Dionysus 
FIGURE 13: FESTIVALS IN ANCIENT GREECE 
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spirits. The name of casks refers to funerary urns, urns containing 
bones, of the dead which were stored in holes in the ground. 
Harrison argues that February was traditionally viewed by Greeks 
and Romans as the month of the dead, while spring was a time to 
placate ancestral spirits in order to insure the earth's fertility 
(Harrison 1962, p. 54). Thus the traditional sequence of events is 
not concerned with consuming vast quantities of alcohol, but can 
be re-constructed as follows. On the first day of "cask opening", 
the urns containing the ancestral spirits are disinterred, re- 
opened, and the spirits invited to come out. The second day of 
"cups" is devoted to remembering the dead, and the ancestral 
spirits are offered food and drink, which, unlike the communal 
feast, is offered to them alone. On the third day of "pots", the 
spirits are invited back into their urns, which are then re-sealed 
and re-interred for another year. Thus Harrison compares the 
Anthesteria to a festival of "all souls" (Harrison 1962, p. 36). 
The Thesmophoria was an autumn festival, held in the Greek 
month of Pyanepsion (October/November). According to Harrison, 
the rites that were practised at this festival "were practised by 
women only and were of immemorial antiquity" (Harrison 19G2, 
p. 120). The first day was called both kathodos and anodos 
(downgoing and uprising), the second nesteia (fasting), and the 
third kalligeneia (fair-born or fair-birth). It was generally viewed 
as a fertility festival, held in honour of Demeter, the goddess who 
gave the, gift of agriculture to women. The first day_ is marked by 
a mass sacrifice of pigs, who are taken down a chasm and ritually 
slaughtered. The women then bring up the remains of the pigs 
sacrificed the previous year. The second day is marked by a fast, 
and the, third day is marked by the strewing of the dead flesh 
onto the, fields. The purpose of the ceremony is to insure the 
earth's fertility before the autumn sowing begins. 
The i Ialoa was another festival organised exclusively by 
women, ' and also held in honour of Demeter. Harrison describes 
the flaloa5as .a 
harvest festival, in which the.. first-fruits of-the 
harvest were offered to the goddess, and. which culminated in a 
huge feast. Part of the festival involved handling "the sacred 
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symbols of both sexes", while some sources refer to the presence 
of cakes made in the shape of genitalia (Harrison 1962, pp. 148- 
149). A ceremony involving similar sacra also features in the 
annual festival at Eleusis, and Harrison argues that the Eleusinian 
mysteries "were in their enactments the very counterpart of the 
Haloa". (Harrison 1962, p. 150). 
. The overt references in the 
literature to the revelation of 
mysteries make the Eleusinian festival rather different from the 
other seasonal festivals in the Greek calendar. What were these 
mysteries? In Harrison's view, the ancient Greek mysteries were 
predominantly organised by and for women: 
"Mysteries were by no means confined to the religion of 
Demeter and Kore. There were mysteries of Hermes, of 
lasion, of Ino, ... , of Hecate. In general mysteries seem to 
occur more usually in relation to the cult of women 
divinities, of heroines and earth-goddesses; from the 
worship of the Olympians in Homer they are markedly 
absent. In general, by a mystery is meant a rite in which 
certain sacra are exhibited, which cannot be safely seen by 
the worshipper till he (sic) has undergone certain 
purifications: ' 
(Harrison 1962, p. 151) 
According to Harrison then, mysteries involve the revelation of 
sacred objects. Those who partake in this secret ceremony are 
forbidden' to disclose what they have seen, and must perform a 
purification ritual beforehand. In Thomson's view however, 
mysteries are also inseparable from initiation. This feature 
enables him to detect a tribal heritage in the period of Athenian 
democracy. Above, we summarised Thomson's account of tribal 
initiation rites, in which the child Is initiated into adulthood, and 
the adult into an elder. According to Thomson, these sort of rites 
are apparent in Plutarch's account of the education of Spartan 
youth, and Aristotle's account of archaic Institutions in Dorian 
Crete. (Thomson 1973, pp. 97-101). He also points f out that 
initiation was a pre-requisite for entry into: the religious cults of 
tribal, societies (Thomson 1973, pp. 95-96).; The proceedings at 
Eleusis also involved initiation into a mystery. However, ini the 
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democratic period, it seems that every Athenian citizen, including 
slaves, was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, and that parts 
of the ceremony are obscure because they were so well-known 
(Thomson 1973, pp. 110-114). 
The sequence of events is as follows (Harrison 1962, pp. 150- 
161). Each candidate for initiation first goes through a process of 
purification by bathing in the sea. Each person brings a sacrificial 
pig, which is also bathed. The pig, while sacred to Demeter, also 
indicates the democratic nature of the event; Harrison comments 
that "the pig was the cheapest and commonest of sacrificial 
animals; one that each and every citizen could afford" (Harrison 
1962, 'P. 153). The pig is sacrificed, and the next stage involves a 
fast. The initiates then set off in a procession from Athens to 
Eleusis, where the rest of the proceedings take place. In the hall of 
initiates, the candidate drinks from a sacred cup, and handles the 
sacred objects. Following this secret ceremony, the initiates return 
to Athens. 
. While the 
Greater Mysteries were performed at Eleusis in 
the autumn and were sacred to Demeter, the Lesser Mysteries 
were performed at Agrae in the spring and were sacred to Kore or 
Persephone, Demeter's daughter (Harrison 1962, p. 559). More- 
over, a- candidate for Initiation had to attend, the lesser before 
they . were qualified 
for the greater. If the mysteries were based 
on tribal initiation rites, then it would seem that the basis of the 
lesser. was the initiation of child to adult, and of the greater, adult 
to . elder: 
On the other hand, the mysteries also coincide with 
stages of , the agricultural cycle, and as Harrison points out, the 
relation between mother and daughter is also one between the 
seeds of autumn and the growth of spring (Harrison 1962, pp. 257- 
321). ;,.. 
The Greater Mysteries at Eleusis share certain features with 
the Thesmophoria and the Haloa, . while' their performance 
coincides with the start of the agricultural year and the autumn 
sowing season. Thomson comments , that . "the great, service 'of 
Demeter: to ; mankind, which the. Mysteries were believed, to 
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commemorate, was the discovery of agriculture" (Thomson 1973, 
p. 110). However, following Harrison's observation that most of the 
mysteries were organised by women, one could argue that the 
secrets of agriculture were initially known only to women. She 
argues that the evolution of the mysteries indicates the changing 
relations between the sexes, social changes that were reflected in 
religious changes. According to Harrison, the Greek goddesses 
were traditionally represented as a triad of youth, mature woman, 
and older woman, or as a pair of mother and maiden (Harrison 
1962, ý pp. 163-321). With the establishment of the Olympian 
pantheon, the goddess becomes less important, and the pairing of 
mother with daughter is replaced by the pairing of mother with 
son, the son replacing the daughter in vase paintings and other art 
forms (Harrison 1962, pp. 322-571). Finally, the son becomes more 
important than the mother (Harrison 1962, p. 562). 
These changes are reflected in the Eleusinian mysteries. 
Initially organised by women and seen as sacred to Demeter, the 
mysteries were also connected with Dionysus, at some stage 
before the democratic period. Part of the proceedings involved the 
enactment of a sacred marriage, and the birth of a divine child 
(Harrison 1962, pp. 548-571); Harrison regards "the rite of the 
Sacred Marriage and the Birth of the Holy Child". as "the central 
mystery". (Harrison 1962, p. 563). In Thomson's view, the 
enactment of a sacred marriage is another example of the heritage 
of tribal initiation, in which initiation into adulthood was 
frequently followed by marriage; he comments that "marriage was 
constantly regarded as a mystery, and the parties to it as initiates" 
(Thomson 1973, p. 116). 
While Demeter was generally viewed as a goddess of 
agriculture, associated with corn and the invention of. bread in 
particular, -Dionysus was generally viewed, as a god of plants, 
associated with ivy, the vine and the invention of wine. He was a 
late comer to the Greek pantheon; Frazer (1993, -p. 
387),, Harrison 
(1962, pp. 364-379), and Thomson (1973, p. 143) all agree that his 
worship came from Thrace. Frazer argues that Dionysus was a god 
of vegetation who annually dies and is born again (Frazer 1993, 
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p. 386). He records many examples of god-kings who reign for a 
fixed term, and are ritually sacrificed by their inheritors (Frazer 
1993, pp. 264-288). He argues that such kings personify the life 
forces that wax and wane with the seasons, and that traces of the 
ritual of killing the old year and bringing in the new can be found 
in the traditional customs of European rural communities (Frazer 
1993, Pp. 296-323). 
z The worship of Dionysus, however, was also associated with 
wild women, dancing, debauchery, and a state of intoxication. As 
exemplified by Euripides' The Bacchae, his worship, like that of 
Demeter, was confined to women, and involved escorting a 
representative of Dionysus into the country, where, in a state of 
exhilaration, the women tear the god to pieces. The women return 
and hold a celebratory feast. Thomson describes the sequence of 
events as a pompe (procession), an agon (contest), and a komos 
(triumphal return), the same ritual pattern exhibited by the 
Eleusinian mysteries and the Olympian games (Thomson 1973, 
p. 156). According to Thomson, "the cults of Dionysus... were very 
ancient - older, in fact, than the god to whose name they were 
attached - and they consisted of a primitive form of agricultural 
magic" (Thomson 1973, p. 141). The magical element becomes 
evident by comparing the rites of Dionysus with the Thesmo- 
phoria, rin which ritually slaughtered flesh is strewn over the 
fields to insure their fertility. Thomson argues that under the 
tyranny of, Pesistratos, who wanted to undermine the religions of 
the aristocracy, at Athens the worship of Dionysus was not only 
tolerated but brought under state control because of its popularity 
among the peasantry - so "the worship of Dionysus was brought to 
town" (Thomson 1973, p. 141). 
The City Dionysia, according to Thomson, lasted five or six 
days ' (Thomson 1973, pp. 155-158). The `first day, -he argues, is 
marked once again by the sequence of pompe, agon, and komos. 
The statue of Dionysus is brought out of its temple and taken in 
ceremonial procession to a shrine outside Athens where it was 
said to Originally belong. Animals are sacrificed in his honäur, the 
main one being a bull offered by the City of Athens,, ` Thomson 
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argues that the bull is an incarnation of Dionysus. A feast is held, 
and at the end of the day's festivities the statue is brought back to 
Athens, where it is placed in a theatre until the end of the festival. 
The rest of the festival is given over to dramatic competitions and 
dithyrambs. A prize bull is awarded to the winners. 
s :, 
The dithyramb was a hymn sung in honour of Dionysus. 
Following Aristotle, Thomson argues that here lies the origin of 
Greek tragedy. The dithyramb involved a leader and a chorus, and 
according to Thomson, "since there is reason to think that the 
leader of the choir impersonated the god, it is plain that we have 
here, the germ of a ritual drama": the leader became an actor 
(Thomson 1973, p. 162). Moreover, Thomson argues that the 
leader is descended from the god-priest of the secret societies that 
performed the rites of Dionysus (Thomson 1973, p. 172). As the 
rites. were a mystery "which only those who had been initiated 
into the secret were able to understand", when the ritual became 
a drama - that is, "a mimetic rite performed by initiates before an 
uninitiated audience" - the ritual needed an interpreter or 
hermeneus (Thomson 1973, p. 172). 
Now, as Harrison reveals, the word used in Aristotle's 
Poetics that is generally translated as plot is mutllos (Harrison 
1963, pp. 327-331). Frye also refers to the equivalence of the two 
terms (Frye 1990, p. 52). In the context of tragedy, Aristotle 
explains that "the representation (nmimesis) of the action is the 
plot (inuthos) of the tragedy; for the ordered arrangement of the 
incidents. is what I mean by plot" (Aristotle. 1965, p. 39). In the 
case of tribal societies, Thomson argues that a myth is "the spoken 
form of the ritual act - the collective expression of the un- 
forgettable experience periodically shared by the participants in 
the rite itself" (Thomson 1973, p. 96). At' a; later stage, of social 
development, he continues, myth, may become detached from 
ritual, but. the two remain attached "in' the drama of. the magical 
fraternity, ":. 
"In these conditions, since the fraternity is secret, the myth 
becomes a mystery, which is revealed to the uninitiated 
only in its outward and visible form, its inner meaning being 
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reserved for "those who understand". Lastly, when the 
fraternity itself declines, its dramatic function is usually the 
most persistent. The society of mystics becomes a guild of 
actors, whose plays have lost their esoteric significance, but 
still retain to some extent the character of a mystery... " 
(Thomson 1973, p. 96) 
In the case of ritual drama then, the muthos or plot is the mystery 
or inner meaning of the mime that is performed by the actors, a 
mystery that is explained by the interpreter or hermeneus. 
Aristotle distinguishes the complex plot from a simple one 
by the occurrence of a reversal (peripeteia) or a discovery (anag- 
norisis), in addition to a change of fortune (Aristotle 1965, p. 45). 
Following Murray (1963, pp. 341-363), Thomson argues that "the 
themes of early tragedy were drawn from the myths of Dionysus", 
the myths not only of the god's death but also of his birth and 
resurrection (Thomson 1973, p. 177). Murray argues that a 
peripeteia is to be found in the change of emotion from sorrow to 
joy that accompanies the god's death and subsequent resurrection, 
and that "such a Peripeteia is clearly associated with an 
Anagnorisis, a Recognition or Discovery" (Murray 1963, p. 342). 
However, Thomson argues that anagnorisis applies not to the god's 
death, as Murray claims, but to his resurrection: 
"... the theme of the recognition is derived from the self- 
revelation of the god after his re-birth or resurrection. His 
appearance was followed, we may suppose, by an 
interrogation on the part of the chorus, at the end of which 
he proved his identity by revealing to them, the sacred 
objects or mystical symbols associated with his cult. " 
"(Thomson 1973, p. 177) 
i ý.: 
Thomson argues that more support for this proposal comes from 
the type `of dialogue in Greek tragedy called stichoinythia, a series 
of alternating question and answer, which`Thomson' `argues is a 
vestige ' of the catechisms of primitive ' initiation, ' and connected 
with the riddle (pp. 177-179). 
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Given the argument that tragedy originated in the rites of 
Dionysus, the enactment of his birth, death, and re-birth, Murray 
identifies the following elements in Greek tragedy as "ritual 
forms": agon (contest) or sparaginos (tearing to pieces), pathos (a 
ritual death or sacrifice), messenger (who announces the god's 
death), threnos (a lament), anagnorisis (discovery or recognition), 
and : theophany (a resurrection, epiphany or apotheosis). Murray 
also argues that this sequence of events can be traced in the 
surviving plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides (Murray 
19 63; ° pp. 341-363 ). 
1. agon (contest) 
2. pathos or sparagmos (ritual death or sacrifice) 
3. messenger, conveying news of the death 
4. threnos (lamentation) 
5. anagnorisis (discovery or recognition) 
6. theophany (resurrection) 
FIGURE 14: RITUAL, FORMS IN GREEK TRAGEDY 
Following Aristotle however, Murray, Thomson, and others 
have pointed out that tragedy and comedy both originated in the 
rites of Dionysus, and that the primitive drama, consisted of three 
plays, and a satyr play, in which the re-born god returns in 
triumphal procession. The fourth play became detached from the 
sequence and evolved into comedy, while the first three evolved 
into the tragic trilogy, as exemplified, by the Orestela of Aeschylus, 
and finally. into the single play (Thomson 1973, pp. 217-295). 
Murray argues that when comedy broke off from tragedy, the 
tragedy , must either end with :a threnos or-include its own 
theophany, and he finds examples of these two variant endings 
(Murray 1963, p. 345). However, Thomson . 
finds no evidence to 
support Murray's suggestion that the trilogy initially represented 
the stages of the god's life (birth, maturity, and death), and argues 
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that the episodic division served the same function as acts in the 
Elizabethan drama (Thomson 1973, p. 227). 
Summarising his argument, Thomson concludes that "the art 
of tragedy was descended, remotely but directly, and with each 
stage in its evolution conditioned by the evolution of society itself, 
from the mimetic rite of the primitive totemic clan" (Thomson 
1973, p. 183). In addition, he argues that the mystical doctrine of 
the mysteries "reproduces the pattern of tribal initiation at every 
point'. ', while "the old pattern has been charged with an entirely 
new meaning" (Thomson 1973, p. 118). 
8.5 STORY SCHEMATA AND INTERPRETATION 
Following this excursion into the social origins of Greek tragedy, 
we can now return to story memory. Above, we concluded that a 
schema is a set of expectations which guide interpretation, and 
argued that textual interpretation is guided by two kinds of 
schemata, one that stems from reading stories, and one derived 
from worldly experience. We have seen that Mandler and Johnson 
and = others have sought to represent schemata using a 
grammatical approach influenced by Chomsky's linguistics. For an 
alternative approach to schemata we turn once more to Saussure's 
notion of language as a system of sequential and associative 
relations. Given the discussion in the last chapter, we can also 
make a. further distinction between schemata for events and 
schemata for scenes, a distinction that reflects two different kinds 
of information, verbal and visual. Using the definition of a story as 
a sequence of events, a story schema is a sequence of events to 
which` we can attach a name, and which acts as a guide to textual 
interpretation. Each of the above illustrations' therefore represents 
a specific type of story schema. 
. Using Todorov's formulation of interpretation as a process of 
finding. correspondences between meanings,,, we argued that 
psychoanalytic interpretation is a- process of finding correspond- 
ences between two narratives, between, a Jungian or Freudian 
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narrative, and the narrative of the text in question. The discussion 
of Greek tragedy provides further examples of interpretation. In 
tracing the process of social evolution, Thomson's schema consists 
of the sequence of events in tribal initiation. In arguing that 
tragedy arose from the rites of Dionysus, Murray's schema 
consists of the sequence of events in the god's life story. From this 
perspective, Murray argues that the trilogy must have initially 
represented the three stages of youth, maturity and old age. The 
difference in schemata is reflected in the identification of 
anagnorisis. For Murray, it is the discovery of the god's death 
which' is interpreted as anagnorisis, for Thomson, who appeals to 
the, correspondence between stichomythia and the catechisms of 
tribal initiation, it is the discovery of his re-birth. 
The ordering of events in the schema also influences the 
process of finding correspondences. Murray claims that the order 
shown in Figure 14 is "the sequence in which these should 
normally occur" (Murray 1963, p. 344). However, the argument 
that this sequence is preserved in the surviving Greek tragedies 
depends on interpretation. In Sophocles' Oedipus Rex for example, 
Murray identifies the agon as the verbal contest between Oedipus 
and the shepherd, which also brings about a peripeteia and an 
anagnorisis (Murray 1963, p. 358). In this altercation, Oedipus, 
seeking to unravel the mystery of his origins, threatens to kill the 
shepherd unless he speaks the truth. In hearing the shepherd's 
replies, Oedipus recognises that the events which he had tried to 
avoid have indeed occurred - he has murdered his father, and 
married his mother - and in this moment of realisation, or seeing, 
he blinds himself. 
However, the murder of his father also constitutes an agora, 
which has already taken place before the play begins. Moreover, 
the contest between Oedipus and the shepherd turns into a series 
of rapid 'questions and answers or, stichomythia, which An 
Thomson's-schema correspond to the catechisms-of tribal 
initiation, so that anagnorisis is again equivalent to the discovery 
of a new identity, rather than an old one. Similar problems arise 
with Thomson's schema: firstly, in finding correspondences, and 
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secondly, in the preservation of order. For example, the agon is 
the sacrifice of a bull in the case of the Dionysia, but the agon is a 
fast in the case of the Eleusinian mysteries. A pompe is followed 
by an agon in the case of the Dionysia, but this order is reversed 
in the case of the mysteries. 
Similar problems also arise in trying to trace the social 
origin' of folktales. Let's return to the question whether there is a 
relationship between folktales and a tribal stage of social develop- 
ment., 1 If we compare the sequence of events 
in tribal initiation 
rites (Figure 12) with Propp's sequence of functions in the folktale 
(Figure 11), then certain similarities between the two will become 
apparent. 
Both sequences contain a departure, a series of events that 
occur away from the home, and a return. Propp finds that every 
opening sequence in his analysis contains function 8a - the lack 
that motivates the quest. In addition, the folktale often begins 
with the disappearance or death of a member of the hero's family, 
a beginning that also marks Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. In the latter 
case, the king has died, the gods have deserted the land, and the 
crops are dying in the fields; a beginning that has similarities with 
"journey to the underworld" myths, such as the Babylonian story 
of Inann a, who searches for her consort Dumuzi, the god of 
vegetation. In the case of Oedipus, the lack motivates the quest to 
find the murderer. The initiation rites also begin with a loss, but 
this occurs both in the symbolic death of childhood, and in the 
physical removal of some part of the body. Additionally, one could 
argue that the lack which motivates the departure is a lack of the 
knowledge which the rites are designed to provide. ' 
Both sequences contain a set of physical ordeals and a set of 
difficult tasks. Both contain the magical helper or instructor, who 
gives the hero ,a secret weapon in the one case, or reveals some 
sacred objects in the other case. The closing 'sequence of, the 
folktale often involves the hero being-given'a new' identity, and 
frequently ends with a marriage, events that also feature in the 
initiation rites. 
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:... Now, in his critique of Propp's morphology, Levi-Strauss 
calls Propp's sequential analysis formalist (Levi-Strauss 1978b). 
While others criticise Propp for a lack of abstraction, Levi-Strauss 
criticises Propp for too much: 
"Unless the content is surreptitiously reintegrated into the 
form, the latter is condemned to remain at such a level of 
abstraction that it neither signifies anything any longer nor 
has any heuristic meaning. Formalism destroys its object. 
With Propp, it results in the discovery that there exists in 
reality only one tale. " 
(Levi-Strauss 1978b, p. 132) 
However, in Propp's formula there is not one but two stories. He 
finds that the two functions 16 and 18 (the physical contest with 
the villain, the hero's victory) do not occur in the same tale with 
the two functions 25 and 26 (the difficult task, its resolution). The 
folktale, according to Propp, therefore consists of two variants. In 
looking, for correspondences with tribal initiation rites, the 
difficult task occurs in the rites of passage from child to adult, but 
the physical contest with the villain features more prominently in 
the rites, of kingship, in which the old king is ritually murdered by 
the new one. One could construct an argument, therefore, that the 
two variants in the folktale reflect a difference in derivation. 
However, although these correspondences can be identified, 
is there a basis for arguing that the one sequence is derived from 
the other, that the folktale represents the collective memory of a 
tribal stage of social development? Levi-Strauss points out the 
difficulties of establishing historical priority in the case of myths 
and folktales, arguing that "their relationship is -not that of 
anterior, to posterior", but a complementary; one (Levi-Strauss 
1978b,. p. 130). In the case of Greek tragedy, , we 
have: concrete 
evidence for the anteriority of rituals and festivals, texts that can 
be given; an approximate date, and contextual documentation. 
Thomson is able to draw on such evidence to, explain the relation 
between tribal initiation rites, the mysteries, Greek tragedy, and 
social and historical development. In comparison, we have 
problems dating myths and folktales, and often lack contextual 
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knowledge. There are no definitive texts for stories in the oral 
tradition; there is only the process of telling and re-telling. 
8.6 STORY SCHEMATA IN FICTION WRITING 
Let's return to the question of how story tellers and fiction writers 
use their story memory to generate new stories. We defined a 
story schema as a sequence of events to which we can attach a 
name, and which acts as a guide to textual interpretation. Fiction 
writing involves memory and imagination, in remembering events 
and scenes from stories or experience, and imagining the events 
and scenes of a new story. One conclusion to the discussion on 
story memory was that interpretation has an influence on how 
stories are remembered. Does interpretation also play a role in 
writing? Given its definition as a process of finding correspond- 
ences between meanings, or between narratives, then 
interpretation in fiction writing must fill the gap between memory 
and imagination, or between remembering and imagining. In this 
context then, interpretation is a process of creating correspond- 
ences between events from a writer's personal or textual 
experience, and the events of a new story. 
The results of research into story memory are summarised 
by Mandler (1982), Thorndyke and Yekovich (1980) and Beau- 
grande and Dressler (1981). All three summaries describe the 
results. that are outlined in Mandler, and Johnson's predictions 
above; but account for them in slightly different ways. Thorndyke 
and = Yekovich give an account of these results from the 
perspective of schema theory (Thorndyke & Yekovich 1980, 
pp. 33-38), while Beaugrande and Dressler summarise the results 
from the perspective of "text-presented knowledge" (Beaugrande 
and Dressler 1981, pp. 202-204). Mandler summarises, the results 
from the perspective of story grammars; so, given that the above 
predictions "have been confirmed in a variety of stories and 
populations", the results tend to justify, the use of grammars 
(Mandler- 1982, p. 210). What do the results tell us about story 
schemata and the organisation of story memory? R> ,4 
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According to Thorndyke and Yekovich, the assumptions of 
schema theory include concept abstraction and hierarchical 
organisation: "A schema represents a prototypical abstraction of 
the concept it represents" and "schemata are organized into a 
generalization hierarchy in memory (Thorndyke & Yekovich 1980, 
p. 27). To these assumptions, we can add the notion that a schema 
can be represented by a grammar. However, the criticisms of 
Thorndyke and Yekovich are more concerned with the assumption 
that reading or encoding is a top-down process, in which a schema 
is instantiated by matching input to vacant slots (Thorndyke & 
Yekovich 1980, p. 28), and the assumption that there is only one 
schema "for the comprehension of narrative texts" (Thorndyke & 
Yekovich 1980, p. 41). They describe schema theory as incomplete 
rather than inaccurate (Thorndyke & Yekovich 1980, p. 42). 
;; However, using a grammar to represent a story schema is 
not the only way to explain concept abstraction and hierarchical 
organisation. We defined a story schema from the perspective of 
sequential and associative relations, as a sequence of events to 
which! we can attach a name. At the Aristotelian level of 
abstraction, the sequence consists of three episodes, a beginning, a 
middle and an end. At the minimal level, each episode must 
contain a verb, and at least one of these verbs, must- signify an 
event. Thorndyke and Yekovich, like Mandler, are more concerned 
with the accurate recall of a story, rather than the process of 
remembering. For the former purpose, the grammar serves as a 
measure, and additions, deletions and distortions are defined 
accordingly. However, the results can also be summarised from 
the alternative perspective of sequential and associative relations 
in remembering. 
From ' this perspective, the results confirm Freud's work on 
the interpretation of dreams, in which he. seeks to establish 
correspondences between events in-, the dreamer's personal 
experience and events in the dream (Freud 197Gb). As mentioned 
in the last chapter, Todorov points out that the operations which 
Freud attributes to the unconscious are no different to those 
328 
involved in any symbolic process, as recorded in writings of the 
rhetorical tradition (Todorov 1982b, p. 248). These operations 
include condensation, displacement, substitution and negation. As 
an example, let's assume we are writing fiction, and that we are 
engaged in the interpretative activity of remembering events 
from personal experience and imagining the events of a story. 
This activity will involve some of the following operations: 
" condensation and expansion: certain events in the original 
sequence may be contracted, while others may be expanded; 
" ellipsis: many events may be omitted altogether; 
" insertion: imaginary events may be inserted into the original 
sequence; 
" displacement: the original order of events is reversed or re- 
arranged; 
" substitution: an event in the original sequence is replaced by 
an imaginary one; 
" negation: an event in the original sequence is replaced by its 
opposite (eg a rise is replaced by a fall). 
Research into story memory indicates that the remembering of 
stories also involves these operations. In writing for a specific 
group of readers or producing a fiction for a specific genre (crime 
thriller, teenage horror), fiction writers may use particular stories 
as models, and apply the above operations to create a new one. 
Associative relations in story memory help the writer to 
imagine specific events. In addition, fiction writers can use their 
störy. memory to create a sequence of Imaginary events by calling 
on various schemata at different levels of abstraction (Figure 15). 
Although derived from an analysis of Greek, tragedy, the Aris- 
totelian notion of the plot represents a higher level of abstraction 
than considerations of genre. Although, derived from an analysis' 
of the' fölktale, Propp's sequence of functions represents a level of 
abstraction which also seems to encompass different genres and 
different art forms, such as films, comics and novels. 
`s '1 
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sequential operations in fiction writing: condensation, expansion, 
ellipsis, insertion, displacement. 
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FIGURE 15: STORY SCHEMATA 
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The significance of Propp's analysis lies in the relevance of 
his discoveries not only to the folktales of other countries, but also 
to the artefacts of contemporary popular culture. The amenability 
of cinematic narrative to Propp's analysis was demonstrated by 
Peter Wollen (Wollen 1976). One of his motives in analysing 
Hitchcock's film North by North-West was to investigate whether 
there is any affinity "between the folk stories of a traditional, oral 
culture and those of contemporary mass culture" (Wollen 1976, 
p. 22). A second motive is Truffaut's suggestion that many of 
Hitchcock's films resemble fairy tales, while Hitchcock likens them 
to the short story and the day-dream (Wollen 1976, p. 23). Wollen 
shows that North by North-West follows the Proppian pattern, 
and'suggests that this pattern is also to be found in other films by 
Hitchcock. 
Moreover, the Proppian sequence of functions is not unique 
to Hitchcock. Here, if my memory serves me well, is a synopsis of 
the film The Karate Kid: 
A New York youth (the hero) seeks the attentions of a girl (the 
princess). She, however, likes boys who drive cars, and rejects the hero 
because he rides a bicycle. The hero then faces competition from the 
local gang-leader (the villain) for the attentions of the princess. In a 
physical confrontation, the villain humiliates the hero and damages his 
bike. A karate competition is advertised at the local youth-club, in 
:1 which the villain seems the likely victor. The hero tries to learn karate 
from an instructor at the club but fails to make progress. However, 
help arrives from an unexpected quarter. The hero's family have a 
mysterious Oriental gardener (the helper and donor), ' whose wisdom 
includes an intimate knowledge of Zen (the secret weapon) and its 
application to karate. After overcoming his scepticism regarding the 
Oriental's strange methods of instruction, the hero agrees to a course of 
arduous training, enters the competition, defeats the villain, receives 
the gift of a car from the all-knowing Oriental, 'followed by much 
admiration' from the princess, and offers to take her for a celebratory 
ride... 
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In the above example, the main characters in the film play the 
roles of hero, villain, princess, and helper. Certain functions are 
expanded, while many are omitted, such as the pursuit and the 
rescue. Examples of the Proppian sequence can also be found in 
other products of popular culture, such as children's comics 
(teenage romances, cartoon adventures, the Bun ty and the Judy). 
According to the comparative study reported by Mandler 
and Johnson, Liberians find European folktales "to be perfectly 
acceptable as local tales" (Johnson & Mandler 1980, p. 80). 
However, the most likely explanation of this phenomenon is the 
ubiquity of the Proppian sequence of functions, rather than 
Mandler and Johnson's grammar. Dseagu argues that it is the 
indigenous tradition of the folktale, rather than Western traditions 
of novel writing, which has been the major influence on the 
development of the African novel. Moreover, "the modern novel in 
Africa tends to reflect the plot structure of the folktale" (Dseagu 
1992, p. 593). 
Dseagu argues that criticism of the African novel tends to 
suggest that the novel is primarily a Western form, which has 
recently been brought to Africa from Europe. Consequently, the 
African-novel is held to be at an early and inferior'stage of 
development compared to its Western counterpart. According to 
Dseagu, the underlying assumption of this Eurocentric criticism is 
that the conditions which enabled the English novel to develop are 
a universal necessity for the novel's development: 
"A great deal of the critical perception of! the African novel 
stems, from the view that the novel as an art form originated 
in the West in the eighteenth century. Ian Watt, in his 
important work The Rise of the Novel, appears to` have given 
currency to this impression by not-, providing , adequate 
; warning that he was confining himself strictly; to the novel 
in, England even while generalizing about. the early 
beginnings of the novel. Thus, certain of his arguments 
pertaining to the social factors' behind the rise of the novel 
in England are often reproduced to evaluate the situation of 
the African novel. " 
(Dseagu 1992, p. 584) 
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In Watt's account of the English novel, the rise of the individual in 
a burgeoning capitalist society is one of the conditions for the rise 
of the novel, the growth of a reading public, and the development 
of. character (Watt 1972). According to Dseagu, critics compare 
these conditions with those that prevail in traditional African 
society, conditions that impose conformity rather than individual- 
ity, to argue that characters do not exist in the African novel, and 
that there is no basis for their development. Dseagu argues that 
characters do exist, but African novelists work with a different 
notion of character: 
"Most African novelists, if not all, use character, not as a 
reflection of individualism, but as a reflection of the ideals 
of communalism, group solidarity, and conformity to 
emphasize the principles of Africa's morality. The technique 
most favored by many African novelists is to make 
character representative and functional... " 
(Dseagu 1992, p. 596) 
This functional notion of character is one of the influences of the 
folklore tradition: 
"In all the folktales of Africa the principle, is the same: the 
character is easily identified for what he stands for, and 
very little or no attempt is made to give this character any 
psychological specificity. " 
(Dseagu 1992, p. 598) 
A further influence on the novel is the sequence of events in 
the folktale, which, as we have seen, are marked by a departure, a 
set of adventures, and a return. The Senegalese novel is marked 
by a similar structure of departure, initiation and return (Dseagu 
1992, p. 591). -According to Dseagu, the episodes in Zulu. folktales 
"tend. to mark important epochs in the rites of passage of the 
individual", and the three most distinctive: phases -arc birth, 
adulthood, and old age (Dseagu 1992, p. 590)., Dseagu argues that 
"in the African novel, precisely the same passage from birth to 
adulthood, is at the core of the plot, structure", - (Dseagu 1992, 
p. 591). On, the basis of this parallel, Dscagu concludes that "more 
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than'75 percent of Africa's novels are based on the plot structure 
of the folktales" (Dseagu 1992, p. 591). 
. So it would seem that in this context, the Proppian sequence 
does have a cultural connection with tribal initiation rites, and 
that this connection is also apparent in the African novel. Yet this 
division into episodes that mark stages in the narrative of life can 
also be found in the English novel. Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre, for 
example, can be broken down into four distinct stages: the first 
ten'chapters contain Jane's youth (her experiences at school, her 
upbringing as an orphan with the Reeds); the next seventeen 
chapters contain Jane's maturity (her relationship with Rochester 
at Thornfield Hall, the prospect of a marriage that fails to occur 
because of Rochester's non-human wife who is locked in the attic); 
the next eight chapters contain Jane's escape from Thornfield Hall 
(in which she spends several nights sleeping alone on the moors, 
and discovers distant cousins living in an isolated cottage); and the 
final sequence contains Jane's approach to old age (her return to 
Thornfield Hall and the now blind and wifeless Rochester). The 
sequence in which Jane escapes to the moors has certain 
similarities with initiation ceremonies that require the initiate to 
spend some nights alone in a forest or wild place. Moreover, Jane 
also discovers a new identity in finding her lost cousins, a family 
which is lacking at the beginning of the novel. 
Similar folktale motifs are found in Jane Austen's novels, 
which also culminate in marriage, while the journey is a 
prominent feature of many novels, such as Don Quixote, The 
Pilgrim's Progress, David Copperfield, Heart of Darkness, Portrait 
of a Lady,. Ulysses, and Sexing the Cherry. Many of these' journeys 
involve some kind of initiation, such as Heart of Darkness , and 
Jungians would describe such narratives as symbolic - symbolic, 
that is, of a narrative of individuation. However, the biographical 
narrative which describes the development" of child 'into adult, 
such as: David Copperpeld, and the narrative which describes the 
problems of achieving a successful match, such as `Jane Austen's 
novels, are. also narratives of initiation, " narratives, that describe 
the rites of passage into adulthood, marriage, or both. " 
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8.7 THE SYMBOLIC 
Moreover, in Todorov's view symbolism and interpretation are 
inseparable (Todorov 1982a, p. 19), so that any narrative X 
becomes symbolic of another narrative Y if we can establish a 
series of correspondences between the events of X and the events 
of Y. If the narrative Y belongs to the same textual category as X, 
then .X is conventionally designated a "re-make" of Y and we are 
in the realm of intertextuality (such as Joyce's Ulysses in relation 
to Homer's Odyssey ). However, if the narrative Y belongs to a 
different textual category (psychoanalytic, religious, scientific, or 
extra-textual rather than literary), then X is conventionally 
termed an allegory or a symbolic narrative. 
For example, we could interpret Jane Eyre as a Freudian 
narrative of repressed desire (Jane flees Thornfield Hall because 
she desires Rochester; she sublimates her sexual desire by 
throwing herself into teaching while living with St John the 
Christian), a Jungian narrative of individuation (Jane's desire to 
express her inner self is symbolised by her visionary paintings; 
the desire of her psyche for liberation is symbolised by her 
staring out the window at the moon; she flees Thornfield to 
rediscover the mother earth within on the moors), or a Proppian 
narrative of the heroine who survives various tests, to achieve 
marital status (Jane the orphan re-discovers her family; the non- 
human wife who threatens Jane's prospect of marriage is a villain 
who is vanquished In a fire; St John is a false hero who tries to 
lure Jane into marriage). 
'As correspondences can be established between all three of 
these narratives (Jungian, Freudian, Proppian), if ýat story . is 
symbolic in one of these senses it must also be symbolic in the 
other two. A narrative can therefore be defined as symbolic if it 
contains a 'sequence of events that can be mapped onto Propp's 
functions in the folktale. However, while this, notion of the 
symbolic applies to events, the symbolic is also used to describe 
the rhetorical device of antithesis, in which two terms are set in 
direct opposition to each other, such as good and evil. When a 
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number of antithetical pairs occur in close textual proximity, a 
correspondence is established between the positive terms of the 
pairs, and another between the negative terms. When one group 
of terms are set in direct opposition to another group, we have 
what Barthes calls the symbolic code (Barthes 1990, pp. 26-28). In 
the Balzac tale, Sarrasine, for example, the opening description 
creates the set of oppositions inside%outside, heat/cold, life/death, 
young woman/old man (Barthes 1990, p. 65). 
; 'Such correspondences are created by description, so that the 
symbolic code of antithesis is a symbolism of the scene, compared 
with the symbolism of events described above. However, for Levi- 
Strauss, antithesis is the guiding principle that creates structures, 
and in his analysis of Indian myth, this principle applies equally 
to events and scenes (Levi-Strauss 1986). According to Levi- 
Strauss, antithesis is a cognitive universal, and this device is used 
to show how the thinking of primitive peoples obeys a certain 
logic (Levi-Strauss 1972). In Leach's summary, Levi-Strauss 
shows that sets of relationships among humans may be rep- 
resented in myth as relations between animals and plants, or 
relations between different categories of animal, food, sound and 
silence, smell and taste, or landscape (Leach 1970, p. 66). 
Correspondences on a universal scale are a major feature of 
what Tillyard (1972) describes as the "Elizabethan world picture". 
In comparison with what Levi-Strauss would call an unconscious 
process. (creating structures by antithesis), the medieval view of 
the universe was a conscious enterprise, in which a "resolution to 
find correspondences everywhere was a large part, of the great 
medieval, striving after unity" (Tillyard 1972, p. 91). ,, In . this world 
picture, the universe was ordered both vertically and horizontally: 
vertically, as a hierarchical chain of creation which ý "stretched 
from the foot of God's throne to the meanest of inanimate objects" 
(Tillyard 1972, p. 33); horizontally, as a series of planes, "arranged 
one . below another in order of dignity but connected by an 
immense net of correspondences" (Tillyard 1972, p. 91). 
336 
Correspondences were held to exist between all the orders 
of creation, so that the sun among the planets, the king among 
men, the lion among the animals, the eagle among the birds, and 
the rose among the plants, could all be seen as equivalent because 
they occupy the same place in the categories to which they belong, 
at the 
, 
top of the vertical order (Tillyard 1972, p. 39). Each could 
therefore stand as a symbol for any of the others. Yet such 
correspondences were not without a political significance. In 
terms of the "body politic", in which the organisation of society is 
likened. to the human organism, the peasant must know that his 
place was firmly entrenched at the bottom of the human anatomy, 
but, just as the feet were essential to support the rest of the body, 
the ploughman's labour was necessary to support the rest of 
society; if the feet refused to function, the body would no longer 
be mobile (Tillyard 1972, pp. 104-10G). 
In creating this system of correspondences, the guiding 
principle appears to be the hierarchy, rather than antithesis: a 
vertical ordering of the universe enables the horizontal system of 
equivalences. However, the domination ýof the Christian church 
ensures. that antithesis is a prominent feature in medieval 
literature, an antithesis that might take the form of God/Satan, 
good/evil, or sin/virtue. Chaucer's moral tales, for example, serve 
to illustrate one of the seven sins or one of the corresponding 
virtues, which the characters serve to personify. Medieval notions 
of character also reflect medieval notions of the human (Tillyard 
1972, pp. 73-87). According to medieval physics, the four humours 
of melancholy, phlegm, blood, and choler, which are created in the 
liver, are the "life-giving moisture of the body" (Tillyard 1972, 
p. 77).,. An imbalance of the humours In our physical composition 
creates a- particular temperament. Our, higher . faculties, form 
another hierarchy, with the five senses at the bottom, the three 
components of common sense, fancy or imagination, and memory 
forming aý middle layer, and reason (comprising the' will and 
: '. understanding) at the top (Tillyard 1972, pp. 78-79).:; 
A-, further aspect of the medieval 'world., picture - is the 
influence of the planets on human behaviour. In the Elizabethan 
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view, "the stars sway the mind to certain states by acting on our 
physical predispositions" (Tillyard 1972, p. 64): 
"If a man is weak in will and naturally choleric, for instance, 
the stars may greatly influence him. Such a man may forget 
that reason should rule the passions and, prompted by 
stellar influence, may give way to them. In this he becomes 
near the beasts... " 
(Tillyard 1972, p. 64) 
Each planet exercised its own influence, which generally reflected 
the attributes of the deity after whom they were named. Venus 
and Mars, two planets that feature in Chaucer's The Knight's Tale, 
form an antithetical pair, in that Venus, as Aphrodite the goddess 
of love, provoked desire, while Mars, as Ares the god of war, 
provoked belligerence. 
This medieval world picture can be traced in the plays of 
Shakespeare. In this case, Elizabethan notions of the human 
constitution, mental faculties and behaviour all serve to create 
characters of a more complex sort than Chaucer's. In addition one 
could argue that, for Shakespeare, antithesis was a structuring 
device and a source of drama. In Measure for Measure, for 
example, one such antithesis is lust v abstinence, an opposition 
that reflects the medieval heritage of the seven sins and the seven 
virtues. In As You Like It, Antony and Cleopatra, and Romeo and 
Juliet, one such antithesis is peace v war, and here one could 
argue that Venus and Mars are responsible for the dispositions of 
the main characters and the events that unfold. 
The pairing of Venus with Mars serves to create drama out 
of the conflict between the two terms of associated pairs, such as 
desire v belligerence, love v hate or peace v war. This conflict 
may take the form of an Internal conflict within characters, or an 
external conflict between two or more characters. In addition, the 
conflict between Venus and Mars may be reflected metonymically 
by spheres of influence, in which case one location is ruled by 
Venus, 'and ä second by Mars. Figure' 16 illustrates these various 
conflicts. 
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FIGURE 16: VFNtJS AND MARS IN SHAKFSPFARF'S DRAMAS 
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;- In As You Like It, Venus rules the Forest of Arden, while 
Mars rules elsewhere. The forest is a magical place where the 
banished Orlando discovers romance, his belligerent brother 
discovers a harmonious disposition, the brothers are reconciled, 
and four weddings conclude the play. In Romeo and Juliet, Venus 
rules the dispositions of Romeo and Juliet, while Mars rules the 
families to which they belong. In Antony and Cleopatra, Venus 
rules in Egypt, while Mars rules the battlefield. However, Antony 
and Cleopatra are ruled by both planets: Antony is torn between 
the demands of military duty and the temptations of Cleopatra, 
while Cleopatra fluctuates between a soothing and an aggravating 
disposition, and between affection and animosity towards Antony. 
Shakespeare's plays show that antithesis may function as 
the structuring device envisaged by Levi-Strauss, which can be 
applied' to events and scenes. We therefore need to distinguish 
between a symbolism of antithesis, a poetic symbolism based on 
the symbol, and a narrative symbolism based on correspondences 
between events. 
The medieval system of correspondences was a way of 
ordering the universe conceptually. In this two-dimensional 
system; a symbol is a name which is substituted for another name 
of the'same horizontal value. This notion of the symbol as a kind 
of metaphor is what might be termed poetic symbolism, and the 
medieval system of associations has provided a lexicon of symbols 
for poets of the "symbolist" school (the lily and the 'rose in Eliot's 
Four Quartets, for example). 
Any historical context for a lexicon'of symbols is denied by 
Jungfans, who argue for a universal lexicon of archetypal symbols. 
Frye's' application of Jung to literary criticism ' can ý also ' be 
characterised by a resolution to find correspondences everywhere, 
in the search for some kind of organic unity, (Frye 1990). Frye 
identifies four narrative categories which he calls "logically prior 
to the ordinary literary genres" (Frye 1990, p. 162). These 
archetypal categories, which Frye calls mythoi or generic plots, are 
romance, tragedy, irony or satire, and'comedy (Frye 1990, p: 162). 
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In Frye's system of correspondences, comedy is associated with 
spring, romance with summer, tragedy with autumn, and satire 
with winter (Frye 1990, pp. 131-239). Having observed that 
tragedy and comedy were once episodes of the same sequence, 
Frye then constructs a "total quest-myth" which spans the four 
seasons (Frye 1990, p. 215). In constructing this myth, Frye 
identifies the theme of each mythoi as one of four elements in 
Greek tragedy, so that these elements also turn out to be arche- 
typal: 
"The four mythoi that we are dealing with, comedy, 
romance, tragedy, and irony, may now be seen as four 
aspects of a central unifying myth. Agon or conflict is the 
basis or archetypal theme of romance. .. Pathos or 
catastrophe ... is the archetypal theme of tragedy.. . Sparagmos ... is the archetypal theme of irony and satire.. . Anagnorisls ... is the archetypal theme of comedy. " (Frye 1990, p. 192) 
In this construction of correspondences, all literatures and all 
narratives are connected by a schema of archetypes, onto which 
all stories can be mapped, and, presumably, from which they all 
derive. Yet Frye is less concerned with interpreting a symbolism 
of events than with establishing relations between: categories, and 
associations between images, so that his global view of literature 
represents a similar construction to the medieval world picture. 
While Jung argues for the archetypal symbol, some inter- 
preters of neolithic culture have argued that the primitive human 
lived in a world of symbols (Dames 1976, pp. 81-84). According to 
what Hawkes calls the romantic view of metaphor, as, exemplified 
by Shelley, Herder, and Vico, myths reflect primitive man's 
metaphorical response to the world, and primitive language was a 
language. -of metaphor and symbol (Hawkes 1989, ýpp. 38-39). 
Others have argued that human thought or, language has evolved 
from the use of symbols to the use of signs. - In Kristeva's . view, 
for 
example, "the second half of the Middle Ages (thirteenth to 
fifteenth, centuries) was a period of4, transition for- European 
culture: - thought based on the sign replaced that : based. on. the 
symbol". (Kristeva 1980, p. 38). 4F=. 
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-. However, Todorov argues that attempts to describe the 
language of primitive peoples in terms of the symbol, and 
attempts to explain the evolution of the sign from the symbol, 
both show the presence of the symbol in our own thought and 
language (Todorov 1982b, pp. 222-246). In the first case, the 
assumption is that our language is "made up solely of signs, in the 
restricted sense - thus of logic, thus of reason": 
"More precisely, as it is difficult to ignore the symbol 
altogether, we declare that we - normal adult males of the 
contemporary West - are exempt from the weaknesses 
linked to symbolic thought, and that the latter exists only 
among the others : animals, children, women, the insane, 
poets (those harmless lunatics), savages, our ancestors - 
who, in turn, know no form of thought but this. " 
(Todorov 1982b, p. 223) 
Whereas some argue that our thinking knows only signs, while the 
others knows only symbols, Todorov argues that "our thinking uses 
the same mechanisms as that of "primitives" or of people who are 
"sick"" 
, 
(Todorov 1982b, p. 223). He then proceeds to identify "the 
mechanisms of symbolic thought in those who claim to have none" 
(Todorov 1982b, p. 225), such as Levy-Bruhl and Piaget. One 
example of the supposedly primitive mechanisms, in our own 
thinking . 
is the confusion of temporal . order, with causality (Todorov, 1982b, p. 243). Here, Todorov recalls Barthes' definition 
of the law of narrative, according to which "the mainspring of 
narrative, is precisely the confusion of consecution and. con- 
sequence, what comes after being read in narrative as, what is 
caused by " (Barthes 1979a, p. 94). In that case then, we can say 
that narrative obeys the rules of a primitive logic. 
In the second case (the evolution of sign, from symbol), 
Todorov argues that "thinking that they are describing, the, origin 
of language and of the linguistic sign, or, their childhood, people 
have in effect projected onto the past an implicit knowledge of the 
symbol as It exists In the present" (Todorov. 1982b, p. 227)., Thus 
descriptions of "original language" can be re-interpreted to show, 
not , 
that -they are necessarily false,, but that they.., have ". mis- 
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identified their object": "in the belief that they were discovering 
the other's sign, they have often described our own symbol" 
(Todorov 1982b, pp. 225-226). 
The difference between linguistic sign and verbal symbol is 
that ý the sign entails a signifier and a signified, whereas the 
symbol involves an association, or a correspondence, between 
names or signifiers. As Todorov explains in his Symbolism and 
Interpretation: 
"... meaning is not simply an association like any other. 
Association implies the possibility of conceiving of each of 
the associated entities autonomously. Now the signifier 
exists only because it has a signified, and vice versa; they 
are not two freely existing entities that someone has decided 
to link together at a given moment. " 
(Todorov 1982a, p. 16) 
Todorov also suggests that "the receiver understands discourses 
but. interprets symbols" (Todorov 1982a, p. 18). However, while 
the receiver might understand signs, a discourse involves partici- 
pants and interpretation, as well as receivers and understanding. 
Moreover, one could argue that it is from a cultural distance that 
symbols need to be interpreted, and that the symbols in 
Shakespeare's dramas, for example, were readily understood by a 
contemporary audience. Just as the Eleusinian mysteries were so 
well: known that much detail was not recorded, Tillyard points out 
that, many, assumptions in the Elizabethan world picture were 
such common knowledge that they are hardly mentioned. in 
contemporary texts (Tillyard 1972, p. 17). Furthermore, Todorov's 
own argument above shows that what we interpret as symbols 
may be understood as signs by others. 
In his Theories of the Symbol, Todorov points out that the 
hermeneutic tradition recognised very early the difference 
between; 
, 
two orders of language, logos and, muthos, "and, 
consequently, between two modes of reception, comprehension in 
the one . case 
and interpretation in the other" (Todorov 1982b, 
p. 30).. In the case of the muthos however, it is not symbols which 
are interpreted, but symbolism : in particular, the symbolism of 
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events, in which one narrative or sequence of events is explained 
by referring to another. 
As we have seen, it was the function of the hermeneus to 
interpret the muthos or plot of the ritual drama in the mysteries. 
Discussing the connection between myth and religious ritual, 
Harrison describes a myth, in this context, as a story with a 
magical purpose (Harrison 1963, pp. 327-331). However, for the 
story or the ritual in which everyone participates or performs, 
there is no audience, and there is no symbolism. If symbolism is 
inseparable from interpretation, It is only when there is a 
separation between performers and spectators that a drama 
becomes symbolic and requires interpretation by the hermeneus. 
The = role of the hermeneus was to explain the mystery or the 
symbolism of the unfolding events, rather than interpret symbols, 
so that, symbolism and mysteries were intertwined., However, 
according to Barthes' (1990) classification of textual signifiers, the 
symbolic code is a code of antithesis, while the hermeneutic code 
is a code of enigmas or mysteries. In the next chapter, we look at 
the hermeneutic code in more detail, and investigate mysteries in 
the context of fiction writing. 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
In. the - last chapter, we identified some of the basic -thinking 
processes in fiction writing as remembering, imagining, and 
focusing the imagination, each of which can, be applied to events, 
scenes,, and syntax. The notion that events require. a, separate 
process of linearisation was discounted for two reasons: firstly 
because some kind of ordering is inherent in remembering and 
imagining, and secondly because of the likely influence of story 
schemata- that is, the ordering of events in story memory. 
In. this chapter we looked at! story = memory and story 
schemata in more detail. We discussed psychological, research into 
the accuracy of story recall, and identified two problems with this 
research. -The first arises from the use of grammars to: represent 
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the structure of stories, which leads to the question of how a story 
grammar is related to a story schema. The second is that people 
not only comprehend but also interpret the stories they read or 
hear. We found evidence for this observation, and argued that the 
function of a story schema is to guide interpretation rather than 
comprehension. However, instead of defining a story schema by a 
grammar, we argued for a definition of a story schema as a 
sequence of events to which we can attach a name. 
We found evidence for the suggestion that "the kind of story 
schema developed from hearing stories from the oral tradition 
may. be a cognitive universal" (Mandler 1982, p. 210). In the 
course of this investigation, we discussed the representation of 
stories, at different levels of abstraction, referring to Propp's 
Morphology of the Folktale and Aristotle's writings on the plot. We 
found, sequential similarities between folktales from different 
cultures, and then looked for an explanation of why this should be 
the case. One explanation is that the similarities reflect a common 
experience in the human mind - this is the explanation given by 
Jung, Freud, and Levi-Strauss. A second explanation is that 
sequential similarities reflect a common experience in social 
development. We investigated this possibility and found 
sequential similarities between tribal initiation rites and folktales, 
but the evidence that folktales reflect a common tribal stage in 
social development was inconclusive. In the course of this 
investigation, we digressed into a discussion on the social origins 
of Greek tragedy, and its evolution from ancient festivals and 
mysteries. This discussion served to explain the origins of the 
term "plot" and its attachment to mystery. It also provided 
specific examples of how story schemata guide interpretation. 
We argued that interpretation has a role In generating new 
stories. In fiction writing, interpretation fills a gap between 
remembering events (either from a writer's story memory or 
from her personal experience) and Imagining the events of her 
fictional work. We showed how story schemata are used in this 
process. Looking at the results of research into story memory, we 
found evidence of the operations noted by Freud in his accounts of 
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the unconscious, and we argued that these operations also apply 
to the process of interpretation in the generation of new stories. 
We concluded by discussing different notions of the 
symbolic, and we identified three different kinds of symbolism. 
The first is a narrative symbolism based on the creation of 
correspondences between events, the second is a poetic 
symbolism based on the use of verbal symbols, and the third is a 
structural symbolism based on antithesis. 
This chapter has explained how story memory and story 
schemata can influence the process of imagining the events of a 
new story. In the course of this explanation, we have referred to 
mysteries in the context of ancient Greece. In the next chapter, we 
consider mysteries in the context of fictional texts, and identify 
further thinking processes in fiction writing. 
6 
346 
.ý7. 
. 
£r 
CHAPTER NINE: 
NAMING 
AND 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
,, 
- ý..... e 
347 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter six, we showed how linguistic approaches to modelling 
writing are dominated by Chomsky's transformational grammar 
and, by a rationalistic view of language. As we saw in the last 
chapter, these views are also reflected in the use of story 
grammars to represent story schemata. In chapter seven we 
discussed Saussure's view of language, and we pursued this 
approach in discussing narration and description in fiction writing, 
and in giving an alternative definition of a story schema. In 
chapter seven, we identified the processes of remembering, 
imagining, and focusing the imagination. Each of these activities 
can be applied to events, scenes, and syntax. In the last chapter 
we showed how story schemata guide interpretation in the 
process of fiction writing. 
To, identify further thinking processes in fiction writing, we 
now, return to the suggestion made at the end of chapter six. 
There we said that to develop a model of fiction writing that made 
use of Saussure's semiological view of language, we would need to 
look at alternative models of reading, as these are more developed 
than models of writing - models of reading that provide an 
alternative to Chomsky's rationalistic account of sentence comp- 
rehension (Figure 17). 
t.. 
the text = 
Isemantic 
structures 
writing 
reading,; 
syntactic 
structures 
FIGURE 17: WRITERS, READERS AND TEXTS: 
THE TEXT AS STRUCTURE 
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.. r 'In this chapter we pursue that suggestion in more detail. We 
begin by discussing different perspectives on the relationships 
between writers, readers, and texts. A shift of emphasis from 
product to process has occurred not only in composition studies in 
the USA but also in literary theory. Our discussion in this chapter 
concentrates on Barthes' (1990) account of the process of reading, 
in which he classifies textual signifiers. Our assumption here is 
that avenues of meaning for readers can also be avenues of 
meaning for writers. 
Barthes describes reading as a process of hypothesis testing, 
in which naming is equivalent to problem solving. We explore the 
role, of ý naming in reading and writing. Following Saussure, we 
argue-`that names are signifiers, rather than elements in an 
inventory of things. Assuming Saussure's notion of the linguistic 
sign, we identify the recall of signs as the thinking that occurs 
automatically whenever a writer is generating text. We argue that 
naming in writing is not the continuous process given by 
rationalistic accounts of language, but refers to the specific. process 
of-'imagining names or signifiers. We conclude this section by 
adding signifiers to the objects of thought in fiction writing, and 
show-how the processes we have already identified (remember- 
ing, imagining, and focusing the imagination) apply to this object. 
Following this discussion of naming, we explore the role of 
problem solving in reading and writing. AI researchers have 
presented an account of story understanding as problem solving. 
We discuss their argument and show that, in the context of fiction 
writing, methods of problem solving can be described in terms of 
sequential and associative relations. r We compare rationalistic 
accounts of problem solving with Barthes' account of the herm- 
eneutic code - a' code of enigmas or mysteries. We show how 
mysteries in fictional texts can be classified according to event, 
scene, signifier, and syntax. We conclude by'discussing the ways 
in which fiction writing can be described as problem solving; these 
include the creation of enigmas for the reader. 
i1ýý, ýVy 
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9.2 READING AND WRITING, WRITERS AND READERS 
The development of composition studies in the USA is marked by 
a shift from emphasising product to emphasising process (Flower 
& Hayes 1980a). Recent developments in literary theory are also 
marked by this change of emphasis, and one aspect of current 
literary theory is a concern for the reader and the process of 
reading (Culler 1983). Before discussing a model of reading, let's 
consider different perspectives on the relationships between 
writers, readers, and texts. 
As a commodity, the text is no different from other 
commodities that are produced for exchange and circulation in the 
market-place (Figure 18). Writers produce texts that are sold to 
publishers, and texts are presented in publications that are aimed 
at specific markets (newspapers, romance magazines, academic 
journals). The publication is a commodity that is distributed to 
points of sale and bought by consumers. Writers maintain a 
relationship with readers only through their publishers and the 
publication, and the market requires the production of texts that 
are aimed at specific readers. The constraints on the writer are 
determined by the constraints on the reader and the demands of 
the market: some publications may be aimed at readers who have 
the 
publisher 
the text the text 
op- 
the the 
writer reader 
FIGURE 18: WRITERS, REAPERS, AND TEXTS: 
THE TEXT AS A COMMODITY 
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limited time for reading, so that texts must be short, entertaining, 
and so forth. The diverse types of publication in the market-place 
(magazines, journals, paperback books) each aim at a diversity of 
readers, whose interests are often explicitly defined by age, 
gender, income, employment or leisure activities (teenage school- 
girl', independent career woman, young housewife, mountain 
climber, train spotter, antique collector). 
writers 
texts 
publishers 
selected 
texts 
critics 
selected 
texts 
readers 
FIGURE 19: WRITER, READERS AND TEXTS: 
THE CRITIC AS A" FILTER ''' ý'' 
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Given this plurality of texts and readers, some have argued 
that there is a need for a specialised group of readers whose 
function is cultural evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination. 
This ethical perspective is exemplified by Liddell's view of 
literary criticism (Liddell 1965). In his view, the literary critic is a 
reader with a censorious function; his role is to mediate between 
authors and readers by passing judgement on literary works 
(Figure 19). Serious criticism must be applied to serious works, so 
that the critic must initially select the serious works that are 
worthy of his attention. This selection excludes some aspects of 
popular culture in their entirety, while certain categories of the 
novel, such as science fiction and pulp romance, are popular 
genres that are equally unworthy of serious attention. This leaves 
a nebulous category of serious novels, which the serious critic 
must read in order to evaluate the quality of the author's mind 
(Liddell 1965, p. 22). Great minds, great works, and good works 
(the minor classics) are worthy of the attentions of posterity, 
while novels that are beneath serious criticism are designated 
"middlebrow" or "lowbrow" (Liddell 1965, p. 20). In this way, the 
critic gives moral instruction to the general mass of readers 
regarding what to read and where to find the humanistic values 
that are essential to the survival of civilisation. 
From this perspective, any attempt to deal with the 
profusion. of texts and signs that proliferate in bookshops or on 
television is regarded with suspicion or hostility. Hough, for 
example, regards Barthes' application, of semiology as "trivial" 
(Hough 1969, p. 109). Cultural studies, semiology, and text 
linguistics are different ways of approaching a plurality; of texts. 
However, we have already noted the problems of establishing a 
taxonomy of text types in chapter six. A 
. 
further problem lies In 
the hybrid approach to texts endorsed by;,. Beaugrande and 
Dressler's text linguistics (Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981)., In, their 
application of communications theory and information theory to 
textual analysis, all texts are regarded as information. Information 
is encoded by, senders and decoded by, receivers. Decoding is a 
reverse process to encoding, so that the message encoded by the 
sender can, be understood by the receiver, (Beaugrande &, Dressler 
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1981', pp. 42-43 ). The process of writing, therefore, is like sending 
a fax or electronic mail, while the writer represents some kind of 
human modem. However, writing that involves the translation of 
syntax into a binary sequence of ones and zeroes is usually the 
occupation of computer programmers who write in machine code. 
the 
publisher 
the the 
writer reader 
the text 
FIGURE 20: WRITERS. READERS AND TEXTS: 
THE TEXT AS SPEECH 
Apart from the metaphor of writing as electronic 
communication, there is a further analogy in Beaugrande and 
Dressler's text linguistics. Just as writing is like sending an 
electronic message to a human modem, writing is also like speech, 
another type of communication that involves sending and 
receiving. We have noted the use of this metaphor in chapter five, 
where we discussed Flower and Hayes' model of planning (Flower 
& Hayes 1980a). In their functional approach to texts, Beaugrande 
and Dressler assume a two-way communication circuit of senders 
and receivers, in which writing is like a speech act (Figure 20). 
Thus, -, the textual functions of narration, *description, - and 
argumentation are transmitted by the writer and `received - by the 
reader in a similar fashion to Saussure's description' of the speech 
circuit (Saussure 1983, p. 11). r =.. ` 
As Beaugrande and Dressler indicate, discourse analysis is a 
term that was initially used to describe the study of conversation 
(Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 19). One problem with the notion 
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that writing can be studied as a type of speech is the distortion of 
the relationships between writer, reader, and text. If we compare 
Figure 20 with Figure 18, the text as a commodity has been 
replaced with the text as a direct link between writer and reader. 
Yet readers do not interact with writers but with texts (Figure 21), 
and, the problem with Beaugrande and Dressler's metaphors for 
the process of reading is that they do not throw any light on this 
process. 
the 
writer 
)ý:: j 
the text 
the text 
the 
reader 
FIGURE 21: WRITERS, READERS, AND TEXTS: 
READING AND WRITING AS TEXTUAL INTERACTION 
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Discussing research into the writing behaviour of academics 
in chapter, three, we asked the question whether there were any 
similarities between academic writing and fiction., From the 
functional point of view, we have seen that. narration, description 
and argumentation occur not only in fictional texts, ; but also in 
other-text types. Academic writing is mainly argumentation, but 
narration and description also have a role in argumentation, as 
Cooper and Matsuhashi indicate (Cooper, &. Matsuhashi 1983). 
However, _ 
from the point of view of _ reading, , 
these textual 
functions are placed in some kind . of context, such as those, 
represented by Figures 18 or 19.. , .. 
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The context of reading is another aspect of the inter- 
textuality that was mentioned in chapter seven, another factor 
that influences the creation of meaning in reading. In Figure 19, 
reading may be influenced by instructions on how to read certain 
texts. In Figure 18, reading is influenced by the packaging of a 
commodity, which might also include instructions on how to read. 
For example, this is William Williams introducing A Book of 
English Essays: 
"The English Essay has a multitude of forms and manners, 
and scarcely any rules and regulations. A minimum 
definition would be to say that the Essay is a piece of prose, 
usually on the short side, which is not devoted to narrative. 
The essayist may use anecdotes to make his point; he may 
even take a leaf out of the novelist's book and create 
characters to illustrate his own opinions. But his chief 
interest is not that of the story-teller. " 
(Williams 1980, p. 11) 
However, while "the essayist's usual role is that of the social 
philosopher, the critic, or the annotator" (Williams 1980, p. 11), 
some of the essays in this collection, such as those _of 
Oliver 
Goldsmith or Charles Lamb's In Praise of Chimney-sweepers, are 
largely devoted to narrative. On the other hand, the Penguin 
edition of the Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Allan Poe 
contains some tales that are largely devoted to argumentation and 
were first published as essays. 
In these examples, textual functions are contextualised by 
the presentation of a commodity: a book of essays, or a complete 
Poe. Here, it is the publication or the commodity that defines the 
text type, and determines whether a text be read as an essay or a 
tale. Culler describes genre as an aspect of intertextuality, one 
way "in which a text may be brought into contact with and 
defined in relation to another text which helps to make it 
intelligible" (Culler 1975, p. 140). However, the above examples 
show that genre, or intertextuality, is not merely a property of the 
text. Discussing genre in the cinema, Steve Neale writes: 
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"The cinema is not simply an industry or a set of individual 
texts. Above all, it is a social institution... Not only a set of 
economic practices or meaningful products, cinema is also a 
constantly fluctuating series of signifying processes, a 
'machine' for the production of meanings and positions, or 
rather positionings for meaning; a machine for the 
regulation of the orders of subjectivity. Genres are 
components in this 'machine'. As systematised forms of the 
articulation of meaning and position, they are a fundamental 
part of the cinema's 'mental machinery'. Approached in this 
way, genres are not to be seen as forms of textual 
codifications, but as systems of orientations, expectations 
and conventions that circulate between industry, text and 
subject. " 
(Neale 1980, p. 19) 
The world of the publication, like the cinema, is a social one, and 
in both cases, genre and intertextuality are aspects of the 
production of commodities. One purpose of genre is to introduce 
some kind of homogeneity in diversity, to establish a relationship 
of familiarity between the consumer and the product. In the 
context of unknown commodities, genre serves the purpose of 
naming, an activity which is also essential in reading and writing. 
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9.3 READING, WRITING, AND NAMING 
Naming, the "process of nomination", is, according to Barthes in 
S/Z, "the essence of the reader's activity" (Barthes 1990, p. 92): 
"... to read is to struggle to name, to subject the sentences of 
the text to a semantic transformation. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 92) 
Yet, ' while the reader appears to be poised on the edge of another 
logical transformation in the manner of Chomsky, this struggle to 
name is not as successful: 
"This transformation is erratic; it consists in hesitating 
among several names... " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 92) 
In this account of reading, the struggle to find a name is an 
activity that Barthes applies to events - the terms of the proairetic 
code: ', 
"Actions (terms of the proairetic code) can fall into various 
sequences which should be indicated merely by listing them, 
,,,. _since 
the proairetic sequence is never more than the result 
of an artifice of reading: whoever reads. the text amasses 
certain data under some generic titles for actions (stroll, 
murder, rendezvous), and this title embodies the sequence; 
the sequence exists when and because it can be given a 
name, it unfolds as this process of naming takes place, as a 
title is sought or confirmed; its basis is therefore more 
empirical than rational, and it is useless to attempt to force 
it into a statutory order; its only logic is that of the 'already- 
done' or the 'already-read... " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 19) 
-1 1. 
In a similar fashion to Genette's treatment of: narrative as 
the expansion of a verb, Barthes refers to the code- of, events as 
the unfolding or expansion of a name, here ä verb or ,a noun. 
Folding, on the other hand, is the contraction of a series of events, 
the classification of a sequence according to a name: 
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"What is a series of actions? the unfolding of a 
name... Inversely, to establish the sequence is to find the 
name: the sequence is the currency, the exchange value of the name. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 82) 
Barthes describes the essence of the reader's activity, the struggle 
to find a name, as a cycle of folding and unfolding. The search for 
a 'name, "the possibility of a metaname" (Barthes 1990, p. 82), is a 
search that dominates Barthes' account of the proairetic code: 
... to read... is to proceed from name to name, from fold to fold; it is to fold the text according to one name and then to 
-,, unfold it along the new folds of this name. This is 
proairetism: an artifice (or art) of reading that seeks out 
names, that tends toward them: an act of lexical 
transcendence, a labor of classification carried out on the 
basis of the classification of language -a maya activity, as 
the Buddhists would say, on account of appearances, but as 
discontinuous forms, as names. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 83) 
In Barthes' activity of folding the text according to a name, 
reading is a process that involves summarising or contracting a 
sequence of events into a smaller unit; in this context, naming is 
comprehending. In the subsequent activity of unfolding the text, 
reading is also a process of interpreting the text in the light of this 
name. Culler explains this process of folding and unfolding by 
describing 'a response to the opening sequence öf Joyce's short 
story, Eveline: 
"Is she 'waiting' for something in particular? Is she 'refusing' 
to do something? Is she 'thinking' or 'making a decision'? " 
(Culler 1975, p. 221) 
Barthes' essence of reading, his cycle of folding and, unfolding, is 
this hesitation among names (thinking, waiting, refusing) : In ,, this 
account of reading, a name is a hypothesis which is established, by 
classifying a sequence of events, and -tested by. interpreting 
subsequent events according to this classification. 
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This notion of reading as hypothesis testing is similar to the 
notion of reading as problem solving that we discuss below. Culler 
also describes reading as a process of hypothesis testing (Culler 
1975, p. 92), and in S/Z, Barthes describes the essence of reading 
as a problem solving activity: the reader's problem is to find a 
name; in this context, naming is equivalent to problem solving. 
According to representational theories of problem solving (Gick & 
Holyoak 1980), "stories or problems can be represented at many 
different levels of abstraction" (Kahney 1986, p. 78). In Kintsch 
and van Dijk's representational model of text production and 
comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk 1978), storing events in long- 
term memory is a process of "abstracting out the essential content, 
or 'gist' of a situation" (Kahney 1986, p. 78). In Kahney's summary: 
"Kintsch and van Dijk have proposed a number of processes 
for constructing abstract representations of the events we 
hear or read about, including deletion, generalization and 
construction. " 
(Kahney 1986, p. 78) 
In this representational theory of text comprehension (Kintsch & 
van Dijk 1978), generalization is a process, that 'generates 
schemata in long-term memory, while construction is a process of 
abstraction through classification, the process that Barthes 
describes as folding the text, or naming. 
" tHowever, while naming is a feature of representational 
models of comprehension and Barthes' account of reading, in the 
latter, reading is also a process of hypothesis testing, of testing the 
name by the subsequent interpretation f of the i text. In Barthes' 
model, reading is a process of textual interaction, an activity=that 
involves a bottom-up process of naming or folding, anda top- 
down° process of unfolding or, interpreting according- to, the 
assumed name. Barthes' model therefore. takes. us -back . to the 
interactive models of human information; processing that. we 
discussed in chapter six, while Culler concludes his Structuralist 
Poetics by trying to decide whether reading is a top-down or a 
bottom-up process (Culler 1975, p. 235). 
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But in Barthes' model of textual interaction, does the 
struggle to name ever succeed? Towards the end of S/Z, Barthes 
writes: 
"Soon all the proairetic sequences will be closed. The 
narrative will die. What do we know about them? That they 
are born of a certain power of the reading, which tries to 
give a sufficiently transcendent name to a series of actions, 
themselves deriving from a patrimonial hoard of human 
experiences; that the typology of these proaireticisms seems 
uncertain or that at least they can be assigned no logic other 
than that of the probable, of empirics, of the 'already-done' 
or 'already-written', for the number and the order of their 
terms vary, some deriving from a practical reservoir of 
trivial everyday acts (to knock at a door, to arrange a 
rendezvous) and others from a written corpus of novelistic 
models (the Abduction, the Declaration of Love, the Murder); 
; that by their typically sequential nature, simultaneously 
syntagmatic and organized, they can form the favored raw 
material for a certain structural analysis of narrative. " 
(Barthes 1990, pp. 203-204) 
On the' one hand, Barthes refers to a sequence of events as the 
unfolding of a name. On the other hand, the folding and unfolding 
of the'text refers to the reader's activity of naming Ia sequence of 
events and interpreting the text in accordance with the assumed 
name. *The contraction of events is a metonymic operation that'the 
reader applies to the proairetic code. However, the, reciprocal 
operation of expanding a name is a metonymic operation that has 
more relevance to writing than to the reader's interpretative 
activity of hypothesis testing. If a sequence of events is the 
expansion of a name, then Barthes' notion of the transcendent 
name, sought but not found by the reader, suggests that were 
such a'name to have an existence, it is to` be found in the mind of 
the author. The transcendent name is then the name out of which 
an entire narrative unfolds; this name remains 
Fa secret name that 
the text does not disclose, a secret'that provides an Insoluble 
riddle for the reader. 
360 
Barthes' hesitation among names leads to his describing 
reading as a "metonymic skid" which is "the very movement of 
meaning" (Barthes 1990, p. 92): 
"... the meaning skids, recovers itself, and advances 
simultaneously; far from analyzing it, we should rather 
describe it through its expansions, lexical transcendence, the 
generic word it continually attempts to join: the object of 
semantics should be the synthesis of meanings, not the 
analysis of words. In a way, this semantics of expansions 
already exists: it is called Thematics. " 
(Barthes 1990, pp. 92-93) 
Now, according to one guide on how to write novels, "Theme is 
often confused with Plot" (Doubtfire 1982, p. 1). While the plot is 
"the` action of the story" (Doubtfire 1982, p. 1) or Barthes' 
- 11 proairetic code, "the theme is the subject of the novel (eg. 
loneliness, revenge, betrayal, self-discovery) and can usually be 
expressed in one word, or at least in one sentence" (Doubtfire 
1982, "p. 1). This last qualification is not uncontroversial, as the 
sentence is more frequently used as a metaphor for the plot 
rather than the theme. According to Culler, for example, Greimas 
uses the structure of the sentence as a model for the plot in his 
Semantique Structurale (Culler 1975, p. 82), while in Barthes' view, 
"the hermeneutic narrative is constructed according to our image 
of the sentence" (Barthes 1990, p. 76). However, if the plot can be 
represented as a sentence, the theme is the subject of the 
sentence'-'the theme is its name. 
Thematics, the discussion of themes, is therefore a quest for 
the name' behind the story, the name out of which the narrative 
unfolds, the answer to the question: what' is `the story about? 
From the, writer's point of view, one ways to approach, fiction 
writing is to decide on a name and then to expand, it, as the above 
example shows. On the one hand, this may not be such an easy 
task, as Doubtfirc points out: 
"Sometimes it is difficult to 'formulate a theme at the'outset, 
but so long as you have a rough idea of the story you want 
,ý to tell, and feel deeply about It,, the theme will clarify asýthc 
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book evolves... The theme may not be uppermost in your 
mind when you first begin to conceive the idea for your 
, story 
but I think you should cherish and nurture it as the 
book progresses... You must tell an absorbing tale but you 
should also preserve your theme, however well concealed. " 
(Doubtfire 1982, p. 3) 
On ° the other hand, medieval fictions provide examples of 
narratives which are the expansions of names. In addition, the 
names in these examples are not names that the author wants to 
conceal. Chaucer's Canterbury Tales include several moral tales 
that illustrate one of the seven deadly sins or one of the 
corresponding virtues. In these examples, the entire narrative 
(narration and description, events and scenes) is the expansion, 
unfolding, or illustration of a name. For example, Pride is 
expanded in the Nun's Priest's Tale, Greed in the Friar's Tale, 
Gluttony in the Pardoner's Tale, and Lechery in the Physician's 
Tale. ' In the Second Nun's Tale, a sermon on Sloth is followed by an 
expansion of the corresponding virtue Fortitude. More virtues are 
unfolded in the Clerk's Tale (Patience) , the Tale of Melibeus 
(Prudence) , the Franklin's Tale 
(Constance or Patience) , and the 
Man of Law's Tale (Constance or Fortitude). In the Tale of 
Melibeus,, Prudence is also personified in Dame Prudence, and in 
the Man of Law's Tale, Constance is also personified in the leading 
character Constance. 
With this last example, we are now on the verge of what 
Barthes calls Thematics. In the Man of Law's Tale, Constance is a 
personification of constancy in the Christian faith and an example 
of Fortitude. In the Franklin's Tale however, Dorigen personifies 
constancy in marriage and exemplifies Chastity in the face of 
Lechery - or is It Patience and Forbearance in marriage, or 
perhaps Fortitude in the face of Sloth? Even with: a -limited 
number of sins and virtues, the possibilities for, thematic 
discussions are endless. 
Moreover, just as the struggle to name is a continuous 
feature of reading according to Barthes, a grammatical approach to 
language suggests that naming - is 'also , a, continuous feature of 
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writing. According to traditional accounts of syntax and sentence 
topics (Phythian 1980, Witte & Cherry 1986), a writer initially 
names the sentence by choosing the grammatical subject, a 
process that is repeated for each sentence. Here we have a 
microcosmic reflection of the macrocosmic operation of choosing 
the theme or the global name. In addition, the function of 
narration is to "name events", as Cooper and Matsuhashi point out 
(Cooper & Matsuhashi 1983, p. 17). In traditional grammar, it is 
the active verb that names events, so that a writer is also naming 
every time he chooses a verb. 
5it 
However, it is only in traditional grammar that writing 
involves choosing an event, followed by a name for the event. In 
that case, language is the nomenclature that is criticised by 
Saussure -a list of names corresponding to things in the external 
world. In Saussure's view of the linguistic sign, ideas are in- 
separable from words, and a sign is a link between a sound 
pattern (the signifier) and a concept (the signified). In this case, 
names are signifiers, rather than elements in an inventory of 
things. -. 
In fiction writing, remembering events and scenes is not 
dependent on language; in this context, remembering can be 
visualising, as Beaugrande and Dressler point out: 
. "The results of ideation and development need not yet be 
... committed to particular natural 
language expressions. They 
might, for instance, be composed 
p 
of 'mental imagery for 
scenes or event sequences. " "` 
(Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, p. 40) 
However, `by itself, visualising does not generate writing. In order 
to write, a writer must also remember linguistic signs. In a similar 
fashion to traditional grammar, Chomsky's dualism suggests that 
writing is 'a process of thinking about things in the external world 
followed by the remembering of names. - Here, we are suggesting 
that although remembering can be visualising in the' context of 
events Tand scenes, writing also requires -the' remembering of 
linguistic signs, rather than names or signifiers: 
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In the basic model of writing represented by Figure 5, the 
remembering of signs is therefore the thinking that cannot be 
dissociated from writing, the thinking that occurs automatically 
whenever a writer is generating text. However, there are 
occasions in writing when the signifier becomes detached from the 
signified. A process of remembering names or signifiers suggests 
that the signified exists in thought but the signifier has been 
forgotten; this provides the sensation of having the word on the 
tip of one's tongue. The signifier also becomes detached from the 
signified in the process of reflecting on the sign; that is, when the 
signifier or the signified become objects of scrutiny. This provides 
the sensation of doubting whether one has chosen the right word. 
However, this meta-linguistic activity of reflecting on the 
sign is not restricted to the occasions when a writer uses a 
dictionary to verify meaning or a thesaurus to find alternative 
signifiers; reflecting on the name or the signifier is a necessary 
process in argumentative writing. Fielding's Joseph Andrews and 
Tom Jones provide examples of argumentative writing in fictional 
texts. In the opening chapters of each volume, the omniscient 
narrator, digresses from narration or description into argument- 
ation, and these chapters often consist of reflections on names or 
signifiers. Book One and Book Three of Joseph Andrews both begin 
with a discussion of biography: "Of writing Lives in general" and 
"Matter prefatory in Praise of Biography". In Tom Jones, 
reflections on signifiers take up the op ening'chapters"of Books 
Four to'Eighteen. These signifiers include histories, - the serious; the 
comic, ' the marvellous, critics, authors, plagiarism, virtue, and 
prologues. In the opening chapters of Books Ten and Eighteen, the 
signifier is the reader. 
If we assume Saussure's notion'of the linguistic sign, naming 
in writing is not a continuous process but refers` to' the specific 
process of imagining names or signifiers. Argumentative writing 
sometimes results in a conclusion that produces a-textual sign; 'a 
textual sign Is invented by defining a signified and 'than attaching 
a signifier to this definition. One purpose of, inventing a sign is to 
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enable a writer to make subsequent references to a signified 
without describing it. In this case, a writer's thinking includes 
imagining a name, a search for a signifier that can be attached to a 
signified. Here, the process of writing involves a process of 
abstraction through naming that is similar to Barthes' notion of 
"folding the text" in reading. However, the invention of signs is not 
restricted to argumentative writing. This is an extract from the 
first chapter of Wolf Solent, a novel by John Cowper Powys: 
"The first thing he did was to attempt to analyse a 
mental device he was in the habit of resorting to -a device 
that supplied him with the secret substratum of his whole 
life. This was a certain trick he had of doing what he called 
'sinking into his soul'. This trick had been a furtive custom 
with him from very early days. In his childhood his mother 
had often rallied him about it in her light-hearted way, and 
had applied to these trances, or these fits of absent- 
mindedness, an amusing but rather indecent nursery name. 
His father, on the other hand, had encouraged him in these 
moods, taking them very gravely, and treating him, when 
under their spell, as if he were a sort of infant magician. 
It was, however, when staying in his grandmother's 
house at Weymouth that the word had come to him which 
he now always used in his own mind to describe these 
obsessions. It was the word 'mythology'; ""and he used it 
entirely in a private sense of his own. He could remember 
a. "very well where he first came upon the word... ". 
. (Powys 1964, p. 19) 
Here we have the description of a signified, the, attachment of a 
sign ifier;; ("mythology"), and the invention of a sign ("Wolf's 
mythology") that recurs throughout the novel. 
However, it is partly a question of interpretation whether 
Powys is. inventing signs or merely imagining signifiers. In a 
biography of Powys, Jeremy Hooker claims that "it is a strength of 
the book that Wolfs 'mythology' can only, be 'apprehended 
imaginatively, through metaphors, and not described reductively 
in 'scientific' psychological terms" (Hooker 1973, p. 35). Discussing 
Lawrence's -The Rainbow, Anne Fernihough refers to, Dcrrida's 
argument that "it is in the nature of apocalyptic writing that it 
promises revelation, a sight of the signified, but leaves us instead 
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with the shape of the signifier" (Fernihough 1995, p., vcxi). On the 
one hand therefore, the question appears to be whether the 
signified is sufficiently defined in the case of Wolf Solent to 
justify 
. 
the reference to "Wolf's mythology" as a sign, while 
Lawrence's "rainbow" remains an empty signifier. 
On the other hand, a functional analysis that compares 
"Wolfs mythology" with Lawrence's "rainbow" shows that we are 
dealing here with a difference between sign and symbol, in which 
the. latter refers back "to one (or several) unrepresentable and 
unknowable universal transcendence(s)" (Kristeva 1980, p. 38). In 
Wolf Solent, "Wolf's mythology" first occurs in the first chapter. 
Here, the signified is described before the signifier is attached to 
it. Subsequently, "Wolf's mythology" occurs frequently throughout 
the novel, and is used as though it were a sign; that is, as though 
the signified had been sufficiently described. Lawrence's "rain- 
bow" occurs five times: once as the title of the novel, twice when 
the narration is focused on Anna, and twice when focused on 
Ursula., Anna is likened to Moses on Pisgah mountain and sees a 
"faint, gleaming horizon, a long way off, and a rainbow like an 
archway, a shadow-door with faintly coloured coping above it" 
(Lawrence 1995, p. 181). Later on the same page: "Dawn and 
sunset were the feet of the rainbow that spanned the day, and she 
saw the hope, the promise". Ursula listens to a sermon on Genesis, 
and hears: "I do set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be a token of 
a covenant between me and the earth" (Lawrence. 1995, p. 302). 
Finally, the novel closes with a scene in, which Ursula, . "as she sat 
at her. window", sees "the stiffened bodies of the colliers", and "a 
dry, brittle, terrible corruption spreading, over., the face ofý the 
land" (Lawrence 1995, p. 458): 
"And 
. 
then, in the blowing clouds, she saw a band of faint 
iridescence colouring in faint colours ä portion of the hill. 
And forgetting, startled, she looked for the hovering colour 
and saw a rainbow forming itself. " 
(Lawrence 1995, p. 458) 
A "vast rainbow" forms and Ursula's vision closes the novel: - 
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"And the rainbow stood on the earth... She saw in the 
rainbow the earth's new architecture, the old, brittle 
corruption of houses and factories swept away, the world 
built up in the living fabric of Truth, fitting to the over- 
arching heaven". 
-(Lawrence 1995, p. 459) 
In Wolf Solent, "Wolfs mythology" has a similar function to 
the sign in argumentation; the signified appears before the 
signifier, and "Wolf's mythology" is used iteratively. In The 
Rainbow, the signifier appears and reappears on five occasions 
before the signified, whose appearance is deferred until the 
apocalyptic conclusion, where it is equated with a "Truth" that is 
contrasted with the "Falsity" of industrial civilisation. While 
"Wolf's, mythology" is described in the text of the novel, 
Lawrence's "rainbow" not only has Biblical connotations but, given 
that Lawrence's thinking was influenced by Nietzsche, points to 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, who prophesises: "I will show them the 
rainbow and the stairway to the superman" (Nietzsche 1969, 
p. 52). Lawrence's interest in symbolism is manifest in his critical 
writings (Lawrence 1962); however, it is the Jungian notion of the 
symbol, and the Jungian notion of "individuation", that seem to be 
the dominant influence on Lawrence's notion of symbolism. 
So, thinking processes in fiction writing include imagining 
names or signifiers. In this context, names include the titles of 
short stories, novels, and chapters, and the names of places and 
characters. Imagining names also includes the invention of signs 
for argumentative purposes. Both "Wolf's mythology" and 
Lawrence's "rainbow" are the result of imagining names, but the 
first occurs in the text and functions as a sign, while the second is 
also the title'of the novel and functions as a symbol. In the latter 
case,, the, process of imagining appears to be influenced by 
intertextüality and by Lawrence's notion of the symbolic. 
According to Barthes, it is the proper name that provides a 
focal point for what he calls "semes" or "connotative signifiers" 
(Barthes` 1990, p. 17). Semes are signifiers of person, place, or 
object. For example, Sarraslne is the title of a short story by 
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Balzac;, at the initial stage of Barthes' reading, the title is a 
mystery - who or what is Sarrasine? But "the word Sarrasine has 
an additional connotation, that of femininity, which will be 
obvious to any French-speaking person, since that language 
automatically takes the final "e" as a specifically feminine 
linguistic property" (Barthes 1990, p. 17). "Sarrasine" is therefore a 
R ., seme or a connotative signifier of femininity; according to Barthes, 
"the proper name acts as a magnetic field for the semes" (Barthes 
1990, 'p. 67): 
"The proper name allows the person to exist outside the 
semes, whose sum nonetheless constitutes it entirely. As 
soon as a Name exists (even a pronoun) to flow toward and 
fasten onto, the semes become predicates, inductors of truth, 
and the Name becomes a Subject: we can say that what is 
proper to narrative is not action but the character as Proper 
Name... " 
; (Barthes 1990, p. 191) 
From Barthes' perspective on reading, "Sarrasine" is a 
signifier of femininity because of its lexical properties; this is an 
example 'of Saussure's associative relations in 'the process of 
reading. However, "Sarrasine" is also the title of Balzac's story, 
and, as the story later reveals, the name of a leading character. 
From a writing perspective, "Sarrasine" is once again the result of 
imagining a signifier. In this case, the signifier is both the name of 
a character, and the title of the story, but we cannot make, the 
inference that the connotative associations of Barthes': reading are 
the same associations that informed the process of imagining. 
In Barthes' account of reading, naming is not restricted to 
naming a sequence of events, the terms of the proairetic code., The 
proairetic code is one of five codes' or categories according . to 
which, Barthes classifies "textual signifiers" (Barthes ; 1990, p. 19); 
codes are therefore meta-names, or. names of, signifiers., Semcs 
form the terms of the semic code. The other three codes are the 
symbolic, the hermeneutic, and-the cultural. As we. discussed in 
the last chapter, the symbolic code is a code of antithesis, and in 
Barthes'. account Is created by description; the hermeneutic code is 
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a code of enigmas or mysteries, and this is discussed below. On the 
cultural code, Barthes comments: 
" .. the cultural codes are references to a science or a body of knowledge; in drawing attention to them, we merely 
indicate the type of knowledge (physical, physiological, 
medical, psychological, literary, historical, etc. ) referred to, 
without going so far as to construct (or reconstruct) the 
culture they express. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 20) 
Barthes introduces more codes in his analysis of Poe's tale, The 
Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar (Barthes 1981). These are codes 
of communication, chronology, and narrative or rhetoric. On the 
one, hand, the new codes that Barthes discovers by this textual 
analysis are absorbed by Genette's notion of narrative discourse 
(Genette 1980). On the other hand, Barthes describes these codes 
as "sub-codes of the general cultural code" (Barthes 1981, p. 155): 
., "Although all the codes are in fact cultural, there is yet one, 
among those we have met with, which we shall privilege by 
calling it the cultural code: it is the code of knowledge, or 
(rather of human knowledges, of public opinions, - of culture 
as it is transmitted by the book, by education, and in a more 
general and diffuse form, by the whole of sociality. " V 
(Barthes 1981, p. 155) 
In a model of fiction writing, these cultural codes, or codes 
of knowledge, are aspects of a writer's semantic, memory (Cohen 
et al 1986), aspects of the knowledge that informs a writer's 
thinking processes. However, while Barthes points out that all 
codes are cultural, his explanation of character in terms of semes 
reduces the notion of character to a purely linguistic phenomenon. 
In his account of reading, "when identical semes traverse the 
same proper name several times and. appear, to settle on it, a 
character is created" (Barthes 1990, p. 67). A character 
is therefore 
"a product of combinations" which are held together, by the proper 
name (Barthes 1990, p. 67). Barthes' notion of semes might explain 
how characters are created In the. process of reading, but, as the 
above example shows, a semic explanation relies on an analysis of 
lexical properties and the associative relations that are made by 
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the reader. In writing, lexical properties might influence the 
imagining of names and a writer's preference for particular words. 
However, a semic account of character is inadequate to explain 
how characters are created in the process of writing. 
Notions of character are also shaped by cultural traditions, 
and are also inseparable from notions of the human. According to 
the medieval cosmogony of earth, air, fire and water, humans are 
compounded of four humours that correspond with the elements: 
melancholy, blood, choler and phlegm (Tillyard 1972, p. 76). An 
imbalance leads to the temperaments of melancholia, sanguinity, 
and so forth; thus "the intertwining of the humours was the cause 
of character" (Tillyard 1972, p. 77). In Forster's discussion of 
character, a "flat" character is an unchanging type with one 
distinctive trait, a notion that reflects the medieval notion of 
humours, while "round" characters undergo a change as a result of 
their, experiences (Forster 1962). According to Genette, the 
classical attributes of character, such as the proper name, physical 
appearance, and moral "nature", have all disappeared from the 
contemporary novel, to be replaced by a more complex notion of 
"personality" (Genette 1980, p. 246). According to Dseagu, African 
novelists tend to have a notion of character which reflects ideals 
of communalism and group solidarity, rather than individuality 
(Dseagu 1992, p. 596). In Watt's view of the English novel, the 
notion of character is inseparable from notions of, individuality 
and growth or change in the individual, and the development of 
these notions parallels the development of capitalism (Watt 1972); 
thus Defoe's Robinson Crusoe reflects the colonial. aspirations of 
an expansive and optimistic eighteenth century capitalism. 
In a similar fashion, one could argue that the demise of the 
individual parallels the falling rate of profit; thus the nostalgic and 
apocalyptic' tendencies of the post-war: English novel: (Bergonzi 
1972) . reflect the pessimism of a . senile capitalism that offers 
warfare as the only means of survival. At the same, time however, 
another major influence on notions of the: human, has been the 
discoveries of Darwin and Freud. In Lawrence's case,: The Rainbow 
reflects his claim to have abandoned "the old stable, ego: of 
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character" and his turn to the ego of Jungian psychology, to what 
Fernihough calls the preconscious (Fernihough 1995, p. xxvii). In 
this case, Jung's notion of the growth of the psyche and Nietzsche's 
notion of the will to power lead to a zenith in the rise of the 
individual, where individual growth "is achieved at great cost; 
there is always the danger that the overweening 'I' will devour 
the 'not-I', that its own expansion will turn into appropriation, 
becoming the will-to-power in a negative sense" (Fernihough 
1995, p. xxviii). 
The example of Lawrence shows how a writer's thinking 
about character is influenced by specific schemata for human 
behaviour and human psychology, in real worlds and in textual 
worlds. Yet if the negative aspect of Nietzsche's concern with the 
will is the will to power and devouring the 'not-I', the positive 
aspect is that "willing is creating" (Nietzsche 1969, p. 223). In 
chapter seven, we argued that it was through their realisation of 
character that fiction writers exercise the omnipotence of 
thoughts, and we used the term focusing the imagination to 
describe the process of "becoming someone else" and allowing 
characters to drive the plot. Focusing the imagination on syntax is 
to ask, "If I were someone else, how would I speak (outer speech), 
think, (inner speech), or write? ". Focusing on, the event or the 
scene is töask, "If I were someone else, what'would I think about 
the events in which I am Involved or the scenes with which I am 
confronted? ". 
The above discussion indicates a further way of focusing the 
imagination, which Is to focus on the name or the signifier. From a 
perspective of text types, focusing on, events, 'scenes or syntax 
produces a narrative with Internal, variable or; multiple focal- 
ization in Genette's typology, depending on{ whether there' is a 
change' of focus and whether, the same events or scenes are 
perceived by more than one character. ` In , any case, simplifying 
this typology we can say that focusing on-the scene or the event 
produces a focalized descriptive or narrative text. Focusing on the 
name 'or the signifier therefore creates a' focalized argumentative 
text. -, In chapter five we referred to the notion that, planning 
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argumentative texts involved the management of polyphony 
(Coirier et al 1994, p. 80), which might involve imaginary 
conversations, or a dialogue with an imaginary protagonist. 
Students may also engage in these sort of verbal rehearsals when 
anticipating tests, exams, interviews and so forth. 
Writing fiction might involve a similar process, a process of 
creating. characters by Imagining their thoughts and opinions 
about specific issues, topics, names, or signifiers. To focus on the 
signifier is to engage in focused argumentation, to create a 
character by asking, "If I were someone else, what would I think 
about, this particular signifier? ". As an example of focused 
argumentation, we return to Lawrence's The Rainbow, where 
Ursula is debating with Winifred on the subject (or signification) 
of religion; Winifred "wanted to bring Ursula to her own position 
of thought": 
"They took religion and rid it of its dogmas, its 
falsehoods. Winifred humanised it all. Gradually it dawned 
upon Ursula that all the religion she knew was but a 
particular clothing to a human aspiration. The aspiration was 
'the real thing - the clothing was a matter almost of national 
:-. taste or need. The Greeks had a naked Apollo, the Christians 
.a white-robed Christ, the Buddhists a royal, prince, the Egyptians their Osiris. Religions were local and religion was 
universal. Christianity was a local branch. There was as yet 
-no assimilation of local religions into universal religion. 
In religion, there were the two great motives of fear 
and love... " 
(Lawrence 1995, p. 317) 
In conclusion, this discussion has brought to light further 
processes in, fiction writing: reflecting on signifiers,,, imagining 
signifiers, and focusing the imagination on signifiers. In addition, 
the remembering of signs was identified as`the'sort of thinking 
that occurs automatically in writing. We have also shown that 
naming in writing is not the same process as naming in ' reading, 
which. Barthes describes as the reader's principal activity.: This 
activity of, naming was also describedý`above'- as' a form of 
hypothesis testing or problem solving, and we now discuss the 
notion of problem solving in more detail. 
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9.4 READING, WRITING, AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
In their studies of reading, psychologists have developed story 
grammars to represent story structure, to measure story 
comprehension, and to investigate the remembering of stories 
(Rumelhart 1975, Thorndyke 1977, Mandler & Johnson 1977, 
Mandler 1978, Mandler & DeForest 1979, Johnson & Mandler 
1980,: Mandler 1982). In the last chapter however, we referred to 
disagreements between story grammarians and Al researchers 
concerning story understanding. Before we discuss the notion of 
problem solving in the context of reading and writing fiction, we 
need to return to those disagreements. 
Criticism of the story grammarians' approach to explaining 
comprehension was initiated by Black and Wilensky (1979). In 
chapter six, we showed how Chomsky's transformational grammar 
provided a model for attempts to represent story structure in 
terms 'of a grammar. On the one hand, Black and Wilensky use 
Chomsky's (1965) arguments to point out the , inadequacies of 
story grammars that are not transformational grammars. On the 
other hand, they also point out the irony that two developmental 
psychologists (Mandler and Johnson) should try to develop a 
transformational grammar of stories when research has shown 
that transformational grammars are unlearnable; hence such a 
grammar, would not aid developmental psychology: (Black & 
Wilensky -1979, pp. 219-220). 
In their evaluation of story grammars, 'Black and Wilensky 
perform what they call an empirical test: 
"The evaluation technique we use. here is to Invent texts, 
then ask whether the various grammars ; accept them ý as 
stories. Ideally, a story grammar should be _a 
set of rules 
which generates all the texts that are stories but no texts 
that are not stories. Thus, if we find a`story that a grammar 
does not generate, that story is empirical'evidence against 
the grammar. In addition, If we find a nonstory, text that a 
;. grammar generates, that also 
Is empirical evidence against 
the grammar. " 
(Black & Wilensky 1979; p. 220) 
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Having ý invented the stories and nonstories that provide the 
empirical evidence on both of these counts, Black and Wilensky 
then show how the grammars are inadequate as models of 
comprehension. This inadequacy is due to the separation of syntax 
and semantics, a separation that we noted in Chomsky's model of 
sentence comprehension. According to Black and Wilensky, the 
main reason why "syntactic rules are not particularly helpful in 
story understanding is that the syntactic classes they presuppose 
cannot be defined independently of the semantic relationship 
between, the sentences" (Black & Wilensky 1979, p. 225). In 
particular, they note that "inference procedures are based upon 
the 'semantics of the story" (Black & Wilensky 1979, p. 226), and 
therefore must operate independently of the syntactic rules 
developed, for example, by Rumelhart (1975). Black and Wilensky 
conclude that "the Important Issue for investigation is the nature 
of understanding, not grammaticality", and therefore advocate 
what they call a content oriented rather than formal approach, an 
approach . that explores "the kinds of knowledge that people use in 
story understanding" (Black & Wilensky 1979, p. 228). 
However, the discussion in chapter six showed that 
knowledge can also be formalised and represented by grammars. 
In Frederiksen's model of discourse comprehension for example, 
content knowledge is formalised by the use of frame grammars 
(Frederiksen 1986). On the one hand, disagreements about story 
understanding reflect the different goals of developmental 
psychologists studying human memory, and Al researchers 
modelling human knowledge. In the first case, the purpose of a 
story grammar is to investigate story schemata, and, as we have 
seen, while Mandler defines a story schema as "a kind of mental 
structure or processing mechanism", she also points out that this 
mental, representation is not the same as the grammar, : which 
serves to represent story structure (Mandler 1982, p. 207)., In the 
second ; case however, the aim is to design machine intelligence, 
and it is frequently claimed that such a system 
'embodies 
or 
represents human Intelligence (Winograd & Flores 1986). In that 
case, it must 'also be claimed that the representations used in the 
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system are equivalent to the mental representations used by 
humans. On the other hand, disagreements about story under- 
standing are concerned with domains of representations, as we 
have noted. In their reply to Black and Wilensky, Mandler and 
Johnson"note a failure to take into account the domain over which 
their theories range. They point out that "we have explicitly 
limited our grammar to stories from the oral tradition" (Mandler 
& Johnson 1980, p. 306), and their explanation of this limitation 
was discussed in the last chapter. 
I t. 
However, there does not appear to be a consensus among 
story grammarians regarding the domain of their theories. In his 
reply to Black and Wilensky, Rumelhart claims: 
"Most story grammars are based around the observation 
that many stories seem to involve a sort of problem solving 
motif... Such stories have roughly the following structure: 
First, something happens to a protagonist which sets up a 
goal that must be satisfied. Then the remainder of the story 
is a description of the protagonist's problem solving 
behavior in seeking the goal coupled with the results of that 
behavior. " 
-(Rümelhart 1980, p. 313) 
According to Rumelhart, the domain of the story grammar is 
limited to stories that begin with a problem and unfold with a 
description of the protagonist's problem solving activities. 
Black' and Wilensky's evaluation of story grammars is 
continued by Black and Bower, who also make the connection 
between story grammars and problem solving: "we believe that 
the 'core intuitions underlying story' grammars relate to the 
planning or problem-solving knowledge that*readers'use'when 
comprehending both stories and procedural expositions" (Black & 
Bower 1980, p. 231). In their theory of stört' understanding 'as 
problem solving, Black and Bower go further than ' Rümelhart and 
define all stories in terms of problems: "A narrative simply relates 
a temporal sequence of events; a story relates a causal sequence 
of events relevant to a protagonist pursuing a goal or resolving 
some problem" (Black & Bower 1980, P-226). 
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According to Black and Bower, "stories have several features 
that commend their use as research material" (Black & Bower 
1980, p. 226). One of those features enables Black and Bower to 
study inference procedures: 
"... dramatic stories are interesting so that readers use their 
"implicit personality theories" to interpret the actions of the 
storybook characters, and that allows us to trace the 
inferences, attributions, and distortions of the text that 
readers typically display. In this regard, we view story 
understanding and recall as similar to the processes by 
which people understand and recall events in their social 
world. Readers are social-inference machines, and when 
reading stories they probably use the same inferential 
routines for interpreting actions, for conjecturing motives, 
and assigning blame as they do in their social interactions. " 
(Black & Bower 1980, p. 226) 
e 
Tt 
Here, Black and Bower make the inference that, because dramatic 
stories are Interesting, readers interpret them in a similar way to 
how they interpret life in general. Their assumption seems to be 
that stories resemble the real world, which is always Interesting. 
However, stories may also be interesting because of what Beau- 
grande and Dressler call "a principled alternativity relationship to 
the accepted version of the "real world"" (Beaugrande & Dressler 
1981, =p. 185). Black and Bower do not make any distinction 
between textual worlds and real worlds, and If one adopts this 
perspective, there is no need to postulate separate story schemata 
for human memory, as Greene remarks (Greene 1986', 'p'. 48). This 
would, be a positive feature if one's 'aim Is to design machine 
intelligence, because the number of representations In' the system 
can then-be trimmed. In Frederiksen's model of' comprehension, 
stories can be interpreted by referring" to more than one frame; 
problem frames are a separate feature from event` frames for 
example (Frederiksen 1986, p. 248). However, Black and Bower 
argue that "if stories are the traces of the problem solving 
activities of the characters, then the representation of story 
structure should be similar to the representation of, problem 
solving" (Black & Bower 1980, p. 236). In thatcäse: 
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"All that is necessary is an understanding of people's goals 
and motivations in real-life situations. Since stories are 
about people, they will naturally describe people's usual 
behaviour. " 
(Greene 1986, p. 48) 
This usual behaviour is outlined by Black and Bower: 
"The reader assumes that the central character will follow a 
rational plan to reach his goal, that he will use standard 
techniques of planning, and that he will use standard 
methods (actions) allowed in that setting as instruments in 
achieving that goal. " 
(Black & Bower 1980, pp. 244-245) 
Black and Bower use their theory to make hypotheses about 
the best remembered parts of stories. However, just as Black and 
Wilensky` perform an empirical evaluation of story grammars by 
inventing the texts that provide the required evidence, Black and 
Bower, also invent the texts that are used to test their predictions. 
In Black and Bower's experiments, a story is a short text that 
describes a problem and the actions taken to resolve the problem. 
For example: 
"John was looking for a book for a university class he. was taking. First he went to look in the library.... " { 
(Black & Bower 1980, p. 236) 
According to Black and Bower's theory, the best remembered 
parts of this story will be the events that bring about asuccessful 
result; "that is, the actions that result in 'John's acquisition of the 
book. Although these predictions arc` cönfirmed by ' Black and 
Bower's experiments, it remains an unanswered question whether 
similar results could have been obtained by alternative rep- 
resentations of story structure. 
The story grammarians do not. make, any, claims, for their 
grammars as models of reading. Black and Bower, however, claim 
that a' theory of problem solving also explains , the, process of 
reading: .. ý. ti°. 
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"Our desired process theory would view a story as though it 
were the literate, "thinking aloud" protocol of a verbose 
character solving an interesting problem; and the reader 
'would be viewed as an interested observer-scientist trying 
to make sense of the story character's problem-solving 
protocol. The reader has an implicit theory of planning and 
problem-solving comparable, say, to the General Problem 
Solver (GPS) of Newell and Simon (1972), and he is applying 
his, GPS interpreter to the character's protocol line by line to 
construct a model of that character's problem-solving plan 
and how his actions relate to it. It is this conjectured trace of 
the character's problem-solving activities (and their 
associated states) that is alleged to be the story's 
representation in the reader's memory. " 
(Black & Bower 1980, p. 244) 
Beaugrande and Miller also classify story units or episodes in 
terms of problems, claiming that this provides a better method of 
identifying episodic boundaries than the story grammarian's 
designation of an episode as an event plus a reaction (Beaugrande 
& Miller '1980, p. 188). In Beaugrande and Miller's case, the 
problem solving approach provides a model of children's story 
comprehension (Beaugrande & Miller 1980). 
Criticisms of attempts to model reading have pointed out 
that laboratory conditions and experimental tasks do not reflect 
real reading situations or the goals of readers; moreover, the 
remembering of simple stories does not reflect the" process of 
reading literary texts (Dillon 1980, Ide & Veronis 1990, Ide-& 
Veronis 1991). Dillon, for example, argues that "the conventions 
governing , laboratory experiments ... are . 
'rather. unlike. those 
governing many situations in which literature is read" (Dillon 
1980, p. 164): 
"Literariness ... resides In the readers'- decision Ito read a 
work as a work of literature, a decision usually warranted 
by its'being offered to them as such by (publisher, cataloger, 
or other authority. Insofar as this reading, is governed by 
conventions peculiar to -theýf literary- situation,,, the' 
conventions may be said tobe literary conventions and to 
be constitutive of 'literature'. " (Dillon 1980, p. 1G4) 
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Attempts to model reading assume a "normalization or idealization 
of reading", whereas "particular readers may have special 
interests and purposes which may lead them to process texts in 
ways the model does not predict" (Dillon 1980, p. 165). The process 
of reading literature is a process of evaluating and interpreting as 
well as remembering (Dillon 1980, p. 169), and interpretation 
involves top-down and bottom-up processing (Dillon 1980, p. 170). 
This notion of interpretation as an interactive process is similar to 
Barthes' notion of reading as a cycle of folding and unfolding -a 
cycle of formulating hypotheses by naming, and testing them by 
interpreting. 
While the original purpose of story grammars was to study 
human story memory, they have since been used as the basis for 
designing computational tools to assist story writing (Yazdani 
1989, Parthemore 1991). The representation of stories by the 
problem solving approach is an alternative method of designing 
machine intelligence, and one which, as we have pointed out, has 
computational advantages. In their criticism of models of reading 
developed by artificial Intelligence researchers, Ide and Veronis, 
like Dillon, consider these models from the perspective of reading 
literary texts (Ide & Veronis 1990, Ide & Veronis 1991): 
"The reader's goals, and the strategies for reaching these 
goals, are different for literary texts than for other texts. For 
a literary text these goals and strategies are likely to be 
considerably more complex than for, ' say, a newspaper story, 
where the goal 'may be only to 'get information' -a goal 
Implicit in current AI strategies, for story understanding, 
.. which include. procedures to construct static structures representing a sequence of events. " 
(Ide & Veronis 1990, p. 57) 
While different readers might pursue different goals, the reader 
of literary texts might have multiple goals which can also vary in 
the process of -reading ; (Ide '& Veronis 1990, p. 57). While Al 
researchers have been concerned with modelling the plans and 
goals of characters in stories (Schank & Abelson 1977), Ide and 
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Veronis point out that modelling the plans and goals of readers is 
a similar process: 
"Modelling the goals and plans of the reader involves 
processes identical to those involved in modelling the goals 
and plans of characters within a story... The kinds of goals 
that are attributed to characters in a story and the plans and 
planning strategies that are assumed to achieve these goals, 
are" not limited to modelling the behaviour of fictional 
characters but instead model human behaviour in general. 
Thus the same procedures currently used in Al systems to 
model the goals and plans of the characters of a story can be 
applied to model the reader himself. " 
(Ide & Veronis 1991, p. 171) 
However, would Al researchers disagree with these comments? 
We pointed out above that Black and Bower do not make any 
distinction between textual worlds and real worlds (Black & 
Bower 1980, p. 226). According to their theory of story under- 
standing,,, readers make the same inferences about fictional 
characters as they do about people in the real world, and both the 
fictional protagonist and the reader are engaged in the same 
activity; -that of problem solving. On the other hand, the reader's 
problem is merely one of recognition: "the problem for the reader 
is to ... recognize the plan of the protagonist of the story" (Black & 
Bower 1980, p. 245). Presumably then, when the protagonist's plan 
has been recognised, the reader's problem is resolved. 
But do protagonists always have plans,, can. they always be 
recognised, - and when they are recognised, does the reader lose 
the motivation to continue reading? According to Black and Bower, 
readers make the same set of rationalistic assumptions about 
fictional characters as they themselves make about readers (Black 
& Bower 1980, pp. 244-245). The theory that, many human 
activities involve problem solving was developed by Newell and 
Simon (Newell & Simon 1972), and their, theory is another aspect 
of the rationalistic tradition criticised by, Winograd and Flores 
(Winograd & Flores 1986): 
"Simon's decision-making theories developed into more 
general theories of 'problem solving' as he and others made 
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the first attempts to build intelligent computer programs. 
Rather than concentrating on the kinds of decisions that 
managers make, researchers studied tasks (such as proving 
logic theorems and solving simple puzzles) that could be 
viewed as problems of search in a space of alternatives. The 
`-'-task is characterized in terms of a 'problem space'. Each 
, 'node' of the space is reached by some sequence of actions, 
and has some consequences relevant to the structure of the 
task. The computer program searches for a solution in this 
potentially huge space of possibilities, using 'heuristics' to 
guide the search and to provide valuations... " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 22) 
Winograd and Flores describe four key elements in Newell 
and Simon's view of problem solving. These are the task 
environment, internal representation, search, and choice 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 22-23): 
"First, we characterize the problem in terms of a 'task 
environment' in which there are different potential 'states' 
of affairs, 'actions' available to the problem solver to change 
the state, and 'goals' from which rational actions can be 
derived. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 22-23) 
For Flower and Hayes, the process of writing is a problem solving 
activity (Flower & Hayes 1980a, Flower & Hayes 1980b, Hayes & 
Flower 1980b), and the task environment is-a`key element in 
their model of writing (Figure 2). What Black and Bower refer to 
as two common methods of problem solving feature in'Flower and 
Hayes"accounts of writing; these are the', -problem reduction 
method and means-ends analysis (Black'& Bower 1980, p. 236). In 
one Faccount (Flower & Hayes 1980a), " the writer's' problem is the 
large number of constraints that must be satisfied simultaneously. 
In this case, one solution is to ignore some constraints altogether; 
this is the problem reduction method., Another solution is to'plan; 
this is the method of means-ends analysis. ' Discussing this model 
of planning in chapter five, we concluded that a student's plan "To 
Do" something is an internallsed instruction. to perform a speech 
act. In this context, the writer's problem is `to"satisfy a-rhetorical 
goal, and an internal representation of the problem is given by the 
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assignment. A plan "To Say" something results from a memory 
search for possible content, while a writer's choice of material is 
constrained by the rhetorical problem. It is this rhetorical 
problem that the writer must solve in Flower and Hayes' further 
accounts of writing as problem solving (Flower & Hayes 1980b, 
Hayes & Flower 1980b). 
However, the analysis of planning in chapter five led to the 
separation of cognitive, meta-cognitive, and motivational 
activities. While writing might be considered as a problem solving 
activity, these different kinds of thinking processes are activated 
by different kinds of problems. While the rhetorical problem is 
tied: to ,a writer's motivation, the problem of choosing a writing 
strategy is a meta-cognitive one. From a cognitive perspective, the 
fiction writer's problem is the task of writing a story. According to 
the rationalistic view of problem solving, a story is a sequence of 
events, and a writer's problem is a metonymic one of describing 
the sequence of events that culminate in some kind of achieve- 
ment.,, The literature describes different methods of problem 
solving . that we can apply to this specific problem '(Newell & 
Simon 1972, Kahney 1986). Yet when applied to fiction writing, 
these methods are merely different ways of pursuing sequential 
and associative relations. < 
Kahney's three common methods of solving problems are 
the heuristic method, means-ends analysis, and the analogical 
method (Kahney 1986). The heuristic or "rule-of-thumb" method 
of writing a story would be to follow a well-used formula or 
schema, one that a writer has used before or one that is enforced 
by-the conventions of genre. In Kahney's summary, means-ends 
analysis, works by determining differences between a ', current 
state of ä problem and a goal state .. -., and -selecting operators 
known to be useful in reducing such differences" (Kahney 1986, 
p. 45). In, this case, a writer knows the beginning of a story and its 
conclusion, and pursues sequential relations in working out how to 
reach the end. To solve a problem by-analogy is to make, use of a 
strategy that would be used to solve a similar problem (Kahney 
1986, p. 68). In, this case, " the problem, solver, looks at the current 
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problem and tries to find similarities with familiar problems. 
Adopting this method, a fiction writer would pursue associative 
relations in searching story memory for events and scenes that 
can be adapted to fit the current story. 
Can we reach a different view of reading as problem solving 
by applying a similar distinction between thinking processes? In 
Forster's Aspects of the Novel, the reader's motivation to continue 
reading, having started, is the urge to know what is going to 
happen next (Forster 1962, p. 35). This urge to know the 
forthcoming sequence of events is what might be called the 
metonymic drive In reading fiction. In Barthes' account of reading, 
the principal activity of the reader is naming. Here the question is 
not so much what is going to happen next, as what 'is going on? 
The question of what is going on, the struggle to name, is what we 
might call the reader's urge or drive for comprehension. The 
reader may lose the motivation to read when the metonymic 
drive is not sustained, or when the drive for comprehension is 
perpetually frustrated. This loss may then be overruled if the 
purpose of reading is not only for entertainment but also to 
satisfy a task set by a teacher or figure of authority. 
While the meta-cognitive aspects of reading would include 
measuring quantities (pages, duration, and so forth), for the 
cognitive aspects we need to turn once more to . sequential and 
associative 'relations. In reading fiction, sequential relations 
encompass the code of events, Barthes' proairetic code. As the 
drives for knowledge and understanding are bound up with 
metonymy, it appears that, in fiction, reading; -cognition and 
motivation are difficult to disentangle. On the other, hand, the 
semic, symbolic and cultural: codes, codes ý. that "establish 
permutable, reversible connections, outside the constraint of time" 
(Barthes _: 
1990, p. 30), are all encompassed in the notion, of 
associative relations. ' 
However, there are two. codes ' that "impose, their terms 
according to an irreversible order" (Barthes 1990, p. 30). The first 
is the code of events, and the second Is the hermeneutic code, the 
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code of enigmas or mysteries. In Barthes' classification of textual 
signifiers, the hermeneutic code includes "all the units whose 
function it is to articulate in various ways a question, its response, 
and the variety of chance events which can either formulate the 
question or delay its answer; or even, constitute an enigma and 
lead to its solution" (Barthes 1990, p. 17): 
"Under the hermeneutic code, we list the various (formal) 
terms by which an enigma can be distinguished, suggested, 
formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed (these 
terms will not always occur, they will often be repeated; 
they will not appear in any fixed order). " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 19) 
In the, rationalistic view of problem solving, problems are 
metonymic phenomena defined by tasks, goals, and plans - the 
code of events - and the reader's problem is to comprehend 
events, within a rationalistic framework. In Barthes' view, to 
comprehend is to name, and naming is an activity that the reader 
also applies to the code of events. From both points of view, the 
reader's drives for knowledge and understanding are tied to 
metonymy. - However, the satisfaction of the first may deliberately 
be deferred, while the second may deliberately, be frustrated. -In 
either case, the reader now encounters a different kind of 
problem. To defer is to leave the reader in suspense, to hold 
something in reserve, to guard a secret, while to baffle produces a 
similar result: the creation of a mystery. 
These, two mysteries are both mysteries of the event:. What's 
going, to 'happen next? What's happening? If, enigmas' are 
questions that confront the reader in the process of reading, then 
we can attempt a classification of mysteries merely. by. listing the 
interrogative pronouns: what, who, whose, whom; which,, when, 
where, how, why? The verb taken by the interrogative will either 
indicate a mystery of the event, or, a mystery of identity (the verb 
"to be"). `In addition, If the fictional'text Is amixture*of, narration, 
description, i and argumentation-, - then we can . -also classify 
mysteries by these textual functions. 
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The first type of mystery is created in the process of 
narrating. Mysteries of the event can be subdivided according to 
Genette's chronological analysis of narrätive discourse (Genette 
1980). One kind of mystery surrounds events that have occurred 
prior to the narrative begins, while a second kind is the 
mysterious event that occurs during the narrative. A third variety 
concerns future events. While the most frequent question here is 
"What's going to happen next? ", other variations are "How is the 
event going to happen? ", "Who will perform the event? ", and 
"When 
. will 
the event occur? " In these cases, the reader knows an 
event is going to happen, but the question is how, who, or when? 
With a change of tense, the same questions might be raised by the 
other varieties of mysterious events: "What happened? ", "How? ", 
"Who? ", and "When? ". In addition, events of the past tense might 
also invoke the question "Why (did the event occur)? " 
The second type of mystery is created by description. If we 
consider, description as an expansion of the verb "to be", then 
mysteries of the scene are also mysteries of identity. Mysteries of 
the scene include "Who is X? " (the "woman in white" of Collins' 
novel, the narrator in Robbe-Grillet's La jalousie), "What is X? " 
(the contents of the box in Poe's Oblong Box), and "Where is X? " 
(Poe's Purloined Letter). 
From, Barthes' point of view however, mysteries of the event 
are also mysteries of identity: for example, " Who performed the 
event? " and " What was the event that occurred? ". On the one hand, 
the event or its perpetrator are mysterious in these examples 
because of their omission from the narrative. In a mystery of the 
scene on the other hand, someone, somewhere or something is 
notable. for its presence in the narrative, while the description 
fails to reveal some vital aspect of this person, . place or object. 
Both types of mystery are therefore mysteries of identity, because 
the narrative deliberately falls to provide a name that will, assist 
the reader's, purpose of identification. The, inability to name 
creates the. problem for the reader, and the. missing name, is 
suppliedby. the interrogative pronouns. 
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Conversely, a narrative may supply a name that is itself a 
mystery. In Barthes' account of reading a short story by Balzac, 
the title of the story poses a question: 
. "The title raises a question: What is Sarrasine? A noun? A 
name? A thing? A man? A woman? This question will not be 
answered until much later, by the biography of the sculptor 
named Sarrasine. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 17) 
However, some of these questions can be answered without 
further reading. We know that Sarrasine is a name, because titles 
are the names of stories. Moreover, titles are usually nouns. Here, 
then, we have another mystery of identity (who or what is 
Sarrasine? ), but one that is created by the title of the story. In his 
analysis of fictional titles, Dillon points out that the titles of short 
stories are often enigmatic: 
"Here there is a special class of titles which refer to some 
crucial image or detail in the story: they function as a 
mystery pointer until the detail is reached and then 
highlight its importance (though not always its meaning). " 
(Dillon 1980, p. 171) 
Names can be mysterious for two' reasons, in a similar 
fashion to the difference between mysteries.. of., the event and 
mysteries of the scene. In the first case, the mysterious name is a 
vital piece of knowledge that someone is seeking, 'and, the name 
may remain, undisclosed by the text. This name may ý be , 
secret, 
unknown, forgotten, taboo, or repressed. In Borges' tale Undr, ä 
secret name is the object of a quest. In Anglo-Saxon riddles and 
the, Welsh Triads, a secret name is hidden in the text. In Tom 
Sawyer and the tale of Peredur in the Mabinogion, the refusal to 
disclose a name is the cause of a fight. However, from the point of 
view of, cognitive processes in fiction, writing, the name is no 
different in. these examples from other objects of quests: (the pot 
of gold, the Holy Grail) or other causes of fights; a writer still has 
to Imagine, the events and scenes of the quest, in which the pot of 
gold, grail or name is the object. ifYF Yý 
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In the second case, the mysterious name is a name that is 
supplied by the text, but the name is mysterious because its 
meaning is obscure, forgotten, repressed, or unknown. A search 
for meaning could supply yet another version of the quest, but 
when the search for meaning is a feature of argumentation, the 
mysterious name provides a third type of mystery. For our first 
example, we return to the beginning of Milan Kundera's novel, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being: 
"The idea of eternal return is a mysterious one, and 
Nietzsche has often perplexed other philosophers with it: to 
think that everything recurs as we once experienced it, and 
that the recurrence itself recurs ad infinitum! What does 
this mad myth signify? " 
(Kundera 1985, p. 3) 
Here we have, not a mystery of identity (What is X? ), but a 
mystery of the signifier (What does X mean? ). Kundera's novel 
begins with argumentation, a discussion of the signifier "eternal 
return", and an attempt to discover its signification or meaning. 
Similarly, Fielding's preface to Joseph Andrews begins (p. 25 of 
the Penguin Classic edition): 
"As it is possible the mere English reader may have a 
4 different idea of romance with ' the author of these little 
; volumes; and may consequently expect, a : kind: of 
entertainment, not to be found, nor which was even 
intended, in the following pages; it may not be improper to 
premise a few words concerning this kind of writing, which 
I do not remember to have seen- hitherto attempted in our 
language. " 
Isere we have another example of a'novel that-begins with 
argumentation. In this case, the mysterious signifier is "romance", 
and Fielding pursues a discussion of its signification. In Tom Jones, 
Fielding begins with another exercise in problem solving, but the 
mystery is less concerned with signification than with 'definition 
and identity again, a mystery of the scene where the scene Is the 
book itself: - What's the menu? (the menu being the subject or the 
contents 'of the book). Book Two begins likewise with another 
mystery of, identity, this time given, by the question: What's a 
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history? In comparison, Book Two of Joseph Andrews begins with 
a mystery of the event, where the event is writing: Why do 
authors divide their books into chapters? 
As a final example of the mysterious signifier, here is an 
extract from Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses: 
"Consider this fallen man. He sought without remorse 
--to shatter the mind of a fellow human being; and exploited, 
. to 
do so, an entirely blameless woman, at least partly owing 
to his own impossible and voyeuristic desire for her. Yet this 
same man has risked death, with scarcely any hesitation, in 
a foolhardy rescue attempt. 
What does this mean? " 
(Rushdie 1992, p. 467) 
Here we, have, not a mystery of the event, but a mystery of the 
signifier, where the signifier is "the sequence of events that have 
just been narrated". While a mystery of the event, as formulated 
by the-reader, is "Why did the event occur? ", here, the events 
themselves are subject to a commentary by the narrator, in a 
similar fashion to the narrator's digressions in Fielding's novels. 
In Barthes' account, the hermeneutic code is an irreversible 
one, presumably because once an enigma is resolved or disclosed, 
it is no, longer an enigma. However, there is a fourth -type of 
mystery or problem that the reader may encounter in fiction, and 
one that may never be entirely resolved.. This ýis the beginning of 
James Joyce's tale of "The Mookse and the Gripes" from Finnegans 
Wake: .., 
"Eins within a space and a wearywide space, it , wart ere 
wohned a Mookse. The onesomeness, wast., alltolonely, 
archunsitslike, broady oval, and a Mookse he would a 
walking go (My hood! cries 'Antony 'Romeo), so `one 
grandsumer evening, after a great morning and his good 
supper of gammon and spittish, -having flabelled,, his eyes; 
:., pilleolcd his nostrils, vacticanated his ears and palliumed his 
throats, he put on his Impermeable, seized his impugnable, 
harped on his crown and stepped'out`of his immobile L 
Rure ` Albo (socolled becauld It was chalkfull of 
masterplasters and had borgeously' letout: gardens, strown 
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with cascadas, pintacostecas, horthoducts and currycombs) 
and set off from Ludstown a spasso to see how badness was 
badness in the weirdest of all pensible ways. " 
(Joyce 1975, p. 152) 
In this example of what might be called a re-invention or re- 
discovery of language, a number of readings will fail to exhaust 
the associative relations prompted by the text. While Joyce strings 
together words and parts of words from English, French, German, 
Latin, Dutch, Greek, Finnish, and so on, Russell Hoban invents a 
type' of slang in Riddley Walker: 
"On my naming day when I come 12 I gone front spear and 
kilt a wyld boar he parbly ben the las wyld pig on the 
Bundel Downs any how there hadnt ben none for a long time 
befor him nor I aint looking to see none agen. " 
(Hoban 1982, p. 1) 
In both of the above examples, the reader encounters a 
problem of a different order to mysteries of the event, the scene, 
or the signifier. Here, the problem is one of syntax, where syntax 
is not so far removed from conventional English as to be totally 
incomprehensible, but is sufficiently different to make the reader 
constantly aware of language. The problem of syntax extends from 
the beginning of the text to its end. While the syntactic problem is 
a problem for the reader, to write this kind of novel also presents 
a particular type of problem to the writer, that of inventing a 
language with its own kind of internal consistency. Riddley 
Walker took five and a half years to write, while Finnegans Wake 
took twenty. 
We began this discussion of problem solving from the 
reader's perspective, and showed how the notion of story 
understanding as problem solving is informed by a rationalistic 
view of problem solving, a view that- also'informs Flower and 
Hayes' notion of writing. We then -reconsidered , the notion of 
problem solving by considering the reader's drives for knowledge 
and, understanding, and suggested that these drives may be 
deliberately impeded in order to create suspense and mystery. 
We then considered cognitive processes in reading fiction from the 
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perspective of sequential and associative relations, and, using 
Barthes' hermeneutic code as a point of departure, looked at the 
range of questions formulated by the reader. We suggested a 
taxonomy of mysteries by textual function: narration (mysteries 
of the event), description (mysteries of the scene), and 
argumentation (mysteries of the signifier). 
In addition, a verbal approach to interrogatives results in a 
distinction between mysteries of the event and mysteries of 
identity. According to Barthes however, reading is a kind of 
hypothesis testing in which naming is equivalent to problem 
solving: From this perspective, mysteries of the event are also 
mysteries of identity because the narrative fails to provide an 
appropriate name. Discussing the mysterious name, we then 
distinguished between a mystery of the signifier created by 
argumentation and a mystery of identity created by a title. 
semic code 
ASSOCIATIVE 
cultural code 
RELATIONS 
symbolic code 
QUENTIAL 
RELATIONS 
the text roairetic code ermeneutic code 
NAMING 
(events) -º° 
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION,,, 
(enigmas) -* 
FIGURE 22: A MODEL OF READING ACCORDING TO BARTFIES . 
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Barthes' account of reading is summarised in Figure 22. The 
principal activity of the reader is naming, an activity that is 
applied to the proairetic code. A secondary activity is problem 
identification, in which the reader formulates the sort of questions 
discussed above. Like the proairetic code, the hermeneutic code is 
an irreversible one, and the unravelling of enigmas an aspect of 
metonymy or sequential relations. 
i 
. 
Let's now reconsider the notion of problem solving from the 
fiction \writer's perspective. As we pointed out above, the problem 
of syntax is not only a problem for the reader but one for the 
writer. On the other hand, the rationalistic methods of problem 
solving are not the only methods of solving this problem. Russell 
Hoban describes the process of writing Riddley Walker as a kind 
of possession by the muse: "What happened was that something 
took hold of me and didn't let go until it got itself onto paper in 
the way that it wanted to be" (from the frontispiece of Hoban 
1982). While it is the character who drives Moggach's plots, it 
appears that, for Hoban, syntax itself can function as a metonymic 
driver.: i 11 .., 
Are 
, the other problems and mysteries that we 
have 
identified-, from the reader's perspective also problems for the 
writer? The problem of meaning is a cue for discursive thinking, a 
process that occupies writers who are involved in argumentation. 
A fiction writer might decide to incorporate this kind of discussion 
within the fictional text, so that a mystery oithe signifier can also 
be a problem, for the writer. The mysterious name on, the other 
hand is a problem that confronts the reader, and: a-problem of 
deferralrather than signification ("Who is Sarrasine? ". rather than 
"What . 
does Sarrasine mean? ");: the, mysterious F name Is ,a 
disembodied signifier that cannot be attached to aasignified until a 
later, part, of the text. From, the writer's point of view, the 
mysterious name is a result of imagining, names or titles rather 
than problem solving. 
Mysteries of the event were classified above according to 
the sort of questions that might be raised in reading. But while 
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these questions provide mysteries for the reader, they also appear 
to be questions that a writer might formulate in developing a 
story:. What's going to happen next? When will the event occur? 
However, in chapter seven we showed how metaphor and 
metonymy governed the remembering and imagining of events 
and scenes. We also pointed out that some kind of temporal 
ordering is inherent in these processes, so that a "linearization of 
content" (Passerault & Coquin 1994, p. 139) appears to have little 
relevance to fiction writing. We also suggested above that, when 
applied to the problem of writing a story, the most frequent 
methods of problem solving are merely different ways of 
pursuing sequential and associative relations. In addition, a 
metonymic drive in writing fiction is tied up with a writer's 
motivation and the unconscious, so that rationalistic methods of 
problem solving appear to have limited application to fiction 
writing. 
.- So; if'thinking processes in fiction writing are more akin to 
primitive. logic than discursive thinking, do the range of questions 
concerning events and scenes include any that present problems 
for the writer, and is the notion of problem solving as a discursive 
process relevant to their solution? The most likely candidate for a 
fiction writer's problem is the question: What's going, to happen 
next? Discursive thinking is one way of solving, this problem,. but 
what about questions of temporal order, motivation and means? 
While events are linearised in their remembering or imagining, a 
writer may rearrange this temporal order in order to create 
suspense and mystery for the reader. Means and motivation 
might be concealed for a similar purpose. In that case then, 
problem solving for the writer is the creation of problems for the 
reader, the reordering of a temporal order, for example, rather 
than a linearisation of chaos. So, for the writer, problem solving 
can be applied to events and scenes, and can be a discursive 
process, a process In which mysteries are formulated, or 
metonymic blocks are overcome. 
Having formulated a mystery, a writer has to work out 
where an enigma is first suggested in the text, how it is held in 
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suspense, and when it is finally disclosed. It follows that one 
method of problem solving in this context is means-ends analysis. 
Beginning with the solution to an enigma, and knowing how and 
when the solution becomes apparent, a writer might then work 
backwards to find out how the enigma should be suggested, and 
how held in suspense. In Little Dorrit for example, the idea that 
Clennam's origins are a mystery is first suggested towards the 
beginning of the novel, while the solution is not revealed until the 
end. In Great Expectations, the mystery of Pip's benefactor is held 
In suspense throughout the novel, while its explanation refers to 
events that occur at the beginning. In both cases, beginnings and 
ends are mutually dependent. 
In'summary, the notion that writing is a kind of problem 
solving, has certain relevances to fiction writing. However, like 
naming, problem solving in writing is not the same as problem 
solving in reading. According to Barthes, reading fiction is a 
process of hypothesis testing in which naming is equivalent to 
problem solving, while the absence of names produces enigmas. 
As a discursive process in fiction writing, problem' solving can be 
applied to events and scenes in order to create mysteries for the 
reader, or to overcome a writer's metonymic block. Problem 
solving can also be applied to signifiers when a writer is engaged 
in, argumentation. When applied to syntax, problem, solving Is 
concerned with the invention of language. 
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9.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we returned to the suggestion made at the end of 
chapter, six. There we said that to develop a model of fiction 
writing that made use of Saussure's observations on language, we 
would need to look at semiological accounts of reading, as models 
of reading are more developed than models of writing. Our 
discussion concentrated on Barthes' (1990) account of the process 
of reading, in which he classifies textual signifiers. Our assumption 
was that avenues of meaning for readers can also be avenues of 
meaning for writers. 
Barthes describes reading as a process of hypothesis testing, 
in which naming is equivalent to problem solving. We explored 
the role of naming in reading and writing. Following Saussure, we 
argued, that names are signifiers, rather than elements in an 
inventory of things. Assuming Saussure's notion of the linguistic 
sign, we identified the recall of signs as the thinking that occurs 
automatically whenever a writer is generating text. We argued 
that naming in writing is not the continuous process given by 
rationalistic accounts of language, but refers to the specific process 
of imagining names or signifiers. We concluded this section by 
adding signifiers to the objects of thought in fiction writing, and 
showed how the processes we have already identified (remem- 
bering or reflecting, imagining, and focusing the imagination) 
apply to this object. 
Following this discussion of naming, we explored the role of 
problem solving in reading and writing. We discussed an account 
given by Al researchers of story understanding as problem 
solving. We argued that characters in fictional texts do not 
necessarily obey the codes of behaviour assumed by rationalistic 
accounts of problem solving. We returned to the distinction 
between motivation, metacognition and cognition, in order to 
discuss the ways in which writing can be described as problem 
solving. We showed how, in the context of fiction writing, methods 
of problem solving can be described in terms of sequential and 
associative relations. We compared rationalistic accounts of 
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problem solving with Barthes' account of the hermeneutic code -a 
code of enigmas or mysteries - and we showed how mysteries in 
fictional texts can be classified according to event, scene, signifier, 
and syntax. We argued that in the context of fiction writing, 
problem solving includes the creation of enigmas for the reader. 
In summary, we can now add problem solving to the 
thinking processes involved in fiction writing, and we can add 
names or signifiers to the objects of these processes. Our model of 
fiction writing now consists of the processes of remembering and 
reflecting, imagining, focusing the imagination, and problem 
solving. Each of these activities can be applied to events, scenes, 
syntax, and names or signifiers. 
However, in this chapter we have not considered different 
strategies of reading. In addition, if our aim is to construct a 
hypertextual aid for fiction writers, we need to look at hypertext 
in more detail - especially as some have argued that, when 
compared with the linearity of printed text, hypertext involves a 
different kind of reader. These are the questions we pursue in the 
next chapter. 
t 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter we pursued the suggestion made at the end of 
chapter six. There we said that to develop a model of fiction 
writing that made use of Saussure's observations on language, we 
would need to look at semiological accounts of reading, as models 
of reading are more developed than models of writing. Our 
discussion concentrated on Barthes' (1990) account of the process 
of reading, in which he classifies textual signifiers. However, we 
did not consider the different strategies that readers pursue in 
reading. We also pointed out that if our aim is to construct a 
hypertextual aid for fiction writers, then we need to look at 
hypertext in more detail. We explore hypertext in this chapter, 
and in the course of this discussion we also look at strategies of 
reading. r 
Some argue that, when compared with the linearity of 
printed text, the non-linearity of hypertext involves a different 
kind of reader. We discuss these arguments, looking firstly at the 
ways in which printed texts are said to contain-non-linearity. We 
find that accounts of non-linearity in printed texts emphasise 
simultaneity and associative relations, but ignore the temporal or 
sequential aspect of reading. We discuss texts that are said to 
exemplify such non-linearity, such as, Borges' Ficciones and 
McLuhan's Gutenberg Galaxy. We also discuss the view of hyper- 
text as a vital part of a constructivist learning environment, in 
which the non-linearity of hypertext provides an alternative to 
the linear authority of traditional text books. 
We then consider the different uses of hypertext. We find 
that the notion of a hypertextual reader does not take into account 
this range of applications, but assumes that a non-linear structure 
necessitates a different kind of reader. We argue that readers of 
hypertexts are no different to readers of linear texts, in that all 
readers pursue a range of strategies in reading. The choice of 
strategy depends on the task that readers are engaged in. 
Research has shown that the most popular strategy for reading 
hypertexts is browsing. We discuss the argument that there is a 
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close relationship between browsing and "associationism" - the 
pursuit of ideas by following associative thought. We argue that 
browsing involves the pursuit of paths through a textual database, 
rather than the pursuit of ideas through associative thought. 
Some argue that hypertext mimics the associative networks 
of human memory. We discuss this notion and identify the 
differences between associative and semantic networks. We show 
how, a semantic network can be used to design a hypertext, and 
also explain why this is not always feasible. We argue that there 
can be no general answer to questions about hypertext structure, 
design, and authoring - these questions must address the purpose 
of the hypertext and the purpose of its readers. 
Some argue that hypertext represents a semantic space 
through which readers navigate. We discuss this notion and find 
that the analogy between navigating in a physical environment 
and navigating in an information space has a limited application. 
We suggest an alternative explanation for the phenomenon of 
gettinglost in a hypertext - it may be that the reader lacks a 
purpose in browsing, and the design of the hypertext may not 
encourage purposeful reading. We conclude that notions of the 
hypertextual reader suffer from a particular-form of contiguity 
disorder: - the reader pursues associative but, not sequential 
relations, reading has a spatial but not a temporal dimension, and 
the reader's goals and tasks are not taken' into' account. 
398 
10.2 LINEARITY AND NON-LINEARITY 
As we mentioned above, the models of reading developed by Al 
researchers have been criticised from the perspective of reading 
literary texts (Dillon 1980, Ide & Veronis 1990, Ide & Veronis 
1991). However, does the observation that readers pursue diverse 
goals not apply equally to the readers of any sort of text? 
Moreover, if models of reading assume a "normalization of 
reading" (Dillon 1980, p. 165), does this criticism not also apply to 
Barthes' account? Perhaps Barthes identifies naming as the 
reader's main activity because his own goal in S/Z is to name, to 
identify the codes or metanames according to which one can 
classify textual signifiers. If generalisations about reading are 
based on a specific story by Balzac, might not more codes be 
discovered by reading more texts, as indicated by Barthes' 
analysis of a Poe story and by Culler's claim that "doubtless 
further additions are necessary" (Culler 1983, p. 33)? On the other 
hand, as Genette points out: 
"This is the paradox of every poetics, and doubtless of every 
other activity of knowledge as well: always torn between 
those two unavoidable commonplaces - that there are no 
objects except particular ones and no science except of the 
general - but always finding comfort and something like 
attraction in this other, slightly less widespread truth, that 
the general is at the heart of the particular, and therefore 
(contrary to the common preconception) the knowable is at 
the heart of the mysterious. " 
(Genette 1980, p. 23) 
The notion that different readers pursue different goals was 
discussed by Seneca in his letters, where, so it seems, the reader 
first appears in literary criticism. In letter CVIII,, Seneca discusses 
Interpretation, and shows how a passage from Virgil's, Georgics 
may be interpreted, firstly, by a literary scholar and, secondly, by 
a philosopher., For Seneca, "it is the person with philosophy in his 
mind who takes these words in the way, they aresmeant to be 
taken" (Seneca 1969, p. 208); that is, ° who interprets correctly. He 
concludes however: 
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"There is nothing particularly surprising about this way 
which everyone has of deriving material for his own 
individual interests from identical subject-matter. In one 
and the same meadow the cow looks for grass, the dog for a 
hare and the stork for a lizard. " 
(Seneca 1969, p. 210) 
Expanding on this topic, Seneca examines the different directions 
which the historian, the literary scholar and the philosopher might 
pursue in studying Cicero's The State. Here, although Seneca still 
prioritises the philosophical enquiry, it is not so much a question 
of which interpretation is the correct one, but more a question of 
pragmatics; Seneca acknowledges that different readers have 
different needs and will use a text for different purposes. 
I 
The consideration that readers use texts for different 
purposes. also concerns the designers of. hypertexts or hyper- 
documents. A hyperdocument is an electronic document that 
consists of nodes, or chunks of information; nodes are connected 
to other, nodes by links that enable a user or. a reader to pursue 
various paths through the document: 
"The concept of hypertext is quite simple: Windows on the 
screen are associated with objects 'in a database, and links 
are provided between these objects', both" graphically (as 
labelled tokens) and in the database (as pointers). " 
(Conklin 1987, p. 17): az. 
When writers describe hypertext by comparing its features with 
those of printed text, they tend to characterise the first as non- 
linear and the second as linear. For example: 
"Möst'of us think of books or' ärticl'es' äs'docümentsto be 
read straight through from start to finish. ' This viewpoint 
was. challenged In the late, 1970s , by 'a self-proclaimed 
visionary named Ted Nelson, " who realised that text in 
electronic form could be much morel fluid "thän' printed matter. The computer, he said, could give us the capability 
to control the access and display of information In new 
ways. ; We need not be bound by, the linearor sequential 
appearance of the written word., Instead the computer could 
give us the capability of connecting remote passages of a 
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document and calling up one passage from another. These 
electronic links could also be used to bridge from one 
document to another to create new networks of knowledge. 
Nelson called the new concept hypertext. " 
(O'Bannon 1987, pp. 94-95) 
Whalley has described the linearity of printed text as a myth, 
referring to the "complex relational structures" created by writers, 
and the "non-linear pattern of associations in the reader's mind" 
(Whalley 1993, p. 9). However, in challenging the notion that 
printed text is linear, Whalley fails to mention a crucial feature of 
the claims made for hypertext, a feature that, one could argue, is 
more misleading than the claim for its non-linearity. 
This feature is particularly evident in discussions of 
"interactive fiction", the term used to describe a fictional text 
designed as a hypertext, in which the reader chooses one of many 
paths that traverse the nodes of the text (Howell 1990, Howell & 
Douglas 1990, Moulthrop 1991, Douglas 1991, Douglas 1992). 
While stressing the non-linearity of hypertext, writers on 
"interactive fiction" also point to certain kinds of experimentation 
in print as exemplars of non-linearity: for example, Sterne's 
Tristram Shandy, Joyce's Finnegans Wake and the stories of 
Borges, particularly The Garden of Forking Paths. There are four 
ways in which a printed text may become an exemplar of non- 
linearity. Discussing the "evolution of interactive fiction", Howell 
and Douglas point to Sterne's departure from a conventional 
temporal ordering of events: 
"Instead, Sterne makes use of associative links - the leaps of 
thought suggested by similar sounds or by the triggering of 
memory which were to form the bedrock of the 
representation of the 'stream of consciousness' introduced in 
the modern novel; and causal links, where action in a 
particular narrative strand is interrupted to trace its cause 
or to examine the repercussions of an event yet to occur. " 
(Howell & Douglas 1990, p. 94) 
In this account, Tristram Shandy exemplifies non-linearity by its 
temporal disorder and associativity. However, according to Bolter, 
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Joyce's Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are hypertexts (and 
therefore non-linear) because of their intertextuality; Ulysses is 
both a "pattern of allusions and references to previous literary 
and cultural texts" and a "self-referential text" (Bolter 1991a, 
p. 135). Thirdly, a work such as Pavic's Dictionary of the Khazars, 
which is arranged like a dictionary, has a non-linear structure that 
forces the reader to formulate their own reading scheme (Howell 
& Douglas 1990, p. 100). According to Bolter, hypertext enables 
"multiple reading", and this feature is common to the non-linear 
narratives of Sterne, Joyce, Borges, Saporta and Cortazar (Bolter 
1991a, pp. 142-144). However, the work of Borges also illustrates 
a fourth way in which a printed text may become an exemplar of 
non-linearity. In this case, a story such as The Book of Sand does 
not enable multiple reading because of a non-linear structure, as 
in the case of Pavic or Saporta, but rather describes a text that 
allows such reading. 
Borges' "Book of Sand" is an ever-changing book that always 
opens at a new page. Compared with the fluidity and mutability of 
electronic text, print is unchangeable and the printed text is fixed 
for all time. According to Bolter, Borges' stories exemplify non- 
linearity by their refusal to endorse this fixity and closure; thus 
Borges anticipates the possibilities of an electronic writing space 
(Bolter 1991a, pp. 137-139). Similarly, Moulthrop writes: "Though 
they come from a time long before the advent of electronic text- 
uality, Borges' stories frame fundamental questions about the 
limits of narrative as a representation of time, questions that 
inform hypertextual fiction" (Moulthrop 1991, p. 119). 
Like The Book of Sand, Borges' story The Garden of Forking 
Paths entertains the notion of an infinite book: 
"In all fictional works, each time a man is confronted with 
several alternatives, he chooses one and eliminates the 
others; in the fiction of Tsui Pen, he chooses - 
simultaneously - all of them. Ile creates, in this way, diverse 
futures, diverse times which themselves also proliferate and 
fork. Here, then, is the explanation of the novel's 
contradictions... In the work of Ts'ui Pen, all possible 
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outcomes occur; each one is the point of departure for other 
forkings... " 
(Borges 1970a, p. 51) 
The "Garden" is not only a book but an image of the universe: 
"The Garden of Forking Paths is an incomplete, but not false, 
image of the universe as Ts'ui Pen conceived it. In contrast 
to Newton and Schopenhauer, your ancestor did not believe 
in a uniform, absolute time. He believed in an infinite series 
of times, in a growing, dizzying net of divergent, convergent 
and parallel times. This network of times which approached 
one another, forked, broke off, or were unaware of one 
another for centuries, embraces all possibilities of time. We 
do not exist in the majority of these times; in some you exist, 
and not I; in others I, and not you; in others, both of us... " 
(Borges 1970a, p. 53) 
It is this denial of temporal continuity that one could argue is the 
theme of many Borges' stories, or the underlying proposition that 
his stories serve to illustrate (Borges 1970f). Moreover, it is the 
denial of time that makes the work of Borges, above all others, an 
exemplar of non-linearity and a "prototype of interactive fiction" 
(Howell & Douglas 1990, p. 99). 
According to Howell and Douglas, the attempt to represent 
simultaneity is common to Tristram Shandy, the work of Borges, 
and Robert Coover's story The Babysitter, but this discovery is due 
to the non-linearity of hypertext: 
"Now that we have before us the possibility for non-linear 
writing which can convey simultaneity more easily than the 
printed word, we can see Sterne's efforts toward juggling 
numerous narrative strands as a precursor for the likes of 
Robert Coover's story 'The Babysitter', where a half dozen 
mutually exclusive representations of the babysitter's 
evening are set before the reader sequentially on the 
printed page but which occur simultaneously in narrative- 
time. " 
([Lowell & Douglas 1990, p. 95) 
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While the work of Sterne and Borges anticipates the non-linearity 
of hypertext, neither writer can represent simultaneity within the 
constraints of the printed page: 
"Furthermore, the printed page constrains a narrative 
environment where simultaneity and the particular variety 
of non-linear chronology sought so strenuously by Sterne is 
not possible. This was first explored then demonstrated by 
Jorge Luis Borges in The Garden of Forking Paths : the post- 
modern narrative most overtly the successor to Sterne's 
novel. " 
(Howell & Douglas 1990, p. 97) 
Using a characterisation of Borges' work by John Barth as the 
"literature of exhaustion", Bolter claims: 
"For Borges literature is exhausted because it is committed 
to a conclusive ending, to a single storyline and denouement. 
To renew literature one would have to write multiply, in a 
way that embraced possibilities rather than closed them off. 
Borges can imagine such a fiction, but he cannot produce it. 
The Ficciones are themselves conventional pieces of prose, 
meant to be read page by page. Yet the works he describes, 
the novels of Herbert Quain or the Garden of Forking Paths, 
belong in another writing space altogether. Borges himself 
never had available to him an electronic space... He could not 
see that the literature of exhaustion in print by no means 
exhausts the electronic medium. " 
(Bolter 1991a, p. 139) 
From this sort of technological perspective, innovative writers 
using the medium of print were held back by unavailable 
technologies; if only they had had access to today's technology of 
hypertext, their visions could have been achieved. As if to 
demonstrate this claim, Moulthrop re-writes The Garden of 
Forking Paths as a hypertext, and investigates the response of 
students (Moulthrop 1991). However, he has to acknowledge that 
"no hypertextual product can realize the 'strictly infinite 
labyrinth' of Borges' fantasy" (Moulthrop 1991, p. 129). The basic 
problem is that Borges envisages not only multiple reading, but 
multiple reading simultaneously, and even with the electronic 
medium and the non-linearity of hypertext, only one path can be 
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chosen at any one moment. Despite this problem, hypertext is 
presented as a medium in which simultaneity is possible (Howell 
& Douglas 1990, Dickey 1991, Bolter 1991a, Bolter 1991b). The 
misleading feature of the claims made for hypertext is the notion 
that, because hyperdocuments have a non-linear structure, then 
the reader's activity must be non-linear; compared with print, 
reading in the electronic medium is somehow different - the new 
medium has given birth to the hypertextual reader. 
But however one describes the structure of printed text, or 
hypertext, the process of reading requires duration; like speech, it 
has a sequential or linear aspect. In the case of speech, Saussure 
points out that the linguistic signifier has a temporal dimension 
(Saussure 1983, p. 69), and that "linearity precludes the possibility 
of uttering two words simultaneously" (Saussure 1983, p. 121); one 
can apply the same observation to reading and writing. In chapter 
six, we referred to Rousset's notion that the reader must defeat 
time in order to perceive the book as a simultaneous network of 
reciprocal relationships; thus "simultaneity is the myth of the total 
reading or description" (Derrida 1978a, p. 24). We have seen that 
Borges' denial of time is shared by Howell and Douglas, who claim 
that an aspiration to simultaneity is common to Sterne, Borges and 
other experimental writers. Like Dickey's notion that hypertext 
provides "an effective illusion of the simultaneity of experience" 
(Dickey 1991, p. 144), Bolter's notion of multiple reading or 
multiple writing takes no account of the temporal aspects of 
reading or writing (Bolter 1991a, pp. 142-146). In the context of 
literary criticism, Derrida finds that "the search for the simul- 
taneous explains the capacity to be fascinated by the spatial 
image" (Derrida 1978a, p. 24); in Bolter's "topographic" accounts of 
writing, reading and writing are activities that occur in space but 
not in time (Bolter 1991a, Bolter 1991b). 
It appears, therefore, that the hypertextual reader, as 
portrayed in the literature, suffers from an acute form of 
contiguity disorder: reading is the pursuit of associative relations 
(the intertextualities of Joyce, the associativitics of Sterne), but 
not sequential ones; reading occurs in space, but not in time; and 
405 
the reader's goal is simultaneity or multiplicity. Yet Bolter's claim 
that hypertextual fiction enables multiple reading is not sub- 
stantiated by the reading experiences described by Howell and 
Douglas (Howell & Douglas 1990, Douglas 1992). Interactive fiction 
does not allow different readings of the same text; rather, the 
reader is presented with a different text on each reading, and is 
not encouraged to develop any sort of global view of the fiction. 
In the case of Michael Joyce's Afternoon for example, 
Howell and Douglas point out that "the reader searching for any 
over-riding structure will be frustrated - it deliberately hides the 
internal structure through esoteric mechanisms" (Howell & 
Douglas 1990, p. 104). While Bolter likens interactive fiction to a 
computer game (Bolter 1991a, p. 130), the difference is that 
players of games are given a clear objective, a set of rules, and are 
aware that they are playing a game. In comparison, the reader of 
Afternoon "often feels completely out of control, in a whirlwind of 
text that progresses by with no apparent rhyme or reason, 
reducing the reader's choices to seemingly meaningless seeds fed 
to some literary random number generator" (Howell & Douglas 
1990, p. 104). Here, Howell and Douglas are discussing reactions to 
the same hypertextual fiction that, according to Bolter, "offers a 
narrative that encompasses contradictory possibilities" and, 
therefore, encourages the reader to "read multiply" (Bolter 1991a, 
p. 143). 
In comparison, the print exemplars of non-linear structure, 
such as the Dictionary of the Khazars, enable the reader to see the 
entire text and develop their own reading scheme. Another 
exemplar of non-linear structure is Saporta's Composition N6.1, a 
fiction that consists of one hundred and fifty loose sheets of 
unnumbered pages, where the reader is asked to shuffle the pack 
and read at random (Bolter 1991a, p. 140). Here again the reader 
has the entire text at their disposal; this is not possible with the 
electronic fictions which disclose their texts according to the 
mysterious rules of their authors. 
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Above we discussed the metonymic drives in reading fiction, 
and here is a situation where, so it seems, those drives cannot be 
sustained. With the examples of interactive fiction cited in the 
literature, the reader's drive for knowledge - the urge to know 
what is going to happen next - is perpetually baffled, while the 
drive for comprehension is perpetually frustrated. Moreover, the 
reader's inability to name is not complemented by the sort of 
problem solving entailed in reading printed fiction; that is, the 
formulation of questions that are resolved by the unravelling of a 
hermeneutic code. Yet while the reader's metonymic drives are 
not sustained, according to Moulthrop the hypertextual reader's 
activity is still one of problem solving, and the reader still pursues 
a metonymic objective. 
Moulthrop refers to Brooks (Brooks 1984), who, drawing on 
Jakobson and others, argues that reading narrative is a process of 
moving from metonymy to metaphor. 
"According to this idealist view, readers move from the 
confusion and multitude of narrative syntax to the shining 
wholeness of ending, where all parts achieve a satisfying 
integration. We negotiate the perplexities of the middle in 
order to reach the promised revelation of the end; 
metonymy precedes and enables metaphor. This theory is 
admirably suited to the interpretation of conventional 
narratives (not surprisingly, since it evolved mainly from 
readings of nineteenth century fiction); but it probably does 
not hold for hypertext. " 
(Moulthrop 1991, pp. 126-127) 
Brooks' argument is therefore based on a metonymical notion of 
metaphor, in which metaphor is the "promised revelation of the 
end". However, Moulthrop uses Brooks' argument that "metonymy 
precedes and enables metaphor" to suggest that "hypertext 
drastically alters - perhaps even inverts - the relationship 
between metonymy and metaphor in conventional narrative" 
(Moulthrop 1991, p. 128). Discussing student responses to his 
hypertextual version of Borges' Garden of Forking Paths, he claims 
that students begin by using the function keys presented on the 
screen as a "primary conceptual framework" or map; this map 
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"represents the text as totality or metaphor" (Moulthrop 1991, 
p. 128). Using the map, students hope "to discover a design which... 
might prove to be buried or scattered in the text" (Moulthrop 
1991, p. 128); this design is the "plot", the metonymic goal that 
readers were trying to uncover. In this case then, metaphor 
apparently precedes and enables metonymy. 
However, the function keys presented on Moulthrop's screen 
indicate four possible movements: "Up, Down, Left, and Right" 
(Moulthrop 1991, p. 128). Using Moulthrop's observations then, we 
could argue that his readers are not starting from a "metaphor of 
the text" at all, but from spatial familiarity; readers are pursuing 
the spatial contiguity given by the function keys to compensate 
for the lack of sequential relations given by the story. One 
problem with Moulthrop's scenario is the inconsistent use of the 
term metaphor: on the one hand, Brooks' metonymic notion of 
metaphor as final revelation; on the other hand, Moulthrop's use 
of metaphor as textual totality. To this problem, we might add 
Moulthrop's metaphoric notion of metonymy as the "plot" that is 
hidden inside the story. Despite these problems, the observation 
that metaphor enables metonymy in the case of hypertextual 
fiction agrees in one sense with other accounts of the hypertextual 
reader (Howell & Douglas 1990, Douglas 1992, Bolter 1991a). The 
agreement is that hypertextual readers pursue associative 
relations rather than sequential ones, whether these are provided 
by the Intertextuality of Ulysses, or the keywords of Michael 
Joyce's Afternoon. In the case of interactive fiction however, the 
reader's goal still appears to be the metonymic drive of trying to 
comprehend the story, and the reader's problem is the inability to 
obtain a global view of the text. 
So far, we have discussed the hypertextual reader as a 
reader of hypertextual fiction. However, the argument that 
traditional narrative entails closure and fixity also applies to 
argumentation. According to Dickey, hypertext is a compositional 
tool that enables a "multiplicity of perspective" and "the rejection 
of a single rhetorical authority" (Dickey 1991, p. 144). According to 
Bolter, the electronic writing space frees the writer from forcing 
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text into a "single line of argument" (Bolter 1991a, p. 146). What 
are the implications of these comments for the hypertext designer 
and the hypertextual reader? 
While the printed text provides examples of "non-linearity" 
in experimental fiction, it also provides examples of "non- 
linearity" in the presentation of arguments. According to 
McLuhan, the adoption of a fixed "point of view" is a feature of 
the Renaissance and one of the effects of print technology 
(McLuhan 1969, p. 72). As a book, The Gutenberg Galaxy is written 
in a way that attempts to reflect its argument. McLuhan writes: 
"The Gutenberg Galaxy develops a mosaic or field approach 
to its problems. Such a mosaic image of numerous data and 
quotations in evidence offers the only practical means of 
revealing causal operations in history. 
The alternative procedure would be to offer a series of 
views of fixed relationships in pictorial space. Thus the 
galaxy or constellation of events upon which the present 
study concentrates is itself a mosaic of perpetually 
interacting forms that have undergone kaleidoscopic 
transformation - particularly in our own time. " 
(McLuhan 1969, p. 7) 
However, it is this method of presentation that makes The 
Gutenberg Galaxy a difficult book for Jonathan Miller to 
summarise, and also to criticise: 
"In fact it is rather difficult to summarise the sprawling 
arguments of the Gutenberg Galax),. Not only is the range of 
its cultural reference wider than anything that can be 
encompassed by a single critic, but the discussion is 
organised in strict obedience to the main thesis, in a fashion 
that actually forbids straightforward linear precis. This is no 
accident on McLuhan's part. He has deliberately laid out the 
evidence in what he calls a mosaic fashion, placing ideas and 
quotations side by side in suggestive juxtaposition, leaving 
the reader to draw his own conclusions as to their mutual 
significance. In doing this he has unfairly anticipated our 
consent to his claim that Imaginative truth Is distorted by 
explicitly linked arguments. " 
(Miller 1971, p. 8) 
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Miller adds that he remains "unconvinced by McLuhan's reasons 
for eschewing a linear arrangement of his ideas" (Miller 1971, 
p. 8). In a similar fashion, Umberto Eco adds to a precis of 
McLuhan's ideas that "this collage of quotations summarizes 
McLuhan's position and, at the same time, exemplifies his 
techniques of argumentation, which - paradoxically - are so 
illustrative of his thesis that they undermine its validity" (Eco 
1987a, p. 230). 
As an advocate of the modusponens (Eco 1987b, p. 130), Eco 
cites McLuhan's writings as an example of cogito interruptus, 
which is marked by the absence of terms such as "therefore" or 
"whereas" that indicate Western ideals of logic and reasoning (Eco 
1987a, pp. 221-222). In the case of The Gutenberg Galaxy, Eco 
points out that the absence of "therefores" in the juxtaposition of 
two sometimes contradictory ideas is filled in by the reader, 
despite McLuhan's insistence that the reader looks at the co- 
presence of arguments as a mere co-presence and not as a logical 
succession: 
"But the trouble is that, secretly, McLuhan wants us to put in 
that 'therefore', also because he knows that, out of 
Gutenbergian habit, as we are reading the two data lined up 
on the printed page, we will be forced to think in 'therefore' 
terms. " 
(Eco 1987a, p. 231) 
According to Eco, in his later work McLuhan wants to promote a 
discourse which abandons the "chains of logic" and aims to present 
"unreasoned data" before the reader; in McLuhan's vision of a 
post-Gutenberg future, the book will be replaced by the "non- 
book", of which The Gutenberg Galax is a prototype (Eco 1987a, 
pp. 231-232). Yet Eco describes an ambiguous situation in which, 
on the one hand, "McLuhan cannot elude the requirement of 
rational clarification of the process we are witnessing" (the 
emergence of the global village in the electronic era), while, on the 
other hand, "when he surrenders to that demand for cogito he is 
bound not to interrupt it" (Eco 1987a, p. 232). Thus: 
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"He doesn't just line up disconnected data and make us 
swallow them as if they were connected. He also makes an 
effort to present us with data that seem disconnected and 
contradictory while he believes them to be connected by 
logical operations, but he is ashamed of showing these 
operations in action. " 
(Eco 1987a, p. 232) 
To demonstrate this ambiguity, Eco quotes an extract from The 
Medium is the Massage and suggests that the insertion of terms 
such as "in fact", "nevertheless", and "on the other hand" creates a 
reasoned argument (Eco 1987a, p. 232). 
However, the above discussion of the hypertextual reader 
suggests that there are two ways of viewing The Gutenberg 
Galaxy. On the one hand, viewing the book from the perspective of 
conventional argumentative texts, we can criticise McLuhan for 
his omission of the rhetorical devices that create a "cohesive" text 
(Halliday & Hasan 1976), thereby leaving the reader to infer 
causation by the spatial contiguity of quotations, assertions, 
observations, and so forth. In this case then, McLuhan's text raises 
the problems described by Miller and Eco. On the other hand, 
viewing the book from the perspective of hypertext, we might cite 
The Gutenberg Galaxy as another exemplar of non-linearity in 
printed texts. In this case, the hypertextual reader is a reader who 
once again pursues associative relations in making the connections 
omitted by McLuhan's "cogito Interruptus". From a hypertextual 
perspective we might argue that, as a collage of quotations, the 
Galaxy represents a hypertext in print format, and if McLuhan 
had had access to today's technology, he would no doubt have 
designed his book as a hypertext, just as Borges would have re- 
written The Garden of Forking Paths. Unfortunately, the reader is 
constrained by the linearity of print to read the Galaxy from start 
to finish, and is unable to pursue alternative paths through the 
text, an option that hypertext now makes available. 
If we adopt this latter perspective, how might we re-design 
The Gutenberg Galaxy as a hypertext? One problem is that the 
book is not solely a collage of quotations, as Eco indicates. Not only 
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are the quotations selective, but their arrangement indicates some 
sort of sequential ordering, and are intercut with McLuhan's 
comments; in other words, as Eco points out, the Gutenberg Galaxy 
is presented as an argument. 
A hyperdocument was defined above as an electronic 
document that consists of nodes; nodes are connected to other 
nodes by links that enable a user or a reader to pursue various 
paths through the document. The simplest way of turning 
McLuhan's Galaxy into a hypertext is to treat each page of the 
book as a node, and treat each turning of the page as a link. We 
then create a hypertext that repeats the sequential ordering of the 
original, and restricts the reader to one path through the 
document. However, this would merely re-invent the scroll, as 
Whalley comments (Whalley 1993, p. 9), and moreover, the reader 
would be unable to skip to earlier or later pages of the text 
without flipping every page. Yet even this apparently simple 
operation faces the problem that a page of text is too large for the 
average screen size, into which a node must fit. A node will have 
to be smaller than a page, so perhaps we should limit a node to a 
paragraph of text? These questions indicate some of the 
difficulties in creating hyperdocuments, particularly when the 
intention is to construct a sustained argument, as Whalley points 
out 
"A line of argument will almost certainly make up more 
than a single paragraph. To reduce the presentation of text 
to the paragraph, or an arbitrary small number of 
paragraphs, is to make it more difficult to present a 
coherent view. However, the alternative of creating the 
'electronic scroll', as has happened in many hypertext 
systems, is to completely defeat the ergonomic gains of 
rapid component access. " 
(Whalley 1993, p. 9) 
Whalley discusses Nash's views of the paragraph in the context of 
designing prose (Nash 1980), and concludes that "to dispense with 
paragraph structure is to lose one of the most important 
techniques of composition available to the writer, and means that 
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hypertext is only likely to be suited to encyclopaedic or frag- 
mented forms of knowledge" (Whalley 1993, p. 9). 
So it appears that we have several problems in turning The 
Gutenberg Galaxy into a hypertext. If we attempt to preserve its 
argument, this can only be achieved by re-inventing the scroll, 
and would serve no ergonomic purpose. But as the Galaxy is a 
non-linear text, surely we can afford to dismiss its line of 
argument, and create a hyperdocument from its source material? 
In that case, even if we restrict our purpose to creating a collage 
of quotes, the reader still faces the ergonomic problems of reading 
from the screen that were noted in chapter three, and we still 
have to fragment the quotes into nodes. In addition, how are we 
going to link these quotes together? The ultimate hypertext is one 
in which each node is connected to every other node, but the 
practical problem of displaying all these paths is difficult to 
resolve. But perhaps it is too authoritarian for the designer to 
control the linking of nodes, so should we not allow the reader to 
sort out this problem? 
This approach is advocated by those who view hypertext as 
an essential part of a constructivist learning environment 
(Cunningham, Duffy & Knuth 1993). A constructivist view of 
learning: 
"... holds that instruction is less a process in which 
knowledge is communicated to learners, and more a matter 
of nurturing the ongoing processes whereby learners come 
to understand the world in which they live. In this view, 
knowledge is an active process of construction, not the 
receipt of information from external sources. The role of 
textbooks and other instructional media shifts from one 
which seeks to maximise the communication of fixed content 
and/or skills to one in which students engage in the 
knowledge construction process... " 
(Cunningham et al 1993, pp. 20-21) 
From this constructivist perspective, "the primary feature of 
traditional textbooks is that they are geared to knowledge telling 
rather than knowledge construction" (Cunningham et al 1993, 
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p. 30). Just as McLuhan claims that the medium of print enforces a 
unilinear perspective, Cunningham and colleagues claim that the 
textbook "typically provides a consistent, unified point of view" 
and "serves as an authority on a topic" (Cunningham et al 1993, 
p. 30). If the traditional textbook is used as the sole resource for 
learning, "learning simply becomes a matter of receiving and 
accepting the specified questions or point of view" (Cunningham et 
al 1993, p. 30). Having discussed the advantages of Intermedia, a 
hypertextual learning environment at Brown University (Landow 
& Delany 1991, Yankelovich, Meyrowitz & van Dam 1991, 
Yankelovich 1991), these authors predict that: 
" .. the textbook of the future will be a construction of the learner, drawing upon the database and authoring, linking 
and customising tools provided. Instructional software will 
be of a different type: instead of selecting, organising and 
presenting content, software will provide tools that enable 
students to select, construct, organise and customise 
information from a variety of sources and representational 
modes. " 
(Cunningham et al 1993, p. 45) 
While one might applaud the aims of a constructivist 
perspective, the notion of the textbook of the future does raise 
some practical problems. The nodes of a hypertext must be linked 
in some way at the design stage, because if there are no links 
whatsoever, then there is no way of accessing the nodes, and no 
way of knowing what sort of information is contained in the 
hypertext. However, one aspect of hypertext research is the use of 
AI techniques to assist authors or users in the construction of 
links (Knopik & Ryser 1990, Boyle & Snell 1990, Nicolson 1990, 
Mayes, Kibby & Anderson 1990, Kibby & Mayes 1993). Using 
these techniques, the construction of links may be deferred by 
designing software that decides what links to construct each time 
the hypertext is used. In this case, the links are not permanently 
fixed. Kibby and Mayes describe such a design, which 
"demonstrates that fixed links between objects such as individual 
graphics or fragments of text are not necessary to generate a 
hypertext system" (Kibby & Mayes 1993, p. 143). In their design, 
links are generated at run time by an "automatic computation of 
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'relatedness' between nodes", where nodes are related by 
"conceptual connectivity" or "semantic proximity" (Libby & Mayes 
1993, p. 138). 
These techniques have been used to design a learning 
environment in which the learner is encouraged to learn with 
concepts and structure their own learning (Mayes et al 1990, 
p. 126). However, although the links are not generated until the 
system is running, it is the software rather than the learner that 
selects a node and constructs a link, using information supplied by 
the learner. The system relies on the use of Al techniques to 
represent knowledge. Knowledge is represented as attributes 
(George, Rada & Beer 1991), and up to sixty attributes are used to 
encode each node of text. When the system is running, it asks the 
learner to specify a number of attributes, and the software 
chooses an appropriate node. As envisaged by the designers, part 
of the learning process therefore lies in working out why such a 
node was chosen by the system; thus "the kind of query system 
approach embodied in StrathTutor turns hypertext on its head" 
(Mayes et al 1990, p. 126). The designers explain that "instead of 
the nodes being thought of as the units of content, the attributes 
in this implicit network can be thought of as the nodes and the 
links as the attaching of these attributes to individual frames" 
(Mayes et al 1990, p. 126). 
From the perspective of the hypertext designer, McKnight 
and colleagues point out that this system: 
if... might be thought to offer an 'automatic' approach to 
linking. However, the decisions involved in linking are 
merely replaced by the necessity to rate each card of the 
document on 60 dimensions. As Kibby and Mayes point out, 
the approach becomes less tenable as the size of the 
document increases. " 
(McKnight, Richardson & Dillon 1993, p. 119) 
From a constructivist perspective on learning, one might also 
criticise the system because the learner is not provided with the 
means of constructing their own links. From either point of view, 
this method of structuring hypertext by the use of Al techniques 
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of concept representation is not without its problems. Moreover, 
one could argue that the constructivist notion of an unstructured 
hypertext represents a sort of hermeneutic circle for the designer. 
On the one hand, some kind of linking is necessary in order to 
access the nodes in the hypertext; otherwise, the contents of the 
hypertext cannot be made available to the learner. On the other 
hand, the purpose of disclosing the contents was to enable the 
learner to construct their own links, and the links have now been 
constructed by the designer. The problem is not resolved by the 
use of Al techniques to construct links at run time, as it removes 
decision making from the learner to the software, and with Kibby 
and Mayes' approach, the learner has no way of knowing what 
nodes are contained in the hypertext. 
Kibby and Mayes' approach also assumes that the nodes of a 
hypertext are representations of concepts (Roth & Frisby 1986). 
To apply Al methods of representing knowledge to the authoring 
of hypertext, we must assume that a hypertext is some kind of 
knowledge base, and that these methods are equally relevant 
whatever the domain of knowledge (Koh, Loo & Chua 1990, 
Jonassen 1990, Jonassen 1993, Storrs 1993, Duncan 1993, Beer & 
Diaper 1991, Knopik & Ryser 1990, Boyle & Snell 1990, Nicolson 
1990). However, the use of hypertext to construct a knowledge 
base is only one of the many uses of hypertext. 
10.3 STRATEGIES OF READING 
The above discussion has highlighted two general approaches to 
the use of hypertext. The first was to consider the translation of 
an existing text in print format into an electronic format. In this 
case, our design will need to take into account Seneca's 
observations that different kinds of readers will pursue different 
kinds of goals. Designing a hypertextual structure therefore raises 
two questions. The first concerns the node: flow should we 
segment a given text (encyclopaedia, instruction manual, novel), 
or construct a database consisting of multiple texts? The second 
concerns the link: I-low should we construct reading paths through 
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the nodes that will enable different readers with different needs 
to pursue their own paths through the database? The second 
approach is to consider the design of new texts or materials that 
make use of hypertext to present or structure information in a 
way that would be inconceivable in print format; for example, 
John Cayley's use of hypertext to present "hyperpoems" (Cayley 
1993). This approach may incorporate the first, for instance when 
constructing knowledge bases that incorporate existing texts. 
In either case, designing a hypertextual structure raises the 
two questions of defining nodes and links. A further question is 
whether to anticipate all possible reading paths and construct 
links accordingly, or whether to give the reader as much 
flexibility as possible. In addition, we need to ask whether and 
how the hypertext can be amended, and whether its creation or 
amending will be performed by multiple users (Rada 1989). 
General guidelines on these questions can only be given at the cost 
of specificity; for example, by assuming that a hypertext is a 
hyperdocument, database or knowledge base. Turning to 
specificity then, a hypertext can be: 
" an "interactive fiction" (Howell & Douglas 1990); 
"a literary text (Delany & Gilbert 1991, Slatin 1988); 
"a corpus of texts (Crane & Mylonas 1991, Kahn 1991, 
Friedlander 1991); 
"a manual on the laws and regulations governing social security 
payments (Storrs 1993); 
"a university prospectus (Nicolson 1990); 
"a guide to "What's on in Edinburgh? " (Edwards & Hardman 
1993); 
"a re-invented book (genest 1990); 
"a polished on-screen document (Rahtz, Carr & Hall 1990); 
"a designer's notepad (Sommerville, Haddley, Mariani & 
Thomson 1990); 
"a hyperpoem (Cayley 1993); 
"a learning support environment (Allinson & Hammond 1993); 
" an open learning system for writers (Williams 1991b); 
"a semantic network (Jonassen 1990, Jonassen 1993); 
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"a tool for collaborative writing (Trigg & Suchman 1993); 
" an electronic journal (Brondmo & Davenport 1990). 
Conklin describes "four broad application areas" in his overview of 
hypertext (Conklin 1987, p. 20): macro literary systems such as 
large on-line libraries, problem exploration tools "to support early 
unstructured thinking on a problem when many disconnected 
ideas come to mind", browsing systems or micro literary systems, 
and general hypertext technology such as the Intermedia system 
developed at Brown University (Landow & Delany 1991, 
Yankelovich, Meyrowitz & van Dam 1991, Yankelovich 1991). 
This diversity in the use of hypertext is reflected in 
definitions of the node. For example, in translating a veterinary 
reference manual into a hyperdocument, "each section in the 
reference manual becomes a hypertext node" (Boyle & Snell 1990, 
p. 33), but in using a general knowledge analysis tool to translate a 
social security reference manual, a node is a paragraph of text 
(Storrs 1993, p. 130). In Kibby and Mayes' method of learning by 
conceptual orientation, a node is the representation of a concept, 
but also a fragment of text, a frame or a screen (Kibby & Mayes 
1993, p. 138). In their frame-based hypermedia system, Koh and 
colleagues choose "to equate a primitive node to a basic media 
object" (Koh et al 1990, p. 159), while a further application of Al to 
assist hypertext design uses two types of node: concept and text 
(Knopik & Ryser 1990, p. 226). 
Given this diversity in the use of hypertext, in what sense 
can we refer to a "hypertextual reader"? Is the hypertextual 
reader a different kind of reader to the reader of printed texts, as 
Bolter suggests (Bolter 1991a)? In Bolter's generalisations on 
reading, there appears to be five kinds of reader: the passive 
reader, the naive reader, the reader who reads for entertainment, 
the critical reader, and the hypertextual reader. According to 
Bolter, "passive reading" occurs when "the reader'loses himself in 
the world of the story" (Bolter 1991a, p. 155): 
"Losing oneself in a fictional world is the goal of the naive 
reader or one who reads for entertainment. It is particularly 
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a feature of genre fiction, such as romance and science 
fiction. The capacity of electronic text ironically to comment 
on itself keeps the reader from falling too far or too long 
into passivity. The reader of "Afternoon" is forced every 
turn to reflect on the experience of reading. " 
(Bolter 1991a, p. 155) 
So the passive reader, the naive reader, and the reader who reads 
for entertainment all pursue the same goal: "the goal of passive 
reading is to forget oneself by identifying with the narrative 
world presented" (Bolter 1991a, p. 228). In comparison, the 
hypertextual reader is exemplified by the reader of interactive 
fiction, particularly Afternoon, and is a critical reader. As passive 
reading is "antireading" (Bolter 1991a, p. 228), we can summarise 
Bolter's generalisations on readers by the two term typology: 
readers and antireaders. 
According to Culler's account of reader-response criticism, 
theories of the reader present a problem in that "the reader" 
alternates between a reader who is manipulated by the text, and a 
reader who "actively takes charge" (Culler 1983, p. 71). We face a 
similar problem with Bolter's notion of the hypertextual reader. 
According to Bolter, the electronic medium forces the hypertextual 
reader to be a reflective reader; thus the hypertextual reader has 
no choice but to be a critical reader. Likewise, the narrative world 
in which the passive reader gets lost is that presented by genre 
fiction or televised soap operas: "In all these cases the reader 
assumes a passive role, enters into the text, and loses any real 
critical distance" (Bolter 1991a, p. 228). According to Bolter 
therefore, readers can be identified by what they read; it is the 
medium or the type of text that enforces some kind of reading 
activity, and creates the type of reader. Moreover, Bolter displays 
the sort of ethical view of media and text types that we described 
at the beginning of the last chapter. It is not only genre fiction and 
broadcast television, but also virtual reality, virtual museums and 
simulated environments that discourage reflective thinking, 
because "viewers are encouraged to lose themselves (and there- 
fore their critical judgement) In the simulation" (Bolter 1991a, 
p. 231). In comparison, hypertext represents the way forward: "A 
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museum of the electronic age should be seeking to turn artifacts 
into elements of a hypertextual book, not a simulated environ- 
ment" (Bolter 1991a, p. 231). 
While interactive fiction enforces a critical distance, 
interactive movies also encourage this loss of self (Bolter 1991a, 
p. 229). It appears, therefore, that interactive television creates 
the same sort of viewer as broadcast television: 
"Under computer control, televised images can be joined 
with verbal text and graphics to form a rich, hypertextual 
structure. However, current television programs are not 
designed to be 'read' in any such hypertextual fashion. They 
are meant to be viewed linearly, in order to keep the viewer 
glued to one channel even through the commercials. 
Television programs and commercials together are designed 
to create a perceptual world that merges with the viewer's 
living room or bedroom. They invite viewers to lose 
themselves, not to stand back and analyze critically. " 
(Bolter 1991a, p. 228) 
So, media and text types are to be judged in terms of the types of 
viewers or readers that they create. While certain media are 
criticised for their seductive properties, the computer, and 
hypertext above all, are to be appreciated for their distancing 
properties. Yet on the other hand, the computer must possess 
some mystical property that makes it intrinsically superior to 
other media, because although Bolter criticises the loss of self 
when viewing television or reading genre fiction, he also claims: 
"Surely there has never been a better text in which to lose 
oneself than the electronic library realized by the 
computer... The computer as hypertext is the newest in a 
long line of candidates for the universal book. And like all 
the previous candidates, the computer makes the seductive 
promise to break down the barrier between thought and 
writing, to join the mind and writing surface into a seamless 
whole. " 
(Bolter 1991a, p. 206) 
The notion that hypertext promises to dissolve the barrier 
between thought and writing would appear to make hypertext no 
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different to the virtual reality that seduces its "viewers" into 
losing their critical detachment. 
Applying Genette's observations above to the specificity of 
hypertext, it would seem that the range of its use is too diverse to 
make generalisations about a hypertextual reader, particularly 
generalisations that are based on the reader of interactive fiction. 
As Seneca points out, "the object which we have in view, after all, 
makes a great deal of difference to the manner in which we 
approach any subject" (Seneca 1969, pp. 209-210). It is not only 
the readers of literary texts who have diverse goals, but the 
readers of hypertexts, and, as we noted in chapter three, the 
electronic medium has no inherent tendencies to create readers or 
antireaders. In order to model the process of writing, we looked at 
writing strategies rather than writers; so, let's look at strategies of 
reading rather than readers. What sort of objectives do users of 
hypertext have in view - to what purpose does the hypertextual 
reader read? 
According to Wright, models of reading have confined 
themselves to the processes of constructing meaning (Wright 
1993, p. 139); some of these models were discussed in chapter six. 
In addition, "most research studies are concerned with similar 
reading purposes", such as comprehension and recall (Wright 
1993, p. 139). The result is that despite "the sizeable research 
literature on the psychology of reading processes", the problems 
of reading strategies have been relatively ignored, and strategy 
selection has been omitted as a component in models of the 
reading process (Wright 1993, pp. 138-139). She Identifies three 
kinds of reading activities - linear reading, browsing and 
deliberate searching - and discusses the influence of information 
design, such as glossaries and overview diagrams, on information- 
seeking strategies when using print and hypertext. 
McAleese argues that browsing is the main activity of 
hypertext users (McAleese 1993). Browsing is to be distinguished 
from deliberate or direct searching, in which the user knows what 
they are looking for but not where to find it. Monk calls this direct 
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searching "exploratory navigation", and makes a distinction 
between this activity and "directed navigation", in which the user 
not only knows what they are looking for but also where to find it 
(Monk 1990, p. 20). Compared with direct searching (or both types 
of Monk's "navigation"), browsing is a more general search for 
information, with varying degrees of purpose. McAleese discusses 
three types of browsing: a "specific" browsing, in which the user 
searches for information within certain parameters, a "general" 
browsing, in which the user does not create any boundaries to 
their search, and a "serendipitous" browsing, in which the user 
"roams" or "wanders" with no purpose (McAleese 1993, pp. 8-10). 
Further types of reading strategies are identified by research into 
database usage: "scanning", a linear version of direct searching, 
and "exploring", in which the user finds out the extent of the 
information base (McAleese 1993, pp. 9-10). 
While McAleese argues that browsing or undirected 
searching is the main activity of hypertext users, he also argues 
that there is a close relationship between this activity and 
"associationism" (McAleese 1993, p. 6). The link between hypertext 
and "association ism" derives from a paper written by Bush (1945), 
who many claim to be the inventor of hypertext: 
"Many authors trace the origins of hypertext back to a paper 
in 1945 written by Vannevar Bush. In this paper, Bush 
conceived of an information storage and retrieval system - 
the 'memex'. In the memex, items were associatively linked 
in a manner which, to Bush, paralleled the 'association of 
ideas' characterisation of memory. " 
(McKnight, Dillon & Richardson 1993, p. 5) 
According to Conklin, Bush's memex "contained a very large 
library as well as personal notes, photographs, and sketches" 
(Conklin 1987, p. 20). Using microfilm and photocells, Bush 
designed the facility to establish "a labelled link between any two 
points in the library" (Conklin 1987, p20). Bush describes his 
purpose as follows: 
"The human mind ... operates by association. Man cannot hope fully to duplicate this mental process artificially, but 
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he certainly ought to be able to learn from it. One cannot 
hope to equal the speed and flexibility with which the mind 
follows an associative trail, but it should be possible to beat 
the mind decisively in regard to the permanence and clarity 
of the items retrieved from storage. " 
(Bush 1945, cited in Conklin 1987, p. 20) 
According to Conklin, Bush's aspiration was "to mechanize the 
scientific literature system" and "to support more natural forms of 
indexing and retrieval" (Conklin 1987, p. 20). 
While Bush's concern was the indexing and retrieval of 
information, he was aware that a machine could not replicate the 
speed and flexibility of associative thought. However, McAleese 
claims that users of machines now expect instant access to 
information: 
"The central notion of a hypertext system is of linking 
chunks of information together... Users of such systems 
browse or scan or search or trace ideas from one element to 
another. Further, they expect rapid access to the information 
required. Information is only a 'mouse movement' away. 
Users have expectations that when their intellectual window 
is open on a particular topic they will be able to find out 
what they do not know 'immediately'... " 
(McAleese 1993, p. 6) 
According to McAleese, it is widely accepted that "the ability to 
browse quickly in a hypermedia system is critical to its usability" 
(McAleese 1993, p. 6). After claiming that "'instant' access to 
information is important in developing ideas", McAleese adds that 
"the ability to follow an idea quickly is an ingredient in browsing" 
(McAleese 1993, p. 6). 
However, there are two problems with this account of 
browsing. The first concerns a user's expectations about hypertext. 
If, as we are frequently told in the literature, a hypertext is some 
kind of database, then our expectations about hypertext will be 
influenced accordingly. In addition, an expectation of rapid access 
is partly a consequence of the user's purpose, and partly of the 
conditions in which the software is used, as we explained in 
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chapter three. This expectation will be greater if the user knows 
what they are looking for. If the user is "exploring", then, by 
definition, they are merely finding out what is contained in the 
database, rather than looking for specific information. 
The second problem concerns the close relationship between 
browsing and associationism. On the one hand, McAleese claims 
that instant access to information is important for developing 
ideas; on the other hand, it is not instant access to information, but 
"the ability to follow an idea quickly" which is "an ingredient in 
browsing" (McAleese 1993, p. 6). Here we have what seems to be a 
case of "cogito interruptus", where we have to make an equation 
to fill in the gap between two sentences - accessing information 
instantly is equivalent to following an idea quickly. He continues: 
"To follow an idea is to use an 'associationist approach'... 
That is, one bit of information triggers an association with 
another bit of information... " 
(McAleese 1993, p. 6) 
Here, McAleese appears to be referring to the associative relations 
of human memory that we discussed in chapter seven, so that 
"information" refers to items in memory. However, he then claims 
that "browsing is where an idea is followed using the linking 
mechanism of the hypertext elements (eg cards, windows, nodes)" 
(McAleese 1993, p. 6). Here, McAleese is now referring to 
hypertext rather than human memory - but in that case, it is not 
"ideas" but "information" in the form of texts that are linked 
together. Finally, the close relationship between hypertext and 
"associationism" appears to be one of equivalence, because, in 
searching for information, browsing is "using associations (or 
links) to determine the next item to be accessed" (McAleese 1993, 
p. 7). Thus ideas are equivalent to information, so that hypertext 
appears to replicate human memory. 
Bush however, as the above quote makes clear, pointed out 
that a machine could not compete with the speed of associative 
thought, and his aim was not to duplicate this mental process. He 
was more concerned with an alternative method of information 
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indexing and retrieval, which enabled the user to construct links 
between items of data. One problem with the above discussion of 
browsing and associationism is the omission of this activity; types 
of browsing are identified by observing how users search for 
information in databases, where links have already been inserted. 
To browse is to follow a path through a database. A user's 
activities would also include link construction and writing in the 
case of In termedia (Landow & Delany 1991), for example, which is 
a writing environment as well as a database. A student writing an 
essay on a literary topic would have access to an electronic library 
with fixed links, a space for writing, and the facility for 
constructing their own links between reference materials. 
In chapter four, we noted the criticism of the "consensus 
model of writing" for its lack of distinction between "mental 
structures and analogous ones on an external medium" (Sharples 
& Pemberton 1992, p. 326): 
"For example, the phrase 'ideas organising' is commonly 
used to describe the activity of creating and modifying 
symbols or words organised as an associative network on 
some external medium. But physical marks are not ideas; 
the networks have the status of an 'intermediate 
representation', a bridge between mental structures and 
text, with some of the properties of each. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 326) 
By a similar confusion of an "idea" with "information", McAleese 
argues that there is a close relationship between browsing and 
"association ism". But the first is contained in the head, while the 
second is contained in a database. When someone is browsing 
through a database, it is not "ideas" that are pursued but paths 
through the database which link chunks of information. 
While McAleese makes the equation between associative 
thinking and pursuing paths through a database, Jonassen goes 
further in claiming that the structure of hypertext reflects the 
structure of human memory: 
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"Many writers have asserted that hypertext mimics the 
associative networks of human memory... Bush (1945), who 
developed the first hypertext prototype, believed that since 
the human mind operates by association, our machines for 
storing and accessing information should also reflect those 
associative structures. " 
(Jonassen 1990, p. 142) 
According to Jonassen, hypertext is different from other database 
technologies in that "the logical control mechanism for accessing or 
manipulating information... Is primarily associative, enabling users 
to navigate through an associative network of ideas" (Jonassen 
1990, pp. 143-144). He argues that "the instructional process may 
be thought of as the mapping of subject matter knowledge 
(usually that possessed by the teacher or expert) onto the 
learner's knowledge structure" (Jonassen 1990, p. 144): 
"Hypertext structures can be designed to reflect the 
semantic structure of a subject matter expert. If instruction 
is the mapping of the teacher's knowledge structure on the 
learner and if hypertext Is an effective instructional medium 
and if the node-link structure of the hypertext reflects the 
semantic structure of the expert, then there is good reason 
to believe that the expert's logic may be mapped directly 
onto the novice browser. This hypothesis obviously demands 
empirical verification which is currently being carried out. " 
(Jonassen 1990, p. 144) 
Jonassen argues that in order to design hypertexts "that reflect 
the semantic structure of the expert", we need to "assess and map 
the expert's knowledge structure" (Jonassen 1990, p. 145). He then 
describes how to use the technique of free word association to 
construct a "semantic map of ideas that comprise a knowledge 
domain"; a semantic map is a "spatial map that reflects the 
semantic distances between ideas" (Jonassen 1990, p. 145). A 
second technique is pattern noting, in which lines are added to a 
central idea, again using free association, and related ideas are 
connected to those lines (Jonassen 1990, pp. 146-147). Both 
techniques therefore involve the sort of "brainstorming" that 
Sharpies and Pemberton describe as a technique in writing 
(Sharpies & Pemberton 1992, pp. 324-325). 
426 
Jonassen then describes how a semantic map can be applied 
to hypertext design. Assuming that hypertext structure reflects 
expert knowledge structure, he remarks that "the three most 
difficult problems in designing a hypertext are how to get started, 
what nodes should the hypertext contain, and how should they be 
linked" (Jonassen 1990, p. 149). According to Jonassen, solving 
each of these problems can be assisted by the two techniques of 
knowledge-mapping described above. A semantic map can then 
be used to define a structure of nodes and links, or to design a 
graphical browser, which is the most direct way of mapping an 
expert's knowledge structure onto hypertext. A user or learner 
clicks on the topics displayed on a graphical browser to visit the 
node (Jonassen 1990, pp. 149-150). 
To investigate his hypothesis, Jonassen carries out three 
empirical studies, in which he assesses "the effects of semantically 
structured hypertexts on learners' knowledge structures" 
(Jonassen 1993, p. 157). This in turn requires methods of assessing 
and measuring learners' structural knowledge (Jonassen 1993, 
pp. 157-158). However, the results of the empirical studies are 
disappointing, as the effects appear to be insignificant, and 
Jonassen concludes "that merely providing structural cues in the 
user interface of a hypertext will not result in significant increases 
in structural knowledge acquisition" (Jonassen 1993, p. 164). For 
one explanation of these results, he turns to Whalley's observation 
on the "mistaken notion.., that the arbitrary 'webs' of facts in 
hypertext systems have much semantic significance" (Whalley 
1990, p. 63), and adds: 
"What matters most in learning is the construction of 
personally relevant knowledge structures. It appears that 
arbitrarily imposed semantic nets may not be adequate to 
overcome personal ones or at least not directly map onto 
learners' knowledge structures. So, merely showing learners 
structural relationships, without a purpose for doing so, is 
probably not sufficient to result in meaningful encoding of 
that information. When structural knowledge outcomes are 
required, learners apparently do attend to the structural 
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information and encode it into memory. " 
(Jonassen, 1993, p. 164) 
Both McAleese and Whalley identify browsing as the main 
strategy of reading hypertext (McAleese 1993, Whalley 1990, 
Whalley 1993). However, Jonassen agrees with Whalley that 
browsing is a strategy which is inappropriate for many forms of 
learning. The students in Jonassen's studies "lacked a clear 
purpose for studying the hypertext" (Jonassen 1993, p. 164), and 
he comments: 
"The question is the extent to which unconstrained browsing 
can support instructional goals, especially without a clearly 
established purpose for studying... Learning from hypertext 
must rely on externally imposed or mediated learning tasks 
- merely browsing through a knowledge base does not 
engender deep enough processing to result in meaningful 
learning. " 
(Jonassen 1993, p. 164) 
Jonassen's observations that browsing must be purposeful to 
result in meaningful learning agrees with the constructivists' 
comments on the cognitive context of learning. Claiming that 
"cognition is situated in experience", Cunningham and colleagues 
argue that how we as learners impose order on our learning 
environment is largely determined by our purpose: "the cognitive 
context which is imposed or in which we place ourselves" 
(Cunningham et al 1993, p. 23). This in turn provides an argument 
for "situated leaning": 
"More specifically, the relevance of information, the 
interrelationships in that information environment, and the 
potential applications of that information that we see are all 
determined in large measure by the goals or purpose we 
bring to the learning environment. Hence, if the goal is to 
pass a test, relevance is determined by the school context of 
what might be tested. If, however, the goal is to use that 
information In some real world application then relevance 
and interrelationships will be determined in large measure 
by that real world task. " 
(Cunningham et al 1993, pp. 23-24) 
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Situating learning makes use of the observation that learners 
make sense of concepts by engaging in the activity that 
circumscribes those concepts (Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989a, 
1989b). If we apply this notion to Jonassen's research into 
structural knowledge acquisition, then for structural knowledge to 
be "meaningful" to students, they themselves must be engaged in 
the process of creating the structures that Jonassen's hypertext 
merely displays. 
Jonassen suggests that it was the novelty of hypertext for 
his students that prevented its effective use as a teaching tool; 
thus a more balanced evaluation would also consider students 
who are "hypertext-literate" (Jonassen 1993, p. 165). The 
presentation of structural cues, such as graphical browsers, had no 
effect on structural knowledge acquisition: "the more novel the 
appearance of the hypertext... the more negatively the students 
reacted to it" (Jonassen 1993, p. 165). For Jonassen, this calls into 
question "the ability of learners to engage in meaningful learning 
rather than information retrieval from hypertext" (Jonassen 1993, 
p. 165). Yet it is difficult to see how students become hypertext- 
literate or engage in meaningful learning about structural 
knowledge if they are merely presented with a database. In the 
case of graphical browsers, Whalley points out that "such high- 
level abstractions are always going to be in danger of 'spoon- 
feeding' students with structures that they should be developing 
for themselves" (Whalley 1993, p. 14). If students are not involved 
in the design of such novelties as associative networks or 
graphical browsers, then the structural knowledge that Jonassen 
hopes will be acquired will remain mysterious, and hypertext will 
remain a mere source of information. 
The results of Jonassen's empirical studies therefore lead 
him to question one assumption of his initial hypothesis: that 
hypertext is an effective instructional medium. However, he does 
not question the other assumptions on which his hypothesis is 
based. We list them here in the order in which they appear above: 
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1. Hypertext is primarily an associative network of ideas. 
2. The structure of hypertext reflects the structure of human 
memory. 
3. Semantics can be represented as a structure. 
4. Knowledge can also be represented as a structure. 
5. Instruction is the mapping of an expert's knowledge 
structure onto a novice's knowledge structure. 
6. Expert knowledge can be represented by the node and link 
structure of hypertext. 
7. Statistical analysis of the results of free association can produce 
a semantic map. 
8. A semantic map can be transplanted directly onto hypertext 
design. 
9. Structural knowledge can be measured. 
The first two assumptions were discussed above, where we 
pointed out that links in hypertext connect nodes of texts or data 
rather than ideas. In chapter seven we discussed how the process 
of remembering is governed by associative relations; here, 
Jonassen assumes that the structure of human memory is 
organised as an associative network. In chapter seven, we also 
referred to the distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory. Episodic memory is organised according to the spatial- 
temporal contexts of events and scenes from our personal 
experience, while semantic memory includes our generalised 
schemata for events, objects, human psychology and behaviour, 
and so forth. It is this "interrelated knowledge within semantic 
memory" that, according to Jonassen, is organised as an associative 
network (Jonassen 1993, p. 155). The claim that the structure of 
hypertext reflects that of human memory therefore rests on the 
assumptions that semantics and knowledge can both be 
represented by the node and link structure of hypertext, that a 
semantic map can be constructed by analysing the results of free 
association, and that "we can map the associative knowledge 
structure of an expert... onto the structure of a hypertext" 
(Jonassen 1993, p154). These assumptions are informed by the 
rationalistic view of semantics discussed in chapter six. 
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10.4 ASSOCIATIVE AND SEMANTIC NETWORKS 
Semantic networks have been developed by Al researchers as a 
method of representing knowledge. Conklin describes a semantic 
network as "a knowledge representation scheme consisting of a 
directed graph in which concepts are represented as nodes, and 
the relationships between concepts are represented as the links 
between them" (Conklin 1987, p. 37). He points out that "what 
distinguishes a semantic network as an AI representation scheme 
is that concepts in the representation are indexed by their 
semantic content rather than by some arbitrary... ordering" 
(Conklin 1987, p. 37). In cognitive science, the terms "concept" and 
"conceptual category" are used interchangeably "to refer to mental 
representations of objects, entities and events" (Roth & Frisby 
1986, p. 20). In cognitive science, the theory of conceptual 
categories assumes that concepts and ideas have an autonomous 
existence from language. In terms of the two approaches to 
language discussed in previous chapters, "concepts" and 
"conceptual categories" are either signifieds that require signifiers 
in order to exist, or names that classify things in the real world. 
Conceptual category theory derives from Aristotle (Roth & 
Frisby 1986, p. 44). Like Aristotle, Collins and Quillian use biology 
as a model (Collins & Quillian 1969), and propose that "concepts of 
living organisms are represented as a hierarchy of categories, each 
linked to a list of defining properties" (Roth & Frisby 1986, p. 43). 
Quillian is also credited with the proposal for a semantic memory, 
in which semantic knowledge is organised along similar lines 
(Quillian 1968). Figure 23 shows an example of a semantic 
network for the conceptual category of flowering plants, in which 
the entities, plants, form the nodes of the net, and their defining 
properties form the link names or link types. For simplicity's sake, 
we assume a world in which there are only seven types of plant. 
This net has a hierarchical structure, with the class or genus of 
flowering plants at the top, and individual species of plant at the 
bottom. Such a structure is not essential to a semantic net, but 
whatever the arrangement of the nodes, a semantic net must have 
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typed links which indicate how to proceed from one node to 
another. 
has-narrow-leaf 
narrow- 
leaf 
has_flower_ 
shape-C / 
flowering 
plants has-broad-leaf 
broad- 
leaf 
has-flower- 
shape_Y 
trumpe bell-like 
-like flower 
is-named 
'\( wild 
bluebell ) daffodil 
dead 
nettle 
no 
overhang 
FIGURE 23: A SEMANTIC NETWORK FOR FLOWERING PLANTS 
Is an associative network equivalent to a semantic network, 
as Jonassen suggests? To answer this question, let's use the 
technique of free association to create an associative network for 
Sarrasine, the Balzac tale of Barthes' analysis. Using the title as the 
initial prompt, we list a stream of associations in sequence as they 
occur. Here we give an example of four strings. The end of each 
string marks a pause, in which the previous strings are read 
before another is generated: 
Sarrasine: 
- Who or what is Sarrasine? » enigmas » problem solving 
reading » naming 
top petai 
overhangs 
bottom 
is-named 
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- denotation » connotation » femininity » antithesis » La 
Zambinella » S/Z» the axis of castration 
- connotation » seines» characters 
- the codes » unfolding » proairesis »vraisemblance » the 
real » Balzac » Flaubert 
To turn this chain of associations into a network, we turn the 
items in the chain into nodes, and delete duplicates. Between the 
nodes, we draw the links given by the original chain. The result is 
the associative network represented by Figure 24. 
arrasine 
o is Sarrasine. enota 
ro Diem soivininini 
ea in antithesis the cod 
namin Zambi Bella 
unfoldi 
S/Z 
roa 
axis of castrat 
vraisemblance 
mal%u` Flaubert 
FIGURE 24: AN ASSOCIATIVE NETWORK FOR SARRASINE 
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More links could be added to this associative net where 
there appears to be further connections between nodes. However, 
to turn this associative network into a semantic network, we need 
to show how the nodes are connected: the types of link need to be 
identified or named. As the original list was the result of 
spontaneity, we assumed that the links between items in the 
associative chain were generally implicit. In the process of naming 
links however, some of the nodes in the associative net now turn 
into links in the semantic net. Further nodes and links have been 
inserted into the associative net to produce the semantic network 
represented by Figure 25. The result is a different kind of 
semantic network to the hierarchical one of Figure 23, but in 
either case, an associative network is not equivalent to a semantic 
network. 
eg_of describes ame them roble Js of a. is of e of g- require olvin a o title of 
unfolds_along 
nigma, 
story eg_of xample_of 
Zambinella ho is 
eg_of arrasine? 
five 
antithesis codes 
(S/Z) Sarrasine denotes 
analysed example-of connotes written-by a za arthes 
emininity 
example-of 
antithesis att 'bute_of I7gcentr 
(gender) 
masculinit 
aracter 
created-by sem 
FIGURE 25: A SEMANTIC NETWORK FOR . SARRASTNF. 
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What is the relationship between semantic networks and 
hypertext? Conklin describes the relation as follows: 
The analogy to hypertext is straightforward: Hypertext 
nodes can be thought of as representing single concepts or 
ideas, internode links as representing the semantic 
interdependencies among these ideas, and the process of 
building a hypertext network as a kind of informal 
knowledge engineering. The difference is that AI knowledge 
engineers are usually striving to build representations 
which can be mechanically interpreted, whereas the goal of 
the hypertext writer is often to capture an interwoven 
collection of ideas without regard to their machine 
interpretability ... " (Conklin 1987, p. 37) 
Although this analogy still reflects the notion of linking ideas 
rather than texts, this notion of hypertext has been used to design 
writing software, in which writers construct their own semantic 
networks as an aid to developing argumentative texts (see chapter 
five). For example, Conklin describes the "Issue Based Information 
System" (IBIS), initially developed by Rittel and Webber (1973) as 
a teleconferencing system. The IBIS includes three types of node 
(issues, positions, and arguments) and nine types of relation to 
link these nodes, such as responds-to, questions, supports, 
objects-to, and refers-to (Conklin 1987, p. 24). The IBIS has been 
adapted by Sharpies and colleagues to form a tool for designing 
their "Writer's Assistant" (Sharples, Goodlet & Pemberton 1989, 
pp. 30-31). However, when hypertext is used as a tool for writers - 
that is, as a space or a set of spaces for writing (Bolter 1991a) - 
the writer, or the software designer, still faces the problem of how 
to "linearise" the nodes of text into a sequential argument (Ghaoui, 
George, Rada, Beer & Getta 1992). 
In these examples, hypertext is used to design a tool which 
writers or designers can use to construct their own semantic 
network. However, a semantic network can be used to guide the 
design of a hypertext itself, as advocated by Jonassen and others 
(Jonassen 1990, Jonassen 1993, Rada 1989, George, Rada & Beer 
1991, Beer & Diaper 1991). Rada argues that "linear" texts such as 
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bibliographies or thesauruses can readily be viewed as semantic 
networks (Rada 1989). Therefore, some texts can be translated 
into hypertexts more easily if we use a semantic network as a 
model for designing nodes and links. However, texts such as 
dictionaries, encyclopaedias, thesauruses, and other works of 
reference are organised according to the sort of "conceptual 
categories" shown in Figure 23. Mapping other kinds of texts onto 
this type of semantic network is not feasible (Ghaoui et al 1992), 
and assumes the essentialist view of semantics that we discussed 
in chapter six. 
Further problems arise with a semantic network that is 
derived from an associative network, such as the one shown in 
Figure 25. As an associative net is the result of free association, 
the connections between nodes might only have a personalised 
relevance. This feature is hopefully removed by turning the 
associative net into a semantic net, because the names of links are 
intended to have a generalised relevance. However, Holt's 
experiments on the structuring of hypertexts show the difficulties 
of establishing a consensus on link names or "relatedness" 
between nodes (Holt, Howell, & Gjengendal 1991). 
Holt and colleagues describe a hypertext authoring system 
"HyperNet", which is "specifically designed as a highly interactive 
modelling tool for research purposes" (Holt et at 1991, p. 192). 
With this system, the hypertext author must name every node 
and specify all links between nodes. However, when using the 
first version of the system, authors found it difficult to name the 
connections between nodes. This raised the question "whether it is 
possible to describe overtly and systematically the logical 
connections that an author has in mind when constructing a 
hypertext" (Holt et at 1991, p. 194). Holt and colleagues investigate 
this problem by an experiment in which a node is defined as a 
paragraph of text. The purpose of the experiment is to find out 
whether a reader can describe the logical relationships between 
pairs of paragraphs which are "related, semi-related or unrelated" 
(Holt et at 1991, p. 193). Participants generally found this task 
difficult, but one surprising result is that nearly one in five found 
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a relationship between unrelated paragraphs. Another result is a 
large variation in how paragraphs are reported as related, and 
Holt and colleagues can find only three general themes that may 
serve as link names, themes which are "vague and global in their 
perspective": how-to-do-or-use, explains, and gives-examples-of 
(Holt et al 1991, p. 195). 
One could argue that naming links between nodes of a 
semantic net should be easier than naming connections between 
paragraphs; in the former case, we are only dealing with the links 
between names, signifiers, or "conceptual categories". However, 
our argument concerns the use of a semantic net to guide 
hypertext design. Jonassen proposes that a semantic net 
represents a hypertext structure, so that nodes in the net become 
nodes within hypertext. The names of the former therefore 
indicate the names of the latter. When a node is an entire 
document or part of a document, then the name of the node is also 
the title of the document or chapter. In that case, a semantic net 
serves as the guide to an electronic library, in which texts are 
read in the same way as print. The "non-linearity" of hypertext is 
only apparent when jumping between documents or to different 
parts of a document, in which case the node is a smaller unit of 
text. As we have seen, this "primitive" or "atomic" node is 
frequently defined as a paragraph. In this case, a link between 
nodes is a link between paragraphs, and to use a semantic net to 
design these links, a paragraph must have a name. 
To have a name however, a paragraph must be structured in 
a particular fashion. Nash discusses four varieties of rhetorical 
design: the step, the stack, the chain, and the balance (Nash 1980). 
In the case of the stack, the rhetorical pattern "is one of definition 
and extension" (Nash 1980, p. 12); a topic is announced In the 
opening sentence of the paragraph, and then amplified. So, just as 
a sentence has a name or a topic, this kind of paragraph has a 
topic sentence. In this case then, the name of the topic sentence is 
also the name of the paragraph, and hence the name of the node. 
However, if every node is designed in this way, a hypertext 
becomes a collection of paragraphs that are only connected by the 
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links between their names; thus hypertext can be viewed as the 
"fragmented text form" of Whalley's description, a form that is not 
conducive to the authoring of cohesive argument (Whalley 1993, 
p. 7). On the other hand, a cohesive argument will take up more 
than one paragraph, and, as Whalley also indicates, the alternative 
to the fragmented text form is to create the "electronic scroll" 
(Whalley 1993, p. 9). 
10.5 STRUCTURES AND NAVIGATION 
The problem of structuring hypertext is therefore not only a 
question of design (defining the nodes and links of a hypertext 
structure) but also a question of authoring (writing the textual 
content of nodes), and these two questions are difficult to separate 
as both must address the purpose of the hypertext and the 
purpose of its readers. The use of a semantic net to design a 
hypertext also has implications for the hypertextual reader. One 
possible consequence is the notion that a hypertext represents 
some kind of semantic space that the reader must navigate while 
under the constant threat of becoming lost. The notion that a 
hypertext has a spatial existence is not restricted to those who 
view its structure in terms of semantics. It is also a consequence 
of an over-emphasis on structure, which, as Derrida points out, is 
inseparable from space. From this perspective, the interrelation of 
node and link forms the organic whole of hypertext structure, 
which has various "archetypal" shapes, such as the hierarchy, the 
hub-and-spokes, or the network (Figure 26). From this angle, the 
first question for the designer is "What structure is the most 
appropriate to my purpose"? 
Following these assumptions, we might argue that if a 
hypertext is structured according to a certain pattern, this pattern 
can be displayed to the reader, and the reader will not get lost in 
the hypertext or "information space" (Beard & Walker 1990). 
While Bolter presents "getting lost" as a worthwhile goal to pursue 
in the case of the universal book, other writers on hypertext have 
described this phenomenon as one of the problems with hypertext 
43 8 
(Conklin 1987, Wright & Lickorish 1989, Wright & Lickorish 1990, 
Simpson & McKnight 1990, Beard & Walker 1990, McAleese 1993, 
Edwards & Hardman 1993, Boyle & Snell 1990, Monk 1990). For 
example: 
"Often the components of a problem can be arrayed on a 
two-dimensional information space. Sometimes the 
information has a visual analogue that makes the meaning 
of the Information space clear to the user; a city map or a 
cat-screen medical image, for example... If the two- 
dimensional information space fits completely onto a display 
screen, there is no navigation problem. Users can point to 
any location using one of the computer's pointing devices. 
They are never lost because they can always see the 
complete information space. " 
(Beard & Walker 1990, p. 451) 
F- 
0 
TIE HIERARCHY 
THE NETWORK 
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THE HUB AND SPOKES 
FIGURE 20: I-IYPERTEXT STRIJCT[JRES 
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For large two-dimensional information spaces such as hypertext, 
Beard and Walker advocate the use of a map window to aid 
navigation. The information filter (Conklin 1987, p. 38) and the 
fish-eye browser (McAleese 1993, pp. 34-35) serve a similar 
function. Graphical browsers are advocated by Conklin (1987), 
McAleese (1993), and Jonassen (1990,1993) as a means of 
navigation, while McAleese also advocates the nodal browser 
(McAleese 1993, pp. 30-31). Monk (1990) argues for a personal 
browser to get to a reader's favourite locations. In all these cases, 
getting lost is viewed as a navigational problem, which can be 
rectified by displaying the structure of the hypertext. 
The problem of finding an appropriate structure for a 
hypertext is alleviated when translating printed texts, if we can 
map the printed text onto a particular structure. Wright and 
Lickorish argue that hypertext structure should be viewed as a 
whole in terms of discourse structure, and not "simply in terms of 
nodes and links" (Wright & Lickorish 1989, p. 118). They identify 
four types of discourse structure in printed texts, which are also 
apparent in hypertexts: the hierarchical (reference works in which 
the same categories of information apply to a variety of entities), 
the modular (many kinds of reference materials), the highly 
cohesive argumentative text, and the multi-thematic (hypertexts 
designed to instruct). Discussing the influence of discourse 
structure on hypertext design, they argue that different kinds of 
structure require different kinds of navigational aids (Wright & 
Lickorish 1989). In an empirical investigation of navigational aids, 
Wright and Lickorish compare two systems for two types of 
hypertext (Wright & Lickorish 1990). They find that readers 
preferred index type navigation for a book-like hypertext with a 
modular information structure, but preferred page navigation for 
a hypertext with a hierarchical structure. In this example, page 
navigation displays pages, or nodes, by names or categories rather 
than page numbers. 
In another empirical investigation of navigation, Simpson 
and McKnight find that a hierarchical contents list is more 
efficient than an alphabetical index in enabling navigation and 
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information retrieval (Simpson & McKnight 1990). They also ask 
participants to produce a structural map of the hypertext, and 
find a positive correlation between the ability to navigate in the 
hypertext and the ability to produce an accurate map of its 
structure. Thus, those readers using a hierarchical contents list 
produced a more accurate map than those using an alphabetical 
index. As the hypertext used in this investigation had a 
hierarchical structure, these findings agree with those of Wright 
and Lickorish, and Simpson and McKnight also comment that "a 
hierarchy may not be the optimum structure for all types of text, 
and methods of conveying structural information for other 
structures are required" (Simpson & McKnight 1990, p. 82). 
Edwards and Hardman make an analogy between navigating 
in hypertextual space and navigating in a physical environment 
(Edwards & Hardman 1993). According to Edwards and Hardman, 
research into how humans orientate themselves in unfamiliar 
places has highlighted four stages in the construction of cognitive 
maps. Initially we identify specific landmarks; the next stage is to 
construct route maps that link them. Thirdly, we construct 
survey-type maps of small areas, and the fourth stage is to build 
larger-scale maps from these smaller-scale maps. As studies of 
simulated environments have produced similar results, Edwards 
and Hardman hypothesise that the hypertextual reader creates a 
"spatial cognitive map" of a hypertext (Edwards & Hardman 1993, 
pp. 90-92). 
To investigate this hypothesis, Edwards and Hardman 
construct an experiment that examines "the effects of different 
hypertext structures on users' perceptions of that document" 
(Edwards & Hardman 1993, p. 92). Three types of structure are 
used in the experiment: a hierarchy, an alphabetically indexed 
structure, and a mixed structure that combines both features. 
Participants are given some information retrieval tasks to 
familiarise themselves with the hypertext, and are then shown a 
number of cards that represent information screens from the 
hypertext. They are asked to place them "as they imagined them 
to be arranged in the hypertext document" (Edwards & Hardman 
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1993, p. 98). Edwards and Hardman hypothesise that the "mixed 
structure" condition will disrupt the navigator's ability to 
construct an accurate map, and this hypothesis is confirmed by 
the results. However, readers created a hierarchical rep- 
resentation of structure in both the indexed and the hierarchically 
structured conditions. Edwards and Hardman conclude that 
"individuals appear to be attempting to create cognitive rep- 
resentations of hypertext structures in the form of a survey-type 
map" (Edwards & Hardman 1993, p. 104). The difficulties of 
constructing a map in the mixed condition "has implications for 
the way hypertext documents are structured" (Edwards & 
Hardman 1993, p. 104). The results also provide further evidence 
that hypertext structure has implications for navigational aids. 
However, the hypertext used in all three conditions of this 
experiment was "a specially constructed database containing 
information about various facilities offered by the City of 
Edinburgh and Edinburgh University in the form of a public 
information system" (Edwards & Hardman 1993, p. 92). In this 
case, the content of the hypertext seems to provide an argument 
for the analogy between navigating hypertextual space and 
navigating the physical environment. Yet it seems that neither the 
structure of the database nor the navigational support make use 
of the visual analogue of a city map which, in this case, would 
make "the meaning of the information space clear to the user" 
(Beard & Walker 1990, p. 451). Baird and Percival use a travel 
metaphor to guide navigation in a database that contains similar 
information about Glasgow; thus readers can go on an 
architectural walk, a historical journey, a shopping expedition, and 
various other trips (Baird & Percival 1993, p. 68). Allinson and 
Hammond also use a travel metaphor to conduct novice users on a 
guided tour of their learning support environment (Allinson & 
Hammond 1993 p. 59). 
However, Dillon and colleagues question the assumption that 
Information occupies a space through which readers travel or 
move, and argue that the notion of navigating electronic space can 
lead to confusion (Dillon, McKnight & Richardson 1993, p. 171). 
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They point out that the results of psychological research into 
navigation in the physical environment cannot be directly 
transferred to the electronic domain. Discussing this research, they 
find that landmark knowledge (such as typographic cues) is more 
relevant than survey-type knowledge (such as structural plans) to 
navigation in paper and hypertext. Moreover, they argue that the 
issue of navigation "is clouded by the confusion of terms such as 
information space and semantic space and the mistaken 
assumption that a document's physical instantiation through a 
presentation medium is equivalent to the semantic space an 
author intended to convey" (Dillon et al 1993, p. 188). 
Dillon and colleagues argue that we need to distinguish 
between the notion of navigating through an information 
structure, and the notion of navigating through a semantic space. 
They point out that "in effect we cannot navigate semantic space, 
at least not in the way we navigate physical environments, we can 
only navigate the physical instantiations that we develop of the 
semantic space" (Dillon et al 1993, p. 187): 
"Ultimately, we believe the idea of directly navigating 
semantic space has to be spurious. Semantic space is an 
abstract psycholinguistic concept which cannot be directly 
observed, only represented by way of alternative 
instantiations. By definition, semantic space is n-dimensional 
and practically unbounded. In order to visualise the 
semantic space it needs to be given physical representation 
and in so doing, it becomes at most three-dimensional 
(though more often two-dimensional) and physically 
bounded. In this form it is easy to see how concepts such as 
navigation appear relevant and thus we may talk of moving 
through semantic space in a manner equivalent to 
navigating physical environments. " 
(Dillon et al 1993, pp. 186-187) 
Let's now attempt to conclude this discussion of the 
hypertextual reader from the perspective of hypertext design. 
Given the definition of a hypertext in terms of nodes and links, 
there are three ways of viewing the structuring of hypertext. 
Firstly, we can view the interrelation of node and link in its 
entirety as some kind of organic whole, and attempt to fit the 
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content of the hypertext into some ready-made pattern. For the 
translation of existing texts on paper, this may not be a difficult 
task, as shown by Wright and Lickorish's analysis of discourse 
structure. However, we noted in chapter three that there are 
ergonomic problems in reading large documents from the screen, 
and we have mentioned that the main strategy of reading 
hypertext is browsing rather than linear reading. This suggests 
that readers tend to use hypertext as a source of information, 
rather than read hypertext in order to comprehend a global 
discourse. According to Whalley, this observation applies not only 
to hypertexts designed as databases, but also to those designed as 
argumentative or instructional texts. Considerations such as these 
lead him to question the use of hypertext for learning, and he 
concludes that hypertext "is not a suitable medium to form the 
core of teaching materials" (Whalley 1993, p. 17). 
Secondly, we can view the structuring of hypertext by 
considering the types of node that it might contain. At a macro 
level, a node may be an entire document if we are linking texts in 
an electronic library. At the same level, a node may also be a 
name, a signifier or a "conceptual category" in a semantic network. 
But at a micro level we have seen that a node is often defined as a 
paragraph. To define a node as a paragraph is to define a node in 
terms of its textual content, and often assumes that a paragraph is 
part of a continuous text. In many cases, the paragraph is part of a 
continuous discourse, but here we face the rhetorical problem in 
designing argumentation for hypertext, the problem that Whalley 
describes as fragmenting cohesive text Into nodes. An alternative 
way of defining the node is to define its function in terms of the 
overall purpose of the hypertext. From this functional perspective, 
the same type of node may contain a word, a sentence, or a 
paragraph. 
Thirdly, we can view the structuring of hypertext by 
considering the types of link and the reader's activity in jumping 
from node to node. We have seen that Kibby and Mayes have 
applied Al techniques to design a system of automated or 
"intelligent" linking. In Al approaches to the design of authoring 
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systems, hypertext is viewed as a knowledge-base or database in 
which information can be represented by the standard AI 
techniques of concept or knowledge representation, techniques 
that are application independent. From an Al perspective, a link 
between nodes is not viewed in terms of the reader's activity in 
jumping from node to node, but is seen as a structural connection 
between representations of knowledge or concepts. On the other 
hand, links between documents are often considered from the 
navigational perspective. According to Landow, the rhetoric of 
hypermedia includes a rhetoric of departure and a rhetoric of 
arrival, so that his rules for authors include labelling links to 
clearly indicate the reader's "destination" (Landow 1991, p. 97). 
Orientation devices such as graphical browsers serve a similar 
purpose of permitting readers "to determine their present 
location" (Landow 1991, p. 86). From this perspective of hypertext 
as an information space, links are viewed, not in terms of the 
reader's activity, but as a problem for interface design. 
Given the linking capability of hypertext, it is not surprising 
that the assumption frequently made about the reader's activity is 
associative thinking. A relation between texts that is encoded by 
the author or designer of the hypertext is viewed as a possible 
association made by its reader. Thus Landow writes that "the 
emphasis upon linking materials in hypermedia stimulates and 
encourages habits of relational thinking in the reader" (Landow 
1991, p. 83). We have seen that associative thinking and 
simultaneity are emphasised in discussions of interactive fiction. 
McAleese describes the reader's activity in browsing as 
associative thinking, and equates the pursuit of information with 
the pursuit of ideas. For Jonassen, the main activity of the 
hypertextual reader is also associative thinking, while the 
structure of hypertext is also an associative structure that reflects, 
parallels, or mimics that of human memory. In his case, the use of 
a semantic net to design hypertext structure reflects the notion of 
hypertext as a semantic space that is criticised by Dillon, McKnight 
and Richardson. In addition, to construct a semantic net from the 
results of free association or brainstorming is to turn sequentiality 
into simultaneity; the result of associative thinking is a list that is 
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turned into an "associative" structure. A further problem in using 
a semantic net as a guide to hypertext design is this foregrounding 
of hypertextual structure and the assumption that the reader's 
activity is confined to navigating within it. 
In summary, we can conclude that notions of the hyper- 
textual reader suffer from a particular form of contiguity disorder, 
in which the reader pursues associative relations in an inform- 
ational or semantic space; reading has a spatial but no temporal 
dimension, and thinking is associative but not sequential. Perhaps 
metonymy is ignored because of its associations with linearity, 
compared with the non-linearity of hypertext and consequently 
its associations with metaphor. We have noted the use of a travel 
metaphor to guide navigation in a learning support environment 
(Allinson & Hammond 1993, p. 59). Baird and Percival claim that 
"metaphors in general, and the travel metaphor in particular, are 
extremely powerful aids to navigation around complex data 
structures such as hypertext systems" (Baird & Percival 1993, 
p. 68). However, their particular concern is a database designed to 
assist visitors to Glasgow, in which a travel metaphor seems 
appropriate. 
In the case of hypertext structure, the concern for finding a 
suitable metaphor or model appears to be based on the notion of 
hypertextual space and the assumption that the lack of a pattern 
will result in the reader's becoming lost. We have seen that 
getting lost is viewed as a problem of navigation and the user 
interface, which can be rectified by displaying the structure of the 
hypertext. However, Dillon and colleagues claim that "the evidence 
for navigational difficulties is often circumstantial or inferential" 
(Dillon et al 1993, p. 171). Moreover, guides to navigation are also 
viewed in the literature as guides to browsing, which suggests 
that getting lost is also the result of pursuing a particular reading 
strategy. We have noted that these range from reading for 
comprehension to direct search and information retrieval, while 
the most common strategy of browsing Is pursued with varying 
degrees of purpose. It may be the lack of purpose that results In 
getting lost, and while this lack is generally attributed in the 
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literature to the need for direction or guidance in the use of 
hypertext, the hypertext may equally not be designed in a way 
that encourages purposeful reading. 
While discussions of the hypertextual reader tend to 
emphasise metaphor and associative relations, the absence of 
metonymy and sequential relations is reflected in this general 
failure to consider the pursuit of goals or the linear aspect of 
reading. Wright and Lickorish conclude their empirical invest- 
igation of navigation with the comment that "authors need to bear 
in mind both the structure inherent in the content material and 
the tasks readers will be seeking to accomplish when they are 
designing navigation systems for hypertexts" (Wright & Lickorish 
1990, p. 93). In their discussion of discourse structure, they also 
point to the reader's tasks as "an important influence on hypertext 
design" (Wright & Lickorish 1989, p. 118): 
"There can be a wide variety of such tasks (answering 
specific queries, learning new facts or ideas, gathering 
together pieces of information for use elsewhere such as 
consulting the hypertext during a writing or planning task). 
Many of these tasks will require that readers have ready 
access to facilities other than just jumping and reading. " 
(Wright & Lickorish 1989, p. 118) 
Wright and Lickorish identify the facility for taking notes as a 
particular facility that many readers would find useful. 
This discussion has highlighted the difficulties in separating 
the problem of systems design (designing the software that 
enables authors or designers to construct a hypertext) from that 
of authoring (writing or compiling the textual content of nodes). 
The first Is traditionally the concern of the software expert, and 
the second that of the domain expert. However, the problem of 
defining and designing the nodes and links of a specific hypertext 
cannot be separated from the question of content on the one hand, 
and the constraints that the authoring system imposes on form on 
the other hand. Holt's experiments on logical structuring show 
some of the difficulties in establishing a consensus on link names, 
even within a limited domain (Holt et al 1991); yet Al approaches 
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to systems design assume an application and domain inde- 
pendence. Seneca observes that different readers use the same 
text for different purposes. If we are designing a hypertext to 
serve a specific purpose, then different domains will present their 
own set of problems, whose resolution may require a specific 
treatment and their own hypertextual structures. 
Given these general observations, let's now return to the 
specific task of designing a writing aid for student writers of 
fiction. From this perspective, a reader's goal is to write a story, 
and their navigation through information space is not aimless but 
has a purpose: searching, not for ideas, but for a specific kind of 
information that will assist thinking and writing. In an empirical 
investigation of information retrieval, McKnight and colleagues 
find that, "for some texts and some tasks", a linear format is more 
efficient than hypertext (McKnight, Dillon & Richardson 1990, 
p. 18). On the other hand, studies of "minimal manuals" demon- 
strate the effectiveness of activity based and goal centred learning 
(Ramsay & Oatley 1991, Draper & Oatley 1992). One possibility, 
therefore, is a minimal database for fiction writers, designed as a 
thinking aid, reference text or expandable notebook. However, we 
need a model of writing that identifies the kinds of thinking in 
fiction writing. Given this kind of model, a modular structured 
hypertext or menu based system could be designed to assist these 
activities. Our tasks are therefore a combination of naming and 
problem solving: naming the types of node and link contained in 
such a hypertext, and identifying the activities of its users. 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we explored hypertext in some detail. We 
discussed the argument that, when compared with the linearity of 
printed text, the non-linearity of hypertext involves a different 
kind of reader. We looked firstly at the ways in which printed 
texts are said to contain non-linearity. We found that accounts of 
non-linearity in printed texts emphasise simultaneity and 
associative relations, but ignore the temporal or sequential aspect 
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of reading. We discussed texts that are said to exemplify such 
non-linearity, such as Borges' Ficciones and McLuhan's Gutenberg 
Galaxy. We also discussed the view of hypertext as a vital part of 
a constructivist learning environment, in which the non-linearity 
of hypertext provides an alternative to the linear authority of 
traditional text books. 
We then considered the different uses of hypertext. We 
found that the notion of a hypertextual reader does not take into 
account this range of applications, but assumes that a non-linear 
structure necessitates a different kind of reader. We argued that 
readers of hypertexts are no different to readers of linear texts, in 
that all readers pursue a range of strategies in reading. The choice 
of strategy depends on the task that readers are engaged in. 
Research has shown that the most popular strategy for reading 
hypertexts is browsing. We discussed the argument that there is a 
close relationship between browsing and "association ism" - the 
pursuit of ideas by following associative thought. We argued that 
browsing involves the pursuit of paths through a textual database, 
rather than the pursuit of ideas through associative thought. 
Some argue that hypertext mimics the associative networks 
of human memory. We discussed this notion and identified the 
differences between associative and semantic networks. We 
showed how a semantic network can be used to design a 
hypertext, and also explained why this is not always feasible. We 
argued that there can be no general answer to questions about 
hypertext structure, design, and authoring - these questions must 
address the purpose of the hypertext and the purpose of its 
readers. 
Some argue that hypertext represents a semantic space 
through which readers navigate. We discussed this notion and 
found that the analogy between navigating in a physical 
environment and navigating in an information space has a limited 
application. We suggested an alternative explanation for the 
phenomenon of getting lost in a hypertext - It may be that the 
reader lacks a purpose in browsing, and the design of the 
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hypertext may not encourage purposeful reading. We concluded 
that notions of the hypertextual reader suffer from a particular 
form of contiguity disorder - the reader pursues associative but 
not sequential relations, reading has a spatial but not a temporal 
dimension, and the reader's goals and tasks are not taken into 
account 
Having discussed hypertext in some detail, we are now in a 
position to represent the findings of the previous chapters. In 
their model of writing, Hayes and Flower (1980a) use the 
metaphor of information processing to represent writing 
operations (Figure 2). In the next chapter, we use the metaphor of 
hypertext to represent thinking processes in fiction writing. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: 
A COGNITIVE MODEL 
OF FICTION WRITING 
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11.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we present the results of our investigations over 
the latter course of this thesis in the form of a cognitive model of 
fiction writing. The model is based on the basic model of writing 
discussed in chapter five. We identify the principal elements of 
cognitive planning in fiction writing as remembering and 
reflecting, imagining, focusing the imagination, and problem 
solving. Each of these processes can be applied to events, scenes, 
syntax, and names or signifiers. Just as Hayes and Flower (1980a) 
use the metaphor of information processing to represent writing 
operations, we use the metaphor of hypertext to represent these 
thinking processes. 
Discussing the model in more detail, we compare it with 
other models of writing, and show how it is similar to cognitive 
models in its concern for representation and process. We discuss 
the question of testing the model, and argue that empirical tests of 
the model in its entirety are not feasible. Some researchers 
suggest that a model of writing can be tested by designing and 
testing a software tool based on the model. We discuss this notion 
and conclude that the testing of models and the testing of 
software are separate questions. We also discuss the notion of 
iterative design, and the place of models of writing in this process. 
Finally, we show how the model can be used in design by 
using it to construct a hypertextual aid for student writers of 
fiction. The aid is planned initially as a minimal database or 
minimal manual that would assist the planning of fiction writing. 
We discuss the structure of the tool in terms of modules, nodes 
and links, and we outline the incremental stages in developing, 
implementing and evaluating a prototype. Whether such a tool 
could be developed into a personalised notebook for fiction 
writers is a question that must await future developments. 
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11.2 A COGNITIVE MODEL OF FICTION WRITING 
In an essay that describes the historical development and the 
basic assumptions of cognitive psychology, George Mandler points 
out that its original label was "human information processing" 
(Mandler 1985, p. 7). From this perspective, cognition is the 
processing of information or representations. In Mandler's view, 
"representation and process are the primary foci of all the 
cognitive disciplines", and represent the basic foundations of a 
cognitive science (Mandler 1985, p. 10): 
"Representation in the widest sense of the term is the 
central issue in cognitive psychology. The concept of 
representation is intimately tied to, and possibly identical 
with, the issue of useful theory. Representational systems 
are theoretical constructs that are postulated as responsible 
for (that cause or generate) the observable thoughts, actions, 
etc. of the organism. There is of course no one-to-one 
correspondence between an act and its representation; we 
do not use the term representation in the sense of a symbol 
that 'stands for' some other event. The representation of 
knowledge, in other words, is the theoretical system that is 
constructed in order to explain, understand, and predict the 
behavior of organisms. " 
(Mandler 1985, p. 11) 
Here, Mandler uses the term representation in the context of acts 
or events on the one hand, and knowledge on the other. However, 
it is the representation of knowledge that is the traditional 
concern of a cognitive science: 
"If we are to have any kind of reasonable theory about 
human thought and action, then we must have a system that 
represents what the organism knows. Thus, representation 
becomes a necessary part of any mental theory. A 
commitment to the importance of representation leaves 
open the kind of representational system one wishes to use 
or construct. " 
(Mandler 1985, p. 11) 
The second primary concern of a cognitive science is process: 
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"Representation in a narrow sense would provide only more 
or less static sources of cognition; we also need the processes 
that shape representations and transform them. " 
(Mandler 1985, p. 11) 
According to Mandler however, cognitive psychology cannot be 
equated with a psychology of thinking; nor is it exclusively 
concerned with the representation of knowledge: 
"Historically, the concern with representation is a concern 
with the representation of knowledge, and hence the 
identification with cognition. However, the current use of 
representation clearly goes beyond any narrow definition of 
knowledge. On the other hand, there exists another tradition 
that identifies knowledge with conscious knowledge and in 
turn identifies the latter with the term cognition. The older 
cognitive psychologies, which were part of that tradition, 
have identified cognition with a psychology of 'thinking'. But 
modern cognitive psychology is not concerned exclusively, 
or even primarily, with conscious thought processes; rather 
it claims that representations and processes can be 
developed to fit the full range of human thought and action. " 
(Mandler 1985, p. 18) 
So, from the perspective of a cognitive science, cognition is 
an activity that involves the processing of representations. This 
notion of cognition, however, is one of the assumptions that are 
questioned by Winograd and Flores in their critique of the 
rationalistic tradition and its influence on the development of a 
computer science (Winograd & Flores 1986). The basis for their 
critique, and for an alternative understanding of computers and 
cognition, lies firstly in hermeneutics and the writings of 
Heidegger and Gadamer, secondly, in the work of the biologist 
Maturana, and thirdly, in the theory of speech acts developed by 
Austin and Searle. Winograd and Flores use these three sources to 
develop an alternative perspective on computer design. 
In Winograd and Flores' summary, Heidegger and Gadamer 
argue that interpretation is an activity which is not confined to 
textual analysis, but is fundamental to human cognition in general. 
Moreover, they both reject the mind-body dualism which "accepts 
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the existence of two separate domains of phenomena, the 
objective world of physical reality, and the subjective mental 
world of an individual's thoughts and feelings" (Winograd & Flores 
1986, p. 30). According to Winograd and Flores, Heidegger argues 
that "the separation of subject and object denies the more 
fundamental unity of being-in-the-world (Dasein) " (Winograd & 
Flores 1986, p. 31): 
"By drawing a distinction that I (the subject) am perceiving 
something else (the object), I have stepped back from the 
primacy of experience and understanding that operates 
without reflection. 
Heidegger rejects both the simple objective stance (the 
objective physical world is the primary reality) and the 
simple subjective stance (my thoughts and feelings are the 
primary reality), arguing instead that it is impossible for one 
to exist without the other. The interpreted and the inter- 
preter do not exist independently: existence is inter- 
pretation, and interpretation is existence. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 31) 
Winograd and Flores summarise Heidegger's writings to make four 
more claims which are relevant to design: the first is that "our 
implicit beliefs and assumptions cannot all be made explicit"; the 
second is that "practical understanding is more fundamental than 
detached theoretical understanding"; the third is that "we do not 
relate to things primarily through having representations of 
them"; and the fourth is that "meaning is fundamentally social and 
cannot be reduced to the meaning-giving activity of individual 
subjects" (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 32-33). According to 
Winograd and Flores, Heidegger's philosophy is "based on a deep 
awareness of everyday life" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 34). One 
example is the notion of "thrownness", according to which we are 
thrown into situations where actions cannot be avoided, their 
effects cannot be predicted, and detached reflection or rational 
planning is not possible (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 34-35). A 
second example is the notion of "readiness-to-hand", according to 
which the properties of objects are not inherent, "but arise only in 
an event of breaking down in which they become present-at- 
hand" (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 36-37). 
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These considerations lead to an alternative notion of 
cognition as an activity that, unlike 'respiration' or 'locomotion', 
can not "be separated from the rest of the activity of the 
organism" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 70). Thinking, in particular, 
is an activity that is not usually performed as a detached or 
reflective activity: 
"In speaking of thinking as a kind of activity, we adopt a 
common pre-understanding that seems so obvious as to be 
unarguable. When you sit at your desk deciding where to go 
for lunch, it seems clear that you are engaged in 'thinking', 
as opposed to other things you might be doing at the time... 
This kind of detached reflection is obviously a part of what 
people do. The blindness of the rationalistic tradition lies in 
assuming that it can serve as a basis for understanding the 
full range of what we might call 'cognition'... " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 71) 
Using Heidegger's notion of "thrownness", Winograd and Flores 
argue that cognition is a situated activity: 
"We do at times engage in conscious reflection and 
systematic thought, but these are secondary to the pre- 
reflective experience of being thrown in a situation in which 
we are always already acting. .. Our acts always 
happen 
within thrownness and cannot be understood as the results 
of a process (conscious or non-conscious) of representing, 
planning, and reasoning. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 71) 
Moreover, Winograd and Flores point out that "Maturana and 
Heidegger both oppose the assumption that cognition is based on 
the manipulation of mental models or representations of the 
world" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 73). Heidegger, on the one 
hand, sees representation "as a derivative phenomenon, which 
occurs only when there is a breaking down of our concernful 
action" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 74). Maturana, on the other 
hand, describes cognition as a biological phenomenon. Winograd 
and Flores summarise his notion of cognition as follows: 
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"As observers we can generate descriptions of the activity of 
living systems in either of two non-intersecting domains. 
One description deals with the structure of the system and 
how that structure determines behavior. Such a description 
is essentially ahistorical. It does not matter how the system 
came to be that way, only that it is. We can at the same time 
describe (as observers of a history of changes within the 
structure and the medium) the pattern of interactions by 
which the structure came to be, and the relationship of those 
changes to effective action. It is this second domain of 
explanation that Maturana calls 'cognitive'. The cognitive 
domain deals with the relevance of the changing structure of 
the system to behavior that is effective for its survival. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 47) 
So according to Maturana, cognition is to be explained in terms of 
diachrony rather than synchrony, while according to Heidegger, a 
synchronic explanation of cognition is not feasible because of the 
"thrownness" in which cognition is situated. 
How are these general considerations relevant to the specific 
task of fiction writing? Firstly, cognition, in the context of writing, 
is situated by what Flower and Hayes call the "task environment" 
(Hayes & Flower 1980a). In the case of student writers, for 
example, this might include the writing assignment, the writing 
laboratory, and the associated problems of learning how to use 
unfamiliar hardware or software while coping with the pressure 
of working to a deadline. In this case, one can argue that a 
practical understanding of technology is more fundamental than a 
detached theoretical understanding, and that the properties of the 
machine become apparent by their absence; that is, they emerge 
when the machine breaks down. We have seen that in this 
situation of "thrownness", students are under pressure to generate 
text. Moreover, rather than step back from the primacy of 
experience that operates without reflection, according to Noel 
Williams student writers are fully absorbed in the unity of "being- 
in-the-world", and cannot avoid the action of generating text. In 
addition, thinking - in the sense of planning or textual structuring 
(the manipulation of mental representations) - is an activity that 
also occurs only in the event of breakdown; that is, when a 
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student is unable to generate text - the phenomenon generally 
known as getting stuck or writer's block. 
However, the task of writing, unlike the tasks which feature 
as examples in Winograd and Flores' analysis, such as decision 
making or corporate management, is a task in which the 
manipulation of representations is fundamental. Describing the 
usability of graphic interfaces such as the Apple Macintosh, 
Winograd and Flores comment that "the challenge for the next 
generation of design is to move this same effectiveness beyond 
the superficial structures of words and pictures into the domains 
generated by what people are doing when they manipulate those 
structures" (Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 165). But when people 
manipulate data structures, we can describe what they are doing 
in different ways. As we pointed out at the beginning of this 
thesis, the process of writing can be described in terms of mental 
activities or physical operations. The models of writing that were 
discussed earlier describe writing from the point of view of 
writing strategies, writing operations (such as planning, trans- 
lating, and reviewing), or manipulating external representations. 
Thinking processes that are concerned with textual manipulation 
are absent from these models. The consideration of different kinds 
of writing strategies led to a discussion of planning, the distinction 
between metacognitive and cognitive activities, and the notion of 
cognitive planning as textual structuring. 
According to Winograd and Flores, Heidegger and Maturana 
both argue that we must go beyond a naive view of the connection 
between thinking and acting, and this basic point is "critical in our 
anticipation of the kinds of computer tools that will be useful" 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 71): 
"In a tradition that emphasizes thought as an independent 
activity, we will tend to design systems to work within that 
domain. In fact much of the current advertising rhetoric 
about computers stresses the role they will play in 'applying 
knowledge' or 'making decisions'. If, on the other hand, we 
take action as primary, we will ask how computers can play 
a role in the kinds of actions that make up our lives ... " (Winograd & Flores 1986, pp. 71-72) 
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In the context of writing, a naive view of the connection between 
thinking and acting is exemplified by the notion that writing 
proceeds as a linear sequence of pre-writing (the detached 
reflective activity of thinking), drafting text, and reviewing. We 
attempted to go beyond this view by describing a basic model of 
writing as a cycle of activities rather than a linear sequence of 
operations, but a cycle in which a detached reflective thinking can 
not be excluded, if we are to take into account different kinds of 
writing behaviour. However, we concluded chapter five with the 
need to define structuring activities in fiction writing. We then 
considered Chomsky's approach to linguistics, the notion of 
syntactic structure, and the representation of textual structure by 
similar methods - rules and grammars. In subsequent chapters we 
adopted a Saussurean or semiological perspective to develop a 
model of diachrony rather than synchrony, a model that 
represents structuring activities rather than structure. 
Considering texts from a functional perspective, Beaugrande 
and Dressler identify narrative, descriptive, and argumentative 
text types, among others. From this perspective, they describe the 
literary or fictional text as a "constellation" of narration, 
description and argumentation, with the additional feature of an 
imaginary (or non-real) relation to the real world. However, one 
problem with the notion that writers perform functions (narrate, 
describe, or argue) is that it assumes a model of writing as speech, 
in which writers are communicating directly to readers. Writers 
create texts, and to create a narrative text, for example, need to 
remember or imagine a sequence of events. Given the discussions 
of metaphor and metonymy, story memory and the symbolic, 
naming and problem solving, we can now fill in the blank spaces 
of Figure 5 to describe a cognitive model of fiction writing. 
The first activity shown in the cycle is thinking, which in 
this context can be defined as a reflective, creative, or discursive 
process. The processes we have identified are remembering and 
reflecting, imagining, focused imagining, and problem solving. 
Each process can be applied to events, scenes, syntax, and names 
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or signifiers. In the case of events and scenes, remembering and 
imagining may be verbal or visual activities. 
All these processes will interact with a writer's memory, and 
we have mentioned the distinction between a biographic or 
"episodic" memory and a semantic memory. Cohen and colleagues 
define this distinction by the sort of information represented, its 
organisation, and its source (Cohen et al 1986, p. 47). Biographic 
memory contains memories of events, scenes, places, people, and 
so forth, derived from personal experience and organised 
chronologically or spatially. Semantic memory contains a general 
knowledge acquired by learning and reason, or by empirical 
observation and interaction, and includes one's spatio-temporal 
schemata for human behaviour and human psychology, in real 
worlds and in textual worlds. In addition, linguistic, cultural and 
scientific knowledge (or what Barthes calls the codes of human 
knowledges), notions of the symbolic, causality, verisimilitude, 
medieval world pictures, the constitution of humans, fictional 
characters, and so forth, can all be placed in a semantic memory. 
Story memory contains memories of events and scenes from 
textual worlds, and the kinds of story schemata discussed in 
chapter eight. These different kinds of memories and knowledges 
interact with the thinking activities which we have identified as 
follows: 
" remembering or reflecting on events - from story memory or 
personal experience; 
" remembering or reflecting on scenes - from screen memory, 
story memory, or personal experience; 
" reflecting on names or signifiers -a discursive or reflective 
process that encompasses proper nouns, abstract nouns, titles, 
etc; 
" remembering or reflecting on syntax - the verbal rehearsal in 
working memory of what has just been written or read; 
" imagining events; 
" imagining scenes; 
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" imagining names or signifiers -a discursive or creative process 
that encompasses proper nouns (characters, locations), titles, 
etc; 
" imagining syntax - the verbal rehearsal in working memory of 
what is about to be written; 
" focused imagining on events - if I were X, what would I do, and 
how would I interpret the events that involve me?; 
" focused imagining on scenes - if I were X, what would I see, 
and how would I interpret what I see?; 
" focused Imagining on names or signifiers - if I were X, what 
would I think about a particular signifier, or what would I call 
a specific phenomenon?; 
" focused imagining on syntax - if I were X, how would I speak, 
how would I think, or how would I write?; 
" problem solving: events - what was the event that occurred, 
when will the event occur, who performed the event, etc; 
" problem solving: scenes - who is the man carrying the yellow 
umbrella, what is in the black box, etc; 
" problem solving: names or signifiers - what does X mean?; 
" problem solving: syntax - inventing, re-inventing or discover- 
ing language. 
The second activity in the cycle is generating text, in the 
form of notes or sentences (where syntactic closure is defined by 
the full stop). Although Flower and Hayes question the notion of 
pre-writing, they still hold a naive view of the relation between 
thought and language in their use of Chomsky's linguistics to 
define the process of "translating" -a transformational operation 
that involves translating logical propositions stored in memory 
into syntax. From the point of view of Saussure's linguistics, the 
activity that we call generating text involves the automatic recall 
of signs and their externalisation into writing. Accounts of writing 
behaviour show that the verbal rehearsal of syntax may be 
omitted altogether in the case of confessional writing, for example, 
or the case of writing prose without prior reflection. However, 
whether a writer is producing notes, sentences from notes, or 
sentences spontaneously without verbal rehearsal, the generation 
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of text does not exclude thought, and the thinking which cannot be 
detached from writing is the automatic retrieval of signs. 
The third activity in the cycle is reading text, again in the 
form of notes or sentences. The model of reading shown in Figure 
22 is also relevant in this context. Reading the text produced so 
far, a writer may pursue sequential relations to identify and 
develop enigmas, to construct a sequence of events from an 
assembly of fragmentary notes, or to imagine how an established 
sequence might be revised or continued. A writer may also pursue 
associative relations in recalling events from story memory, in 
finding correspondences with specific story schemata (Figure 15), 
in developing descriptive episodes, symbolism, characters, in 
retrieving knowledge from semantic memory, and so forth. If the 
story is already underway, then the writer's story memory now 
includes the writer's own text. 
As shown in Figure 5, the process of writing is a cycle of 
thinking, generating, and reading text, and a writer's movements 
around this cycle establishes what Sharples has called a "rhythm 
of writing". The line of external representations marks a detached 
thinking above the line, while the overlapping zones represent 
strategies of writing in which all planning is on-line, or the 
activities of remembering and imagining occur simultaneously 
with text generation. Before we can fill in the spaces of Figure 5, 
there is one remaining problem to consider. 
The different kinds of thinking activities are represented 
above by a list. How should we represent these activities on the 
model? In the last chapter, we discussed research into hypertext 
and cognitive mapping, in which subjects are given a hypertext 
and asked to produce a map of structure. What we are doing is 
working in a reverse direction. Our aim is to map or represent 
structuring activities or cognitive processes, rather than structure, 
knowledge, or information. The map can then be used as the basis 
for designing a hypertext. However, as Winograd and Flores point 
out, "the development of any computer-based system will have to 
proceed in a cycle from design to experience and back again", a 
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cycle often referred to as iterative design (Winograd & Flores 
1986, p. 171). We want to use the model to design a hypertext, but 
at this stage, just as Flower and Hayes use the metaphor of 
information processing to construct their model (Figure 2), we can 
use the metaphor of hypertext to represent these thinking 
activities. We have identified four distinct processes, each of 
which can be applied to four distinct objects, and all sixteen 
activities need to be interconnected, in that it is possible to jump 
from any one process to another, and from any one object to 
another. 
If we represent the four processes (reflecting, imagining, 
focused imagining, and problem solving) as a set of concentric 
circles, all of which are contained within the circle of thought, then 
we can represent the objects (events, scenes, names or signifiers, 
and syntax) as a set of axes, all of which radiate from the centre of 
this circle. In this way, it is possible to visualise the inter- 
connections of the whole, in that one can jump from any point 
within the circle of thought to any other point - but the particular 
jumps that concern us are those from one axis to another, and 
those from one circle to another. We can label the jumps between 
axes as metonymic (a jump to events), metaphoric (a jump to 
scenes), abstractive (a jump to names or signifiers), and syntactic. 
The result is the cognitive model of fiction writing shown in Figure 
27, in which the task environment, meta-cognitive activities, and 
"faculties" (such as reason, the will or the imagination) are 
omitted. 
To construct their model of writing, Flower and Hayes take 
the strategic decision "to model the behavior of individual writers 
rather than the average behavior of groups of writers", a decision 
which they justify as follows: 
"The disadvantage of this approach is that it may be 
expensive. In the worst case, each individual may require a 
separate model. With better luck, models of Individual 
writers will turn out to be variants of a small number of 
model types. The advantage of this approach Is that it is 
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more likely than a model of the average to capture the 
behavior of actual (rather than idealized) writers. " 
(Hayes & Flower 1980b, p. 391) 
The model in Figure 27 is not based on individual writers; neither 
is it based on an idealised average writer. In the earlier 
discussions of models, it was concluded that while we need to take 
into account reports of writing behaviour, our aim should be to 
model writing rather than writers. Flower and Hayes use a 
writer's text "to confirm or elaborate the more direct observations 
of process" (Hayes & Flower 1980b, p. 389), observations that are 
derived from the intrusive method of protocol analysis. To model 
writing, we have used a semiological analysis of texts to infer 
thinking processes. 
Is the result, then, a representation of writing as an 
idealised activity that no actual writer engages in? Does the model 
represent, like Casaubon's "key to all mythologies" in George Eliot's 
Middlemarch, some kind of key to the writing of all narratives, or, 
as Barthes describes at the beginning of S/Z, an attempt to see all 
the world's stories within a single structure: 
"There are said to be certain Buddhists whose ascetic 
practices enable them to see a whole landscape in a bean. 
Precisely what the first analysts of narrative were 
attempting: to see all the world's stories (and there have 
been ever so many) within a single structure: we shall, they 
thought, extract from each tale its model, then out of these 
models we shall make a great narrative structure, which we 
shall re-apply (for verification) to any one narrative: a task 
as exhausting (ninety-nine percent perspiration, as the 
saying goes) as it is ultimately undesirable, for the text 
thereby loses its difference. " 
(Barthes 1990, p. 3) 
In a similar fashion, Todorov introduces the notion of a universal 
grammar of narrative: 
"In the very earliest reflections on language, a hypothesis 
appears according to which there may be discovered a 
common structure that transcends the obvious differences 
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among languages. Investigations of this common structure, a 
kind of universal grammar, have been pursued, with 
varying degrees of success, for more than twenty centuries... 
But if we admit the existence of a universal grammar, 
we must no longer limit it to languages alone... " 
(Todorov 1977a, p. 108) 
To see all the world's stories within a single structure is the sort of 
perception that Buddhists would call Juana - "Juana is a 
knowledge which, motivated by the desire for emancipation, 
penetrates to the real nature of things" (Conze 1959, p. 15). Now, 
introducing his translation of Buddhist scriptures, Edward Conze 
explains that "Sanskrit has numerous words for 'knowledge', to 
which nothing corresponds in our rather impoverished language", 
and the most appropriate word he can find for Jnana is cognition 
(Conze 1959, p. 15). From a Buddhist perspective then, a cognitive 
model of fiction writing would need to be one that can generate an 
infinite number of stories. 
Chomsky's task was to define a finite set of resour es that 
will generate an infinite number of sentences - an arduous task. 
To define a finite set of resources that will generate an infinite 
number of stories would appear to be even more arduous. 
However, there is no need to represent human resources by rules 
and grammars. A grammar is a device for representing structure, 
and Barthes and Todorov both describe attempts, not to find the 
human resources that will generate an infinite number of stories, 
but to find a universal grammar, story schema, or model of 
narrative structure, onto which the structures of all stories can be 
mapped. If we define human resources in terms of thinking 
processes, such as those above, then it is possible for a finite set of 
resources to generate an infinite number of structures. Rather 
than represent writing as an idealised activity therefore, the 
model serves to demonstrate that "some of our most complex and 
imaginative acts can depend on the elegant simplicity of a few 
powerful thinking processes" (Flower & Hayes 1981, p. 386). 
A universal grammar of narrative, on the other hand, 
suggests that the possibilities for generating new fictions are 
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limited to variations of set themes, novel instantiations or perm- 
utations of well-defined and pre-determined elements, or novel 
applications of an established set of rules. As Borges comments, "if 
literature were nothing more than verbal algebra, anyone could 
produce any book by essaying variations" (Borges 1970e, p. 249). 
Borges claims that attempts such as Lully's "to solve all arcana by 
means of an apparatus of concentric, revolving disks of different 
sizes, subdivided into sectors with Latin words", Mill's fear "that 
some day the number of musical combinations would be 
exhausted", or Lasswitz's fantasy "of a universal library which 
would register all the variations of the twenty-odd orthographic 
symbols", all exemplify a common tendency to turn metaphysics 
and the arts "into a kind of play with combinations" (Borges 
1970e, p. 248). Contrary to Bolter's claim that, for Borges, 
"literature is exhausted" (Bolter 1991a, p. 139), Borges himself 
comments: 
"Those who practise this game forget that a book is more 
than a verbal structure or series of verbal structures; it is 
the dialogue it establishes with its reader and the intonation 
it imposes upon his voice and the changing and durable 
images it leaves in his memory. This dialogue is infinite... 
Literature is not exhaustible, for the sufficient and simple 
reason that no single book is. A book is not an isolated being: 
it is a relationship, an axis of innumerable relationships. One 
literature differs from another, prior or posterior, less 
because of the text than because of the way in which it is 
read... " 
(Borges 1970e, pp. 248-249) 
Literature is not exhaustible as one book alone contains an infinite 
number of readings, so that a new reading is always possible in 
theory. 
Yet elsewhere in Borges' writings, the notion of novelty or 
originality in thought is questioned. In The Immortal, Borges 
writes that "in an infinite period of time, all things happen to all 
men" (Borges 1970c, p. 144), and that "every act (and every 
thought) is the echo of others that preceded it in the past, with no 
visible beginning, or the faithful presage of others that in the 
467 
future will repeat it to a vertiginous degree" (Borges 1970c, 
p. 146). In The Shape of the Sword, he writes: "Whatever one man 
does, it is as if all men did it" (Borges 1970b, p. 99). These and 
many other examples serve to illustrate Borges' thesis that time, 
as a chronological sequence of ordered moments, does not exist -a 
refutation that Borges claims "is found in some way or another in 
all my books" (Borges 1970f, p. 253). In this argument, Borges 
claims that "each moment is autonomous", and that "each moment 
we live exists, but not their imaginary combination" (Borges 
1970f, p. 258). Noting a tendency in his own experience for certain 
memories to recur, Borges suspects that "the number of 
circumstantial variants is not infinite", so: 
"... we can postulate, in the mind of an individual (or of two 
individuals who do not know of each other but in whom the 
same process works), two identical moments. Once this 
identity is postulated, one may ask: Are not these identical 
moments the same? Is not one single repeated term 
sufficient to break down and confuse the series of time? Do 
not the fervent readers who surrender themselves to 
Shakespeare become, literally, Shakespeare? " 
(Borges 1970f, p. 259) 
Describing an experience in which he is given a moment of insight, 
Borges comments that "the number of such human moments is not 
infinite", and that "the elemental ones" (those of fear and desire, 
pain and pleasure) are "even more impersonal" (Borges 1970f, 
p. 262). So, according to Borges, no thought can be described as 
original, or unique to an individual human - which casts doubt on 
the notion that the same text can generate an infinite number of 
readings. What makes an individual human unique, according to 
this theory, can be attributed to a random permutation of a finite 
set of thoughts, all of which, as discrete moments in a discon- 
tinuous time, have been thought by someone else. 
Any claim to originality concerning our model of fiction 
writing would therefore need to be qualified from this idealist 
perspective. However, there is no need to resort to idealism to 
argue for the improbability of "original discoveries", because in 
our case there is concrete evidence that any such claim needs 
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qualification. In Hindu scriptures there are many references to the 
omnipotence of thought, and in Hindu myths concerned with the 
origins of the universe, to deities performing an act of creation by 
exercising the mind or the will (O'Flaherty 1975). Brahma in the 
Upanishads and Krsna in the Bhagavad Gita are both examples of 
prajapatis, deities with the mental powers of primordial creation. 
Now, if we turn to the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad (1.6), 
recorded some time between 800 and 400BC, we find that the 
universe is composed of three elements: 
"THIS universe is a trinity and this Is made of name, form, and 
action. 
The source of all names is the word, for it is by the word 
that all names are spoken. The word is behind all names, even 
as Brahman is behind the word. 
The source of all forms Is the eye, for it is by the eye that 
all forms are seen. The eye is behind all forms, even as 
Brahman is behind the eye. 
The source of all actions is the body, for it is by the body 
that all actions are done. The body is behind all actions, even as 
Brahman is behind the body. 
Those three are one, ATMAN, the Spirit of life; and 
ATMAN, although one, is those three. 
The Immortal is veiled by the real. The Spirit of life is the 
immortal. Name and form are the real, and by them the Spirit is 
veiled. " 1 
So, if we disregard the verbal rehearsal of syntax as a product of 
the phonetic alphabet and a phenomenon that is closely associated 
with writing, what we have defined in a model of fiction writing 
as objects of thought - represented by the axes of events, scenes, 
and names - turn out to be the constituents of the universe as 
recorded in the Upanishads. 
According to the Elizabethan world picture, every human is 
a microcosm of the universe; according to the Hindu, not only is 
the universe a creation of the mind of a prajapati, but a spark of 
the praJapati is contained in every human. Now, according to 
Borges, "it may be that universal history Is the history of a 
handful of metaphors" (Borges 1970d, p. 224). One such metaphor, 
1 p. 127 in Mascaro's translation for Penguin, 1965. 
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which he traces in Pre-Socratic philosophy and medieval 
cosmogony, is that of God or the universe as an infinite sphere, 
whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere 
(Borges 1970d, p. 224-227). If we combine this metaphor with the 
Hindu model, we can say that the universe is an infinite sphere, 
composed of events, scenes, and signifiers, which can be 
represented as a set of axes of infinite extension, radiating from a 
centre that is everywhere and therefore in the mind of every 
human. If we add a fourth axis to represent syntax, we can also 
say that every human is a potential storyteller, with a mind like 
the universe, and an infinite number of stories to tell. 
11.3 TESTING THE MODEL 
How does the model compare with other models of writing? How 
does it compare with models of cognitive processes? How can it be 
tested? How can it be used to design software? To answer these 
questions, we need to discuss the model in more detail. 
Let's return to Mandler's argument that "representation and 
process are the primary foci of all the cognitive disciplines" 
(Mandler 1985, p. 10). As Mandler points out, "historically, the 
concern with representation is a concern with the representation 
of knowledge" (Mandler 1985, p. 18). Traditionally, cognition has 
been equated with conscious knowledge, and cognitive psychology 
with a psychology of 'thinking' (Mandler 1985, p. 18). Mandler 
argues however that cognitive science is not concerned exclusively 
with conscious thought processes, while "the current use of rep- 
resentation clearly goes beyond any narrow definition of 
knowledge" (Mandler 1985, p. 18). These two aspects of cognitive 
science were discussed in chapter two, where we noted the 
neglect of conscious thought (Griffin 1984), and the universal 
application of representations (Winograd & Flores 1986). Firstly 
then, we have to place the above model of fiction writing in the 
context of the more traditional view of cognition and cognitive 
psychology - that is, the view of cognition as conscious knowledge, 
and the view of cognitive psychology as a psychology of 'thinking'. 
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However, we have argued that representations are basic to 
the process of writing. In addition, we have argued that in order 
to establish what constitutes cognitive planning in fiction writing, 
we need to identify the kinds of thinking processes that produce 
fictional texts. The model therefore shares with models of 
cognitive processes, and with cognitive models of writing, a prime 
concern for representation and process. 
The mental representations that we have identified as basic 
to fiction writing are events, scenes, syntax, and names or 
signifiers. The justification for these distinctions comes firstly 
from the linguistic approaches to writing that we discussed in 
chapter six. In Beaugrande and Dressler's discussion of text types, 
literary texts "contain various constellations of description, 
narration, and argumentation" (Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, 
p. 185). These textual functions of narration, description and 
argumentation are the same functions that Cooper and Matsuhashi 
(1983) attribute to sentence roles. From Frederiksen's (1986) 
perspective of high-level frames, a narrative frame is composed of 
event structures and scene structures. From a similar perspective 
of framing processes, Witte and Cherry (1986) identify narrative 
and descriptive framing. All these accounts agree that narrating 
and describing are two activities that occupy fiction writers. 
Narration and description are textual functions that can be 
identified by textual analysis. In chapter seven, we argued that 
iterative narration is a form of description, so that in fictional 
texts, description is signified by the verb "to be" and other textual 
signifiers such as the pluperfect tense, while narration is signified 
by the active verb and other textual signifiers such as "Once", "One 
day", and so forth. We argued that, the underlying mental rep- 
resentations are events and scenes. The justification for this 
distinction lies in the inference from the textual functions of 
narration and description, in the semantic models developed by 
AI researchers and adopted by Frederiksen (1986), and in the 
research of cognitive psychologists studying human memory 
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(Cohen, Eysenck & LeVoi 1986) - events are verbal represent- 
ations, while scenes are visual representations. 
Events and scenes from a writer's past experience are stored 
in the writer's memory. Before we discuss the further represent- 
ations of syntax and signifiers, let's recapitulate on the types of 
knowledge that are involved in fiction writing. In the model, we 
have followed Tulving (1972) in the distinction between episodic 
and semantic memory. Episodic knowledge is an autobiographical 
record of one's own experiences - "the events, people, and objects 
you have personally encountered" (Cohen et al 1986, p. 46). 
Semantic knowledge, on the other hand, "consists of facts about 
the world in general" (Cohen et al 1986, p. 46): 
"So you might have stored in your episodic memory 
personal knowledge about, for example, a particular clock in 
your living room at home, its appearance, habits, history, 
etc. You also have semantic knowledge about clocks in 
general, their function, mechanism, defining characteristics, 
and so on. " (Cohen et al 1986, p. 46) 
These two types of knowledge are also characterised by different 
modes of organisation in memory: 
"Personal episodic knowledge usually includes details about 
the particular time and particular place in which objects and 
events were experienced. This is known as the spatio- 
temporal conte't. General semantic knowledge is not tied to 
a specific context in this way. " 
(Cohen et al 1986, p. 46) 
In the model, we have used the term biographic to describe the 
episodic type of knowledge, because this autobiographical record 
contains scenes as well as events - the term episodic suggests 
events and a temporal ordering, rather than scenes and a spatial 
ordering. 
Compared with the temporal and spatial ordering of episodic 
memory, semantic memory is organised in the form of schemata - 
"packets of general knowledge relating to the same topic" (Cohen 
et al 1986, p. 47). However, there are many problems with schema 
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theories of human memory; these include the question of how 
they are acquired in the first place (Cohen et al 1986, p. 30). 
Moreover, not all cognitive psychologists accept the distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory (Cohen et al 1986, p. 47). 
We also saw in chapter nine that some AI researchers argue 
against the notion of story schemata, and explain story 
understanding in terms of schemata derived from the real world 
(Black & Bower 1980). In that case, there would be no need for a 
separate story memory, as this would be a part of semantic 
memory. 
Despite all these disagreements, in the model we have used 
the labels of semantic, biographic, and story memory to 
distinguish the types of knowledge that are involved in fiction 
writing; for reasons that we discuss below, we have avoided the 
question about how this knowledge should be represented. 
Biographic memory contains events and scenes from a writer's 
personal experience. Story memory contains events and scenes 
from a writer's story experience; that is, from their readings of 
texts and their viewings of films and television. Semantic memory 
contains a writer's general knowledge about the world. We have 
argued that this category includes a writer's linguistic knowledge, 
and a textual knowledge of a general nature; the latter includes 
notions of verisimilitude, spatio-temporal schemata for the 
behaviour of fictional characters, and so forth. 
Some of this knowledge will be specific to the individual 
writer, while some will be shared with others. Episodic knowledge 
in particular is a specific knowledge; a writer's biographic memory 
is their unique record, and, as we argued above, the potential 
source of countless stories. Semantic knowledge, story knowledge, 
and story schemata will be shared with other writers, in varying 
degrees. As we discussed in chapter two, the sort of knowledge 
traditionally modelled by Al researchers is semantic knowledge, 
rather than episodic knowledge. As episodic knowledge plays a 
major role in fiction writing, we argued that this was the main 
reason why it was not feasible to design computer programs that 
simulate human writers of fiction. One difference between the 
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above model and other cognitive models of writing is the inclusion 
of this personal element, and hence the acknowledgement that 
such a model can not be tested by designing computer software. 
In the model, there is a lack of detail concerning how the 
types of knowledge are organised and represented in memory. 
One reason for this lack has already been noted: in the case of 
biographic memory, the details of its contents will depend on the 
specific writer, so that it shares with other biographic memories 
only the spatio-temporal ordering of events and scenes. Story 
schemata have been omitted in detail here, as they were 
discussed at some length in chapter eight. Finally, there is a lack 
of detail concerning semantic memory for three reasons. 
The first is that models of semantic knowledge have been 
discussed in great detail elsewhere. As we saw in chapter six, 
Frederiksen's (1986) model of writing is primarily concerned with 
semantic knowledge. Within Al, frames, scripts and schemata are 
similar ways of representing semantic knowledge, and 
Frederiksen's frame grammars are one way of representing the 
knowledge that is stored in semantic memory. However, we also 
saw that Frederiksen's frame grammars gave a rationalistic 
account of events and scenes from our perspective of narration 
and description in fiction writing. So, while a writer's semantic 
memory includes a knowledge of causality and temporal ordering, 
it would also include a textual knowledge of how these notions are 
represented and subverted in fictional texts. 
For example, let's suppose a writer is developing a fiction 
based on events from their personal experience. In chapter eight, 
we saw how, in the transformation of these real-life events into 
fictional events, a writer might apply the sequential operations of 
condensation, expansion, ellipsis, insertion and displacement, and 
the associative operations of substitution and negation (Figure 15). 
So, having decided what events they are going to write about, the 
writer faces the problem of covering up gaps in a new (fictional) 
ordering of events. In selecting the devices to do this, a writer 
may apply their knowledge of causality and chronology to invent 
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a character's motives, cover chronological gaps, and present a 
coherent narrative. 
However, this knowledge has to be combined with a 
linguistic knowledge of how coherence is achieved through textual 
signifiers, such as "three days later", "one morning in September", 
"the trees were coming into bud when" - that is, through terms of 
a chronological, temporal or seasonal code. While frame grammars 
can represent a general schema of causality or temporal ordering, 
there are problems in using grammars to represent textual 
semantics, as we saw in chapter six, and this is the second reason 
why such details are not included in the model. Nevertheless, 
some kind of knowledge of textual signifiers needs to be included 
in a writer's semantic memory. In addition, we might need to add 
a new code to Barthes' classification of textual signifiers (Barthes 
1981,1990) -a rationalistic code, which would form a variant of 
the scientific code. The terms of a rationalistic code would include 
textual signifiers such as "therefore", "because", and so forth, 
which, though they are implicit in Frederiksen's event frames, are 
- in the context of fictional texts - more often found in argument- 
ation rather than narration. Moreover, in writing a piece of "magic 
realism" (Brooke-Rose 1992), a fiction writer may decide to flout 
the accepted rules of causality and temporal ordering altogether, 
as we saw in chapter seven. 
The third reason for a lack of detail concerning semantic 
memory is twofold. Firstly, as Mandler argues, a concern for 
representing knowledge would result in a purely static or 
synchronic view of cognition (Mandler 1985, p. 11). Mandler 
argues that we need to identify the processes that shape and 
transform representations to establish a dynamic or diachronic 
view of cognition (Mandler 1985, p. 11). As we saw above, the 
biologist Maturana argues that cognition is to be explained in 
terms of diachrony rather than synchrony, while Heidegger argues 
that a synchronic view of cognition is not feasible. 
Secondly, in our case we also need to identify which 
representations are shaped and transformed in the process of 
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fiction writing. The body of linguistic knowledge stored in a 
writer's semantic memory could be represented by a grammar, as 
we saw in chapter six. We also saw how grammars have been 
used to represent semantics. However, we also saw that linguistic 
approaches to modelling writing were dominated by a concern for 
structure - thus a linguistic model of writing tends to describe 
writing in terms of synchrony rather than diachrony, in terms of a 
hierarchy of semantic and syntactic structures, rather than 
structuring activities. In this case, a model of textual structures, in 
which semantic structures are transformed into syntactic 
structures, is assumed to be a model of writing. 
In our attempt to identify which representations are shaped 
and transformed in the process of fiction writing, we have argued 
that the body of knowledge stored in a writer's semantic memory 
has an influence on the process of writing. However, we have also 
argued that the representations of linguistic and semantic 
knowledge developed by cognitive scientists are not the 
representations that are transformed in the process of fiction 
writing. We concluded that these are events, scenes, syntax, and 
signifiers, rather than the representations of textual structures 
developed by linguists, and this is another reason for the omission 
of detail concerning semantic memory. 
A further and fundamental difference between the above 
model and other models of writing is its departure from the 
linguistic assumptions of cognitive science, assumptions that are 
also found in current writing research. In a rationalistic view of 
language, words are the names of things, and naming in writing is 
a continuous process, as we saw in chapter nine; verbs, for 
example, name events. In addition, ideas have a separate 
existence from language, so that writing might involve an initial 
stage of pre-writing, in which ideas are formulated and clarified. 
As we have seen in the course of this thesis, rationalistic views of 
language are found in traditional grammar, in Chomsky's 
transformational grammar, in Hayes and Flower's notion of 
translation, In the separation of cognitive and linguistic planning, 
in writing software, and elsewhere. 
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Over the last few chapters, we followed an alternative set of 
assumptions based on Saussure's semiological view of language. In 
his account of the linguistic sign, ideas are inseparable from 
words, and the linguistic sign is a link between a signifier, or 
sound pattern, and a signified, or concept. In this case, names are 
signifiers, rather than elements in an inventory of things, so that 
naming in writing is not a continuous process, but a specific one of 
imagining names or signifiers. In the context of fiction writing, 
names or signifiers include names of characters, places, chapters 
and concepts, the last usually in the context of argumentation. In 
chapter nine, we argued that the remembering of signs is a 
process that is automatic in writing, the kind of thinking that 
occurs automatically whenever a writer is generating text. We also 
discussed the occasions in writing when the signifier becomes 
detached from the signified. 
In Saussure's account of language as a system of sequential 
and associative relations, syntax is an aspect of the former. In 
chapter seven, we discussed a model of working memory 
developed by cognitive psychologists. In this model, the 
"articulatory loop" or inner voice organises information in a 
temporal and sequential fashion. In the context of writing, this 
component is responsible for syntactic organisation - that is, 
rehearsing words about to be written and organising them 
sequentially. Given that events are verbal representations while 
scenes are visual ones, we deduced that the inner voice is also 
responsible for organising events in the context of fiction writing, 
while the inner eye component of the model is responsible for 
scenes. By rejecting Chomsky's dualism in favour of Saussure's 
view of language, in which there is only one object of thought, we 
also deduced that events and syntax are distinct concerns. 
All this recapitulation should serve to explain why we 
identified events, scenes, syntax, and names or signirers as the 
mental representations that are shaped and transformed in the 
process of fiction writing - what we might call the preoccupations 
of the writer's working memory. Before we discuss the processes 
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that shape and transform them, we need to compare the above 
model with other cognitive models of writing. The model shares 
with Sharpies and Pemberton's (1992) model of writing the 
distinction between internal and external representations. In 
Figure 27, a line marks this distinction, with mental 
representations above the line, and external representations 
below. In the model, the latter feature as notes or sentences - 
sentences correspond to "linear text" in the Sharpies and 
Pemberton model (Figure 3), while notes can be any of the other 
items in boxes 1 to S. 
How does the model compare with the Hayes and Flower 
(1980a) model? Firstly, the model is based on a different set of 
linguistic assumptions, so that the operation that Hayes and 
Flower call translation disappears altogether, to be replaced by 
the automatic recall of signs, while we use generating to refer to 
the generation of text. Secondly, the model is also based on the 
distinction between motivational, metacognitive, and cognitive 
processes. As we discussed in chapter five, these distinctions are 
blurred in the Hayes and Flower model, and this was one reason 
for reviewing the operations of planning, translating, and 
reviewing. As these operations also assume a medium of writing, 
and are based on observations in a pen and paper medium, we 
argued for a basic model of writing based on the activities of 
thinking, writing, and reading. We showed how the Hayes and 
Flower model could be interpreted in this fashion, and we also 
showed how their operations could be re-constructed from the 
basic model. Taking into account reports of writing behaviour, we 
represented the activities of thinking, writing and reading as a 
cycle, to escape the linear sequence suggested by Hayes and 
Flower's use of the information processing metaphor. 
In constructing the basic model, we also recognised the need 
to identify representation and process. Above the line that 
separates internal from external representations, the detached 
activity of thinking is a process that transforms mental rep- 
resentations into other mental representations. Below the line, 
thinking is attached to the generation of text, so that in this case, 
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thinking and writing are processes that transform mental 
representations into external representations. We should add that 
with the operations of editing and cut and paste, external rep- 
resentations are transformed into other external representations. 
Finally, the activity of reading is a process that transforms 
external representations into mental representations. 
At that stage of our investigation, we could only identify 
external representations, which were provided by Sharples and 
Pemberton's (1992) model (Figure 3). To develop the basic model 
into a model of fiction writing, we needed to identify the relevant 
mental representations, and the processes that shape and 
transform them. Given the mental representations of events, 
scenes, syntax, and names or signifiers, the processes we have 
identified as shaping and transforming them are remembering 
and reflecting, imagining, focusing the imagination, and problem 
solving. The model differs from other models of cognitive 
processes in the terminology we have used to label these 
processes, and this terminology requires some justification. 
As we saw in chapter two, cognitive science and models of 
cognitive processes have been criticised for their neglect of 
conscious thought (Griffin 1984). The main concern of cognitive 
psychology has been the basic processes of attention, perception, 
learning and memory (Greene & Hicks 1984). Conscious thought 
tends be studied in a specific context only, that of problem solving 
(Kahney 1986), while problem solving is often referred to in the 
literature as an activity that is separate from thinking. For 
example, Sutcliffe (1988, p. 11) describes cognition as "the mental 
activity we describe in everyday terms as reasoning, problem 
solving, thinking and learning". In everyday terms then, reasoning 
and problem solving are seen as separate from thinking, so what 
is thinking? 
As we pointed out in chapter two, reasoning and problem 
solving are activities that can be represented by symbolic logic; 
the use of symbolic logic to formalise thought is a feature of 
artificial intelligence (Kowalski 1979). There, we discussed the 
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argument that the designation of certain computer systems as 
"intelligent" Is based on a rationalistic notion of Intelligence: 
"The rationalistic orientation not only underlies both pure 
and applied science but is also regarded, perhaps because of 
the prestige and success that modern science enjoys, as the 
very paradigm of what it means to think and be intelligent. 
In studies of thought, emphasis Is placed on the form of the 
rules and on the nature of the processes by which they are 
logically applied. Areas of mathematics, such as symbolic 
logic and automata theory, are taken as the basis for 
formalizing what goes on when a person perceives, thinks, 
and acts. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 16) 
So, cognitive science tends to concentrate on those aspects of 
conscious thought that can be represented by symbolic logic, such 
as reasoning and problem solving, because of the goal of designing 
"intelligent systems". Other aspects of conscious thought are seen 
as less of a priority, and placed In the nebulous category of 
"thinking". 
That is why our terminology differs from the terminology 
used to describe basic cognitive processes. The Initial question we 
must ask is whether the terminology exists within cognitive 
psychology to describe the processes we have discussed. For 
example, why do we use the term remembering, when cognitive 
research Into human memory uses the term recall? Our argument 
is that there Is a significant difference between the two. We use 
the term remembering to refer to the conscious process of 
remembering - that Is, a process of searching long-term memory 
for Items which are brought Into short-term or working memory. 
We use the term reflecting to describe the process In which items 
continue to circulate between long-term and short-term memory 
but are not necessarily transformed Into external representations. 
We use the term recall on the other hand to refer to the automatic 
process In which items from long-term memory jump Into short- 
term memory. One example of the latter is the automatic retrieval 
of signs In the process of writing. Another example is the phenom- 
enon of "being reminded" of something without conscious effort, 
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that is, when a stimulus provokes an associative or sequential 
relation in long-term memory. 
We have argued that fiction writing Involves the 
remembering of events and scenes from biographic memory and 
story memory. In chapter eight, we showed how the sequential 
and associative operations of condensation, displacement, and so 
forth - operations that are noted by Freud In his accounts of the 
unconscious, and by cognitive psychologists In their research into 
story memory - are applied In the process of fiction writing. A 
problem of terminology arises here because the psychologists 
researching Into story memory use the term recall (eg Mandler & 
DeForest 1979). Firstly however, the experiments set up by 
cognitive psychologists are designed to measure accuracy. This Is 
not necessarily the concern of fiction writers who are engaged in 
transforming events and scenes from story or biographic memory 
Into the events and scenes of a fictional work - this will involve a 
conscious process of remembering rather than recall. Secondly, 
given the above distinction between recall and remembering, the 
experiments designed to measure accuracy are experiments in 
remembering, not recall. In our model, recall is an aspect of 
writing that Is always occurring in the retrieval of signs, whereas 
remembering and reflecting are aspects of cognitive planning. 
A similar question could be asked of our use of the term 
imagining - why do we use the term Imagining when we could 
have used the term planning? In the case of Imagining syntax, we 
have the process that Is usually called sentence planning. With 
events and scenes, we have a process that could be called 
sequential planning In the former case, and visual planning In the 
latter. In the case of Imagining names or signifiers, we have the 
process of naming, but we could also call this process lexical 
planning. However, the problem with using the term planning, as 
we saw in chapter five, is its equation with thinking and Its use to 
describe all manner of activities. Our argument Is that cognitive 
planning, in the context of fiction writing, Includes all the thinking 
processes as shown on the model. By Imagining, we are referring 
to a specific process of verbal or visual formulation, which may 
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make use of the Items brought into short-term memory from 
biographic and story memory through the process of remember- 
ing, but would also make use of Items from semantic memory. As 
we pointed out in chapter two, cognitive science and Al have 
traditionally been concerned with input processes rather than 
output processes, so that there is a certain lack of terminology to 
describe the processes Involved in creative activities, and in this 
case, we can think of no better term to describe this process than 
imagining. 
This observation regarding a lack of suitable terminology 
applies even more to the process we have called focusing the 
imagination, which has no place in models of basic cognitive 
processes. We have used the term to describe the process in which 
a writer imagines she Is someone else. In chapter seven, we 
argued that we need some process of this sort to account for the 
phenomenon in which characters drive the imagination (Boylan 
1993), and to account for Genette's (1980) typology of text types. 
Just as we Inferred that writers must remember or imagine 
events and scenes in order to narrate or describe, we inferred that 
writers must focus the Imagination in order to produce focused 
narration, description, or argumentation. 
Justification for this process also comes from research into 
the planning of argumentative texts. Coiner and colleagues point 
out that the planning of arguments Involves the management of 
polyphony by imaginary conversations (Coirier, Dellerman & 
Marchand 1994). In this case, the verbal rehearsal of an argument 
Involves a debate with an Imaginary protagonist, so that a 
focusing of the Imagination Is necessary in order to establish the 
protagonist's point of view. In chapter seven, we showed how this 
process of focusing the imagination could be applied to events, 
scenes, and syntax. In the case of syntax, the imagination can 
focus on inner speech (someone's thought), outer speech 
(conversation), or writing. In the case of names or signiflers, we 
have the process that produces focused argumentation. 
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In its terminology, the process we have labelled problem 
solving requires less justification. As we pointed out above, 
reasoning and problem solving are those aspects of conscious 
thought on which cognitive science has tended to concentrate. As 
we showed in chapter nine however, the generally accepted 
methods of problem solving can also be viewed from the 
perspective of sequential and associative relations in thinking. In 
the case of names or signifiers, problem solving is concerned with 
the question of meaning, while in the case of events and scenes, 
problem solving for the writer includes the creation of problems 
or mysteries for the reader. 
Remembering, imagining, focusing the imagination, and 
problem solving - these are the processes that we have identified 
as basic to fiction writing, and the processes that act on the mental 
representations of events, scenes, syntax, and names or signifiers. 
Above the line, the processes transform mental representations 
into other mental representations in the detached activity of 
thinking, while below the line they transform mental represent- 
ations into external representations in the activity of writing 
which, in this case, consists of the generation of text. 
The model shares with Hayes and Flower's (1980a) model 
the use of a computer metaphor to represent these processes. In 
this case, we have used the metaphor of hypertext rather than 
information processing. As we saw in chapter ten, hypertext 
consists of nodes, or chunks of information, which are connected 
to other nodes by links that enable a user or a reader to pursue 
various paths through the hypertext. The sequence in which 
writers jump from one process to another is unpredictable, and 
we want to represent the possibility of jumping from one process 
to any other, and from one representation to any other. To 
represent this possibility presents a topological problem which, on 
our part, has given rise to endless doodles of grids, cylinders, 
spheres, and various other designs. The optimum solution seemed 
to be to represent the processes as a series of concentric circles, 
and the representations as a set of axes radiating from the centre 
- thus a jump from one representation to another is a jump 
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between axes on the model, a jump from one process to another is 
a jump between circles on the model, and a jump from 
remembering scenes to imagining events, for example, involves 
both a change of axis and a change of circle. 
We have asserted that the sequence in which writers jump 
from one process to another is unpredictable, but should there not 
be some kind of process in the model that determines these 
jumps, like the monitor on Hayes and Flower's (1980a) model? 
Surely there must be some method of inter-process communi- 
cations, because the alternative is to suggest that writers jump 
from one process to another in a purely arbitrary fashion? We are 
not suggesting that writers are driven solely by the processes 
shown on the model, but the question of monitoring and inter- 
process communications take us outside the realm of cognition 
and into the concerns of motivation and metacognition (Figure 4). 
As we have pointed out, the thinking processes shown on the 
model are what we have identified as the constituents of cognitive 
planning - motivational and metacognitive aspects of writing have 
been deliberately omitted from the model. 
Can any more details be added to the model? Much of the 
detail that is omitted through the lack of space on Figure 27 has 
been discussed at great length in the latter course of this thesis, 
and it would be needless recapitulation to repeat it here. In 
chapter eight for example, we showed how story schemata can 
influence the process of fiction writing, and we argued that 
interpretation has a role in generating new stories. In a narrative 
context, interpretation is a process of finding correspondences 
between the events of one narrative and those of another. We 
showed that in the context of fiction writing, interpretation fills a 
gap between remembering events (either from a writer's story 
memory or from her personal experience) and imagining the 
events of her fictional work. Story schemata can influence the 
selection of events that will form the basis of a story, and in this 
context, interpretation is a process of mapping events from a 
writer's personal experience onto the events of the fictional work. 
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A lack of detail in models of writing is a feature of Holt's 
(1992) criticism of the Hayes and Flower (1980a) model and the 
Sharpies and Pemberton (1992) model. Holt (1992, p. 59) argues 
that "what are needed are task models which describe, in detail, 
how writing tasks are conducted". In chapter four, we also 
criticised those models for a lack of detail, but from a different 
perspective - the models did not provide us with any details 
concerning types of writing. However, we argued that general 
models are also required, and the model of fiction writing shown 
in Figure 27 is a general model of fiction writing. Just as Sharpies 
and Pemberton (1992, p. 329) point out that a writer may not 
necessarily use all the representations shown in Figure 3, we need 
to point out that fiction writing will not necessarily consist of all 
the processes shown in Figure 27. 
The details of how story knowledge, semantic knowledge 
and biographic knowledge interact with the various processes will 
vary between writers and vary in the writing of different texts. 
Neither do we make any claims about a natural order of processes; 
indeed, we have asserted that the sequence will be unpredictable. 
However, any method of representing these processes will suggest 
some kind of chronological order through metonymic association - 
that is, a contiguity on the printed page is assumed to be a 
temporal contiguity. As Barthes points out, "the mainspring of 
narrative is precisely the confusion of consecution and con- 
sequence, what comes after being read in narrative as what is 
caused by" (Barthes 1979a, p. 94). 
So, given that our representation of axes and concentric 
circles Is bound to be read in a narrative fashion, we have 
presented them in what seems to us to be a logical sequence. A 
reasonable order of processes would seem to be motivational and 
metacognitive activities in the first instance, followed by the 
remembering of specific events and scenes, imagining and 
interpreting with the use of story schemata, creating a basic text, 
followed by further cycles that may include focusing the 
imagination and problem solving. However, fiction writers are not 
under any obligation to follow what seems to be a logical 
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sequence. Novels such as Faulkner's As I Lay Dying and The Sound 
and the Fury for example, would seem to involve the process of 
focusing the imagination at the onset, while problem solving 
would seem to be the cue for many of James' tales, as Todorov and 
others (Leavis 1948) have pointed out: "the essential secret is the 
motive force of Henry James' tales, it determines their structure" 
(Todorov 1977c, p. 175). 
So, the question of detail raises the question of how much 
detail should a general model of writing contain, before it becomes 
a model of writing tailored to an individual writer? The conclusion 
to chapter three was that a model of writing should accommodate 
a range of behaviours if we are to use the model as the basis for 
designing computer software - the alternative was a tool tailored 
to a specific writer. To describe the above model in any more 
detail, we would need to describe the process of writing a specific 
work of fiction. This might involve the protocol analysis of a 
particular writer engaged in writing a fiction, perhaps an entire 
novel -a task that would be, as Barthes recounts, "ninety-nine 
percent perspiration" (Barthes 1990, p. 3). 
In that case then, how could this general model be tested? 
Could we not use protocol analysis to validate the processes that 
we have called the constituents of cognitive planning in fiction 
writing? Before we answer that question, we need to point out 
that testing the model will have to be a two-stage process. The 
model of Figure 27 is based on the basic model of Figure S. We 
discussed the testing of the basic model in chapter five, and the 
first stage of testing the model rests on that discussion. How does 
the model of Figure 27 differ from the model of Figure 5? Firstly, 
we followed a set of linguistic assumptions in constructing the 
above model. Secondly, we followed the assumption that thinking 
processes can be inferred from written products: 
"Informing many of the studies that look beyond the level of 
the sentence in their examinations of written products is the 
sometimes explicit but usually implicit assumption that 
suprasentential structural patterns in written texts reflect 
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thinking processes of the mind that produced the text. " 
(Witte & Cherry 1986, p. 119) 
In making inferences from written products however, we followed 
a set of linguistic assumptions derived from Saussure. Moreover, 
the written products we have examined include not only works of 
fiction but also works of' narratology, principally the work of 
Jakobson, Barthes, Genette and Todorov. Linguistic assumptions 
and narratological analysis have provided the context in which we 
have inferred processes from written products. We also need to 
add that this process of inference has looked to the findings of 
cognitive psychology for support or contradiction. The result is 
that we have added to the basic model the details of process and 
representation, a model of reading, and three types of knowledge. 
As we pointed out in chapter two, the testing of models 
tends to reflect the source and purpose of the model, so let's look 
at the source of these details: 
" events, scenes - linguistics, narratology, cognitive psychology, 
and inference 
" syntax, names or signifiers - linguistics and inference 
" remembering, imagining - linguistics, narratology, cognitive 
psychology and inference 
" focusing the imagination - narratology, writing behaviour, and 
inference 
" problem solving - linguistics, narratology, cognitive psychology, 
and inference 
" story memory, semantic memory, biographic memory - 
cognitive psychology 
" reading - linguistics and narratology 
So, the source of the above model lies in linguistics, narratology, 
cognitive psychology, and inference from textual analysis - the 
last has supplied the examples that were used to illustrate process 
and representation in fictional texts. Given the diversity of sources 
for the model, what would the second stage of testing consist of? 
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The model is a general model, as we explained above. It is 
not only an interpretation of research in the fields of cognitive 
psychology and narratology, but also a construction from the 
results of textual analysis. The principal method of testing will 
therefore be a discursive one - that is, a reasoned argument that 
explains why interpretations of research are not permissible, or 
one that explains why we cannot make deductions about thinking 
processes on the basis of textual analysis, or one that accepts we 
can make deductions but finds errors in our reasoning process and 
the deductions and inferences we have made, or one that not only 
points out those errors but also provides alternative deductions 
and inferences, and an alternative model. 
Empirical tests of the model in its entirety are simply not 
feasible. As we argued above, a writer will not necessarily use 
every process shown on the model, and we are making no claims 
as to a natural sequence, so any empirical testing through protocol 
analysis or direct observation would have to be directed at finding 
evidence that such processes are occurring. One problem with this 
kind of empirical test is that of linguistic assumptions in identify- 
ing representations and interpreting results - our identification of 
signifiers and syntax rests on a semiological rather than rational- 
istic view of language, and it is these assumptions about language 
that influence how the results of empirical research are inter- 
preted. Protocols or video recordings of a writer at work need to 
be compared with the writer's text, so that we need to carry out a 
process of textual analysis in either case. In the case of direct 
observation, we would also need to establish some kind of criteria 
for mapping the writer's external gestures onto the processes of 
the model: for example, a scratch of the head or a frown as an 
indicator of problem solving, a chin held in the hand as an 
indicator of remembering, and so forth - in short, we would need 
to establish some kind of consensus in how to infer thinking 
processes from a writer's gestures, postures and facial expressions 
(eg Matsuhashl 1982). 
The textual analysis of fictional texts is another method of 
testing the model empirically. In this case, we could work through 
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the text sentence by sentence, analyse the verbs to identify 
narration, description, and argumentation, infer the processes of 
remembering and imagining events and scenes, analyse the 
argumentative sections to identify the relevant names or 
signifiers, analyse the text in its entirety to identify points of view 
and to infer focusing, and where there is evidence of the 
hermeneutic code, analyse the code to infer problem solving. One 
problem with this kind of empirical test is that there is no one-to- 
one map between syntax and semantics, as we argued in chapter 
six, so that we cannot infer signifiers and syntax in the same way 
that we can infer events and scenes, and we can only infer 
problem solving by analysing the proairetic code, as we discussed 
in chapter nine. If we assumed a rationalistic model of semantics 
(eg Frederiksen 1986, Witte & Cherry 1986), we might have the 
advantage of being able to map the entire text onto a grammar, 
even though the task might involve "ninety-nine percent 
perspiration" (Barthes 1990, p. 3). In our case, the absence of a 
one-to-one map suggests that this kind of empirical test might 
achieve an even greater ratio. 
However, there is a further possibility regarding empirical 
tests. In chapter two, we argued that the testing of models tends 
to reflect their source and purpose. We have discussed testing in 
relation to the source of the model, but what about tests in 
relation to its purpose? 
11.4 MODELS, TOOLS AND ITERATIVE DESIGN 
As we saw in chapter two, Sharples (1992) argues that the test of 
a model of writing is whether it can be used to design computer 
programs that mimic human writers. However, according to 
Sharples and Pemberton (1992), a model of writing can also be 
tested by designing software tools for writers, and by testing the 
tools: 
"A writing tool designed on the basis of an explicit model of 
writing is an embodiment of the assumptions, possibilities 
and limitations of that model. By testing the tool with a 
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variety of writers the model can be evaluated and refined... 
As well as offering new facilities for writers, a cognitive- 
based writing environment can also act as a powerful 
research tool with which to explore and develop further 
models of the writing process. " 
(Sharples & Pemberton 1992, p. 335) 
In the first case, a model of writing is to be tested and verified, 
and this is achieved by designing computer software that 
simulates human writers. Presumably, therefore, some models 
may be true, while others may be false. But in the second case, a 
model of writing is to be evaluated and refined, rather than 
verified, and this is achieved by the alternative method of 
designing and testing software tools for writers. 
Noel Williams (1991a, pp. 29-31) also argues that we need to 
model writing in order to design more effective tools. His remarks, 
together with Sharples and Pemberton's comments on refining a 
model by testing a tool, both suggest that an explicit model of 
writing is a hypothesis about writing processes that can be tested 
by some kind of implementation of the model on a machine. The 
problem with this formulation, however, is how do we conduct 
such a test? One method is the simulation test we discussed in 
chapter two, with all the problems that such a method involves. 
The alternative method is to follow Sharples and Pemberton's 
suggestion, and to design and test a software tool based on the 
model. 
Following this suggestion, how should we proceed? What is 
the relation between model and tool, and how do we evaluate and 
refine the model by testing the tool? Discussing the development 
of a software tool for writers, Sharpies and colleagues argue that 
there will be a design cycle of implementation, evaluation and 
revision (Sharples, Goodlet & Pemberton 1989, pp. 34-35), while 
Winograd and Flores argue that "the development of any 
computer-based system will have to proceed in a cycle from 
design to experience and back again" (Winograd & Flores 1986, 
p. 171). If we apply this iterative cycle of design and experience to 
the relation between model and tool, it would appear that model 
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and tool are complementary - an explicit model of writing serves 
as the basis for designing a tool, the implementation and testing of 
a prototype serve to refine the model, and the refined model in 
turn serves as the basis for making enhancements to the tool. 
However, research into human-computer interaction (HCI) 
has developed several ways of testing and evaluating software 
tools, the oldest and most frequent being an empirical test of 
usability (Bawa 1994). Moreover, Sharples and colleagues test 
their external representation model by carrying out a protocol 
analysis and task analysis of two writers, not by testing their tool 
(Sharples, Goodlet & Pemberton 1989, p. 28). The problem with the 
above notion of a complementary relation between model and tool 
is how these HCI tests of the tool serve to modify the model - if 
the tool proves to be unusable, how do we know whether this is 
due to the model or due to problems with the software design? 
Can we establish a direct link between a model of writing and the 
usability of a tool based on the model? Does poor usability 
indicate that there is something fundamentally wrong with the 
model? 
Evidence of such a direct link between usability and model 
is, unfortunately, not readily available. Let's consider the example 
of outliners. As we discussed in chapter five, the outliner is based 
on the data structure of the tree, a ubiquitous structure in 
grammars and computer science. In chapter six, we showed how 
this data structure can represent syntactic structure (Chomsky 
1957), and pointed out its role in the compilation and interpret- 
ation of program code (Bornat 1979). In chapter five on the other 
hand, we discussed "Outline and Draft" as a writing strategy, and 
discussed outlines in the context of planning in writing. In the 
context of writing development, Burtis and colleagues argue that 
the first type of identifiable planning is that of finding content for 
a composition; thus a primitive plan consists of "a listing of 
content possibilities" (Burtis et al 1983, p. 154). An outline may be 
as basic as this primitive plan -a table of contents only. A more 
detailed outline may include the main points of an argument or 
the synopsis of a story. 
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However, it is generally accepted that most outlining 
software is unusable (Holt 1992). As we argued in chapter six, 
while the data structure of the tree can represent syntactic 
structures, it has no correspondence with a writer's structuring 
activities - in particular, it bears little relation to the ways in 
which writers "outline and draft". So in this case, can we establish 
a direct link between usability and model? As Williams (1991a) 
points out, most writing software assumes a model of "Plan, Draft, 
and Revise". In the case of outliners, software designers must 
assume such a model of writing, in which "outlining" is seen as a 
form of planning, or assume that their software will assist the 
writing strategy of "Outline and Draft". But if the software is 
unusable because of its lack of correspondence with the ways in 
which writers "outline and draft", then it is the design, rather than 
the model, that lies at the root of the problem. The design of 
outlining software is based on a particular data structure, that of 
the tree, and it would appear to be its ubiquity in grammars and 
compilers that has given rise to its grafting and diffusion into 
writing software. 
In this case then, we cannot find evidence of a direct link 
between model and usability - poor usability is a result of the 
design. Neither is there evidence of such a link in Holt's (1992) 
discussion of usability. According to Holt (1992), it is a design 
methodology, rather than a model of writing, that explains why so 
many tools for writers are poor in their usability. He argues that 
"computer-based tools are only partially successful in supporting 
writers" because of the way tools are designed (Holt 1992, p. 54) - 
software designers must take greater account of users by 
changing their approach to "user-centred design" (Norman & 
Draper 1986). With this approach, software designers design tools 
with writers rather than for writers. 
Before we return to the relation between model and tool, 
let's consider Holt's argument. According to Holt (1992, p. 55), the 
user-centred design cycle consists of four stages: a detailed study 
of user requirements, a design process consisting of three phases 
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(conceptual design, functional design and dialogue design), 
prototyping of the software, and an evaluation of the prototype 
(Figure 28). A study of user requirements involves "four major 
categories of activity" (Holt 1992, p. 55). These are the study of 
user characteristics, task analysis (this involves "obtaining an 
understanding of the users' goals and activities"), situational 
analysis, and establishing acceptance criteria (ie "what will the 
users find acceptable as a usable system"). 
User 1 ý( Design 
requirements J1 
Iteration 
Evaluation )4 ( Prototyping 
FIGURE 28: THE USER-CENTRED DESIGN CYCLE 
(from Holt 1992, p. 55) 
A further and major feature of the user-centred design 
method is iteration. Holt explains that "the underlying philosophy 
is that no matter how hard you try, you cannot get it right the 
first time" (Holt 1992, pp. 55-56). What this means in practice is 
that "the first prototype is evaluated and the information gleaned 
from the evaluation is used to change the prototype" (Holt 1992, 
p. 56). Holt points out that "the number of iterations required 
depends on how good the original user requirements study was 
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and how well this was expressed in the design" (Holt 1992, p. 56). 
He explains this process of iteration as follows: 
"The iteration process arises out of the evaluation and feeds 
into the user requirements; in other words, evaluation does 
not provide information for the prototyping stage or design 
but for the initial study of users. This needs clarification. In 
real terms, the evaluation concentrates on the prototype and 
provides information for improving it. It must however be 
emphasised that the prototype is an expression of the design 
whereas the design is a way of formalising the information 
gained from the users requirements study. The evaluation of 
the prototype is therefore enhancing the study of users and 
information gained from evaluation does in fact modify the 
user requirements and, hence, the design. " 
(Holt 1992, p. 56) 
Now, if we substitute "model of writing" for "user requirements" 
in Figure 28 and in Holt's explanation of iteration, the result might 
explain how a model of writing can be evaluated and refined by 
testing and evaluating a tool. However, the above explanation is 
only a summary of the general methodology of "user-centred 
design" - how do we apply these general principles to the design 
of writing software, and where does a model of writing fit in? 
According to Holt, "if we adopt the approach advocated by 
user-centred design, we must first of all ask how well we 
understand writers as users of software" (Holt 1992, p. 57). He 
argues that what is needed is an understanding of user 
characteristics, formal studies of user requirements, and models of 
the user (Holt 1992, p. 57). In his view, the problem with cognitive 
models of writing, such as Hayes and Flower's (1980a) and 
Sharples and Pemberton's (1992), is that they are too broad - 
although they do allow us to identify tasks such as planning, 
translating, and reviewing (Holt 1992, pp. 59-G0). So, what we 
need are more detailed task models - "task models are a type of 
cognitive model used in human-computer interaction work to 
model user behaviour, describing how a user carries out dialogue 
with a computer to complete a specific task" (Holt 1992, p. 60). 
Task analysis techniques have been used to model text editing 
(Holt 1992, p. 60). He points out however that while a great deal is 
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known about the editing stage of writing, the same cannot be said 
about the planning stage; hence what we need is a task model of 
planning (Holt 1992, p. 62). 
Now, given that many software tools for writers are 
unusable, it would seem an uncontentious argument that software 
designers should take greater account of users. However, Holt's 
argument goes further, in advocating that software designers 
must take greater account of users by changing their approach to 
"user-centred design", and there are several problems with this 
argument. 
The first concerns models of writing. On the one hand, Holt 
criticises the models of Hayes and Flower (1980a) and Sharples 
and Pemberton (1992) for their broadness, arguing that we need 
more detailed task models. On the other hand, he uses the Hayes 
and Flower model as the basis for identifying those tasks, so that 
not only are planning, translating and reviewing seen as the basic 
tasks that need further elaboration, but they are also seen as 
stages in the process of writing - thus, throughout this discussion, 
Holt assumes a linear model of "Plan, Draft, and Revise". There is a 
double irony here. The first is that he dismisses broad models of 
writing strategies, yet assumes a specific strategy in discussing 
the way forward. The second is that he criticises standalone 
software (Holt 1992, p. 59), arguing that the way forward is "the 
integration of planning, generating and revision into a single 
software environment" (Holt 1992, p. G2), yet he does not question 
a model of writing based on observations of a pen and paper 
medium. According to Holt's argument, the problem of usability is 
to be resolved through a change in design methodology, not by 
developing more models of writing - but this change involves the 
development of detailed task models, and the tasks that Holt 
identifies rest on a model of writing. The assumption is that 
questions of a general nature, and questions concerning the 
underlying model, have all been resolved. 
The second problem concerns the nature of tasks in writing 
and their representation. As Ilolt points out, task models are used 
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in human-computer interaction work to describe how a user 
carries out a dialogue with a computer; these techniques have 
been used to model text editing (Holt 1992, p. 60). In this instance 
however, it is a relatively easy though time-consuming task to 
accumulate the data from which to develop a task model -a user's 
interactions with a computer can be recorded and logged by the 
method of keystroke analysis. A user's input from mouse or 
keyboard can be recorded by embedded software, so that this can 
be a non-intrusive way of studying the writing process (Eklundh 
1993). A great deal is known about the editing stage of writing, as 
Holt points out, because many writers use computers to perform 
this operation, there are ways of recording their interactions with 
the machine, and we can identify editing from specific keystrokes. 
However, as we discussed in chapter five, many writers do 
not find computers conducive to planning, and do not use them for 
this purpose. We know less about "the planning stage" of writing, 
therefore, partly because "the planning stage" uses a different 
medium, so that the method of keystroke analysis is unavailable 
to us. We also know less about planning because of the confusion 
about what it is; consequently, it is not as easy to identify as 
editing. In situations where writers do use computers to compose, 
we could use the method of keystroke analysis to log the temporal 
gaps between generating or manipulating text; in Matsuhashi's 
(1982) "real-time" observations of writers, a temporal gap is 
interpreted as planning. To make this inference, we have to 
assume that a temporal pause in writing is an indicator that a 
writer is thinking, and that such thinking constitutes planning. As 
we showed in chapter five, these equations are not without their 
problems. 
In short, it is difficult to see how we can study editing and 
planning by using the same techniques. Can we apply a method of 
establishing a task model of editing to establish a task model of 
planning, in the detail and the form that Holt insists are needed? 
As Holt points out, several task models are in the form of a 
grammar; production rule grammars have been applied to the 
specification of human-computer dialogue (Holt 1992, p. GO). In 
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chapter four, we saw how a set of production rules can represent 
the operation of editing. Because production rule grammars have 
been used to specify human-computer dialogue and to represent 
the operation of editing, Holt assumes that they can also represent 
planning and writing. Yet as he admits, "none have been applied 
to the task of writing" (Holt 1992, p. GO), so where is the evidence 
that planning and writing can be represented in this fashion? 
Our argument is that there is a basic difference between the 
operation of editing, and the other writing operations defined by 
Hayes and Flower (1980a). In chapter five, we showed how we 
could reconstruct those operations from our basic model of 
thinking, writing, and reading. If we return to Figure 8, we see 
that the basic difference between editing and the other operations 
of translating, planning and reviewing is that thinking is omitted 
from the cycle - le editing is an automatic process, triggered when 
certain conditions are satisfied. While editing is an automatic 
process, the operations of writing - planning in particular - 
generally involve conscious thought. As Holt recounts, "writing is 
not editing, editing is part of writing' (Holt 1992, p. 60) - we can 
also say that writing is not an automatic operation, but automatic 
operations are part of writing. 
In our basic model of writing, thinking, writing, and reading 
can all be construed as tasks in writing. Our task was to develop 
that basic model into a model of fiction writing by trying to 
identify what constitutes cognitive planning in fiction writing - we 
could argue, therefore, that the result, represented by Figure 27, 
is a model that Holt argues is needed: a "task model of planning" 
in fiction writing, in which remembering, imagining, focusing the 
imagination, and problem solving constitute the tasks. 
The third problem with Holt's argument is his technique of 
argumentation, which not only makes it difficult to criticise his 
argument, but also makes it difficult to establish what that 
argument is - the technique is that of "cogito interruptus". We 
referred to this technique in our discussion of The Gutenberg 
Galaxy in chapter ten. McLuhan's text is marked by the absence of 
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terms such as "because", "therefore" or "whereas" - terms of the 
rationalistic code - and we noted that the absence of such terms in 
the juxtaposition of two sometimes contradictory ideas is filled in 
by the reader. Holt's text is marked by a similar absence, so that 
we are constantly required to fill in the gaps. 
As an example, let's start at the beginning. In his 
introduction, Holt provides a summary of his argument: 
"This paper... argues that... computer-based tools are only 
partially successful in supporting writers. The reason for 
this failure is the very nature of the way tools are designed. 
What is needed is a different approach to system design, 
referred to as user-centred design. " 
(Holt 1992, p. 54) 
After this introduction, Holt discusses the question, "What is 
usability? " Here, we are told about the existence of an EEC 
directive, which "specifies how software should be made more 
usable" (Holt 1992, p. 54). And then we read: 
"At this stage, it is important to pose the question: How can 
highly usable software be developed, in particular for 
writers? Software developers and users must adopt an 
approach to software design that takes greater account of 
the users, i. e. the design and implementation process is user 
rather than technology driven. This change of approach is 
referred to as user-centred design: ' 
(Holt 1992, p. 54) 
Holt then discusses the methodology of "user-centred design". So, 
having told us that computer-based tools are only partially 
successful in supporting writers because of the way that tools are 
designed, Holt omits to tell us how tools are designed. Then, 
having told us about an EEC directive which specifies how 
software should be made more usable, Holt omits to tell us any 
details about this specification. Instead, we have an interruption - 
from this we gather that the current design of writing tools is 
technology driven, rather than user driven. We can now read his 
text to the end, without finding an answer to the question, "How 
are tools designed? " So we can only conclude that tools are 
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designed in a way that is "technology driven", and this must be 
the reason why computer-based tools are only partially successful 
in supporting writers. 
Now, we could use the above observations on outliners as a 
basis for arguing that design is "technology driven". But on the 
other hand we could also argue - without blaming Chomsky for 
the poor usability of outliners - that the underlying data structure 
of the tree has been adopted in outliners because of assumptions 
about language, linguistics, and structures: a tree can represent 
syntactic structure; therefore it must be able to represent 
semantic structure. In that case however, design is "data driven" 
rather than "technology driven". Moreover, there are many 
problems with the equations that are suggested by Holt's cogito 
interruptus. If design is "technology driven", does it necessarily 
follow that the resulting computer software is unusable? The 
notion that technology drives design raises a set of questions 
concerning the relations between technology, design, usability, 
commodities and society, which, following Holt's gloss over these 
questions, we are not going to discuss here. 
The fourth problem with Holt's argument concerns the 
methodology of "user-centred design" (Norman & Draper 1986). 
Holt's technique of cogito interruptus gives an authority to the 
advocation of this methodology, while he fails to provide any 
evidence that this methodology will succeed in producing highly 
usable software. After telling us about an EEC directive due to 
become law, he then asks the question, "How can highly usable 
software be developed? " We are then told that software designers 
must change their approach to "user-centred design". Is Holt 
suggesting that this methodology is stipulated by an EEC directive, 
so that it will shortly become law that software designers must 
adopt it? 
In the literature on current writing research, "user-centred 
design" is not a conspicuous feature. Consequently, it is difficult to 
find any evidence to support holt's argument that this approach 
will necessarily produce more usable software. While one can 
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applaud the aims of such an approach, its application raises the 
question of feasibility. Explaining the principle of iteration, Holt 
points out that "sometimes the number of iterations is determined 
by time constraints and/or financial considerations" (Holt 1992, 
p. 56). Sometimes? Is Holt suggesting that there are research and 
design projects which are not subject to the constraints of time 
and money, and are able to continue ad infinitum? If the 
constraints of time and money determine the curtailment of a 
project after a limited number of iterations, are there any 
guarantees that the result will be a highly usable piece of 
software? 
Constraints of time and money will also determine whether 
such an approach is feasible in the first instance. Unfortunately, a 
methodology that demands "an early and intense involvement of 
users" (Holt 1992, p. 56) is also going to demand an early and 
intense investment of time and money. In the specific case of 
developing software tools for student writers, the methodology of 
"user-centred design" is not a feasible option - the users will not 
have the time, and the institution may not have the financial 
resources. Moreover, in the case of courseware or software with a 
pedagogical function, an early and intense involvement of users 
through the application of "user-centred design" is tantamount to 
embracing a constructivist perspective on learning, and this is 
another discussion that we will have to gloss over at this stage. 
If we consider how to apply the general principle of "user- 
centred design" to the design of writing software, we find that this 
involves techniques that have been applied in other areas of 
human-computer interaction work so are not specific to this 
methodology. Holt identifies "three categories of information 
which are essential to the application of user-centred design 
techniques" (Holt 1992, p. 57). These are understanding user 
characteristics, formal user requirements studies, and user 
modelling. In the ensuing discussion, Holt concentrates on this last 
category, which includes task analysis, task modelling and 
representation. Yet task analysis is not an activity that is specific 
to the methodology of "user-centred design". In their discussion of 
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the development of a "Writer's Assistant", Sharples and colleagues 
argue for a development methodology called DCSS -a 
"development methodology for a cognitive support system" 
(Sharples et al 1989, p. 25). The first phase of this strategy consists 
of the development of a model of writing. They comment: "Having 
developed a preliminary model of the writing process, we then 
tested and refined it by performing a task analysis of the 
activities of two people carrying out report writing tasks using 
both paper and a conventional text editor" (Sharples et al 1989, 
p. 28). Neither is the notion of iteration specific to the methodology 
of "user-centred design" - even the data-driven and hierarchical 
SSADM method of design entertains the notion of a "planning 
cycle" and "temporal iteration" (Downs, Clare & Coe 1988, pp. 153- 
154). 
In summary, Holt's advocation of "user-centred design" is 
marked by the rhetorical technique of cogito interruptus, which 
lends authority to his argument while failing to provide it with 
substance. He fails to provide any evidence to justify his claim 
that a specific methodology will result in highly usable software, 
nor does he provide any evidence to support his insistence that 
production rule grammars can be used to represent planning and 
the task of writing. How can we test Holt's theory that this method 
will produce highly usable software? Given the lack of software 
tools for writers that have been designed by the "user-centred 
design" method, it is difficult to find any evidence to justify or 
falsify his argument. The techniques that he advocates are not 
unique to "user-centred design", but are used in other 
development methodologies that take greater account of users 
than some of the older data-driven methodologies such as SSADM. 
Underlying his argument and discussion of tasks in writing is the 
assumption of the Hayes and Flower (1980a) model of writing, a 
model that was developed from observations of writing in a pen 
and paper medium. 
So, let's return to the relation between model and tool, and 
let's remind our readers of our aims and assumptions discussed in 
chapter one. As Holt points out, the category of writer includes 
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"both professional and amateur creative writing, professions such 
as journalism, technical writing and translation, and numerous 
professionals who write as part of their jobs although writing may 
not be their main job function (scientists, engineers, business 
executives, etc. )" (Holt 1992, p. 62). Within this wide range of 
writers, there will be some groups who may be more amenable to 
the method of "user-centred design" than others. As we pointed 
out, many professional fiction writers do not use computers to 
compose, do not believe that computers have any use in creative 
processes, and do not see any need for software tools. However, 
within this wide range of writers there are students in higher 
education, and within this category of students there are a smaller 
number on creative writing courses, who perform most of their 
writing activities in a writing laboratory or resource centre. Our 
aim was to develop software tools for those students, and in this 
case, "an early and intense involvement of users" was not a 
feasible option. 
What was our strategy? In the first instance, we conducted a 
"situational analysis" and a study of "user characteristics". These 
were not carried out as formal procedures, but informally through 
miscellaneous communications with lecturers and students. We 
also conducted a study of "user requirements". Again, this was not 
carried out as a formal procedure - instead, we reviewed the 
literature on computers and writing to establish what kind of 
software tools would be beneficial to student writers, given the 
situations in which they worked, and concluded that software 
tools to assist planning were a priority. 
However, we were in no position at that stage to identify 
what constitutes planning in fiction writing. Given this lack, and 
given that writing software is always based on a model of writing 
(Williams 1991a, p. 31), we began an iterative process of 
reviewing current models of writing from the perspective of 
design. The principal question that we asked of these models was 
whether one could one use them to design aids for fiction writing; 
an iterative process in which we considered a model, considered 
its implications for design, dismissed the model and considered 
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another, and so forth. Thus a design perspective provided one 
reason for finding the models of writing used in current writing 
research to be inadequate; that is, they could not be used as the 
basis for designing a planning, thinking or structuring tool for 
fiction writers. 
We argued however that we could develop a model of fiction 
writing by analysing the texts produced by professional fiction 
writers, and by identifying the processes that create fictional 
texts. The result would be a general model of fiction writing which 
we could use as a basis for designing tools for student writers. In 
this case, a software tool is bound to have a pedagogic function, so 
that the model will serve to fill in the details of user requirements 
in the first instance; ie the model should help us to identify 
aspects of planning in which student writers need assistance, and 
should gives us some clues to the design. Subsequently, we enter 
the iterative cycle shown in Figure 28 of prototyping, evaluating, 
reviewing user requirements, and modifying the design, so that 
once we enter this cycle, the model will have served its purpose. 
In this case therefore, the test of a model is a separate issue to the 
test of a tool; the former was discussed above, while the latter will 
rely on standard HCI methods of software evaluation. Indeed, 
given the above discussion on usability, it is difficult to see how a 
model can be tested by testing a tool, unless the tool is a computer 
program that simulates human writers. 
11.5 APPLYING THE MODEL 
The purpose in developing the model was to design a tool to assist 
student writers in the planning of fiction writing. Given its 
pedagogic purpose, the model could also serve as a guide in the 
teaching of fiction writing or creative writing. However, to discuss 
that application would involve a detailed discussion of the 
contents of courses in creative writing. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we shall confine our discussion to the design of a 
hypertextual tool for student writers of fiction. 
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So, how can we apply the model to the design of writing 
software? We need to interpret the model in terms of our initial 
objective - the design of a planning, thinking, or structuring tool 
for student writers of fiction. Winograd and Flores argue that: 
"The most successful designs are not those that try to fully 
model the domain in which they operate, but those that are 
'in alignment' with the fundamental structure of that 
domain, and that allow for modification and evolution to 
generate new structural coupling. As observers (and 
programmers), we want to understand to the best of our 
ability just what the relevant domain of action is. This 
understanding guides our design and selection of structural 
changes, but need not (and in fact cannot) be embodied in 
the form of the mechanism. " 
(Winograd & Flores 1986, p. 53) 
If we assume that in our case "the fundamental structure of the 
domain" is represented by the structuring activities in the model, 
then one interpretation of Winograd and Flores' argument is that 
tools that serve to replicate such activities or tools that anticipate 
all possibilities are not feasible. In the former case, we need to 
point out the frequent assumption that a tool involves automation 
(eg Collins & Gentner 1980). For tools such as spelling or grammar 
checkers, this may be the case, but the analogy in the case of a 
"thinking tool" suggests that the machine is doing the thinking. In 
using "tool" to refer to an item of software whose purpose is to 
assist thinking, we assume that thinking is left to the writer. 
In the case of tools that attempt to anticipate all 
possibilities, the arguments of Winograd and Flores suggest 
instead that certain activities from the model will have to be 
selected for the tool. This agrees with our initial assumption that, 
if we establish a model of fiction writing by analysing the texts 
created by professional fiction writers, then we can use the model 
to identify where students need assistance and design the 
software accordingly. Winograd and Flores also argue that tools 
may be used in ways that cannot be foreseen, and that "design 
includes the generation of new possibilities" (Winograd & Flores 
1986, p. 170). In the case of hypertext, this is an argument for 
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providing a basic minimum of links in the first prototype until it 
is tested. Moreover, one could argue that some links may have a 
relevance to some readers but not to others, so that their insertion 
is best left as an activity for the user. 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the model is to serve as 
a guide in designing the first prototype of the tool. In this case, 
designing a hypertext involves the following activities: 
" Defining what structuring activities the tool is intended to 
assist, and therefore the general content of the hypertext in 
terms of modules, menus, or basic components. 
" Defining the general form or structure of the hypertext in 
terms of a) types of nodes and b) types of links. 
" Establishing the basic layout and display of items on the screen. 
The model should serve as a guide to solving these problems. In 
the last case, information provided by the model will be 
supplemented by general guidelines concerning human-computer 
interface design (eg Sutcliffe 1988, Monk 1984). 
A further consideration is the extent to which the tool 
enables interaction on the part of its users. In his discussion of the 
use of hypertext in education, Hammond (1993) describes three 
dimensions along which computer based learning varies. One is 
"the degree to which the learner rather than the system controls 
exposure to learning materials" (Hammond 1993, p. 64). Tradition- 
al computer based learning materials present information in a 
fixed sequence, while permitting jumps back to earlier stages. 
Hypertexts on the other hand often allow readers to choose their 
own route through the materials. In our case, whatever the 
general content of the hypertext, the structure must allow for the 
jumps that are indicated by the model; that is, between different 
activities, and between the objects of those activities. 
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Another dimension is "the nature of the learning activity", 
and whether it requires the learner "to create materials or 
relationships rather than merely observe them" (Hammond 1993, 
p. 64). In our case, if we design a hypertext that includes 
examples, should the tool allow for students to insert their own? 
In addition, should the tool allow for students to insert their own 
links? 
The third dimension is similar to the second, and concerns 
"the extent that learners are required to process the materials 
actively rather than passively" (Hammond 1993, p. 64). One 
strategy for engaging learners is to provide them "with external 
motivation for making the best of the information available, 
perhaps through imaginative learning assignments", while another 
is to "provide a range of learning activities which move outside 
strict hypertext" (Hammond 1993, p. 65). In our case, we assume 
that the external motivation to use the tool, and the learning 
activities which are outside the hypertext, are partly provided by 
the writing assignment that the student is already engaged in. 
However, if we are designing a tool to assist thinking, planning, or 
textual structuring, the question is whether such a tool could be 
used as a personalised notebook, rather than a non-interactive 
database through which the student merely browses. 
For the remainder of this chapter, we shall outline the 
conceptual design of Story-Prompt, a hypertextual aid for student 
writers of fiction. It is planned initially as a minimal database or 
minimal manual whose purpose is to assist the planning of fiction 
writing. Whether such a tool could be developed into a 
personalised notebook is a question that must await future 
developments. We shall discuss the structure of Story-Prompt in 
terms of modules, nodes and links, and we shall discuss the 
incremental stages in developing, implementing and evaluating a 
prototype. 
In its conception, Story-Prompt has some similarities with 
the type of planning software described by Kellogg, which 
"presents menus and prompts to lead a writer through a 
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standardized genre" (Kellogg 1989, p. 72). In this case however, 
Story-Prompt presents menus and prompts to offer some 
suggestions to student writers in ways of structuring fiction. It has 
some similarities also with Williams' "open learning system for 
writers" (Williams 1991b), in that two of the three entities in that 
system (concepts and examples) appear in this one, albeit in 
different forms; "concepts" appears in the form of the explanatory 
nodes described below. The basic difference, however, is that 
Story-Prompt is seen less as instructional software, and more as a 
resource for fiction writers who work with computers, containing 
hints on textual structuring and a minimal database of quotes or 
examples. Story-Prompt is intended to be a tool for students on 
writing courses and writers already engaged in writing fiction. 
Thus Williams' third entity, "practice", is seen as the fiction that a 
writer is engaged in. However, there are a number of ways of 
providing for interaction with the tool, which will be explored 
once the initial prototype has been implemented and tested; the 
avenues of future development are sketched below. 
Story-Prompt will have what Wright and Lickorish (1989) 
call a modular structure, consisting of four main modules: story 
memory, characters, mysteries, and symbols. As mentioned above, 
one purpose of the model is to select the structuring activities 
which the tool is intended to assist. The four components of the 
tool reflect four activities in the model, while the contents of the 
modules are supplementing or prompting a writer's story memory 
in the one case and semantic memory in the other three: 
" story memory - remembering 
" characters - focusing the imagination 
" mysteries - problem solving 
" symbols - imagining by applying the symbolic 
The home stack will consist of nodes or cards that explain 
the purpose of the hypertext, displays the main menu, and offers 
a choice of three routes to view the contents in broadcast mode: 
the event route, the scenic route, or the abstract route. 
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The story memory module will present a number of story 
schemata at various levels of abstraction, including Aristotle's 
"beginning, middle and end", and Todorov's "state, transformation 
and state". At .a more specific level, the schemata might include an 
abridged morphology of the folktale (adapted from Propp), or a 
schema of initiation ritual (adapted from Thomson). Each schema 
would be illustrated with examples taken from recorded myths or 
legends, folktales, and novels. In most cases we would not attempt 
to summarise or re-write the texts used for the examples. As 
Story-Prompt is intended to be a minimal database, our intention 
is to use as examples a sequence of three sentences selected from 
episodic boundaries. The examples would be connected to each 
other at an abstract level, so one could browse through story 
memory by browsing through "beginnings" "middles" or "endings". 
The characters module will be sub-divided into three 
modules: "What's a character? ", "How to create characters", and 
"You and your characters". Apart from the first, each module will 
also be sub-divided into event, scene, and name. The first module 
will present different notions of what constitutes a character, and 
might include the medieval notion of humours, for example, or 
Forster's definition of flat and round characters. The second 
module will present a number of different ways in which 
characters are created textually, such as by speech, by proper 
name, or by description, for example. Each method would be 
illustrated by examples. The third module will present different 
ways of focusing narration, again illustrated by examples. Thus 
this module owes a large debt to Genette's analysis of text types. 
In chapter seven above, we used his notion of "focus" to suggest 
that there are diverse ways in which writers relate to their 
characters, and that this is manifest in the different ways in which 
stories can be told. All the examples would again use a sequence 
of three sentences. 
The mysteries module will present the different kinds of 
mysteries to be found in fictional texts. These will be sub-divided 
into mysteries of the event, scene, and name, and presented as a 
range of questions, such as "Where is X? ", "Who is X? ", or "Why did 
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the event occur? ". Each question would be illustrated by examples, 
in which an enigma is first proposed. 
The symbols module will present different notions of the 
symbolic and be sub-divided into three modules: correspondences, 
antithesis, and symbolism in the plot. The first two modules will 
be further sub-divided into event and scene, while the third 
module will take the reader to story memory. 
We have tried to define the types of nodes in Story-Prompt 
by their function. On that basis, there would be three kinds: 
explanatory nodes, menu nodes, and syntax nodes. The first 
includes most of the cards in the home stack, and the cards in the 
opening sequences of each module which explain concepts. The 
second category applies to all the cards that display a number of 
options to the user, including the main menu card in the home 
stack, and the menu cards of each module. The third category 
applies to all the examples. 
To define the types of links in Story-Prompt, we can use the 
model as a guide. The model was used to select four kinds of 
structuring activities which are reflected in the four modules of 
Story-Prompt. It also tells us that a jump between these four 
activities can occur at any time. The consequence for design is that 
all four modules must be available from any part of the hypertext. 
In practice, the exceptions to this general rule are when the 
reader first enters Story-Prompt, and when the reader chooses 
the example cards, which present three sentences in sequence 
before returning to the point of departure. The model also tells us 
that a jump between the objects of the four activities can occur at 
any time. The consequence for design is that within each module, 
the four options of events, scenes, names, and syntax are always 
available, where applicable. In the case of story memory, for 
example, the event option is the only one available. 
In total, there are eight types of links. Firstly, there is the 
type of link that links cards or nodes of the same module: these 
are defined as sequential links. Secondly, there is the type of link 
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that enables users to jump from one module to another: these 
jumps correspond to the jumps between the different activities 
shown in the model, and are defined as inter-modular links. 
Thirdly, there is the type of link which enables users to choose a 
sub-module; these are defined as sub-modular links. Fourthly, 
there is the type of link which is always available within each 
module and enables the user to jump between events, scenes, 
names, and syntax: these jumps correspond to the jumps between 
the objects of the activities shown in the model, and are defined in 
the same way, as metonymic links (to events), metaphoric links 
(to scenes), abstractive links (to names), and syntactic links (to the 
examples). Finally, there is the type of link which connects the 
schemata and examples in story memory: these are defined as 
associative links. 
In its conception, the first prototype of Story-Prompt is 
seen as a basic skeleton that would have to be implemented and 
tested before extra features can be added and further possibilities 
investigated. The skeleton would contain all the menus and 
prompts described above, and a minimal database of examples. It 
would exclude the option of names, but retain those of events, 
scenes, and syntax Names would be omitted at this stage, because 
this axis of the model is primarily concerned with abstraction and 
argumentation. Once the prototype has been implemented and 
tested, the future development of the software would occur in 
stages, following the principle of iterative design. Each stage 
would investigate a specific feature, according to the following 
sequence: 
Firstly, we would investigate how users of the software can 
add their own examples to the database. One problem with using a 
sequence of three sentences as examples is that the readers may 
be unfamiliar with the texts from which they are taken. To supply 
the entire text on-line will be ergonomically counter-productive, 
and totally against the guiding principle of maintaining Story- 
Prompt as a minimal database. On the other hand, examples are 
fundamentally necessary to the tool; for example, in illustrating 
different ways of telling stories by using a range of Genette's text 
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types. One solution is to supply a basic minimum of examples in 
the prototype, and to use a range of texts; some will be more 
familiar to students than others. 
The facility for adding new examples therefore needs to be 
investigated. However, to insist that students find their own 
examples as a condition of using the tool is to turn the tool into 
instructional software and departs from its original purpose. The 
aim of Story-Prompt is to supply a range of examples of sufficient 
breadth to enable student writers to find the most appropriate 
way of telling the stories they want to tell, and of structuring the 
texts they are writing. Finding examples from texts may interfere 
with a student's usual assignments. The primary purpose of the 
prompt is to provoke a student's own writing. In this context, 
Story-Prompt will be more successful if it encourages students to 
supply examples by writing their own stories, rather than find 
examples by searching texts. 
The second facility that needs investigating is how readers 
in story memory can insert their own schemata and their own 
links between schemata. Once again however, this should not be 
made a condition of using the tool, and Story-Prompt will be more 
successful if it encourages students to use schemata to write their 
own stories, rather than find correspondences between stories 
they have read. 
The third facility is the facility for taking notes. If such a 
facility were included, then Story-Prompt would begin to 
resemble a writing environment rather than a tool - the 
hypertextual writing environment that Bolter calls a topographic 
writing space. However, one problem with using hypertext as the 
basis for a writing environment is the linearisation problem: notes 
entered in the hypertext will have to be copied or cut and pasted 
into a word processing application if they are to be incorporated 
into the text in production. Switching between applications in this 
fashion is not conducive to usability (Holt 1992). 
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The fourth stage would involve gathering together the 
results of the previous stages to investigate whether Story- 
Prompt could be developed as a notebook for fiction writers. In 
that case, each user would receive a basic version, consisting of 
menus, prompts, and one set of examples. The basic version could 
then be converted into a personalised notebook, which fiction 
writers would use to add their own examples, insert their own 
schemata, insert their own links between schemata, and as a space 
for note taking, storing, and organising. However, the problem we 
would then have to resolve is how to integrate such a tool into a 
single writing environment - as we mentioned above, if writers 
have to switch applications from word processor to notebook and 
back again, this can lead to frustration on the part of the user and 
poor usability on the part of the tool (Holt 1992). 
To fully evaluate the prototype we will need to adopt 
objective and subjective measures. Firstly, we would like some 
account of the paths which the readers of Story-Prompt pursue 
through the hypertext. These paths can be measured objectively 
by logging the user's input from mouse or keyboard. Input can be 
recorded by software embedded in the hypertext, so that this is a 
non-intrusive method of observation. This sort of information can 
be used to identify problems with the arrangement of menus and 
buttons on the screen. Usability is another aspect of the software 
that requires evaluation. Apart from empirical tests of usability 
(Bawa 1994), other ways of measuring usability include guided 
evaluation techniques, such as cognitive walkthroughs (Poison, 
Lewis, Rieman & Wharton 1992) or heuristic evaluation (Nielsen 
1992), and model-based evaluation techniques (Card, Moran & 
Newell 1983). 
As a subjective measure however, we would like to know 
more directly from the users of Story-Prompt whether it works. 
In the case of a writer who is thinking about writing a story but 
has not yet started writing, we would like to know whether using 
the software helps to provoke ideas for the text of a story, 
whether notes or syntax. In the case of a writer who has already 
started writing a story, we would like to know whether using the 
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software helps in textual structuring or in finding a structure for 
the story they are writing. In terms of the categories of writers 
established by behavioural psychologists, we would like to know 
whether Story-Prompt is an aid to invention in the case of the 
"Planners", and an aid to discovery in the case of the "Discoverers". 
11.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we presented the results of our investigations over 
the latter course of this thesis in the form of a cognitive model of 
fiction writing. The model is based on the basic model of writing 
discussed in chapter five. We identified the principal elements of 
cognitive planning in fiction writing as remembering and 
reflecting, imagining, focusing the imagination, and problem 
solving. Each of these processes can be applied to events, scenes, 
syntax, and names or signifiers. Just as Hayes and Flower (1980a) 
use the metaphor of information processing to represent writing 
operations, we used the metaphor of hypertext to represent these 
thinking processes. 
Discussing the model in more detail, we compared it with 
other models of writing, and showed how it is similar to cognitive 
models in its concern for representation and process. We 
discussed the question of testing the model, and argued that 
empirical tests of the model in its entirety are not feasible. Some 
researchers suggest that a model of writing can be tested by 
designing and testing a software tool based on the model. We 
discussed this notion and concluded that the testing of models and 
the testing of software are separate questions. We also discussed 
the notion of iterative design, and the place of models of writing 
in this process. We argued that although software designers need 
to take greater account of users, the methodology of "user-centred 
design" (Norman & Draper 1986) is not always a feasible option 
due to economic, temporal, and pedagogic considerations - in our 
case, a model of writing is instrumental in helping to establish a 
user's requirements in the first instance. 
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Finally, we showed how the model can be used in design by 
using it to construct a hypertextual aid for student writers of 
fiction. The aid is planned initially as a minimal database or 
minimal manual that would assist the planning of fiction writing. 
We discussed the structure of the tool in terms of modules, nodes 
and links, and we outlined the incremental stages in developing, 
implementing and evaluating a prototype. Whether such a tool 
could be developed into a personalised notebook for fiction 
writers is a question that must await future developments. 
In summary, here is a comparison of the above model of 
fiction writing (CMFW) with the models of Hayes and Flower 
(1980a) and Sharples and Pemberton (1992): 
Haves & Flower Sharples & Pemberton: CMFW: 
concerned with: 
motivation cognition cognition: 
metacognition (external reps) (mental reps) 
cognition 
method of representation: 
data flow diagram grid/boxes 
writing viewed as: 
operations, 
information 
processing 
assumptions: 
Chomsky, 
rationalistic view 
of language 
testing_ 
protocol analysis 
operations, 
techniques, 
tasks 
Hayes/Flower model 
protocol analysis, 
task analysis 
cycles/axes 
activities, 
tasks, 
conscious processes 
Saussure, 
semiological 
view of language 
discursive, 
protocol analysis ? 
task analysis ? 
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The research that resulted in this thesis was concerned with the 
design of software tools for students on writing courses, courses in 
which creative writing and fiction writing are significant elements. 
An initial survey of the literature found that there is a need for 
on-line planning tools for students on writing courses who 
perform most of their writing in a writing laboratory or resource 
centre, while there is a lack of writing software aimed specifically 
at fiction writers. We also found that one of the uses of hypertext 
is the design of "problem exploration tools" - "tools to support 
early unstructured thinking on a problem when many dis- 
connected ideas come to mind" (Conklin 1987, p. 20). Hypertext is 
the basis of "idea processors", tools designed to assist the planning 
of argumentative texts (Kellogg 1989, p. 75), and of an "open 
learning system" for writers (Williams 1991b). Conklin claims that 
hypertext "opens some very exciting possibilities, particularly for 
new uses of the computer as a communication and thinking tool" 
(Conklin 1987, p. 17). It seemed, therefore, that hypertext would 
be a suitable device to design a thinking, planning or structuring 
tool for writing fiction - our aim was to design a hypertext that 
would assist a student's thinking about their writing, given the 
environmental conditions in which most of their writing takes 
place. 
However, we also found that "writing software and writing 
teaching always use a model of writing" (Williams 1991a, p. 31). 
Moreover, given that creative writing is often seen as a 
mysterious activity in which writers are possessed by the muse, 
we could not identify what constituted planning in the context of 
fiction writing, or even establish whether this was an activity that 
fiction writers engaged in. So, we looked at models of writing in 
current writing research to see what they could tell us about 
planning, and to see whether we could find a suitable basis for 
designing a planning or structuring tool for fiction writers. As we 
discussed in chapters three to six, the result of this investigation 
was a negative response to this last question, but we did emerge 
with a basic model of writing behaviour (Figure 5), and some 
clarity regarding planning and a writer's thinking processes 
(Figure 4). 
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In the course of these investigations, we also discovered that 
much of the current research into writing is based on a set of 
assumptions concerning language and linguistics. These include 
the rationalistic view of language as a nomenclature, in which 
words are the names of things, and ideas are autonomous entities 
that exist separately from language. In writing research, this view 
is manifest in the separation of cognitive planning and linguistic 
planning, and in Hayes and Flower's (1980a) notion of translation. 
As we showed in chapter six, most of these views seem to be 
inherited from Chomsky's transformational grammar and his 
separation of syntax and semantics. Chomsky's ideas have had a 
major influence on computational linguistics, and the heritage of 
these ideas can be seen in the development of story grammars, 
text grammars, and linguistic models of writing. 
Our alternative approach in developing the basic model into 
a model of fiction writing was to follow a semiological view of 
language. In this approach, we adopted Saussure's notion of the 
linguistic sign, the assumption that we cannot separate ideas from 
language, and the view of language as a system of sequential and 
associative relations, in which syntax is an aspect of the former. 
We pursued this approach in looking at narration and description 
in the context of fiction writing, where we found that apparently 
irrational features in myths, fairy stories and contemporary 
fictions, could all be cited as counter examples to rationalistic 
definitions of narrative and causality. However, in looking more 
closely at these "irrational features", we found their defining 
terms to be those of metaphor and metonymy, as exemplified in 
Frazer's discussion of magical thought. In the course of this 
discussion, we found that sequential and associative relations 
apply not only to language but also to human memory. In part- 
icular, the sequential and associative operations that Freud notes 
in the workings of the unconscious are the same operations that 
cognitive psychologists note in people trying to remember stories 
accurately. We argued that they were also evident in fiction 
writing, in cases where writers select certain episodes from their 
experience or their story memory, and use them as the basis for a 
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fictional work - thus interpretation, in the sense defined by 
Todorov, plays the role in fiction writing of binding together the 
two processes of remembering and imagining. 
As well as adopting a semiological view of language, to 
develop a model of fiction writing we looked at research in the 
area of narratology - the work of Jakobson, Genette, Todorov and 
Barthes in particular. We also used the findings of research into 
human memory conducted by cognitive psychologists, so that the 
result - the model of writing discussed in the last chapter - is the 
consequence of analysing and comparing research in the areas of 
linguistics, narratology, and cognitive psychology. 
This comparative approach was necessary for two main 
reasons. Firstly, as we noted at the beginning of this thesis, 
current research into writing has a marked preference for direct 
observations of writers at work. In these empirical studies, there 
is a conspicuous absence of textual analysis, while the texts that 
writers create are a conspicuous absence in current models of 
writing. Given the linguistic assumptions inherited from Chomsky, 
and given the absence of semiological approaches to studying 
writing, we had to use research in the area of narratology to gain 
a perspective on how different types of texts might influence the 
process of writing. As we were also using narratology and textual 
analysis to make inferences about thinking processes, we looked 
to research in cognitive psychology for any confirmation or 
refutation of these inferences. 
However, as we also pointed out at the beginning, apart 
from research into human memory, learning and problem solving, 
cognitive psychology has tended to concentrate on the basic 
processes of attention and perception, while tending to ignore 
conscious thought. At the same time, research into artificial 
intelligence (Al) has been primarily concerned with input 
processes rather than output processes, so that cognitive science - 
which tries to integrate the alms of Al, cognitive psychology, and 
linguistics - has not been concerned with modelling the creative 
aspects of human activities. So, the second reason for a 
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comparative approach was the absence of creative activities in 
models of cognitive processes. To describe the elements of 
cognitive planning in fiction writing, we have had to use terms 
which do not figure in cognitive models because of this absence, as 
we discussed in the last chapter. 
Our discovery of the underlying linguistic assumptions in 
current writing research tends to confirm the observations of 
Winograd and Flores (1986) on the rationalistic tradition in 
computer science and its manifestation in cognitive science. In the 
case of natural language understanding, Al systems assume a 
rationalistic notion of semantics, in which lexical items and 
sentences have some kind of absolute meaning that is 
independent of the context in which they occur. Winograd and 
Flores characterise such an approach as follows: 
"In a complete rationalistic analysis of meaning, we would 
be able to explicate the meaning of each utterance by 
showing how it is built up systematically from smaller 
elements, each with its own determinate meaning. At the 
bottom, the smallest elements would denote objects, 
properties, and relations of interest in the external world. 
Although there is a deep fallacy in this orientation, there is 
also a power in its emphasis on regular formal structures. To 
the extent that they are adequate for a particular purpose 
(such as the implementation of language-like facilities on 
computers) they provide a systematic approach for 
generating rules and operations dealing with symbolic 
representations. " 
(Winograd & Flores 198G, p. G4) 
As we discussed in chapter six, linguistic approaches to modelling 
writing are dominated by a concern for structure, and by the use 
of grammars to represent structure. Indeed, grammars have a 
ubiquitous presence in computer science. The main reason for this 
is that grammars are readily implemented on a computer, so that 
the principal motivation for using them would seem to be the aim 
of designing machine intelligence, whether this is intended to 
enhance interaction or provide automation. As we discussed in 
chapter two, the test of a cognitive model for a cognitive scientist 
is whether it can be used to design computer software that can 
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simulate the relevant process. Thus one could construe the motive 
behind the use of grammars in linguistic models of writing as the 
simulation test - that is, to design a model of writing that can be 
used to design computer programs that simulate human writers. 
As we discussed in chapter two, this may be more feasible for 
some types of writing than for others - in the case of fiction 
writing, such a task faces the initial problem of modelling a 
writer's biographic or episodic memory, and the further problem 
of how to evaluate the results. 
Some "techno-phobes" might cite the above aims as evidence 
of the onward march of machines. ' Presumably, they would find 
further evidence in Holt's (1992) advocation of the integrated 
software environment for writers - in which all the writer's tasks 
("planning, generating and revision") would be performed on the 
machine. One does not have to be technophobic, however, to ask 
whether the integrated software environment is what writers 
want. As it appears to this writer, the main problem with such a 
notion is that a gain in usability may be a loss in ergonomics, in 
the case of documents as long as this one. The production of this 
thesis has necessitated many days, weeks and months in which 
eight hours a day were spent composing with the computer. A 
great percentage of that composition time involved reading off the 
screen, and when this activity is sustained over a long period, 
one's eyes get tired. In this situation, a change of environment is 
welcome, so that in this case, textual planning consisted of a 
combination of on-line methods and pen and paper techniques. 
Consequently, the idea of performing each and every task on the 
machine - in the case of producing a lengthy document over a long 
period of time - does not get much support from the writer of this 
thesis. 
For smaller documents with a shorter production schedule, 
an integrated environment would not have the same ergonomic 
drawbacks. On the other hand, one could argue that, while there is 
I "Come in humans, your time is up... " - Kevin Warwick, professor of 
cybernetics at Reading University, on his new book, March of the 
Machines, in the Times Higher Education Supplement, 7/3/97, p. 17. 
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a need for integrated environments in the case of small 
documents, there is still a need for separate tools such as 
notebooks and planning aids for two reasons. Firstly, separate 
tools give writers the option of using the computer for a specific 
task such as planning and the option of composing with pen and 
paper - in other words, an inverted scenario to what currently 
seems to be the case. Secondly, separate tools would give writers 
engaged in long documents the option of working with pen and 
paper or with the machine. In either case, we are arguing that 
ergonomic considerations demand a certain flexibility in the 
provision of tools for writers. Moreover, one could argue that 
there is a need for specialised aids to assist writers with particular 
kinds of documents - for example, an integrated software 
environment for writing short stories, one for academic papers, 
other tools for novelists, and so forth. 
In any case, software designers still have to face the 
problem of design methodology. In the last chapter, we argued 
that a "user-centred design" approach, while desirable, was not 
always feasible. This was not only due to the constraints of time 
and economics, but also due to the pedagogic purpose in providing 
tools for student writers. While Holt (1992) argues for a "user- 
centred design" methodology in the design of writing software, he 
assumes the Hayes and Flower (1980a) model of writing in 
discussing the writing operations that this methodology should 
address, thus confirming Williams' claim that writing software is 
always based on a model of writing (Williams 1991a, p. 31). Our 
argument is that, in situations where a "user-centred design" 
approach is not feasible - particularly in the case of designing 
tools for student writers -a model of writing serves as a guide in 
establishing a user's requirements in the first instance. Thus in 
this case, a model of writing serves as a portal, a way in to the 
iterative cycle of designing, prototyping, evaluating, and review- 
ing the user's requirements. 
However, in the case of full-time students on writing courses 
who perform most of their writing in a writing laboratory or 
resource centre, one could argue that the ergonomics of producing 
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long documents is less of a concern than the usability of the tools 
in this environment. We then face the problem that standalone 
tools are poor in their usability, as Holt (1992) points out, because 
users have to switch from one application to another. One solution 
is an integrated software environment for students, the integrated 
environment recommended by Holt, in which every task in 
writing is performed on the machine. 
However, problems have been reported with writing 
environments that attempt to combine word processing software 
with inducements to planning, as we pointed out in chapter one. A 
six-year project to design a writing environment for students was 
discussed by Thea van der Geest at the Sixth UK Conference on 
Computers and Writing (van der Geest 1993). The environment 
combines word processing software with writing instruction in an 
attempt to encourage students to plan. Evaluation of the project 
identified a basic problem in trying to integrate instruction on the 
one hand, and on the other, the word processing software that 
students use to perform their regular writing assignments; van 
der Geest argues for the separation of tools and courseware. 
Winterbauer reports a similar problem in his evaluation of a "pre- 
writing" aid; according to Winterbauer, "the core of the problem 
seemed to be that students were unwilling to devote 'extra time' 
to using an innovation that did not seem to have a direct relation- 
ship with the rest of the course requirement" (Winterbauer 1992, 
p. 176). In both cases, instruction or exercises had an interference 
effect on a student's regular writing tasks, giving rise to the 
question: why bother with tools or exercises that appear to be 
irrelevant to the task at hand? 
In the case of student writers then, ergonomics and usability 
are not the only considerations in designing software; a third 
consideration is pedagogy. As we have discussed elsewhere, if a 
student performs all aspects of her writing in a writing laboratory 
or resource centre, then, unless planning is a part of writing 
instruction, it may not happen because of the pressure to produce 
a text (Bloor 1995, p. 142). This problem will not be resolved by 
providing students with software tools that are seen as irrelevant 
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to the task at hand. In this case - where software tools have a 
pedagogic function - instead of integrating standalone tools into a 
writing environment, the second solution to the problem of 
usability is through the integration of their pedagogic function 
into the kinds of teaching and instruction that students receive. 
So, in providing a tool to assist students on writing courses in the 
planning of their writing, we are assuming that planning will form 
part of their course, and that using such a tool will be integrated 
into the sessions allocated to this activity. 
In conclusion, this discussion has raised a number of issues 
with implications for future research, design, and teaching: 
Research: 
- In the area of cognitive psychology, there is a need for research 
that is directed towards developing our understanding of creative 
processes. 
- In the area of linguistics and textual analysis, there is a need to 
develop methods of analysing argumentative texts from a semio- 
logical perspective. 
- In writing research, there is a need for empirical research that 
assumes a semiological view of language, whether this be directed 
towards testing the model discussed in the last chapter, or 
towards developing our understanding of writing argumentative 
texts. 
Dem 
- More models of writing need to be developed for particular 
kinds of writing. The design of integrated writing environments, 
as well as separate tools, needs to be aimed at facilitating the 
creation of particular kinds of documents. 
- Software designers need to take into account ergonomic and 
pedagogic considerations, as well as usability; the use of tools with 
a pedagogic function intended for student writers needs to be 
Integrated into the kinds of teaching and Instruction that students 
receive on their course. 
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- The conceptual design of Story-Prompt needs to be developed 
into a prototype; investigations into its further development need 
to be carried out as outlined in the last chapter, while taking into 
account the above considerations. 
Teaching: 
- Teaching modules that look at computers and writing from the 
perspective of symbolism and semiology offer a way of 
integrating the teaching of technology with the teaching of 
writing, so that writing skills and technological skills develop in 
tandem. 
- Developers of writing courses need to consider ways of teaching 
an applied narratology for writers and designers, following 
Genette's suggestion that "what would theory be worth if it were 
not also good for inventing practice? " (Genette 1988, p. 157). 
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